Tuesday, April 30, 2024

 150 tsla

124 church. leased at 2k/Mo after repairs, for a 15 year rent to buy deal. [need to contact lawyer.]

124 house 398

25k oil      448002 

bank accounts $15k? 463002.

25k mom's oil. (trust)

[future trust 270k.]

$1 law firm

 jd, llm, admitted 7th circuit, Marion county bar association, representative case majors v abell (cite), Stewart v Taylor. no employees. home office.

current cases include Doe v Hendrix, Doe v Carroll county, not yet filed. to do, meet with Jim kimek.

$1 recycling company.

 vehicle. tools. inventory, storage unit, goodwill, accounts receivable. 

$1 pending lawsuits. counterclaims, Marion county, plasma center, what else? 

2023 income summary

step 1 gross income from all sources

wages, royalties, interest, social security, plasma, scrapyard, medical experiments, gift, bequest. 

wages 5, royalties 5, interest 1, social security 7, plasma 2, scrapyard, $300,  medical experiments 1150, gift 1, bequest (300). 

so 11, 7, 2, .300, 1.150, 1, (300) so 20,300 + 2, 150 so $22, 150 in gross income, plus a $300,000 bequest from my mother's estate. 

deductions: interest 1k, is social security taxed? 

ok, apparently I don't have to pay tax on the 7k sss. that makes it even easier.


plasma and gift not taxed 3k,   so reduce gross by 4 k, now 18, 150. now law office expenses, 1k medical experiments 1k salvage company 1 k. now $15, 150. net income. am i forgetting $1000 here somewhere?   yes! texas taxes $800. so now $14, 350 net income.

if i take a trip to texas in 2025, i can deduct the miles. 

oil related expenses: laptop, mapping software, 

less 13, 850 personal exemption = $500 in taxable income. 

step 2 deductions

step 3 net income

wages 5k.(taxes and FICA paid)

oil       5k

ss        $7k  17k. 

$1k gift

[$300k bequest.]

plasma $1k untaxed. 

deductions - law office $1k

medical studies $1k expenses.

$900 medical study income. 

$16k income. possible $1k more deductions if needed. what about mileage, hotels, per diems ?

personal deduction $14k for 2023?

$13,850 for single or married filing separately

so income of $15-16K, less 13, 850 = 1,150 to 2, 150 in taxable income. plus whatever the state tax is. 

already paid FICA on the self-employment portion. no FICA needed on oil, interest.

already paid federal  and state on the 5k of wages. 

763002 including the trust.

to file: 

federal, state, local.

$1k in interest and bank bonuses. < what deductions apply against this income? internet, computer, $600, $200. so already $800, let's just take this off. so 14-15K in income. - 13,850 in personal exemption/deduction. so $200 to $1200 in taxable income, already paid on wages. not looking to get a refund check, just want to file for compliance reasons. 

any rent? no?

second draft: make it simpler. cut words. few words goods, eschew sesquipedalian tendencies. 

draft: to rick, or any tax preparer.

re: 2023 income taxes, federal and state, for robbin stewart.

step 1: here are my numbers.

step 2: feed into taxact, taxhawk, etc. , some free software, to generatre a proposed tax return. 

keep it confidential. 

if needed, prepare a motion and memo asking for penalties to be waived. explain we were waiting on a trust return. amend 2022 filing.

still to do: review compliance history, see if any interest accruing, any unresolved penalties. 

to rick: recently in inherited a bit of money, so instead of doing my taxes myself on the back of an envelope as usual, i want to step up my game and hire a lawyer or accountant or tax preparer or bookkeeper or something of that sort.

here is that back of an envelope calculation:

taxable income: $500. nope, $650, forgot remainder. 

gross income other than bequest: 22,000 + remainder. remainder = 150. gross income of $22, 150

net income otb $14, 350. nope 14,500

personal deduction 13, 850.

ergo taxable income of $650.

already paid by deductions on $5k of wages. 

dont need a refund, just a proper return.

oh! add that form from bumpers about trust income. might be another 900 or whatever.

is there a 1% city tax on the bequest?

if we can accomplish this task of filing my 2023 taxes, we can then look into past years, which may need amended returns. 

second draft: make it simpler. cut words. few words goods, eschew sesquipedalian tendencies. 

hi Rick. can you help me file?

I had taxable income in 2023 of $650, based on gross income of

$22,130, net income of $14,500, and a personal exemption of 13, 850.

I also have a form I something from my late mother's trust account, of which I am a beneficiary. That was the point  at which I decided I should consult a professional; I have not done one of these before.

I also had a check from my sister, a bequest from my mother, which is apparently not taxed. I can provide details as needed. 

Cordially AA


$1 16th Street property.

$1 campaign account.

liabilities:

taxes $10k h+h lien, 

hey! is there a lien on my property? get a title report.

get proof of what happened with the tax auction. seek an accounting of unpaid funds. 

re-read that unclean hands memo. 

[I took some time off to work in the yard till say 11 15. this is Tuesday morning 4/30/24.]

