Rejection of the Informational Interest: In candidate elections, knowing who funds a candidate is crucial for voters. In independent issue referenda (like a school tax levy), the Court ruled that the author's name carries no weight or informational value to the reader.
wrong quote. i'll try again. i'm rereading buckley p 64. the buckley test is not what we were told.
In some instances, disclosure may even expose contributors to harassment
or retaliation. These are not insignificant burdens on individual
rights, and they must be weighed carefully against the interests which
Congress has sought to promote by this legislation. In this process, we
note and agree with appellants' concession
that disclosure requirements certainly in most applications appear to
be the least restrictive means of curbing the evils of campaign
ignorance and corruption that Congress found to exist.
REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS Unlike the limitations on contributions and expenditures imposed by 18 U.S.C. § 608 (1970 ed., Supp. IV), the disclosure requirements of the Act, 2 U.S.C. § 431 et seq. (1970 ed., Supp. IV), [Footnote 68] are not challenged by appellants as per se unconstitutional restrictions on the exercise of First Amendment freedoms of speech and association. [Footnote 69] Indeed, appellants argue that "narrowly drawn disclosure requirements are the proper solution to virtually all of the evils Congress sought to remedy." Brief for Appellants 171.
marilyn.odendahl@indianacitizen.org
Since NAACP v. Alabama, we have required that the subordinating interests of the State must survive exacting scrutiny. [Footnote 73] We also have insisted that there be a "relevant correlation" [Footnote 74] or "substantial relation" [Footnote 75] between the governmental interest and the information required to be disclosed. See Pollard v. Roberts, 283 F. Supp. 248, 257 (ED Ark.) (three-judge court), aff'd, 393 U. S. 14 (1968)
here, the court says exacting scrutiny, footnoiting the civil rights cases. it didn not define and is not using a term of art. AND it must show a relevant correlatyion.
Since NAACP v. Alabama, we have required that the subordinating interests of the State must survive exacting scrutiny. [Footnote 73] We also have insisted that there be a "relevant correlation" [Footnote 74] or "substantial relation" [Footnote 75] between the governmental interest and the information required to be disclosed. See Pollard v. Roberts, 283 F. Supp. 248, 257 (ED Ark.) (three-judge court), aff'd, 393 U. S. 14 (1968)
73 NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. at 357 U. S. 463. See also Gibson v. Florida Legislative Comm., 372 U. S. 539, 372 U. S. 546 (1963); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. at 371 U. S. 438; Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. at 361 U. S. 524.
The strict test established by NAACP v. Alabama is necessary because compelled disclosure has the potential for substantially infringing the exercise of First Amendment rights.
the court uses the word strict to describe the scrutiny it is using.
p 65 The disclosure requirements, as a general matter, directly serve substantial governmental interests. In determining whether these interests are sufficient to justify the requirements, we must look to the extent of the burden that they place on individual rights.
is that where they got substasntial from? deter corruption and appearasnce of corruption. compelling interest.
It is undoubtedly true that public disclosure of contributions to candidates and political parties will deter some individuals who otherwise might contribute. In some instances, disclosure may even expose contributors to harassment or retaliation. These are not insignificant burdens on individual rights, and they must be weighed carefully against the interests which Congress has sought to promote by this legislation. In this process, we note and agree with appellants' concession [Footnote 81] that disclosure requirements -- certainly in most applications -- appear to be the least restrictive means of curbing the evils of campaign ignorance and corruption that Congress found to exist. [Footnote 82] Appellants argue, however, that the balance tips against disclosure when it is required of contributors to certain parties and candidates. We turn now to this contention.
and therefore found no
tenable rationale for assuming that the public interest in minority party disclosure of contributions above a reasonable cutoff point is uniformly outweighed by potential contributors' associational rights,
We are not unmindful that the damage done by disclosure to the associational interests of the minor parties and their members and to supporters of independents could be significant. These movements are less likely to have a sound financial base, and thus are more vulnerable to fall-offs in contributions. In some instances, fears of reprisal may deter contributions to the point where the movement cannot survive. The public interest also suffers if that result comes to pass, for there is a consequent reduction in the free circulation of ideas both within [Footnote 85] and without [Footnote 86] the political arena.
On this record, the substantial public interest in disclosure identified by the legislative history of this Act outweighs the harm generally alleged.
An opinion dissenting in part from the Court of Appeals' decision concedes
oh! there's a partial dissent below, should read it to argue the point later.
buckley is a unified executive case, a separation of powers landmark. when did unified executive come back into play? (humphrey's executor narrowed)