Robert Joseph McGraw Properties, LLC
gt's todo list
this is not a public blog, just a place hwere i can leave myself notes. nothing to see here folks, move along.
Wednesday, June 10, 2026
HEALTH AND HOSPITAL CORPORATION ) OF MARION COUNTY, ) ) Plaintiff / ) Counter-Defendant, ) ) v. ) ) ROBBIN STEWART, ) ) Defendant / Counter- ) Plaintiff / Third-Party ) Plaintiff, ) DEFENDANT’S SUPPLEMENTAL REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF SYSTEMIC OPERATIONAL DATA Comes now the Defendant, Robbin Stewart, pro se, and pursuant to Rules 26 and 34 of the Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure, requests that the Plaintiff, Health and Hospital Corporation of Marion County, produce the following operational data and administrative records within thirty (30) days of service of this request: 1. Any and all annual, quarterly, or monthly data logs kept by the Plaintiff from January 1, 2021, to the present detailing the total number of civil petitions filed seeking the judicial destruction, euthanasia, or permanent removal of domestic canines or puppies under Marion County Code Chapter 799. 2. Copies of all finalized chronological case summaries (CCS) or final judicial orders in Marion County where the designated counsel representing the Plaintiff successfully obtained a signed order for the euthanasia or destruction of an animal. 3. Systemic data sheets showing the percentage of animal enforcement actions initiated by the Plaintiff that were prosecuted under a preponderance of the evidence standard rather than a clear and convincing evidence standard. 4. Any formal written guidelines, internal memos, or office policy documents governing the criteria Plaintiff's legal counsel must evaluate before submitting a formal recommendation to a court seeking an animal destruction order. Dated: June 10, 2026 Respectfully submitted, ____________________________________ Robbin Stewart, Defendant Pro Se [Your Address] [Your Phone] [Your Email] CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Discovery Request has been served upon the Plaintiff, Health and Hospital Corporation of Marion County, via the Indiana E-Filing System (IEFS) or by leaving a copy in t
STATE OF INDIANA ) IN THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
) SS: CIVIL DIVISION 20
COUNTY OF MARION ) CASE NO. 49D20-2311-OV-045330
HEALTH AND HOSPITAL CORPORATION )
OF MARION COUNTY, )
)
Plaintiff / )
Counter-Defendant, )
)
v. )
)
ROBBIN STEWART, )
)
Defendant / Counter- )
Plaintiff / Third-Party )
Plaintiff, )
)
v. )
)
JOHN DOE 1 (Primary Complainant), )
BILL DOE (Of 4007 E. Wash.), )
JOHN DOE 3 (Caretaker), and )
JOHN DOE 4 (Caretaker's Employer),)
)
Cross-Defendants / )
Third-Party Defendants. )
DEFENDANT’S COUNTERCLAIM, THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT, AND CROSS-CLAIMS
Comes now the Defendant, Counter-Plaintiff, and Third-Party Plaintiff, Robbin
Stewart, pro se, and pursuant to Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure 13, 14, and
19, files this Counterclaim against Counter-Defendant Health and Hospital
Corporation of Marion County, Cross-Claims against Cross-Defendant John Doe 1,
and Third-Party Complaints against Third-Party Defendants Bill Doe, John Doe
3, and John Doe 4, seeking joint and several damages in the amount of $165,000,
and in support thereof, states as follows:
PARTIES
1. Defendant, Counter-Plaintiff, and Third-Party Plaintiff Robbin Stewart is a
resident of Marion County, Indiana.
2. Plaintiff and Counter-Defendant Health and Hospital Corporation of Marion
County (HHC) is an independent municipal corporation operating within Marion
County, Indiana.
3. Cross-Defendant John Doe 1 is the primary complainant in the underlying
ordinance enforcement action and a resident of Marion County.
4. Third-Party Defendant Bill Doe is a resident of Marion County residing at
4007 E. Washington Street, who houses, harbors, and actively facilitates
the actions of Cross-Defendant John Doe 1.
5. Third-Party Defendant John Doe 3 is an individual operating as a caretaker
within Marion County, Indiana.
6. Third-Party Defendant John Doe 4 is a business entity or employer doing
business in Marion County, Indiana, operating under the principle of
respondeat superior relative to the actions of John Doe 3.
FACTS
7. On or about [Day One Date], Cross-Defendant John Doe 1, an active user
of illicit controlled substances, specifically heroin, approached Third-Party
Plaintiff Robbin Stewart and issued an unlawful extortion demand for $100.
8. Upon refusal of the extortion demand, Cross-Defendant John Doe 1 retreated
into his residence, retrieved a firearm, and unlawfully displayed said
firearm in a threatening and intimidating manner toward Third-Party Plaintiff.
9. Third-Party Defendant Bill Doe maintained full knowledge of John Doe 1's
criminal conduct, actively housed him at 4007 E. Washington Street, and
engaged in concerted activity to facilitate an ongoing campaign of
harassment and extortion against Stewart.