Susie Talevski, Attorney, Susie Talevski, Attorney At Law, Valparaiso, IN, Andrew Tutt, Attorney, Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff-Appellant. Lawrence Saul Robbins, Alan E. Untereiner, Attorneys, Robbins, Russell, Englert, Orseck & Untereiner LLP, Washington, DC, for Defendants-Appellees. Maame Gyamfi, William Alvarado Rivera, Attorneys, AARP Foundation Litigation, Washington, DC, for Amici Curiae American Association of Retired Persons, AARP Foundation, California Advocates for Nursing Home Reform, Center for Medicare Advocac



==

bingo! [cue naked gun scene] https://casetext.com/case/talevski-v-health-and-hospital-corporation-of-marion-county

talevski 7th circuit. so I can spend up to 20 minutes today reading that, instead of doing laundry.  it would be better to do both. almost noon. and the laptop stopped charging again.

 Tuesday goals:

Jim kimec

trash containers. pile of trash. headlight? kankan bathhouse. 

hire a private detective to investigate Gupta.

write up the counterclaims.

Text of Section 1:

Inherent Rights

WE DECLARE, That all people are created equal; that they are endowed by their CREATOR with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; that all power is inherent in the people; and that all free governments are, and of right ought to be, founded on their authority, and instituted for their peace, safety, and well-being. For the advancement of these ends, the people have, at all times, an indefeasible right to alter and reform their government.[1]


Text of Section 3:

Freedom of Religious Opinions

No law shall, in any case whatever, control the free exercise and enjoyment of religious opinions, or interfere with the rights of conscience.[1]


All people shall be secured in the natural right to worship ALMIGHTY GOD, according to the dictates of their own consciences.[1]

comments:

here, Indiana law recognizes natural rights. this was the philosophy of the founders in 1816, and was re-ratified by the 1984 amendment and remains effective today. Colleen Price v State discusses the text history and traditions that underlie the Indiana constitution's bill of rights, article I.

H + H does not recognize natural rights, only legislative powers. It is the role and obligation of the court to restrain H + H in order to prevent their infringing or violating natural rights, including property, life, liberty, pursuit of happiness, religious practice, and others. 

[It does not always recognize even legislative powers. recently the supreme court reminded them that they are subject to 42 USC 1983, the Ku Klux Klan Act. cite text.]

Respondent Ivanka Talevski maintains that she can enforce the rights these particular FNHRA provisions describe via 42 U. S. C. §1983, which, since the 1870s, has provided an express cause of action to any person deprived (by someone acting under color of state law) of “any rights . . . secured by the Constitution and laws.” Petitioners insist that respondent is wrong about being able to rely on §1983 in this context, for two independent reasons. First, petitioners urge us to discard our longstanding recognition that
 2 HEALTH AND HOSPITAL CORPORATION OF MARION CTY. v. TALEVSKI Opinion of the Court

 §1983’s unqualified reference to “laws” “means what it says,” Justice Jackson, Talevski, 7-2, 2024. 
We reject both propositions. “Laws” means “laws,” no less today than in the 1870s, and nothing in petitioners’ appeal to Reconstruction-era contract law shows otherwise. Consequently, as we have previously held, §1983 can presumptively be used to enforce unambiguously conferred federal individual rights.... 

Accordingly, we affirm the lower court’s judgment that respondent’s §1983 action can proceed in court. 

(so the case continues, unless it settled. could ask IJ. org for an amicus below.)

Dear IJ,
Recently in Talovski v Marion County Health and Hospital, the Supreme Court ruled that Talovski's estate can continue its 19833 lawsuit against Health and Hospitssl. H + H.

I am asking IJ to consider writing an amicus at the lower court, urging it to find against
H+H. This would be consistent with IJ's position of restraining governmental abuse.

H+H is the "poorhouse". It provides emergency medical care at a public hospital and nursing home care to indigent people. In recent years it has been plagued with scandal, as top executives go to jail or retire. It may have vast liability to the estates of people who died without adequate medical care. 

It also micromanages private land use decisions in Marion county, in ways that implicate IJ's Timbs concerns. An amicus in the H + H case would allow IJ to discuss how Timbs should impact Indiana law going forward.

They are trying to take my car. This suggests to me that Timbs applies. oh was it section 16 I was looking for?

they placed him in petitioner Valparaiso Care and Rehabilitation’s (VCR) nursing home.1 When he entered VCR, —————— 1We rely for these facts on the operative complaint’s well-pleaded allegations. See Walden v. Fiore, 571 U. S. 277, 281, n. 2 (2014). Cite as: 599 U. S. ____ (2023) 3 Opinion of the Court Mr. Talevski could talk, feed himself, walk, socialize, and recognize his family. Later in 2016, however, Mr. Talevski’s condition suddenly deteriorated. He became unable to eat on his own and began losing the ability to communicate in English (leaving him to rely primarily on Macedonian, his native language). VCR staff claimed this was dementia’s natural progression. But Mr. Talevski’s daughter suspected, and then confirmed with outside physicians, that VCR was chemically restraining Mr. Talevski with six powerful psychotropic medications.

so, they torture people, then lie about it, then the people die, then their estate tries to recover, then they pretend that they have no liability, and use taxpayer dollars to delay by involving the supreme court. 

this is unclean hands.

we note that two justices, alito and Thomas, agreed with the h + H position and dissented, so it cannot be considered a frivolous argument, and H + H is as entitled to due process as the rest of us. Due process is something they are denying to me.

