Monday list
make signs
star bank to chase $4k.
get 327 info.
post signs.
this is not a public blog, just a place hwere i can leave myself notes. nothing to see here folks, move along.
Thursday. it ate my short list.
here's a longer one.
rent at circle city. forgot!
tomorrow is first Friday,
buy that 329 s oxford house - x drive by again.
x trash containers. no, jordan today.
x washed bathroom floor
paid storage unit
rent bigger storage unit tomorrow. $150/mo.
got cans together.. too late for today.
got laundry together, too late for today. we did some.
it ate my post. I have to write all this again.
329 s oxford
hay Tom, here's an idea for a birthday present for Bert.
write a letter to Michigan Technological University offering to buy Alberta Michigan and change the name to 'bert' Michigan, then lease it back to the college for $1 year.
It could also be the site of future the cabin episodes.
Alberta Michigan was founded by Henry Ford, and has an interesting history and some useful rules Bert will enjoy, such as the no Jews policy. Bertopia.
There is a cute girl who did a YouTube video about the town, and you might like to have her as a podcast guest to discuss the idea. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KgrlU6D4l-s
If the college says no, the letter itself is the gift, that you tried to buy Bert a town.
But if they say yes, in your price range, do it.
=
hey Tom,
here's another idea for what to get bert for his birthday.
here's what you tell bert:
we heard you built a second house, and maybe you're buying a small town, and we have our racing division, and we fly private a lot, so spouse and I were thinking about your ecological footprint [it's like bigfoot] so we thought a nice thing to do would be to get you some solar panels that would generate as much electricty as you use. so we asked leeann how much your electric bill was, and we asked ( ) our crew how big a solar panel we need, and we bought some cheap land out in the desert near the Salton Sea, and we built the panels, and it's a tax write-off.
Oh, and we've booked you a hot air balloon flight if you want to fly over it and see what it looks like, or we could just use the drone footage. [a blimp would be extra, maybe bill Burr in a helicopter, maybe just pretend it's bill and use a drone.]
=
ok, now the reveal here is that the solar panels spell out "BERT". Also, it comes with the rest of hitler's teaset.
Beert. A new line of double strength beers.
150 tsla
124 church. leased at 2k/Mo after repairs, for a 15 year rent to buy deal. [need to contact lawyer.]
124 house 398
25k oil 448002
bank accounts $15k? 463002.
25k mom's oil. (trust)
[future trust 270k.]
$1 law firm
jd, llm, admitted 7th circuit, Marion county bar association, representative case majors v abell (cite), Stewart v Taylor. no employees. home office.
current cases include Doe v Hendrix, Doe v Carroll county, not yet filed. to do, meet with Jim kimek.
$1 recycling company.
vehicle. tools. inventory, storage unit, goodwill, accounts receivable.
$1 pending lawsuits. counterclaims, Marion county, plasma center, what else?
2023 income summary
step 1 gross income from all sources
wages, royalties, interest, social security, plasma, scrapyard, medical experiments, gift, bequest.
wages 5, royalties 5, interest 1, social security 7, plasma 2, scrapyard, $300, medical experiments 1150, gift 1, bequest (300).
so 11, 7, 2, .300, 1.150, 1, (300) so 20,300 + 2, 150 so $22, 150 in gross income, plus a $300,000 bequest from my mother's estate.
deductions: interest 1k, is social security taxed?
ok, apparently I don't have to pay tax on the 7k sss. that makes it even easier.
plasma and gift not taxed 3k, so reduce gross by 4 k, now 18, 150. now law office expenses, 1k medical experiments 1k salvage company 1 k. now $15, 150. net income. am i forgetting $1000 here somewhere? yes! texas taxes $800. so now $14, 350 net income.
if i take a trip to texas in 2025, i can deduct the miles.
oil related expenses: laptop, mapping software,
less 13, 850 personal exemption = $500 in taxable income.
step 2 deductions
step 3 net income
wages 5k.(taxes and FICA paid)
oil 5k
ss $7k 17k.
$1k gift
[$300k bequest.]
plasma $1k untaxed.
deductions - law office $1k
medical studies $1k expenses.
$900 medical study income.
$16k income. possible $1k more deductions if needed. what about mileage, hotels, per diems ?
personal deduction $14k for 2023?
