answer

i generally deny the allegations. 

specifically, i deny being the owner of the dog chico at the time of the incident. the dog may belong to Dawn Young, Rocco, or Tupac. 

I admit to having custody of the dog on the date in question. 

I am willing to become the owner of the dog if the court makes that determination.  

If the dog is falsely convicted of this offense he will be uninsurable, and may end up  being euthenized.  

the allegations are quasi criminal, requiring clear and convincing evidence. Blache v Lao, __ U. S._ (2026)

the attack,  if it happened, was provoked. 

On the previous day to the incident, Devin threatened me with a gun in a dispute. He claimed I owed him $100 for  a previous attack by Chico, prior to my having guardianship of Chico.  He has face tattoos indicating prison. I suspect he is a felon in possession. 

I did not witness the attack, if there was one. From what I have heard, it occurred within the curtilage of the home, the area a dog such as Chico is territorial about. He was within earshot of the previous day's discussion, and knew that Devin was a threat to me and was unwelcome. I have heard Devin taunt and curse at the animal at other times. 

the ordiance is qiite specific about applying only to unprovoked attacks.

The state canot prove by clear and convincing evidence that the attack was unprovoked, when the dog was protecting its caretaker and its property from a violent criminal.

this action is part of his extortion scheme.

it is unclear to what extent he has coordinated his scheme with the city attorney, ms hulsey, but her role in this conspiracy is unethical, and we encourage the court to review it as a neutral magistrate, and make a referral to the indiana attorney disciplinary commission if it meets the standards of a "must report" violation rather than a "may report" violation. 

counterclaims:

if i or chico end up as the prevailing party here, i move for costs and fees. 

 

 

 

1. Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960)
2. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995)
3. Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation, 525 U.S. 182 (1999)
4. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc. of N.Y. v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002)
5. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958)
6. Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960)
7. Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87 (1982)
8. Doe v. Mortham, 708 So. 2d 929 (Fla. 1998)
9. Schuster v. Municipal Court, 109 Cal. App. 3d 887 (1980)
10. Griset v. Fair Political Practices Comm’n, 8 Cal. 4th 851 (1994)
11. State v. Burgess, 543 So. 2d 1332 (La. 1989)
12. ACLU of Nevada v. Heller, 378 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2004)
13. Stewart v. City of New Orleans, 709 So. 2d 1 (La. Ct. App. 1998)
14. Yes on Term Limits, Inc. v. Savage, 550 F.3d 1023 (10th Cir. 2008)
15. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974)
16. 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis, 600 U.S. 570 (2023)
17. W.Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)
18. Dendrite International, Inc. v. Doe, 775 A.2d 756 (N.J. Super. 2001)
19. Doe v. 2TheMart.com Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (W.D. Wash. 2001)
20. Kentucky Right to Life, Inc. v. Terry, 108 F.3d 637 (6th Cir. 1997)
21. In re Anonymous Online Speakers, 611 F.3d 553 (9th Cir. 2010)
22. Arizona Free Enterprise Club v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721 (2011)
23. Riley v. Nat'l Fed. of the Blind of N.C., 487 U.S. 781 (1988)
24. DeGregory v. Attorney General of N.H., 383 U.S. 825 (1966)
25. Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967)