>bong hit. > new plan. write to each of the amici in Talevski, see if they would want to join or author an amicus at the lower court. unless it has settled.

so that would go on my list of 20. 

amicus in talevski
I could even write it myself!

which h + H lawyers are implicated in talevski's torture, death, subsequent attempt at evasion of financial responsibility?


what is the whole set of lawyers employed at h + H during the time Talevski was a prisoner, tortured, died?

which of them were in no way involved?
which had a role limited to the litigation? I think that takes them out of it, unless they knew something they didn't report.







These are factors the court must weigh in considering the public interest prong of winter. while here we are not dealing with an injunction, the clean and lien seems to be based on the equitable powers of the court.



Monday, April 29, 2024

 to mayor Joe Hogsett

re h + h abuse.

hi. my name is Robbin Stewart.

in Stewart v Taylor, 1997, I won a case against the Marion County Election Board on a free speech issue. Since you used to be Indiana's Secretary of State, this might interest you.

The issue was whether a sign saying "Robbin Stewart for Township Board Vote Tuesday" was protected by either the Indiana Constitution or the First Amendment. The court agreed on the First Amendment issue and did not reach the state claims. 

Now it is 2024 and I am again running for township board, and again distributing signs that say Robbin Stewart for Township Board Vote Tuesday. My signs are protected speech under the Indiana constitution.

As the Mayor, you have a bully pulpit to be able to resolve these concerns, if you choose to get involved. In the Mulholland case, on a closely related issue, the city spent $70,000 to settle the case. There is similar exposure here. 

There's an unusual wrinkle. After I won Stewart v Taylor, I was sued 58 times by your Health + Hospital department. Some would say that this creates an appearance of impropriety. They are planning to do a "clean and lien" in two weeks. I think this is bad optics. Perhaps you can encourage H + H to back off a tad while we work out some election law issues. 

Circa 2010 I bought a vacant shack on Rt 40 for $7,500. I installed a bit of plumbing and electricity, fixed some of the holes in the roof, and have been able to use it both as a base for my little recycling business and as a place to live. I have been able at times to provide housing for the otherwise unhoused, such as our mutual friend Mark Smith.

I used to try to do organic farming and provide community parks and playgrounds, but too much hassle from H + H made this unfeasable and I have lost those properties. I have been destitute most of the time since then as the result of this hassle. I am currently elderly and both physically and mentally somewhat disabled. The harassment by H + H continues to be extremely stressful. I was diagnosed in 2001 by H + H with major depression, a life threatening disease. Stress aggravates the depression, and at times my behavior can become erratic. 

It is important to me that they leave me alone. A man's home is his castle. Perhaps you could suggest they back off a bit.

short outline of a motion to the court. first draft; never file a first draft.

cc gupta ij.org Rutherford institute indybar Adam lawyer

This is an emergency motion for a 30 day extension of time in which to retain new counsel. The alternative would be that I would have to proceed pro se and file my own motions. I am aware pro se litigants can be a burden on the court, and I would prefer to avoid this. I can afford counsel, but do not know anyone who practices in this area, and it could take a reasonable time.

Following a hearing in march, the court took the matter under advisement and issued an order for a clean and lien.

I had retained counsel, and we had plans to file a motion for reconsideration and then, if denied, an interlocutory appeal, on the issue of the standard of evidence. 

On Thursday, I received an email from counsel that he is withdrawing from the practice of law. While I was aware he had been on probation, this was unexpected, and we had not made any succession planning.

I am writing this Monday evening. 

He has not formally filed a motion to withdraw yet.  

I can assure the court that this is not some scheme we cooked up for delay. 

There are some courts which would be unwilling to accept a filing or motion from a defendant after an appearance has been entered. 

The Indiana constitution allows a party to be heard by themself "and by counsel." The case law limits this principle in most cases, and a party must speak through their counsel, but here the distinguishing factors include that I am a  member of the bar, and counsel has effectively withdrawn. I would be within my rights to "fire" him. Instead I ask the court to just recognize the situation, and expect a motion for leave to withdraw in due time, and for new counsel to be substituted as soon as they can be retained. As to the status of the property, cleanup continues, but is not finished. 

I have one full time temporary employee, and several volunteers on site. Today it rained and we didn't get much done. The costs of the employee are not supported by the ordinary income of the recycling company, so are coming from capital, depleting the value of the business, but we put compliance with the court's order as a highest priority item, even if we disagree with it and intend to keep litigating the issue, if counsel can be found.  

Perhaps some recent photos will be attached as an exhibit. 

In the past 30 days, we have had forsythia, daffodils, apple cherry and plum blossoms, redbud, lionstooth, and other flowers. The tulips are late this year but should blossom during may.