10. Separately, Third-Party Defendant John Doe 3 placed Third-Party Plaintiff
in immediate apprehension of offensive, harmful physical contact by issuing
verbal threats to execute physical violence utilizing a firearm.
11. At all times relevant to the verbal firearm threats, John Doe 3 was
acting within the scope of his employment, under the direction, control,
and benefit of Third-Party Defendant John Doe 4.
12. On Day Two, a full twenty-four hours after the armed extortion attempt,
Cross-Defendant John Doe 1 entered into immediate, uninvited proximity to
the property and person of Third-Party Plaintiff to intentionally provoke
an animal interaction and manufacture a fraudulent civil liability claim,
in direct continuation of the prior day's extortion scheme.
13. Approximately one month prior to the alleged incident, John Doe 1
launched a distinct physical attack against the subject animal, causing
the animal to retain a defensive memory of this physical trauma.
14. Counter-Defendant HHC, through its agents, personnel, or assistant
prosecutors, maintained actual or constructive knowledge of the extortionate
scheme, the armed intimidation, and the lack of individual probable cause,
yet intentionally chose to process, adopt, and prosecute the manufactured
complaint.
15. Counter-Defendant HHC acted in concert and entered into a tacit or explicit
combination with John Doe 1 to validate, weaponize, and enforce the
fraudulent ordinance citation, thereby directly aiding, abetting, and
conspiring in the ongoing extortion and abuse of process against Stewart.
16. Five (5) independent eyewitnesses observed and will corroborate this
systemic pattern of armed intimidation, uninvited proximity, prior animal
abuse, governmental complicity, and manufactured fraud.
COUNT I: CIVIL CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT EXTORTION
(Against HHC, John Doe 1, and Bill Doe, Jointly)
17. Counter-Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 through 16 as if fully
set forth herein.
18. Counter-Defendant HHC, Cross-Defendant John Doe 1, and Third-Party
Defendant Bill Doe entered into a concerted agreement, combination,
and common design to accomplish an unlawful purpose, specifically: the
criminal extortion, intimidation, and fraudulent manufacture of civil
ordinance liability against Stewart.
19. Counter-Defendant HHC advanced this conspiracy by utilizing its statutory
enforcement authority to validate an ungrounded ticket, despite being put
on notice of the underlying threats, armed intimidation, and provocation.
20. As a direct and proximate result of this conspiracy, Stewart suffered
severe administrative, professional, financial, and personal damages.
COUNT II: CIVIL ASSAULT / INTIMIDATION
(Against John Doe 1 and John Doe 3)
21. Third-Party Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 through 20 as if fully
set forth herein.
22. On Day One, John Doe 1 intentionally placed Third-Party Plaintiff in
imminent apprehension of harmful or offensive contact by displaying a
firearm to back up a criminal cash demand.
23. Separately, John Doe 3 intentionally placed Third-Party Plaintiff in
imminent apprehension of harmful or offensive contact by issuing verbal
threats of armed violence.
24. These actions constitute civil assault under Indiana common law, causing
direct emotional trauma and security costs to Third-Party Plaintiff.
COUNT III: RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR / VICARIOUS LIABILITY
(Against John Doe 4)
25. Third-Party Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 through 24 as if fully
set forth herein.
26. At all times relevant, Third-Party Defendant John Doe 3 was an employee,
agent, or servant acting within the clear scope of his employment with
Third-Party Defendant John Doe 4.
27. Under the Indiana common-law doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer
is liable for the tortious acts of its employees committed within the scope
of employment.
28. Third-Party Defendant John Doe 4 is vicariously liable for the torts and
armed threats committed by its employee against Third-Party Plaintiff.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Defendant, Counter-Plaintiff, and Third-Party Plaintiff Robbin
Stewart respectfully requests that this Court enter judgment in his favor and
against Counter-Defendant HHC, Cross-Defendants, and Third-Party Defendants,
jointly and severally, for compensatory damages, consequential damages, and
punitive damages in the total amount of ONE HUNDRED SIXTY-FIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS
($165,000.00), alongside the costs of this action, and all other just and
proper relief.
Dated: June 10, 2026
Respectfully submitted,
STATE OF INDIANA ) IN THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT ) SS: CIVIL DIVISION 20 COUNTY OF MARION ) CASE NO. 49D20-2311-OV-045330 HEALTH AND HOSPITAL CORPORATION ) OF MARION COUNTY, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) ) ROBBIN STEWART, ) ) Defendant. ) ORDER The Court, having reviewed Defendant’s Motion for Continuance, now finds that said Motion should be GRANTED. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the hearing currently scheduled for June 15, 2026, is hereby VACATED. This matter is rescheduled for a hearing on the _____ day of ________________, 2026, at ________ ___.m., which date shall be not less than thirty (30) days from the date of this Order. SO ORDERED this _____ day of ________________, 2026. ____________________________________ Judge, Marion Superior Court
COUNTY OF MARION ) CASE NO. 49D20-2311-OV-045330
HEALTH AND HOSPITAL CORPORATION )
OF MARION COUNTY, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. )
)
ROBBIN STEWART, )
)
Defendant. )
ORDER
The Court, having reviewed Defendant’s Motion for Jury Trial, and being duly
advised in the premises, now finds that said Motion should be GRANTED.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that this matter shall be set for a trial by jury. The
Court Clerk is directed to calendar this cause accordingly and issue notice to
the parties.