$13,850 for single or married filing separately
so income of $15-16K, less 13, 850 = 1,150 to 2, 150 in taxable income. plus whatever the state tax is.
already paid FICA on the self-employment portion. no FICA needed on oil, interest.
already paid federal and state on the 5k of wages.
763002 including the trust.
to file:
federal, state, local.
$1k in interest and bank bonuses. < what deductions apply against this income? internet, computer, $600, $200. so already $800, let's just take this off. so 14-15K in income. - 13,850 in personal exemption/deduction. so $200 to $1200 in taxable income, already paid on wages. not looking to get a refund check, just want to file for compliance reasons.
any rent? no?
second draft: make it simpler. cut words. few words goods, eschew sesquipedalian tendencies.
draft: to rick, or any tax preparer.
re: 2023 income taxes, federal and state, for robbin stewart.
step 1: here are my numbers.
step 2: feed into taxact, taxhawk, etc. , some free software, to generatre a proposed tax return.
keep it confidential.
if needed, prepare a motion and memo asking for penalties to be waived. explain we were waiting on a trust return. amend 2022 filing.
still to do: review compliance history, see if any interest accruing, any unresolved penalties.
to rick: recently in inherited a bit of money, so instead of doing my taxes myself on the back of an envelope as usual, i want to step up my game and hire a lawyer or accountant or tax preparer or bookkeeper or something of that sort.
here is that back of an envelope calculation:
taxable income: $500. nope, $650, forgot remainder.
gross income other than bequest: 22,000 + remainder. remainder = 150. gross income of $22, 150
net income otb $14, 350. nope 14,500
personal deduction 13, 850.
ergo taxable income of $650.
already paid by deductions on $5k of wages.
dont need a refund, just a proper return.
oh! add that form from bumpers about trust income. might be another 900 or whatever.
is there a 1% city tax on the bequest?
if we can accomplish this task of filing my 2023 taxes, we can then look into past years, which may need amended returns.
second draft: make it simpler. cut words. few words goods, eschew sesquipedalian tendencies.
hi Rick. can you help me file?
I had taxable income in 2023 of $650, based on gross income of
$22,130, net income of $14,500, and a personal exemption of 13, 850.
I also have a form I something from my late mother's trust account, of which I am a beneficiary. That was the point at which I decided I should consult a professional; I have not done one of these before.
I also had a check from my sister, a bequest from my mother, which is apparently not taxed. I can provide details as needed.
Cordially AA
$1 16th Street property.
$1 campaign account.
liabilities:
taxes $10k h+h lien,
hey! is there a lien on my property? get a title report.
get proof of what happened with the tax auction. seek an accounting of unpaid funds.
re-read that unclean hands memo.
[I took some time off to work in the yard till say 11 15. this is Tuesday morning 4/30/24.]
Susie Talevski, Attorney, Susie Talevski, Attorney At Law, Valparaiso, IN, Andrew Tutt, Attorney, Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff-Appellant. Lawrence Saul Robbins, Alan E. Untereiner, Attorneys, Robbins, Russell, Englert, Orseck & Untereiner LLP, Washington, DC, for Defendants-Appellees. Maame Gyamfi, William Alvarado Rivera, Attorneys, AARP Foundation Litigation, Washington, DC, for Amici Curiae American Association of Retired Persons, AARP Foundation, California Advocates for Nursing Home Reform, Center for Medicare Advocac
==
bingo! [cue naked gun scene] https://casetext.com/case/talevski-v-health-and-hospital-corporation-of-marion-county
talevski 7th circuit. so I can spend up to 20 minutes today reading that, instead of doing laundry. it would be better to do both. almost noon. and the laptop stopped charging again.
Tuesday goals:
Jim kimec
trash containers. pile of trash. headlight? kankan bathhouse.
hire a private detective to investigate Gupta.
write up the counterclaims.
Text of Section 1: Inherent Rights WE DECLARE, That all people are created equal; that they are endowed by their CREATOR with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; that all power is inherent in the people; and that all free governments are, and of right ought to be, founded on their authority, and instituted for their peace, safety, and well-being. For the advancement of these ends, the people have, at all times, an indefeasible right to alter and reform their government.[1]
|
to mayor Joe Hogsett
re h + h abuse.
hi. my name is Robbin Stewart.
in Stewart v Taylor, 1997, I won a case against the Marion County Election Board on a free speech issue. Since you used to be Indiana's Secretary of State, this might interest you.