We have planted [alphabetize] onions, potatoes, shallots, peas, beans, marigold, chysanthemum, poppy, okra, tomatoes, squash, beets, pumpkins, melons, in the front and back yard. in a previous clean and lien the staff intentionally smashed up our cold frames, destroying the crop for the year, in addition to taking the 85 windows intended for the greenhouse. The result of that was here in 2024 we still don't have the greenhouse up. $25 x 85 = 1700 + 425 = $2125.   

we have several perennials including rose of Sharon hibiscus, and mint.

this year we have added rosemary, chives, several new kinds of mint, cumin, and other herbs.  it's Tuesday now. i'll take a walk or a drive. 

A clean and lien at this time, not in accordance with law, will work an inequitable hardship on a temporarily unrepresented party. 

In the event that the clean and lien is not postponed, I will be filing counterclaims under Article I sections 1, 11, 12, 16, and others, as well as the 4th 5th and 8th amendments. 

 No man's particular services shall be demanded, without just compensation: No man's property shall be taken by law, without just compensation; nor, except in case of the State, without such compensation first assessed and tendered.

It is difficult for me to work in the yard all day while simultaneously acting as my own lawyer. I'm a little rusty at this sort of thing; for example I don't even know how to electronically file.

Based on my notes from my conversations with my former lawyer, I am capable of submitting a motion for reconsideration. I am less confident of my ability to correctly handle the procedures for the interlocutory review. In both cases I would prefer that the filings be prepared by an attorney, other than myself. 


 Please extend me 30 days in which to find new counsel.

This motion [ ] is [ ] is not opposed by opposing counsel.

Respectfully submitted, Robbin Stewart. 


 reading g chiu, listing the cases they rely on, which are the wrong cases. 8:22 April 29. 2024. been at it over 20 minutes.

Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. at 463

We hold that the district court acted within its discretion to conclude that Plaintiffs did not establish a likelihood of success on the merits.

 The district court applied “exacting scrutiny,” which “requires a ‘substantial relation’ between the disclosure requirement and a ‘sufficiently important’ governmental interest.” Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 366–67 (2010) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976) (per curiam)). On de novo review, Fyock, 779 F.3d at 995, we hold that exacting scrutiny is the correct legal standard.


Plaintiffs seek a preliminary injunction on the ground that the secondary-contributor disclaimer requirement violates the First Amendment. We hold that the district court acted within its discretion to conclude that Plaintiffs did not establish a likelihood of success on the merits. The district court applied “exacting scrutiny,” which “requires a ‘substantial relation’ between the disclosure requirement and a ‘sufficiently important’ governmental interest.” 

note the bait and switch! legerdemain, attempted clever wordplay. apples and volcanos.

both words begin with the five letters "discl", but they are two completely different things. rookie mistake, or deliberate evil.

Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 366–67 (2010) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976) (per curiam)). O


next bait and switch: cite CU again!

In the electoral context, both the Supreme Court and our court have consistently applied exacting scrutiny to compelled disclosure requirements and on-advertisement disclaimer requirements. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 366–67 (holding that disclaimer and disclosure requirements are subject to exacting scrutiny); 

Lie! TCU did not hold that. It mentioned it in passing in dicta.

so the structure of the 9th circuit opinion, as mouthpiece for campaign legal center, is as follows:

1. Don't mention Barnette, Talley, tornillo, Woodley, Talley and McIntyre.

Instead, focus on a three sentence ambiguous passage in dicta in CU taken out of context, while ignoring the rest of the CU decision, which upheld strict scrutiny. 

It is my sense that this is an untenuous approach. let's see where it goes. 

the next case it cites is Reed, John Doe No. 1 v. Reed,, which is a disclosure case that is not a disclaimer case.

the next cases it cites are Reed, Buckley, Davis v fec. in McIntyre, the Court reversed the Ohio supreme court's use of Buckley and intermediate scrutiny. I have forgotten the issue in Davis, it's the millionaire's amendment case. ok, in Davis, at the end of the opinion, it found disclosure unconstitutional under the buckley/bonta standard.

similarly, under that approach, the California regulation would fail as well. however, Davis is a disclosure case, not a disclaimer case, so it adds little to the discussion here.

 The remaining issue that we must consider is the constitutionality of §319(b)’s disclosure requirements. “[W]e have repeatedly found that compelled disclosure, in itself, can seriously infringe on privacy of association and belief guaranteed by the First Amendment.” Buckley, 424 U. S., at 64. As a result, we have closely scrutinized disclosure requirements, including requirements governing independent expenditures made to further individuals’ political speech. Id., at 75. To survive this scrutiny, significant encroachments “cannot be justified by a mere showing of some legitimate governmental interest.” Id., at 64. Instead, there must be “a ‘relevant correlation’ or ‘substantial relation’ between the governmental interest and the information required to be disclosed,” and the governmental interest “must survive exacting scrutiny.” Ibid. (footnotes omitted). That is, the strength of the governmental interest must reflect the seriousness of the actual burden on First Amendment rights. Id., at 68, 71.