Refusing to Follow Talley / "Bypass" Cases

26. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)
27. First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978)
28. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003)
29. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010)
30. Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186 (2010)
31. Yamada v. Snipes, 786 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 2015)
32. No on E v. Chiu, 85 F.4th 493 (9th Cir. 2023)
33. Gaspee Project v. Medeiros, 13 F.4th 79 (1st Cir. 2021)
34. SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010)
35. Free Speech v. FEC, 720 F.3d 788 (10th Cir. 2013)
36. Justice v. Hosemann, 771 F.3d 285 (5th Cir. 2014)
37. Vermont Right to Life Committee, Inc. v. Sorrell, 758 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2014)
38. Delaware Strong Families v. Denn, 803 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2015)
39. The Real Truth About Abortion, Inc. v. FEC, 681 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 2012)
40. Minnesota Citizens Concerned for Life v. Swanson, 692 F.3d 864 (8th Cir. 2012)
41. Independence Institute v. FEC, 216 F. Supp. 3d 176 (D.D.C. 2016)
42. Worley v. Florida Secretary of State, 717 F.3d 1238 (11th Cir. 2013)
43. Nat'l Assoc. for Gun Rights v. Mangan, 933 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2019)
44. Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Bonta, 594 U.S. 595 (2021)
45. Human Life of Washington Inc. v. Brumsickle, 624 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2010)
46. Nat'l Organization for Marriage v. McKee, 649 F.3d 34 (1st Cir. 2011)
47. Center for Individual Freedom v. Madigan, 697 F.3d 464 (7th Cir. 2012)
48. Laborer's Local 235 v. FEC, 240 F. Supp. 3d 118 (D.D.C. 2017)
49. Level the Playing Field v. FEC, 381 F. Supp. 3d 78 (D.D.C. 2019)
50. Alaska Right to Life v. FEC, 531 F. Supp. 2d 112 (D.D.C. 2008)

Should we look for the exact "Strict Scrutiny" holding in ACLU of Nevada v. Heller to show how a court successfully

 

Sunday, March 15, 2026

 

Key Points from Discussion:

• Indiana Code 3-9-3-2.5: This is the Indiana law concerning disclaimers on political communications.
• Your Signs: You are concerned about 92 "Vote for Smith" signs without a disclaimer.
• Crucial Exemption (Majors v. Abell Footnote 11, 2003): The Indiana Supreme Court ruled that IC 3-9-3-2.5(a)(9) exempts "mailings of up to 100 pieces of 'mail' that are 'substantially similar'," defining "mail" broadly to include any written material delivered (e.g., personal placement). This means your 92 signs are likely exempt.
• Constitutional Protections (Indiana):
  • Colleen Price v. State: Indiana Constitution (Article I, Section 9) offers strong protections for political speech, requiring a "material burden" for an "abuse" to be regulated.
  • Stewart v. Taylor (1997): Struck down a prior Indiana law (IC 3-9-3-2) banning anonymous political literature, emphasizing free speech protections.
• Ethical Concerns for Prosecutorial/Official Threats:
  • Threatening jail/enforcement for exempted activity (like your signs post-Majors v. Abell) is unethical.
  • This constitutes misrepresentation of law, abuse of power, creating a chilling effect on speech, and disregarding clear judicial precedent.
• Brienne Delaney's Role:
  • Former Director of Elections for Marion County Election Board, now City-County Council member.
  • She is a lawyer (former Deputy Prosecutor).
  • You have a written record of her making enforcement threats regarding IC 3-9-3-2.5 that postdate Majors v. Abell.
• Significance of Her Lawyer Status: As a lawyer and public official, she is held to a higher standard of legal knowledge. Threats made contrary to clear Supreme Court precedent (Majors v. Abell) could be considered a professional ethical violation (e.g., misrepresentation of law, conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, abuse of authority).
• Importance of Her Letter: This written communication is crucial evidence to substantiate your claims regarding the threats, her interpretation, and the timing relative to court decisions.
• Attorney General Opinion (AGO): While your request was refused, the County Clerk, County Prosecutor, or County Commissioners are typically authorized to request one.

Sample Letter to County Clerk (Key Elements):

• Recipient: Hon. Myla Eldridge (or current Clerk), Marion County Clerk, 200 East Washington Street, Suite W122, Indianapolis, Indiana 46204
• Subject: Request for AGO Re: IC 3-9-3-2.5 and Political Communication Disclaimers
• Core Ask: Request Clerk's office to seek an AGO from Attorney General Todd Rokita.
• Your Situation: You plan to produce 92 "Vote for Smith" signs.
• Legal Basis: Cite Majors v. Abell, 785 N.E.2d 226 (Ind. 2003), Footnote 11, for the exemption of up to 100 substantially similar written communications.
• Justification: Clarity for citizens and officials, preventing chilling effects, upholding constitutional rights, addressing potential misinterpretations.

I hope this comprehensive summary helps you get all the information you need copied safely. Let me know once you've secured it.