The issue was whether a sign saying "Robbin Stewart for Township Board Vote Tuesday" was protected by either the Indiana Constitution or the First Amendment. The court agreed on the First Amendment issue and did not reach the state claims.
Now it is 2024 and I am again running for township board, and again distributing signs that say Robbin Stewart for Township Board Vote Tuesday. My signs are protected speech under the Indiana constitution.
As the Mayor, you have a bully pulpit to be able to resolve these concerns, if you choose to get involved. In the Mulholland case, on a closely related issue, the city spent $70,000 to settle the case. There is similar exposure here.
There's an unusual wrinkle. After I won Stewart v Taylor, I was sued 58 times by your Health + Hospital department. Some would say that this creates an appearance of impropriety. They are planning to do a "clean and lien" in two weeks. I think this is bad optics. Perhaps you can encourage H + H to back off a tad while we work out some election law issues.
Circa 2010 I bought a vacant shack on Rt 40 for $7,500. I installed a bit of plumbing and electricity, fixed some of the holes in the roof, and have been able to use it both as a base for my little recycling business and as a place to live. I have been able at times to provide housing for the otherwise unhoused, such as our mutual friend Mark Smith.
I used to try to do organic farming and provide community parks and playgrounds, but too much hassle from H + H made this unfeasable and I have lost those properties. I have been destitute most of the time since then as the result of this hassle. I am currently elderly and both physically and mentally somewhat disabled. The harassment by H + H continues to be extremely stressful. I was diagnosed in 2001 by H + H with major depression, a life threatening disease. Stress aggravates the depression, and at times my behavior can become erratic.
It is important to me that they leave me alone. A man's home is his castle. Perhaps you could suggest they back off a bit.
short outline of a motion to the court. first draft; never file a first draft.
cc gupta ij.org Rutherford institute indybar Adam lawyer
This is an emergency motion for a 30 day extension of time in which to retain new counsel. The alternative would be that I would have to proceed pro se and file my own motions. I am aware pro se litigants can be a burden on the court, and I would prefer to avoid this. I can afford counsel, but do not know anyone who practices in this area, and it could take a reasonable time.
Following a hearing in march, the court took the matter under advisement and issued an order for a clean and lien.
I had retained counsel, and we had plans to file a motion for reconsideration and then, if denied, an interlocutory appeal, on the issue of the standard of evidence.
On Thursday, I received an email from counsel that he is withdrawing from the practice of law. While I was aware he had been on probation, this was unexpected, and we had not made any succession planning.
I am writing this Monday evening.
He has not formally filed a motion to withdraw yet.
I can assure the court that this is not some scheme we cooked up for delay.
There are some courts which would be unwilling to accept a filing or motion from a defendant after an appearance has been entered.
The Indiana constitution allows a party to be heard by themself "and by counsel." The case law limits this principle in most cases, and a party must speak through their counsel, but here the distinguishing factors include that I am a member of the bar, and counsel has effectively withdrawn. I would be within my rights to "fire" him. Instead I ask the court to just recognize the situation, and expect a motion for leave to withdraw in due time, and for new counsel to be substituted as soon as they can be retained. As to the status of the property, cleanup continues, but is not finished.
I have one full time temporary employee, and several volunteers on site. Today it rained and we didn't get much done. The costs of the employee are not supported by the ordinary income of the recycling company, so are coming from capital, depleting the value of the business, but we put compliance with the court's order as a highest priority item, even if we disagree with it and intend to keep litigating the issue, if counsel can be found.
Perhaps some recent photos will be attached as an exhibit.
In the past 30 days, we have had forsythia, daffodils, apple cherry and plum blossoms, redbud, lionstooth, and other flowers. The tulips are late this year but should blossom during may.