   The §319(b) disclosure requirements were designed to implement the asymmetrical contribution limits provided for in §319(a), and as discussed above, §319(a) violates the First Amendment. In light of that holding, the burden imposed by the §319(b) requirements cannot be justified, and it follows that they too are unconstitutional.

if the disclosure provisions of Davis were unconstitutional under a much more permissive test, it is unlikely that the San Francisco regulations will survive the much stricter exacting scrutiny test as used in grant v Meyer and McIntyre v Ohio.

ok, next?

brumsickle, an erroneous case that supports their position.

 see also Family PAC v. McKenna, 685 F.3d 800, 805–06 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Disclosure requirements are subject to exacting scrutiny, don't know that one.

Plaintiffs take the position that disclaimer and disclosure are “terms of art,” and argue that the City’s ordinance should be reviewed under strict scrutiny because it is a “hybrid disclaimer/disclosure requirement.” 

[Plaintiffs are correct.]

But Plaintiffs cite no authority that makes a similar distinction.7

[maybe. so we provide a little, ACLF being the best case, supported by tables one and 2. oh! McIntyre is the authority that makes that distinction. in McIntyre, the court specifically rejected the use of disclosure lax review from Buckley for the kiss of death strictest most exacting scrutiny.

did plaintiffs not cite McIntyre? I suspect they did.

oh there's footnote 7:

See, e.g., Gaspee Project v. Mederos, 13 F.4th 79, 95 (1st Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 2647 (2022); Smith v. Helzer, No. 3:22-CV-00077-SLG, 2022 WL 2757421, at *10 (D. Alaska July 14, 2022), appeal docketed, No. 22-35612 (9th Cir. argued Feb. 9, 2023). We hold that Americans for Prosperity Foundation does not alter the existing exacting scrutiny standard.

what gaspee and helzer have in  common is the same set of lawyers and the same set of lies. 

But Plaintiffs cite no authority that makes a similar distinction.7 Indeed, they acknowledge that the Supreme Court has applied exacting scrutiny to both disclosure rules, John Doe No. 1, 561 U.S. at 196, and disclaimer requirements, Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 366–67. 

[the court is correct here. plaintiffs concede far too much. plaintiffs seem to want to test bonta, rather than relying on McIntyre and such. that's why I need to file this amicus, and may need to intervene. however, grant v Meyer exacting scrutiny is enough. better pull that up Jamie.

Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414 (1988)

When I lived in Colorado in the 1980s I met Paul Grant via the Libertarian Party. Later we both became lawyers.
In Meyer v Grant (1988) and then Buckley v ACLF (1999?) the Court upheld Grant's right to pay petitioners, and to not have them have to wear disclaimer nametags. 

Grant had the idea that while the Libertarian party was not winning at the polls, Colorado's citizen initiative process could be used to win victories on popular libertarian issues, including trucking deregulation, property tax reform, and marijuana legalization. A majority of states now allow medical or adult use marijuana based in large part on Grant's strategy. As a disabled senior citizen, being able to obtain medical marijuana inexpensively in nearby Michigan is an example of the personal freedoms the Libertarians fought for. 

The Meyer v Grant case sheds light on how versatile the exacting scrutiny standard is:

"The First Amendment is a value-free provision whose protection is not dependent on 'the truth, popularity, or social utility of the ideas and beliefs which are offered.' NAACP v. Button, [371 U.S. 415371 U. S. 445 (1963)]."

"The very purpose of the First Amendment is to foreclose public authority from assuming a guardianship of the public mind. . . . In this field, every person must be his

Page 486 U. S. 420

own watchman for truth, because the forefathers did not trust any government to separate the true from the false for us."

Having decided to confer the right, the State was obligated to do so in a manner consistent with the Constitution, because ... this case involves "core political speech."

U.S. Supreme Court

Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414 (1988)Meyer v. Grant

No. 87-920

Argued April 25, 1988

Decided June 6, 1988

486 U.S. 414

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE TENTH CIRCUIT

Syllabus

A Colorado statute allows a proposed state constitutional amendment to be placed on a general election ballot if its proponents can obtain the signatures of at least 5 percent of the total number of qualified voters on an "initiative petition" within a 6-month period, but makes it a felony to pay petition circulators. Concluding that they would need the assistance of paid personnel to obtain the required signatures within the allotted time, appellee proponents of a constitutional amendment that would remove motor carriers from the Colorado Public Utilities Commission's jurisdiction brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against appellant state officials, seeking a declaration that the statutory payment prohibition violated their First Amendment rights. The District Court upheld the statute, but the Court of Appeals ultimately reversed, holding that the statute violates the First Amendment, as made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment.

Held: The statutory prohibition against the use of paid circulators abridges appellees' right to engage in political speech in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Pp. 486 U. S. 420-428.