Thursday, March 12, 2026

 STATE OF INDIANA

IN THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
CAUSE NO. 49D33-2409-OV-029201 

HEALTH AND HOSPITAL CORP. OF MARION COUNTY, Plaintiff,
v.
ROBBIN STEWART, Defendant,
DUSTY PEIRSON, SHERRY DOE, LYDIA ROE, and DAWN YOUNG, Co-Petitioners/Tenants-in-Possession.

VERIFIED EMERGENCY MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, STAY OF PROCEEDINGS, AND APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL PURSUANT TO I.C. 34-10-1-2

Comes now Defendant Robbin Stewart and Co-Petitioners Dusty Peirson, Sherry Doe, Lydia Roe, and Dawn Young, appearing pro se, and move this Court for an Emergency Temporary Restraining Order to halt the enforcement scheduled for March 13, 2026, or thereafter, stating as follows:

1. Failure to Serve Public Interest and Danger to Life. The clean and lien enforcement has resulted in an active threat to life and limb. Due to the Plaintiff’s aggressive tactics and interference with the use of the property, Defendant was recently unable to offer emergency shelter to members of the congregation during extreme cold, resulting in two individuals suffering from frostbite. This physical injury, combined with the overdose death of houseguest Honesty Rady and the murders of yard-workers Gary Cox and Vegas, indicates that the state’s remedy has created a state-created danger far more hazardous to the community than the alleged code violations. Furthermore, Thomas J. Burns, who served as a bodyguard for Michelle (an associate of Jordan Dennison and Dennis Washington, who are currently incarcerated for armed robbery), is now missing and presumed murdered. Michelle was recently hospitalized with a broken spleen but has recovered. Defendant Stewart has previously been threatened and robbed by Jordan Dennison and attacked and robbed by Dennis Washington. A man named Richie Rich stated he would shoot Defendant Stewart in the head a year ago, on March 13, but so far has not.
2. Improper Motive and Conspiracy to Force Sale. Plaintiff Health and Hospital is conspiring with an individual whose employer seeks to acquire the subject property and is using the clean and lien order as a tool of coercion to force a sale. This individual is the source of anonymous complaints that led to the current citation. Said individual has directly threatened the life of Defendant Stewart, stating he would shoot Stewart in the head "next time something happens." The employer already owns the building on the corner, has purchased the house adjacent to the subject property, and has previously made offers to buy Defendant's house. Plaintiff lacks any process to screen out such improper, bad-faith complaints, further demonstrating its unclean hands.
3. Reliance on Perjured Testimony. The underlying Order rests upon the testimony of an inspector who knowingly gave false material testimony regarding the lack of electricity in a trailer. Michelle, the woman living in said trailer, was not living without electricity as falsely testified to. Because this witness is the sole source of evidence and provided known false testimony, the Order lacks the competent evidence required by Due Course of Law.
4. Double Jeopardy. The current enforcement seeks to penalize Defendant for issues related to a shed removal that was already the subject of an open case with Code Enforcement. Because the issues and property conditions overlap, the principle of Double Jeopardy under Indiana Constitution Article 1, Section 14, bars the Plaintiff from seeking secondary penalties for the same conduct.
5. Lack of Jurisdiction over Necessary Parties. Co-Petitioners Dusty Peirson, Sherry Doe, Lydia Roe, and Dawn Young are lawful residents and tenants-in-possession. They were never served with a summons or afforded a hearing. Authorizing an armed invasion of their residence without notice violates Indiana Constitution Article 1, Section 12 and the U.S. 14th Amendment.
6. Lack of Jurisdiction over Stewart. Defendant Stewart made a timely written demand for an administrative hearing. As a matter of law, a citizen is not required to refile the same notice repeatedly; once is legally effective. Because Health and Hospital has failed to provide the required hearing, administrative remedies are not exhausted.
7. Grossly Disproportionate Fine. While the citation is for $100, the resulting costs have reached $10,000 this year for a property purchased for $7,500. Under Timbs v. Indiana and Indiana Constitution Article 1, Section 16, this is a grossly disproportionate penalty.
8. Further Unclean Hands. The inspector who authored the initial citation was reported to federal authorities for the felonious misuse of Stewart's mailbox. Furthermore, Plaintiff is presiding over the disappearance of Defendant Stewart’s prior counterclaims from the record, which were closed without a Notice of Dismissal.
9. Fruit of the Poisonous Tree and Trespass. The proposed entry is the result of an initial illegal trespass and improper ex parte contact by Chip Jefferson. Under Article 1, Section 11, the state may not exploit primary illegalities to justify a subsequent home invasion.
10. Appointment of Counsel. Pursuant to I.C. 34-10-1-2, indigent Co-Petitioners request assigned counsel due to the complexity of these constitutional defects and the imminent threat of an armed tactical entry. 