We have planted [alphabetize] onions, potatoes, shallots, peas, beans, marigold, chysanthemum, poppy, okra, tomatoes, squash, beets, pumpkins, melons, in the front and back yard. in a previous clean and lien the staff intentionally smashed up our cold frames, destroying the crop for the year, in addition to taking the 85 windows intended for the greenhouse. The result of that was here in 2024 we still don't have the greenhouse up. $25 x 85 = 1700 + 425 = $2125.
we have several perennials including rose of Sharon hibiscus, and mint.
this year we have added rosemary, chives, several new kinds of mint, cumin, and other herbs. it's Tuesday now. i'll take a walk or a drive.
A clean and lien at this time, not in accordance with law, will work an inequitable hardship on a temporarily unrepresented party.
In the event that the clean and lien is not postponed, I will be filing counterclaims under Article I sections 1, 11, 12, 16, and others, as well as the 4th 5th and 8th amendments.
No man's particular services shall be demanded, without just compensation: No man's property shall be taken by law, without just compensation; nor, except in case of the State, without such compensation first assessed and tendered.
It is difficult for me to work in the yard all day while simultaneously acting as my own lawyer. I'm a little rusty at this sort of thing; for example I don't even know how to electronically file.
Based on my notes from my conversations with my former lawyer, I am capable of submitting a motion for reconsideration. I am less confident of my ability to correctly handle the procedures for the interlocutory review. In both cases I would prefer that the filings be prepared by an attorney, other than myself.
Please extend me 30 days in which to find new counsel.
This motion [ ] is [ ] is not opposed by opposing counsel.
Respectfully submitted, Robbin Stewart.
reading g chiu, listing the cases they rely on, which are the wrong cases. 8:22 April 29. 2024. been at it over 20 minutes.
Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. at 463
We hold that the district court acted within its discretion to conclude that Plaintiffs did not establish a likelihood of success on the merits.
The district court applied “exacting scrutiny,” which “requires a ‘substantial relation’ between the disclosure requirement and a ‘sufficiently important’ governmental interest.” Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 366–67 (2010) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976) (per curiam)). On de novo review, Fyock, 779 F.3d at 995, we hold that exacting scrutiny is the correct legal standard.
Plaintiffs seek a preliminary injunction on the ground that the secondary-contributor disclaimer requirement violates the First Amendment. We hold that the district court acted within its discretion to conclude that Plaintiffs did not establish a likelihood of success on the merits. The district court applied “exacting scrutiny,” which “requires a ‘substantial relation’ between the disclosure requirement and a ‘sufficiently important’ governmental interest.”
note the bait and switch! legerdemain, attempted clever wordplay. apples and volcanos.
both words begin with the five letters "discl", but they are two completely different things. rookie mistake, or deliberate evil.
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 366–67 (2010) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976) (per curiam)). O
next bait and switch: cite CU again!
In the electoral context, both the Supreme Court and our court have consistently applied exacting scrutiny to compelled disclosure requirements and on-advertisement disclaimer requirements. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 366–67 (holding that disclaimer and disclosure requirements are subject to exacting scrutiny);
Lie! TCU did not hold that. It mentioned it in passing in dicta.
so the structure of the 9th circuit opinion, as mouthpiece for campaign legal center, is as follows:
1. Don't mention Barnette, Talley, tornillo, Woodley, Talley and McIntyre.
Instead, focus on a three sentence ambiguous passage in dicta in CU taken out of context, while ignoring the rest of the CU decision, which upheld strict scrutiny.
It is my sense that this is an untenuous approach. let's see where it goes.
the next case it cites is Reed, John Doe No. 1 v. Reed,, which is a disclosure case that is not a disclaimer case.
the next cases it cites are Reed, Buckley, Davis v fec. in McIntyre, the Court reversed the Ohio supreme court's use of Buckley and intermediate scrutiny. I have forgotten the issue in Davis, it's the millionaire's amendment case. ok, in Davis, at the end of the opinion, it found disclosure unconstitutional under the buckley/bonta standard.
similarly, under that approach, the California regulation would fail as well. however, Davis is a disclosure case, not a disclaimer case, so it adds little to the discussion here.