(a) The statute is subject to exacting scrutiny, since the circulation of an initiative petition seeking to deregulate the Colorado trucking industry necessarily constitutes "core political speech," for which First Amendment protection is at its zenith. The statute burdens such speech in two ways: First, it limits the number of voices who will convey appellees' message and the hours they can speak and, therefore, limits the size of the audience they can reach. Second, it makes it less likely that appellees will garner the number of necessary signatures, thus limiting their ability to make the matter the focus of statewide discussion. The statute's burden on speech is not relieved by the fact that other avenues of expression remain open to appellees, since the use of paid circulators is the most effective, fundamental, and perhaps economical means of achieving direct, one-on-one communication, and appellees' right to utilize that means is itself protected by the First Amendment. Nor is the statutory burden rendered acceptable by the State's claimed authority to impose limitations on the scope of the state-created right to legislate by initiative; the power to ban initiatives entirely does not include

Page 486 U. S. 415

the power to limit discussion of political issues raised in initiative petitions. Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U. S. 328, distinguished. Pp. 486 U. S. 420-425.

(b) The State has failed to sustain its burden of justifying the statutory prohibition. The argument that justification is found in the State's interest in assuring that an initiative has sufficient grass roots support to be placed on the ballot is not persuasive, since that interest is adequately protected by the requirement that the specified number of signatures be obtained. Nor does the State's claimed interest in protecting the integrity of the initiative process justify the prohibition, because the State has failed to demonstrate the necessity of burdening appellees' ability to communicate in order to meet its concerns. It cannot be assumed that a professional circulator -- whose qualifications for similar future assignments may well depend on a reputation for competence and integrity -- is any more likely to accept false signatures than a volunteer motivated entirely by an interest in having the proposition placed on the ballot. Moreover, other statutory provisions dealing expressly with the potential danger of false signatures are adequate to minimize the risk of improper circulation conduct. Pp. 486 U. S. 425-428.

828 F.2d 1446, affirmed.

STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.

In Colorado, the proponents of a new law, or an amendment to the State Constitution, may have their proposal placed on the ballot at a general election if they can obtain enough signatures of qualified voters on an "initiative petition" within

Page 486 U. S. 416

a 6-month period. One section of the state law regulating the initiative process makes it a felony to pay petition circulators. [Footnote 1] The question in this case is whether that provision is unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, sitting en banc, held that the statute abridged appellees' right to engage in political speech, and therefore violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal Constitution. We agree.

IColorado is one of several States that permits its citizens to place propositions on the ballot through an initiative process. Colo.Const., Art. V, § 1; Colo.Rev.Stat. §§ 1-40-101 to 1-40-119 (1980 and Supp.1987). Under Colorado law, proponents of an initiative measure must submit the measure to the State Legislative Council and the Legislative Drafting Office for review and comment. The draft is then submitted to a three-member title board, which prepares a title, submission clause, and summary. After approval of the title, submission clause, and summary, the proponents of the measure then have six months to obtain the necessary signatures, which must be in an amount equal to at least five percent of the total number of voters who cast votes for all candidates for the Office of Secretary of State at the last preceding general election. If the signature requirements are met, the petitions may be filed with the Secretary of State, and the measure will appear on the ballot at the next general election. Colo.Rev.Stat. §§ 1-40-101 to 1-40-105 (1980 and Supp.1987).

Page 486 U. S. 417

State law requires that the persons who circulate the approved drafts of the petitions for signature be registered voters. Colo.Const., Art. V, § 1(6). Before the signed petitions are filed with the Secretary of State, the circulators must sign affidavits attesting that each signature is the signature of the person whose name it purports to be and that, to the best of their knowledge and belief, each person signing the petition is a registered voter. Colo.Rev.Stat. § 1-40-109 (Supp.1987). The payment of petition circulators is punished as a felony. Colo.Rev.Stat. § 1-40-110 (1980), n. 1, supra.

Appellees are proponents of an amendment to the Colorado Constitution that would remove motor carriers from the jurisdiction of the Colorado Public Utilities Commission. In early 1984, they obtained approval of a title, submission clause, and summary for a measure proposing the amendment, and began the process of obtaining the 46,737 signatures necessary to have the proposal appear on the November, 1984, ballot. Based on their own experience as petition circulators, as well as that of other unpaid circulators, appellees concluded that they would need the assistance of paid personnel to obtain the required number of signatures within the allotted time. They then brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Secretary of State and the Attorney General of Colorado, seeking a declaration that the statutory prohibition against the use of paid circulators violates their rights under the First Amendment. [Footnote 2]

Page 486 U. S. 418

After a brief trial, the District Judge entered judgment upholding the statute on alternative grounds. First, he concluded that the prohibition against the use of paid circulators did not burden appellees' First Amendment rights because it did not place any restraint on their own expression or measurably impair efforts to place initiatives on the ballot. [Footnote 3] The restriction on their ability to hire paid circulators to speak for them was not significant, because they remained free to use their money to employ other spokesmen who could advertise their cause. Second, even assuming, arguendo, that the statute burdened appellees' right to engage in political speech, the District Judge concluded that the burden was justified by the State's interests in (a) making sure that an

Page 486 U. S. 419

initiative measure has a sufficiently broad base to warrant its placement on the ballot, and (b) protecting the integrity of the initiative process by eliminating a temptation to pad petitions.

A divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed for the reasons stated by the District Court. After granting rehearing en banc, however, the court reversed. The en banc majority concluded that the record demonstrated that petition circulators engage in the communication of ideas while they are obtaining signatures, and that the available pool of circulators is necessarily smaller if only volunteers can be used.

