First Amendment scrutiny regardless of how the government characterizes the requirement. Alaska's disclaimer requirement cannot survive that scrutiny.

---

Argument Section (Draft)

I. THE ALASKA COURT APPLIED THE WRONG STANDARD.

The "paid for by" requirement compels speech on the face of a communication. It is a disclaimer. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995), controls.

McIntyre applied exacting scrutiny to a compelled identification requirement on political literature and struck it down. In McIntyre, exacting scrutiny is strict scrutiny — the same standard this Court applied in NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960), and Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977). Alaska's disclaimer requirement fails that standard for the same reasons Ohio's did.

II. THE BUCKLEY TEST IS A MYTH.

The deferential "substantially related to a sufficiently important interest" standard the Alaska court applied derives from equal protection intermediate scrutiny, not from Buckley v. Valeo. Its attribution to Buckley is without support in that decision's text. Buckley applied exacting scrutiny in the same demanding sense as NAACP and Bates.

III. CITIZENS UNITED DICTA DOES NOT CONTROL.

No party in Citizens United challenged the disclaimer or disclosure provisions. The Court's characterization of exacting scrutiny as a lesser standard was unnecessary to any holding. Dicta cannot displace McIntyre.

IV. THE NINTH CIRCUIT GOT IT RIGHT.

ACLU of Nevada v. Heller, 378 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2004), applied McIntyre correctly to a disclaimer requirement and struck it down. That decision is directly controlling in Alaska. The Alaska Supreme Court ignored it.

V. CHILES AND FIRST CHOICE CONFIRM THE CORRECT FRAMEWORK.

Chiles v. Salazar, 607 U.S. ___ (2026), reaffirms that relabeling compelled speech does not reduce scrutiny. First Choice Women's Resource Centers v. Davenport, 608 U.S. ___ (2026), reaffirms that compelled identification of speakers and associates burdens First Amendment rights from the moment of demand. Alaska's disclaimer requirement survives neither.

---

To Do

• Read full Chiles opinion (Kagan concurrence, Jackson dissent)
• Read full First Choice opinion
• Identify SCOTUS-admitted counsel to sign brief (contact Institute for Free Speech after cert petition filed July 13)
• Pin down Boren/Buckley cross-contamination — find first case where "substantially related" appears in First Amendment disclaimer context
• Find specific Alaska out-of-state speaker additional disclaimer requirement (separate Alaska case, details forgotten)
• Consider Crawford amicus as style model
• File supplemental authority notice to Alaska Supreme Court
• Walk into Reagan National Advertising office re: billboard

---

Notes on IC 3-9-3-2.5 (Indiana — Separate but Related)

Indiana's current disclaimer statute has never been ruled on under Indiana Constitution Article 1, Section 9 — Stewart has been asking courts to rule on it for years without success. A SCOTUS clarification that McIntyre exacting scrutiny = strict scrutiny would force Indiana courts to finally confront the Section 9 question. Stewart v. Taylor struck the predecessor (IC 3-9-3-2). Majors v. Abell lost on 3-9-3-2.5 via Posner/McConnell. Chiles and First Choice now provide the framework to try again.

 so mr briown comes over todasy and he mentions about how michelle wanted to get my poa nd have me civally committed and then live in my house. we'll do a podcast about it.

 ITIGATION BLUEPRINT: CLASS-ACTION CASE SUMMARY

Forum: U.S. District Court, Eastern District of California
Parties: John Doe et al. v. Members of the Fair Political Practices Commission (FPPC)
Counsel Target: Alan Gura (Institute for Free Speech, D.C. / CA Bar Active)

---

1. The Core Injury & Class Structure (The Binary Trap)

The FPPC's unconstitutional sign-layout rules force political candidates to surrender up to 35% of their physical visual canvas under explicit threat of misdemeanor prosecution, asset seizure, and jail time. The class action splits this injury into a binary structure across a 2-year federal / 1-year state lookback window:

• Subclass A (The Canvas-Extinguished Class): Candidates who complied with the mandate, resulting in concrete actual damages measured as "Extinguished Advertising Inventory" (loss of visual market value) plus printing remediation costs.
• Subclass B (The Stewart/Deterred Class): Candidates who refused to comply and were completely deterred from distributing or printing their signage due to the express threat of criminal enforcement (Stewart v. Taylor).

2. The Dual-Track Damages Engine

• Federal Track (42 U.S.C. § 1983): Claims for actual compensatory market-value damages and uncapped individual-capacity punitive damages. Nominal damages are locked in under Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski, ensuring absolute Article III standing and a permanent path to a $5 million lump-sum fee/cost award under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (Hutto v. Finney exception).
• State Track (Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1 - The Bane Act): Bypasses standard state-law sovereign immunity hurdles by utilizing a statutory private right of action. Both Subclasses are entitled to a mandatory minimum statutory floor of $4,000 per individual violation without being required to prove actual economic loss. If willful operational suppression or coercive distress is proven, the jury can trigger a treble multiplier, escalating recovery to $12,000 per violation, per person.

