STATE OF INDIANA ) IN THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
) SS: CIVIL DIVISION 20
COUNTY OF MARION ) CASE NO. 49D20-2311-OV-045330
HEALTH AND HOSPITAL CORPORATION )
OF MARION COUNTY, )
)
Plaintiff / )
Counter-Defendant, )
)
v. )
)
ROBBIN STEWART, )
)
Defendant / Counter- )
Plaintiff / Third-Party )
Plaintiff, )
)
v. )
)
JOHN DOE 1 (Primary Complainant), )
BILL DOE (Of 4007 E. Wash.), )
JOHN DOE 3 (Caretaker), and )
JOHN DOE 4 (Caretaker's Employer),)
)
Cross-Defendants / )
Third-Party Defendants. )
DEFENDANT’S COUNTERCLAIM, THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT, AND CROSS-CLAIMS
Comes now the Defendant, Counter-Plaintiff, and Third-Party Plaintiff, Robbin
Stewart, pro se, and pursuant to Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure 13, 14, and
19, files this Counterclaim against Counter-Defendant Health and Hospital
Corporation of Marion County, Cross-Claims against Cross-Defendant John Doe 1,
and Third-Party Complaints against Third-Party Defendants Bill Doe, John Doe
3, and John Doe 4, seeking joint and several damages in the amount of $165,000,
and in support thereof, states as follows:
PARTIES
1. Defendant, Counter-Plaintiff, and Third-Party Plaintiff Robbin Stewart is a
resident of Marion County, Indiana.
2. Plaintiff and Counter-Defendant Health and Hospital Corporation of Marion
County (HHC) is an independent municipal corporation operating within Marion
County, Indiana.
3. Cross-Defendant John Doe 1 is the primary complainant in the underlying
ordinance enforcement action and a resident of Marion County.
4. Third-Party Defendant Bill Doe is a resident of Marion County residing at
4007 E. Washington Street, who houses, harbors, and actively facilitates
the actions of Cross-Defendant John Doe 1.
5. Third-Party Defendant John Doe 3 is an individual operating as a caretaker
within Marion County, Indiana.
6. Third-Party Defendant John Doe 4 is a business entity or employer doing
business in Marion County, Indiana, operating under the principle of
respondeat superior relative to the actions of John Doe 3.
FACTS
7. On or about [Day One Date], Cross-Defendant John Doe 1, an active user
of illicit controlled substances, specifically heroin, approached Third-Party
Plaintiff Robbin Stewart and issued an unlawful extortion demand for $100.
8. Upon refusal of the extortion demand, Cross-Defendant John Doe 1 retreated
into his residence, retrieved a firearm, and unlawfully displayed said
firearm in a threatening and intimidating manner toward Third-Party Plaintiff.
9. Third-Party Defendant Bill Doe maintained full knowledge of John Doe 1's
criminal conduct, actively housed him at 4007 E. Washington Street, and
engaged in concerted activity to facilitate an ongoing campaign of
harassment and extortion against Stewart.
10. Separately, Third-Party Defendant John Doe 3 placed Third-Party Plaintiff
in immediate apprehension of offensive, harmful physical contact by issuing
verbal threats to execute physical violence utilizing a firearm.
11. At all times relevant to the verbal firearm threats, John Doe 3 was
acting within the scope of his employment, under the direction, control,
and benefit of Third-Party Defendant John Doe 4.
12. On Day Two, a full twenty-four hours after the armed extortion attempt,
Cross-Defendant John Doe 1 entered into immediate, uninvited proximity to
the property and person of Third-Party Plaintiff to intentionally provoke
an animal interaction and manufacture a fraudulent civil liability claim,
in direct continuation of the prior day's extortion scheme.
13. Approximately one month prior to the alleged incident, John Doe 1
launched a distinct physical attack against the subject animal, causing
the animal to retain a defensive memory of this physical trauma.
14. Counter-Defendant HHC, through its agents, personnel, or assistant
prosecutors, maintained actual or constructive knowledge of the extortionate
scheme, the armed intimidation, and the lack of individual probable cause,
yet intentionally chose to process, adopt, and prosecute the manufactured
complaint.
15. Counter-Defendant HHC acted in concert and entered into a tacit or explicit
combination with John Doe 1 to validate, weaponize, and enforce the
fraudulent ordinance citation, thereby directly aiding, abetting, and
conspiring in the ongoing extortion and abuse of process against Stewart.
16. Five (5) independent eyewitnesses observed and will corroborate this
systemic pattern of armed intimidation, uninvited proximity, prior animal
abuse, governmental complicity, and manufactured fraud.
COUNT I: CIVIL CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT EXTORTION
(Against HHC, John Doe 1, and Bill Doe, Jointly)
17. Counter-Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 through 16 as if fully
set forth herein.
18. Counter-Defendant HHC, Cross-Defendant John Doe 1, and Third-Party
Defendant Bill Doe entered into a concerted agreement, combination,
and common design to accomplish an unlawful purpose, specifically: the
criminal extortion, intimidation, and fraudulent manufacture of civil
ordinance liability against Stewart.
19. Counter-Defendant HHC advanced this conspiracy by utilizing its statutory
enforcement authority to validate an ungrounded ticket, despite being put
on notice of the underlying threats, armed intimidation, and provocation.
20. As a direct and proximate result of this conspiracy, Stewart suffered
severe administrative, professional, financial, and personal damages.
COUNT II: CIVIL ASSAULT / INTIMIDATION
(Against John Doe 1 and John Doe 3)
21. Third-Party Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 through 20 as if fully
set forth herein.
22. On Day One, John Doe 1 intentionally placed Third-Party Plaintiff in
imminent apprehension of harmful or offensive contact by displaying a
firearm to back up a criminal cash demand.
23. Separately, John Doe 3 intentionally placed Third-Party Plaintiff in
imminent apprehension of harmful or offensive contact by issuing verbal
threats of armed violence.
24. These actions constitute civil assault under Indiana common law, causing
direct emotional trauma and security costs to Third-Party Plaintiff.
COUNT III: RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR / VICARIOUS LIABILITY
(Against John Doe 4)
25. Third-Party Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 through 24 as if fully
set forth herein.
26. At all times relevant, Third-Party Defendant John Doe 3 was an employee,
agent, or servant acting within the clear scope of his employment with
Third-Party Defendant John Doe 4.
27. Under the Indiana common-law doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer
is liable for the tortious acts of its employees committed within the scope
of employment.
28. Third-Party Defendant John Doe 4 is vicariously liable for the torts and
armed threats committed by its employee against Third-Party Plaintiff.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Defendant, Counter-Plaintiff, and Third-Party Plaintiff Robbin
Stewart respectfully requests that this Court enter judgment in his favor and
against Counter-Defendant HHC, Cross-Defendants, and Third-Party Defendants,
jointly and severally, for compensatory damages, consequential damages, and
punitive damages in the total amount of ONE HUNDRED SIXTY-FIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS
($165,000.00), alongside the costs of this action, and all other just and
proper relief.
Dated: June 10, 2026
Respectfully submitted,