"Thus, the effect of the statute's absolute ban on compensation of solicitors is clear. It impedes the sponsors' opportunity to disseminate their views to the public. It curtails the discussion of issues that normally accompanies the circulation of initiative petitions. And it shrinks the size of the audience that can be reached. . . . In short, like the campaign expenditure limitations struck down in Buckley, the Colorado statute imposes a direct restriction which 'necessarily reduces the quantity of expression. . . .' Buckley, 424 U.S. at 424 U. S. 19."

828 F.2d 1446, 1453-1454 (CA10 1987) (citations omitted).

The Court of Appeals then rejected the State's asserted justifications for the ban. It first rejected the suggestion that the ban was necessary either to prevent fraud or to protect the public from circulators that might be too persuasive:

"The First Amendment is a value-free provision whose protection is not dependent on 'the truth, popularity, or social utility of the ideas and beliefs which are offered.' NAACP v. Button, [371 U.S. 415371 U. S. 445 (1963)]."

"The very purpose of the First Amendment is to foreclose public authority from assuming a guardianship of the public mind. . . . In this field, every person must be his

Page 486 U. S. 420

own watchman for truth, because the forefathers did not trust any government to separate the true from the false for us."

"Thomas v. Collins, [323 U.S. 516323 U. S. 545 (1945)] (Jackson, J., concurring)."

Id. at 1455. The court then rejected the suggestion that the ban was needed to assure that the initiative had a broad base of public support because, in the court's view, that interest was adequately protected by the requirement that the petition be signed by five percent of the State's eligible voters. Finally, the Court of Appeals rejected an argument advanced by a dissenting judge that, since Colorado had no obligation to afford its citizens an initiative procedure, it could impose this condition on its use. Having decided to confer the right, the State was obligated to do so in a manner consistent with the Constitution, because, unlike Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U. S. 328 (1986), which involved only commercial speech, this case involves "core political speech."

IIWe fully agree with the Court of Appeals' conclusion that this case involves a limitation on political expression subject to exacting scrutiny. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1424 U. S. 45 (1976). The First Amendment provides that Congress

"shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."

The Fourteenth Amendment makes that prohibition applicable to the State of Colorado. As we explained in Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88310 U. S. 95 (1940),

"[t]he freedom of speech and of the press, which are secured by the First Amendment against abridgment by the United States, are among the fundamental personal rights and liberties which are secured to all persons by the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgment by a State. "

Page 486 U. S. 421

Unquestionably, whether the trucking industry should be deregulated in Colorado is a matter of societal concern that appellees have a right to discuss publicly without risking criminal sanctions.

"The freedom of speech and of the press guaranteed by the Constitution embraces at the least the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully all matters of public concern without previous restraint or fear of subsequent punishment."

Id. at 310 U. S. 101-102. The First Amendment "was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people." Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476354 U. S. 484 (1957). Appellees seek by petition to achieve political change in Colorado; their right freely to engage in discussions concerning the need for that change is guarded by the First Amendment.

 The First Amendment protects appellees' right not only to advocate their cause, but also to select what they believe to be the most effective means for so doing.
Here, by contrast, the speech at issue is "at the core of our electoral process and of the First Amendment freedoms," Buckley, [424 U.S. at 424 U. S. 39 (quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S. 23393 U. S. 32 (1968))] -- an area of public policy where protection of robust discussion is at its zenith."
We agree with the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the statute trenches upon an area in which the importance of First Amendment protections is "at its zenith." For that reason the burden that Colorado must overcome to justify this criminal law is well nigh insurmountable.















6 In ACLU of Nevada v. Heller, 378 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2004), we held that strict scrutiny applied to statutes that affect the content of election communications. 378 F.3d at 987. But we have since acknowledged that intervening Supreme Court decisions clarified that we apply exacting scrutiny to disclosure and disclaimer requirements. See Brumsickle, 624 F.3d at 1005 (citing John Doe No. 1, 561 U.S. at 196, and Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 366–67). 7 Citing Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. B

the State's interest in protecting the integrity of the initiative process does not justify the prohibition because the State has failed to demonstrate that it is necessary to burden appellees' ability to communicate their message in order to meet its concerns. 

"[L]egislative restrictions on advocacy of the election or defeat of political candidates are wholly at odds with the guarantees of the First Amendment."

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 424 U. S. 50. That principle applies equally to "the discussion of political policy generally or advocacy of the passage or defeat of legislation." Id. at 424 U. S. 48. The Colorado statute prohibiting the payment of petition circulators imposes a burden on political expression that the State has failed to justify. The Court of Appeals correctly held that the statute violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Its judgment is therefore affirmed.

It is so ordered.

"[L]egislative restrictions on advocacy of the election or defeat of political candidates are wholly at odds with the guarantees of the First Amendment."

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 424 U. S. 50.

footnotes

But the fact that advocacy may persuade the electorate is hardly a reason to suppress it. . . ."

"[T]he concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment. . . ."