SO ORDERED this _____ day of ________________, 2026.
____________________________________
Judge, Marion Superior Court
STATE OF INDIANA ) IN THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
) SS: CIVIL DIVISION 20
COUNTY OF MARION ) CASE NO. 49D20-2311-OV-045330
HEALTH AND HOSPITAL CORPORATION )
OF MARION COUNTY, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. )
)
ROBBIN STEWART, )
)
Defendant. )
MOTION FOR JURY TRIAL
Comes now the Defendant, Robbin Stewart, pro se, and pursuant to Article 1,
Section 20 of the Indiana Constitution and Indiana Rule of Trial Procedure 38,
respectfully moves this Court for an Order setting this matter for trial by
jury, and in support thereof, states as follows:
1. Article 1, Section 20 of the Indiana Constitution explicitly mandates that
the right of trial by jury in civil cases "shall remain inviolate."
2. Under established Indiana constitutional jurisprudence, this provision
safeguards the right to a jury trial for any cause of action where the
underlying substance, rights, or remedies were recognized at common law
prior to or at the time of the adoption of the 1851 Indiana Constitution.
3. The subject matter of this enforcement action directly concerns the
regulation, harboring, keeping, and property compliance of a domestic
canine.
4. Under Indiana common law and statutory frameworks stretching back to the
founding of the state in 1816 and remaining intact through 1851, dogs were
legally classified as personal property, chattel, and a distinct species
of domestic property subject to strict ownership rights and liabilities.
5. At common law in 1851, any adjudication regarding liabilities, penalties,
or rights tied to the keeping of such domestic property carried an
absolute right to a trial by a jury of peers.
6. The Plaintiff’s utilization of a modern administrative classification—the
"Ordinance Violation" designation—constitutes a distinction of form
rather than substance. A statutory re-labeling cannot constitutionally
abrogate or erase a fundamental right that remains textually inviolate.
7. Denying a jury trial in this matter would allow administrative labels to
circumvent the constitutional boundary line drawn by the framers of the
Indiana Constitution to protect property interests.
WHEREFORE, Defendant respectfully requests that this Court grant this Motion,
enter an Order setting this cause for a trial by jury, and grant all other
just and proper relief.
Dated: June 10, 2026
Respectfully submitted,
____________________________________
Robbin Stewart, Defendant Pro Se
[Your Address]
[Your Phone]
[Your Email]
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Motion has been served upon the
Plaintiff, Health and Hospital Corporation of Marion County, via the Indiana
E-Filing System (IEFS) or by first-class U.S. mail on this 10th day of June, 2026.
____________________________________
Robbin Stewart
STATE OF INDIANA ) IN THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
) SS: CIVIL DIVISION 20
COUNTY OF MARION ) CASE NO. 49D20-2311-OV-045330
HEALTH AND HOSPITAL CORPORATION )
OF MARION COUNTY, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. )
)
ROBBIN STEWART, )
)
Defendant. )
ORDER
The Court, having reviewed Defendant’s Motion for Jury Trial, and being duly
advised in the premises, now finds that said Motion should be GRANTED.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that this matter shall be set for a trial by jury. The
Court Clerk is directed to calendar this cause accordingly and issue notice to
the parties.
SO ORDERED this _____ day of ________________, 2026.
____________________________________
Judge, Marion Superior Court
Attn: Legal Department
3838 N. Rural Street
Indianapolis, IN 46205
- Motion for Continuance (with your signed Certificate of Service)
- Proposed Order for Continuance (on a separate page for the judge to sign)
- Motion for Jury Trial (with your signed Certificate of Service)
- Proposed Order for Jury Trial (on a separate page for the judge to sign)
- Note: Bring an extra copy of both motions to have the clerk stamp and hand back to you for your personal records.
- One copy of the file-stamped Motion for Continuance
- One copy of the file-stamped Motion for Jury Trial
- Defendant's First Request for Discovery and Production of Administrative Records
- Electronic Service Check: If you end up using the e-filing system later instead of driving, checking the service box next to the HHC attorney's name inside the portal satisfies this delivery step automatically.
- The 30-Day Window: Handing over the discovery document today locks in your Indiana Trial Rule 34(B) protections, legally preventing the assistant prosecutor from rushing the June 15 date while your discovery window remains open.