notice of tort claim 

at about 10:25 am monday morning a person trespassed at my property at 4015 E. Washington St. 

when confronted by my assistant and reminded that this was private property, she displayed a badge, said she didnt need permission. she took photographs and eavesdropped on a private conversation. 

at about 10:30 Mr. Pierson alerted me, but he had left. Around 11:am I was getting on the bus to go print and file a proposed order in a dog bite case, when presumably the same jane doe entered my front yard, without permission, invitation, or a warrant. She was short dark and ugly, with shoulder-length dark hair. 

There were no indigent circumstances creating any exception to the warrant requirement. 

There is a clean and lien order on the property in case _. I do not think that this order constitutes a license to enter at any time, at least without displaying the order as authority. 

If not, then she was 

1 trespassing under the statutes and common law.

2. violating my civil rights under 42 usc 1983.

3. violating my rights under section 11.

4. and the 4th amendment.

5.   by obtaining evidence by unlawful means she sought to violate my rights to due course of law under section 12.

6. by obtaining evidence by unlawful means she sought to violate my rights to due process. 

7. Lawyers can be responsible for the acts of their subordinates. Here, I have already written to Shelly Gupta, the Attorney of record in the case, letting her know to end the trespassing by HH staff. For Jane Doe to do so is misconduct not just on her own part but on Shelly Gupta's part. Professional ethics and due course of law overlap here. 

 

 

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📧 Email Draft

Subject: Rule 37.2(a) Notice of Intent to File Amicus Curiae Brief – Alaska Policy Forum v. APOC (No. [Insert Docket Number])

Dear Counsel of Record,

Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.2(a), this email serves as formal, timely notice that [Insert Your Organization/Client's Name] intends to file an amicus curiae brief at the certiorari stage in Alaska Policy Forum v. Alaska Public Offices Commission, et al.

The amicus curiae brief will be filed in support of the [Respondent / Petitioner / Neither Party — Choose One].

Please note that we intend to submit this brief on or before the current deadline of Wednesday, August 12, 2026 (or any subsequent extended deadline granted by the Clerk's office to the Respondent).

Please let us know if your respective clients consent to the filing of this brief. If you have any questions or require additional details regarding the filing, do not hesitate to contact us.

Sincerely,

[Your Name / Your Organization]
[Your Contact Information]
[Your Website]

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⚠️ Crucial Next Steps After Sending

1. Keep the Receipt: Take a screenshot of the sent email showing the date, timestamp, and all recipient email addresses. You do not need to file this screenshot with the Court, but you must keep it in your files as proof of compliance.
2. Add the Mandatory Footnote: Your amicus brief's very first footnote must include specific language proving you sent this notice. You can copy and paste this text directly into your draft:

"Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.2(a), counsel for amicus curiae states that timely electronic notice of the intent to file this brief was provided to the Counsel of Record for all parties at least 10 days prior to the filing deadline."

(Note: If you are a private entity and not a state government, remember that this same footnote must also contain your Rule 37.6 authorship and monetary contribution disclosures.)

     

STATE OF INDIANA )
) SS:
COUNTY OF MARION )

IN THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL DIVISION, ROOM 33

CASE NO. 49D33-2603-OV-010695

CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS,
Plaintiff,

v.

ROBBIN G. STEWART,
Defendant.

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PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND FINAL ORDER

I. Procedural Posture and Constitutional Guardrails

1. Statutory Interpretation: The local ordinance sets a regulatory floor, not a ceiling. It cannot curtail state constitutional guarantees.
2. Federal Seventh Amendment: Under footnote 6 of Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 192 n.6 (1974) (reaffirmed in Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 719), the Seventh Amendment civil jury guarantee has historically been treated as non-incorporated against the states.
3. Preservation of the Issue: Because this statement is footnote dicta rather than a modern holding, the federal incorporation issue is expressly preserved for appellate review under the modern trend established by McDonald, Timbs, and Ramos. A technical denial on federal grounds was proper solely to preserve the record.
4. State Section 20 Error: However, the court committed fatal, reversible error by denying a jury trial under Section 20 of the Indiana Constitution. Independent state grounds under Gates v. Indianapolis mandate a jury trial as of right in quasi-criminal dog ordinance cases.
5. Equitable Subversion: The City sought injunctive relief. Adding "three drops of equity in a bucket of law" does not transform a predominantly penal, quasi-criminal action into a purely equitable proceeding. The Section 20 jury guarantee remains intact.

II. Evidentiary Standards and Constitutional Avoidance

6. Due Course of Law: Defendant contends that a mere preponderance of the evidence standard in a quasi-criminal trial fails to satisfy the Due Course of Law requirements of Section 12.
7. The Middle-Ground Standard: Indiana law recognizes the clear and convincing standard in grave civil proceedings, including fraud, punitive damages, civil commitments, and truancy.
8. Federal Perspectives: As highlighted by Blanche v. Lau (June 2026), the federal judiciary actively treats "clear and convincing" as a critical procedural safeguard. While Lau centered on when the standard applies rather than mandating it for municipal actions, it confirms the standard's utility in balancing asymmetric government-versus-citizen litigation.
9. Asymmetry of Power: In a standard civil action, two private actors stand balanced on the scales of justice (e.g., Caperton safeguards against structural bias). Here, the state brings a massive, specialized litigation team with an expansive budget against a structurally disadvantaged, self-represented defendant.
10. Interests at Stake: Chico the dog is classified as chattel under traditional property law. However, his owner possesses vital liberty and property interests under Section 1 of the Indiana Constitution.
11. Application of Avoidance: Because a companion animal's life is at stake, the threat of erroneous destruction creates an unconstitutional deprivation under a low evidentiary standard. Applying the Mathews v. Eldridge three-factor test, the massive private interest and structural risk of error mandate the clear and convincing standard. Under the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, this Court applies the clear and convincing standard to resolve the dispute without declaring the underlying ordinance textually unconstitutional.

III. Findings on the Merits and Equitable Relief

12. Factual Disputes: Severe material disputes exist regarding whether the dog was actively provoked and whether the interaction occurred on a public sidewalk or entirely within the Defendant's private property line.
13. Unclean Hands: Because Plaintiff's counsel actively withheld material, exculpatory evidence from the defense in violation of Professional Conduct Rule 3.4(a), the Plaintiff comes to this court with unclean hands. Equitable injunctive relief is strictly barred on this basis.
14. Injunctive Balancing: Injunctive relief is an extraordinary remedy. The City failed to prove that ordinary legal remedies were insufficient. Applying the four-part Winter injunction framework—balancing the burden on the parties, the public interest, likelihood of success, and irreparable harm—the factors decisively favor the Defendant.

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Final Judgment and Order

EVIDENTIARY STANDARDS AND DETERMINATIONS

• This Court finds that the Plaintiff [ ] DID [ ] DID NOT prove its case by a preponderance of the evidence.
• This Court finds that the Plaintiff [ ] DID [ ] DID NOT prove its case by clear and convincing evidence.

DISPOSITION OF RELIEF

• The Plaintiff's petition for a permanent injunction is hereby [ ] GRANTED [ ] DENIED.
• The [ ] PLAINTIFF [ ] DEFENDANT is declared the prevailing party in this matter.
• Court costs of $__________ are assessed against the nonprevailing party.

SO ORDERED,

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Judge / Referee
Marion Superior Court, Civil Division 33
State of Indiana

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Print this out as it stands. Good luck at the clerk's office.