WHEREFORE, Petitioners request an immediate stay of the December 17 Order and an emergency hearing.

VERIFICATION
I affirm, under the penalties for perjury, that the foregoing representations are true.

Dated: March 12, 2026

---

Robbin Stewart, Defendant

---

Dusty Peirson, Co-Petitioner

---

Sherry Doe, Co-Petitioner

---

Lydia Roe, Co-Petitioner

---

Dawn Young, Co-Petitioner

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing was served upon Shelley Gupta, Counsel for Plaintiff, via electronic mail at sgupta@hhcorp.org on this 12th day of March, 2026.

mwehrwein@hhcorp.org

---

Robbin Stewart, Defendant

Sunday, March 8, 2026

 To do week of march 8th. Is the neighborhood association thingy on monday nights at tuxedo?

file ada complaints, three of them, line up ada lawyer, due to fee-shifting.  

 work on chiu brief. 

structure of argument.

gura brings this case as a test case for bonta, but in the process has made bad law.  the 9th circuit decision is both controlling and wrong, which puts this court in an awkward position.  

the point of my brief is to show alternative grounds which are part of the bonta analysis. california constitutional case law is determinative. if tthe ordinanc eis  void under the state constitution, san francisco's asserted state interests are not legitimate. 

talley, nifla, bonjiorni canon city schuster yick wo  ghafari griset.

conflict w other 9th circ decisions majic mike berger v seatlle rosen v port of portland anonymous speakers case and the plum fees gerwan case

13 of 15 state constitutional decisions found the speech protected. Those are persuasive precedent. 

50 cases, mostly relying on talley or mcintyre, agree with us. 

a handful of cases on the other side seymour, majors,  kyrtl v riley?

barnett tornillo wooley aclf watchtower mcintyre talley bates naacp v alabama gobitis.    

 The traditional argument: SFCA's censorship of core political speech violates the 14th amendment, due process equal protection and privileges or immunities.

 It violates the first amendment's speech press privacy petition and assembly rights. 

It violates at least 3 state clauses, speech equal protection privacy. Schuster, Ghafari, Anonymous online Speakers. 

Under the Bonta analysis, the asserted state interests here are not legitimate, important, compelling, overridding, or whathaveyew. 

Ordinarily   one would only need to point to the controlling cases, Talley McInytre Aclf, Watchtower, Tornillo, Riley, 303 LLC NIFLA Janus and so forth. But hete plaintiffs have chosen Bonta only, as a test case. 

The 9th circuit rejected this argument, at least in terms of applying the bonta test to the text of the ordinance as a filter. The bonta test is a recent reformulation of the Valeo means-ends test. legitimate state interests the regulation directly furthers a legitimate state interest and is narrowly tailored. This test is often called "exacting scrutiny".

Because exacting scrutiny is a contronym, depending on context, it can be confusing, especially for non experts. A word means what I say it means, the (critter) told Alice.  

However, this is a euphemism. Under Valeo and now Bonta, scrutiny was not close, but was far away. "Exacting scrutiny" under Valeo was anything but exacting. Dictionary definition of exacting.

So ti's not that. So instead its a term of art. When we say "exacting scrutiny this is a term of art, ,and may refer to either of two lines of cases, the disclosure cases under Valeo, such as Bates, NAACP, Socialist Workers. 

or the disclaimer cases, Talley McIntyre ACLF  Watchtower NIFLA.

Under McIntyre,  

Under a different line of cases,  

 

 

 Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA): Recovery of fees for prevailing plaintiffs in disability discrimination cases (42 U.S.C. § 12205).