The remaining issue that we must consider is the constitutionality of §319(b)’s disclosure requirements. “[W]e have repeatedly found that compelled disclosure, in itself, can seriously infringe on privacy of association and belief guaranteed by the First Amendment.” Buckley, 424 U. S., at 64. As a result, we have closely scrutinized disclosure requirements, including requirements governing independent expenditures made to further individuals’ political speech. Id., at 75. To survive this scrutiny, significant encroachments “cannot be justified by a mere showing of some legitimate governmental interest.” Id., at 64. Instead, there must be “a ‘relevant correlation’ or ‘substantial relation’ between the governmental interest and the information required to be disclosed,” and the governmental interest “must survive exacting scrutiny.” Ibid. (footnotes omitted). That is, the strength of the governmental interest must reflect the seriousness of the actual burden on First Amendment rights. Id., at 68, 71.
The §319(b) disclosure requirements were designed to implement the asymmetrical contribution limits provided for in §319(a), and as discussed above, §319(a) violates the First Amendment. In light of that holding, the burden imposed by the §319(b) requirements cannot be justified, and it follows that they too are unconstitutional.
if the disclosure provisions of Davis were unconstitutional under a much more permissive test, it is unlikely that the San Francisco regulations will survive the much stricter exacting scrutiny test as used in grant v Meyer and McIntyre v Ohio.
ok, next?
brumsickle, an erroneous case that supports their position.
see also Family PAC v. McKenna, 685 F.3d 800, 805–06 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Disclosure requirements are subject to exacting scrutiny, don't know that one.
Plaintiffs take the position that disclaimer and disclosure are “terms of art,” and argue that the City’s ordinance should be reviewed under strict scrutiny because it is a “hybrid disclaimer/disclosure requirement.”
[Plaintiffs are correct.]
But Plaintiffs cite no authority that makes a similar distinction.7
[maybe. so we provide a little, ACLF being the best case, supported by tables one and 2. oh! McIntyre is the authority that makes that distinction. in McIntyre, the court specifically rejected the use of disclosure lax review from Buckley for the kiss of death strictest most exacting scrutiny.
did plaintiffs not cite McIntyre? I suspect they did.
oh there's footnote 7:
See, e.g., Gaspee Project v. Mederos, 13 F.4th 79, 95 (1st Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 2647 (2022); Smith v. Helzer, No. 3:22-CV-00077-SLG, 2022 WL 2757421, at *10 (D. Alaska July 14, 2022), appeal docketed, No. 22-35612 (9th Cir. argued Feb. 9, 2023). We hold that Americans for Prosperity Foundation does not alter the existing exacting scrutiny standard.
what gaspee and helzer have in common is the same set of lawyers and the same set of lies.
But Plaintiffs cite no authority that makes a similar distinction.7 Indeed, they acknowledge that the Supreme Court has applied exacting scrutiny to both disclosure rules, John Doe No. 1, 561 U.S. at 196, and disclaimer requirements, Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 366–67.
[the court is correct here. plaintiffs concede far too much. plaintiffs seem to want to test bonta, rather than relying on McIntyre and such. that's why I need to file this amicus, and may need to intervene. however, grant v Meyer exacting scrutiny is enough. better pull that up Jamie.
6 In ACLU of Nevada v. Heller, 378 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2004), we held that strict scrutiny applied to statutes that affect the content of election communications. 378 F.3d at 987. But we have since acknowledged that intervening Supreme Court decisions clarified that we apply exacting scrutiny to disclosure and disclaimer requirements. See Brumsickle, 624 F.3d at 1005 (citing John Doe No. 1, 561 U.S. at 196, and Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 366–67). 7 Citing Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. B
the State's interest in protecting the integrity of the initiative process does not justify the prohibition because the State has failed to demonstrate that it is necessary to burden appellees' ability to communicate their message in order to meet its concerns.
"[L]egislative restrictions on advocacy of the election or defeat of political candidates are wholly at odds with the guarantees of the First Amendment."
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 424 U. S. 50. That principle applies equally to "the discussion of political policy generally or advocacy of the passage or defeat of legislation." Id. at 424 U. S. 48. The Colorado statute prohibiting the payment of petition circulators imposes a burden on political expression that the State has failed to justify. The Court of Appeals correctly held that the statute violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Its judgment is therefore affirmed.
It is so ordered.
"[L]egislative restrictions on advocacy of the election or defeat of political candidates are wholly at odds with the guarantees of the First Amendment."
