STATE OF INDIANA )
) SS:
COUNTY OF MARION )

IN THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL DIVISION, ROOM 33

CASE NO. 49D33-2603-OV-010695

CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS,
Plaintiff,

v.

ROBBIN G. STEWART,
Defendant.

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PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND FINAL ORDER

I. Procedural Posture and Constitutional Guardrails

1. Statutory Interpretation: The local ordinance sets a regulatory floor, not a ceiling. It cannot curtail state constitutional guarantees.
2. Federal Seventh Amendment: Under footnote 6 of Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 192 n.6 (1974) (reaffirmed in Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 719), the Seventh Amendment civil jury guarantee has historically been treated as non-incorporated against the states.
3. Preservation of the Issue: Because this statement is footnote dicta rather than a modern holding, the federal incorporation issue is expressly preserved for appellate review under the modern trend established by McDonald, Timbs, and Ramos. A technical denial on federal grounds was proper solely to preserve the record.
4. State Section 20 Error: However, the court committed fatal, reversible error by denying a jury trial under Section 20 of the Indiana Constitution. Independent state grounds under Gates v. Indianapolis mandate a jury trial as of right in quasi-criminal dog ordinance cases.
5. Equitable Subversion: The City sought injunctive relief. Adding "three drops of equity in a bucket of law" does not transform a predominantly penal, quasi-criminal action into a purely equitable proceeding. The Section 20 jury guarantee remains intact.

II. Evidentiary Standards and Constitutional Avoidance

6. Due Course of Law: Defendant contends that a mere preponderance of the evidence standard in a quasi-criminal trial fails to satisfy the Due Course of Law requirements of Section 12.
7. The Middle-Ground Standard: Indiana law recognizes the clear and convincing standard in grave civil proceedings, including fraud, punitive damages, civil commitments, and truancy.
8. Federal Perspectives: As highlighted by Blanche v. Lau (June 2026), the federal judiciary actively treats "clear and convincing" as a critical procedural safeguard. While Lau centered on when the standard applies rather than mandating it for municipal actions, it confirms the standard's utility in balancing asymmetric government-versus-citizen litigation.
9. Asymmetry of Power: In a standard civil action, two private actors stand balanced on the scales of justice (e.g., Caperton safeguards against structural bias). Here, the state brings a massive, specialized litigation team with an expansive budget against a structurally disadvantaged, self-represented defendant.
10. Interests at Stake: Chico the dog is classified as chattel under traditional property law. However, his owner possesses vital liberty and property interests under Section 1 of the Indiana Constitution.
11. Application of Avoidance: Because a companion animal's life is at stake, the threat of erroneous destruction creates an unconstitutional deprivation under a low evidentiary standard. Applying the Mathews v. Eldridge three-factor test, the massive private interest and structural risk of error mandate the clear and convincing standard. Under the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, this Court applies the clear and convincing standard to resolve the dispute without declaring the underlying ordinance textually unconstitutional.

III. Findings on the Merits and Equitable Relief

12. Factual Disputes: Severe material disputes exist regarding whether the dog was actively provoked and whether the interaction occurred on a public sidewalk or entirely within the Defendant's private property line.
13. Unclean Hands: Because Plaintiff's counsel actively withheld material, exculpatory evidence from the defense in violation of Professional Conduct Rule 3.4(a), the Plaintiff comes to this court with unclean hands. Equitable injunctive relief is strictly barred on this basis.
14. Injunctive Balancing: Injunctive relief is an extraordinary remedy. The City failed to prove that ordinary legal remedies were insufficient. Applying the four-part Winter injunction framework—balancing the burden on the parties, the public interest, likelihood of success, and irreparable harm—the factors decisively favor the Defendant.

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Final Judgment and Order

EVIDENTIARY STANDARDS AND DETERMINATIONS

• This Court finds that the Plaintiff [ ] DID [ ] DID NOT prove its case by a preponderance of the evidence.
• This Court finds that the Plaintiff [ ] DID [ ] DID NOT prove its case by clear and convincing evidence.

DISPOSITION OF RELIEF

• The Plaintiff's petition for a permanent injunction is hereby [ ] GRANTED [ ] DENIED.
• The [ ] PLAINTIFF [ ] DEFENDANT is declared the prevailing party in this matter.
• Court costs of $__________ are assessed against the nonprevailing party.

SO ORDERED,

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Judge / Referee
Marion Superior Court, Civil Division 33
State of Indiana

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Print this out as it stands. Good luck at the clerk's office.

 City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes (1999) determined that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suits for damages regarding unconstitutional land takings warrant a Seventh Amendment jury trial, while reaffirming that this amendment does not apply to state court proceedings. The 5-4 ruling confirmed a right to a jury in federal court for regulatory takings cases, distinguishing this from the procedural requirements of state courts.

 

Case Caption

STATE OF INDIANA / CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS,
Plaintiff,

v.

[DEFENDANT'S NAME] & CHICO,
Defendants.