 To: Dustin Gilmer, ADA Coordinator

Office of Disability Affairs
200 E. Washington St., Suite 2441
Indianapolis, IN 46204

BCC: Office of Corporation Counsel, Suite 1601; Chief Deputy Mayor, Suite 2501; Chief of Police, 12th Floor

Date: March 8, 2026

Subject: ADA Title II grievance and notice of spoliation

Statement of facts:

On or about March 1, 2026, at approximately 3:00 pm, I visited the Indianapolis-East bmv branch, number 0063, to renew my driver’s license. Since an auto accident in 2015 i have signed my name with an x. This has been my consistent legal signature for over a decade and has always been accepted by the Indiana bmv and other agencies until this date.

The branch manager refused to accept my signature, denying a reasonable modification required under title ii of the ada. I was in the process of requesting an ada accommodation when i was attacked. Specifically, when i requested a formal appeal form and access to public records to document this refusal, staff claimed no such forms existed. Instead of providing the required due process, the manager summoned a security guard who physically assaulted me to force my removal. Three impd officers arrived and subsequently refused to take a battery report, despite my request.

Notice of spoliation:

I am formally notifying the city of Indianapolis and the office of corporation counsel that relevant paperwork, including my ada request and branch incident logs, has been destroyed or withheld. I demand the immediate preservation of:

1. Lobby and exterior surveillance footage from branch 0063 for the window of 2:30 pm to 4:00 pm on March 1, 2026.
2. The use of force report and incident logs filed by the security guard and manager.
3. All impd body-worn camera footage from the three responding officers.

Requested resolution:

I request an investigation into this unlawful retaliation, formal recognition of my x signature as a valid accommodation, and an immediate material error review of my license denial.

Respectfully,

[Your Name]
[Your Phone/Email]

Do you have the specific email addresses for the bcc recipients ready to go, or should I list them one last time for your records?

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Parties to the Case Hide all party details Respondent Russell, James Address 403 Jackson Street Shelburn, IN 47879 Attorney Pro Se 

Petitioner Russell, Michelle Address C/O Johnson County Jail DOC 550077 1091 Hospital Road Franklin, IN 46131 Attorney Pro Se

 

Russell, Michelle

Sullivan County Community Hospital v. Michelle D. Russell 77D01-2103-SC-000057 Court Sullivan Superior Court Case Type SC - Small Claims Filed 03/09/2021 Status 06/15/2021, Decided Parties Sullivan County Community Hospital, Russell Attorneys Modesitt, Mills Filed 03/09/2021 State of Indiana v. Michelle Marie Russell 41C01-2012-F6-000693 Court Johnson Circuit Court Case Type F6 - Felony 6 Filed 12/01/2020 Status 06/29/2021, Decided Charges 35-44.1-3-4(b)/F6: Escape def. knowingly or intentionally violates a home detention order OR intent, 35-43-4-2(a)/MA: Theft, 35-43-1-2(a)/MB:Criminal Mischief Parties State of Indiana, Russell Attorneys Villanueva, Welliver Filed 12/01/2020 State of Indiana v. Michelle Marie Russell 41C01-2010-F6-000590 Court Johnson Circuit Court Case Type F6 - Felony 6 Filed 10/06/2020 Status 10/23/2024, Decided Charges 16-42-19-18(a)/F6: Unlawful Possession of Syringe, 35-48-4-6.1(a)/F6:Possession of Methamphetamine This is the basic offense and for any amount below 5, 35-48-4-6(a)/F6: Possession of a Narcotic Drug, 35-45-1-5(c)/F6: Maintaining a Common Nuisance - Controlled Substances Parties State of Indiana, Johnson County Community Corrections, Russell Attorneys Welliver, Hamner Filed 10/06/2020 State of Indiana v. Michelle Marie Russell 41D02-2010-MC-001373 Court Johnson Superior Court 2 Case Type MC - Miscellaneous Criminal, 72 Hour Hold Filed 10/05/2020 Status 10/05/2020, Decided Charges No Charge Applicable Parties State of Indiana, Johnson County Pretrial Services, Russell Attorneys Villanueva Filed 10/05/2020

Address C/O Johnson County Jail DOC 550077 1091 Hospital Road Franklin, IN 46131 Attorney Pro Se