3. The Evisceration of Defensive Immunities

• Federal Qualified Immunity: Completely defeated via the "Griset II Notice Hammer." Griset v. FPPC (Griset II) provided explicit, binding notice within the Ninth Circuit that statutory layout/disclosure rules violate the core anonymous and unencumbered political speech rights established in McIntyre and Talley. Continued enforcement constitutes bad-faith, reckless disregard of clearly established law.
• State Statutory Immunity (Gov. Code §§ 820.2 & 821.6): Completely neutralized. Under the native constitutional interest vacancy doctrine (Schuster; Ghafari), a state actor has zero legal authority or discretion to enforce an unconstitutional mandate; their actions are strictly ultra vires. Furthermore, Leon v. County of Riverside (2023) confines § 821.6 prosecutorial immunity strictly to formal malicious prosecution, stripped of authority over pre-litigation administrative civil rights coercion. Under Cornell, reckless disregard of a constitutional boundary automatically establishes the specific intent required to unlock Bane Act liability.

4. The Settlement & Litigation Wedges

• The Yick Wo Discovery Protocol: Subpoenaing internal FPPC case management logs, digital communication channels (Slack/text/email), and audit logs to prove a systematic, politically asymmetric pattern and practice of selective enforcement.
• The Certification Feint: A tactical motion under California Rules of Court, Rule 8.548 requesting that the Ninth Circuit certify a question to the California Supreme Court regarding direct actual damages for Tri-Constitutional violations (Speech, Privacy, Equal Protection) targeting internet speakers. While Degrassi and Gates present a nominal-damages wall on pure state constitutional claims, the threat of the Supreme Court using the Privacy Clause (Art. I, § 1) to create a borderless digital tort creates an asymmetric risk that forces the state to blink.
• The Maher Pipeline: The ultimate hammer. Individual staff face personal punitive bankruptcy from the § 1983 and Bane Act claims. To rescue their judgment-proof staff, the California Attorney General must step to the table, waive 11th Amendment immunity, and execute a prospective federal consent decree alongside the global fee-shifting payout.

---

 to do:

letter to alaska. print and mail. 

hava complaint form. print and mail and handdeleiver

outline alaska amicus.

review chiu ethics threat letter

outline a m otion for rehearting in h h case.

make a list online for jay

write up the letter to the cop, michelle, etc. 

wait dustin was here today? 

meet  w sherry and dusty

i need a list a budget and a schedule

• Alaska Letter: Print, sign, and mail to the court and counsel.
• HAVA Complaint: Print, mail, and hand-deliver to the election office.
• Alaska Amicus: Draft the core outline based on the new 2026 cases.
• Chiu Letter: Review the ethics threat and note defensive points.
• H H Case Rehearing: Outline the core procedural and substantive errors.
• Jay's Online List: Compile and upload the specific tasks for Jay.
• Police/Michelle Letter: Write the formal statement to the police and Michelle.
• Sherry/Dusty Meeting: Prepare your core talking points before they arrive.

---

 IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF ALASKA

Alaska Policy Forum,
          Petitioner,
v.                                         Supreme Court No. S-18533
Alaska Public Offices Commission,
          Respondent.

____________________________________________________________________

NOTICE OF SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY
____________________________________________________________________

TO THE CLERK OF THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES OF RECORD:

The Alaska Supreme Court issued its decision on February 13, 2026. The U.S. Supreme Court immediately shifted the constitutional ground by issuing Chiles v. Salazar on March 31, 2026, and First Choice Women's Resource Centers v. Davenport on April 29, 2026. These intervening decisions establish that topic-specific compelled disclaimers cause an immediate, content-based First Amendment injury, completely invalidating the Alaska framework. The certiorari petition deadline is July 13th, 2026. This court has an opportunity to revise its decision. Otherwise, the U.S. Supreme Court is likely to remand for consideration in light of Chiles v. Salazar.

Dated: May 23, 2026

Respectfully submitted,

_______________________________________
Amicus Curiae


CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 23rd day of May, 2026, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Notice of Supplemental Authority was served via first-class U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, upon the Clerk of the Appellate Courts and the following counsel of record:

Stacey Stone, Esq.
Holmes Weddle & Barcott, P.C.
701 West 8th Avenue, Suite 700
Anchorage, AK 99501

Scott Kendall, Esq.
Condon Partch & Kendall
500 L Street, Suite 300
Anchorage, AK 99501

Office of the Attorney General
Alaska Department of Law - Civil Division
1031 West 4th Avenue, Suite 200
Anchorage, AK 99501


_______________________________________
Amicus Curiae

 alley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960); People v. Bongiorni, 205 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 856 (1962); Ghafari v. Municipal Court, 87 Cal. App. 3d 255 (1978); People v. Drake, 97 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 32 (1979); Schuster v. Municipal Court, 109 Cal. App. 3d 887 (1980); Griset v. Fair Political Practices Com., 8 Cal. 4th 851 (1994); id., 69 Cal. App. 4th 818 (1999); id., 25 Cal. 4th 688 (2001); Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Lyons (Gerawan I), 24 Cal. 4th 468 (2000); Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Kawamura (Gerawan II), 33 Cal. 4th 1 (2004); Krinsky v. Doe 6, 159 Cal. App. 4th 1154 (2008); In re Anonymous Online Speakers, 661 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2011).