"Buckley, 424 U.S. at 424 U. S. 48-49. . . . [T]he people in our democracy are entrusted with the responsibility for judging and evaluating the relative merits of conflicting arguments."

Cf. Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U. S. 45456 U. S. 60 (1982) ("The State's fear that voters might make an ill-advised choice does not provide the State with a compelling justification for limiting speech").

I had been thinking this was 8 am Tuesday morning but it was still Monday night.

“This type of scrutiny is necessary even if any deterrent effect on the exercise of First Amendment rights arises, not through direct government action, but indirectly as an unintended but inevitable result of the government’s conduct in requiring disclosure.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 65.

note here this is Buckley, talking about disclosure, so it has very little to do with a disclaimer case, which has a whole different set of rules, also called exacting scrutiny.

now watch how the next sentence attempts another bait and switch, by trying to fool the reader into thinking Buckley was a disclaimer case:

“This type of scrutiny is necessary even if any deterrent effect on the exercise of First Amendment rights arises, not through direct government action, but indirectly as an unintended but inevitable result of the government’s conduct in requiring disclosure.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 65. wrong cite i'll try again.


Courts have upheld other laws, even where there was some deterrent effect, because “[d]isclaimer and disclosure requirements may burden the ability to speak, but they ‘impose no ceiling on campaign-related activities,’ Buckley, 424 U.S., at 64, and ‘do not prevent anyone from speaking,’ McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 201 (2003).” Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 366 (citations altered).

Buckley v Valeo, unlike Buckley v ACLF, is not a disclaimer case. mcconnell, like CU, is an express advocacy case, and is not on point here. 

whatever effect McConnell had in 2003 has been eroded in a death of 1000 cuts. Bcra has never been found unconstitutional in totality, but it has been sliced and diced by cases such as Cruz, Davis, cu, wrtl I + II.

Its relevance to disclaimer cases has been eroded by newer and controlling free speech cases, including Reed v city of Gilbert (hey look, they have the wrong Reed as well as the wrong Buckley.]

Janus, NIFLA, 303, see also Masterpeice Cake shop, decided on other grounds. 

To survive exacting scrutiny, a law must satisfy all three steps of the inquiry. The threshold question is whether there is a “substantial relation” between the challenged law and a “sufficiently important” governmental interest. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 366–67 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see Ams. for Prosperity Found., 141 S. Ct. at 2384 (describing a substantial relation as “necessary but not sufficient”).

Courts have long recognized the governmental interest in the disclosure of the sources of campaign funding: [D]isclosure provides the electorate with information as to where political campaign money comes from and how it is spent by

the court errs here. under McIntyre and 303, the states interest must be overriding or compelling, not merely important.  

agree:

Next, “[t]o withstand this scrutiny, the strength of the governmental interest must reflect the seriousness of the actual burden on First Amendment rights.”

 


Courts have long recognized the governmental interest in the disclosure of the sources of campaign funding: [D]isclosure provides the electorate with information as to where political campaign money comes from and how it is spent by..

hey look! a bait and switch! the court here is talking about disclosures when it should be talking about disclaimers. disclaimers and dyslexia and disclosure are each different things and should not be randomly substituted for each other. they are terms of art. words have meaning and power. 


in McIntyre the court rejected an informational interest as satisfying exacting scrutiny. San Francisco cannot refight this battle, unless it chooses to join texas in a succession or nullification controversy. 


“[T]he people in our democracy are entrusted with the responsibility for judging and evaluating the relative merits of conflicting arguments.” agree. San Francisco cannot substitute its judgements for those of its people. San Francisco cannot dictate the text of political signs, in either sense of the word dictate.

Understanding what entity is funding a communication allows citizens to make informed choices in the political marketplace. Alaska Right to Life Comm. v. Miles, 441 F.3d 773, 793 (9th Cir. 2006)

isn't that just an express advocacy case? I forget its details right now.

10:20 pm Monday night. been at this a while. still raining.

We have “repeatedly recognized an important (and even compelling) informational interest in requiring ballot measure committees to disclose information about contributions.” Family PAC, 685 F.3d at 806. Disclosure of who is speaking “enables the electorate to make informed decisions and give proper weight to different speakers and messages.” Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 371. “

however disclosure and disclaimers are two completely different things. oh look! it's the CU bait and switch again. I wonder, just wonder, if campaign legal center filed any briefs in family pack. off to do a bit of research.

family pack is a wash state bopp case. not a disclaimer case.

William R. Maurer, Seattle, WA; William H. Mellor and Paul M. Sherman, Arlington, VA, for amicus curiae Institute for Justice. so it does not support the court's opinion at all.

---

3 See, e.g., Jenkins v. Waldron, 11 Johns. 114, 191–92 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1814); Rail v. Potts, 27 Tenn. (8 Hum.) 225, 226 (1847); Long v. Long, 10 N.W. 875, 875 (Iowa 1881); Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 U.S. 58, 64 (1900); Wayne v. Venable, 260 F. 64, 66 (8th Cir. 1919); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 269 (1939). 

these are cases Hasen found in a Harvard student note. they are old cases in which people got (or tried to get) damages for voting wrongs.