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Special Context Clarifications

1. Ethics Complaint Basis

An ethics complaint against the Plaintiff's counsel under these facts would rest on Indiana Rule of Professional Conduct 3.8 (Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor/Government Lawyer) and Rule 3.4 (Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel). [1]

Specifically, withholding known "exculpatory, innocence-proving evidence" breaches a government attorney's affirmative duty to disclose material evidence that tends to negate the guilt or mitigate the offense in quasi-criminal enforcement proceedings.

2. Clear and Convincing Evidence Mandate

The "clear and convincing evidence" standard is required in civil commitment, truancy, and juvenile delinquency cases because the private liberty interests at stake outweigh the government’s administrative burdens. [1]

Under the U.S. Supreme Court's foundational framework, a standard higher than a preponderance is constitutionally compelled whenever the individual faces a significant deprivation of liberty, a stigma of criminal-like misconduct, or the state-sanctioned dissolution of fundamental parental or custodial control.

3. The Forgotten Precedent

The 3-factor procedural due process test you are referencing is from the landmark case Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). [1]

The court must balance:

1. The private interest affected by the official action.
2. The risk of an erroneous deprivation of that interest under existing procedures, and the probable value of additional safeguards.
3. The Government's interest, including fiscal and administrative burdens. [1]

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Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

I. Procedural Posture and Constitutional Guardrails

1. Statutory Interpretation: The local ordinance governing animal control and public safety sets a regulatory floor, not a ceiling. It cannot curtail foundational state constitutional guarantees.
2. Right to a Jury Trial: The Defendant timely moved for a jury trial as of right under Sections 19 and 20 of the Indiana Constitution, as well as the Seventh Amendment. This Court notes that under controlling stare decisis, Gates v. Indianapolis explicitly established that jury trials are available as of right under the Indiana Constitution for dog ordinance violations.
3. Quasi-Criminal Classifications: Gates properly followed Cunningham (governing motor vehicle infractions), ruling that dog ordinances are quasi-criminal. Because they carry heavy penalties and severe stigmas, enhanced due process considerations actively apply.
4. Equitable Subversion: The City sought emergency injunctive relief alongside legal penalties. However, adding "three drops of equity in a bucket of law" does not transform a predominantly penal, quasi-criminal action into a purely equitable proceeding. The Section 20 jury guarantee remains intact and cannot be bypasses by strategic pleading.

II. Evidentiary Standards and Constitutional Avoidance

5. Due Course of Law: The Defendant contends that a mere preponderance of the evidence standard in a quasi-criminal trial fails to satisfy the Due Course of Law requirements of Section 12 of the Indiana Constitution.
6. The Middle-Ground Standard: Indiana law explicitly recognizes the clear and convincing standard in grave civil proceedings, including fraud, punitive damages, civil commitments, and truancy.
7. Federal Perspectives: As highlighted by the Defendant's invocation of Blanche v. Lau (Supreme Court, June 2026), the federal judiciary actively treats "clear and convincing" as a critical procedural safeguard. While Lau centered on when the standard applies rather than mandating it for municipal actions, it confirms the standard's utility in balancing asymmetric government-versus-citizen litigation.
8. Asymmetry of Power: In a standard civil action, two private actors stand balanced on the scales of justice (e.g., Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co. safeguards against structural bias that would tip this balance). Here, the state brings a massive, specialized litigation team with an expansive budget against a structurally disadvantaged, self-represented defendant.
9. Interests at Stake: Chico the dog is classified as chattel under traditional property law, meaning his individual rights cannot be directly recognized. However, his owner possesses vital liberty and property interests under Section 1 of the Indiana Constitution.
10. Application of Avoidance: Because a companion animal's life is at stake, the threat of erroneous destruction creates an unconstitutional deprivation under a low evidentiary standard. Applying the Mathews v. Eldridge three-factor test, the massive private interest and structural risk of error mandate the clear and convincing standard. Under the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, this Court applies the clear and convincing standard to resolve the dispute without declaring the underlying ordinance textually uncommensurate with Section 12. [1]

III. Findings on the Merits and Equitable Relief

11. Factual Disputes: Severe material disputes exist regarding whether the dog was actively provoked and whether the interaction occurred on a public sidewalk or entirely within the Defendant's private property line.
12. Unclean Hands: Because Plaintiff's counsel actively withheld material, exculpatory evidence from the defense, the Plaintiff comes to this court with unclean hands. Equitable injunctive relief is strictly barred on this basis.
13. Injunctive Balancing: Injunctive relief is an extraordinary remedy. The City failed to prove that ordinary legal remedies were insufficient. Applying the four-part Winter injunction framework—balancing the burden on the parties, the public interest, likelihood of success, and irreparable harm—the factors decisively favor the Defendant.

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Final Judgment and Order

EVIDENTIARY STANDARDS AND DETERMINATIONS

• This Court finds that the Plaintiff DID NOT prove its case by a preponderance of the evidence.
• This Court finds that the Plaintiff DID NOT prove its case by clear and convincing evidence. [1]

DISPOSITION OF RELIEF

• The Plaintiff's petition for a permanent injunction is hereby DENIED.
• The Defendant is declared the PREVAILING PARTY in this matter.
• Court costs are assessed against the PLAINTIFF. [1]

SO ORDERED,

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Judge / Referee
Marion County Superior Court
State of Indiana

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