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 424 U. S. 50.
footnotes
But the fact that advocacy may persuade the electorate is hardly a reason to suppress it. . . ."
"[T]he concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment. . . ."
"Buckley, 424 U.S. at 424 U. S. 48-49. . . . [T]he people in our democracy are entrusted with the responsibility for judging and evaluating the relative merits of conflicting arguments."
Cf. Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U. S. 45, 456 U. S. 60 (1982) ("The State's fear that voters might make an ill-advised choice does not provide the State with a compelling justification for limiting speech").
I had been thinking this was 8 am Tuesday morning but it was still Monday night.
“This type of scrutiny is necessary even if any deterrent effect on the exercise of First Amendment rights arises, not through direct government action, but indirectly as an unintended but inevitable result of the government’s conduct in requiring disclosure.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 65.
note here this is Buckley, talking about disclosure, so it has very little to do with a disclaimer case, which has a whole different set of rules, also called exacting scrutiny.
now watch how the next sentence attempts another bait and switch, by trying to fool the reader into thinking Buckley was a disclaimer case:
“This type of scrutiny is necessary even if any deterrent effect on the exercise of First Amendment rights arises, not through direct government action, but indirectly as an unintended but inevitable result of the government’s conduct in requiring disclosure.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 65. wrong cite i'll try again.
Courts have upheld other laws, even where there was some deterrent effect, because “[d]isclaimer and disclosure requirements may burden the ability to speak, but they ‘impose no ceiling on campaign-related activities,’ Buckley, 424 U.S., at 64, and ‘do not prevent anyone from speaking,’ McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 201 (2003).” Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 366 (citations altered).
Buckley v Valeo, unlike Buckley v ACLF, is not a disclaimer case. mcconnell, like CU, is an express advocacy case, and is not on point here.
whatever effect McConnell had in 2003 has been eroded in a death of 1000 cuts. Bcra has never been found unconstitutional in totality, but it has been sliced and diced by cases such as Cruz, Davis, cu, wrtl I + II.
Its relevance to disclaimer cases has been eroded by newer and controlling free speech cases, including Reed v city of Gilbert (hey look, they have the wrong Reed as well as the wrong Buckley.]
Janus, NIFLA, 303, see also Masterpeice Cake shop, decided on other grounds.
To survive exacting scrutiny, a law must satisfy all three steps of the inquiry. The threshold question is whether there is a “substantial relation” between the challenged law and a “sufficiently important” governmental interest. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 366–67 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see Ams. for Prosperity Found., 141 S. Ct. at 2384 (describing a substantial relation as “necessary but not sufficient”).
Courts have long recognized the governmental interest in the disclosure of the sources of campaign funding: [D]isclosure provides the electorate with information as to where political campaign money comes from and how it is spent by
the court errs here. under McIntyre and 303, the states interest must be overriding or compelling, not merely important.
agree:
Next, “[t]o withstand this scrutiny, the strength of the governmental interest must reflect the seriousness of the actual burden on First Amendment rights.”
Courts have long recognized the governmental interest in the disclosure of the sources of campaign funding: [D]isclosure provides the electorate with information as to where political campaign money comes from and how it is spent by..
hey look! a bait and switch! the court here is talking about disclosures when it should be talking about disclaimers. disclaimers and dyslexia and disclosure are each different things and should not be randomly substituted for each other. they are terms of art. words have meaning and power.
in McIntyre the court rejected an informational interest as satisfying exacting scrutiny. San Francisco cannot refight this battle, unless it chooses to join texas in a succession or nullification controversy.
“[T]he people in our democracy are entrusted with the responsibility for judging and evaluating the relative merits of conflicting arguments.” agree. San Francisco cannot substitute its judgements for those of its people. San Francisco cannot dictate the text of political signs, in either sense of the word dictate.
Understanding what entity is funding a communication allows citizens to make informed choices in the political marketplace. Alaska Right to Life Comm. v. Miles, 441 F.3d 773, 793 (9th Cir. 2006)
isn't that just an express advocacy case? I forget its details right now.
10:20 pm Monday night. been at this a while. still raining.
We have “repeatedly recognized an important (and even compelling) informational interest in requiring ballot measure committees to disclose information about contributions.” Family PAC, 685 F.3d at 806. Disclosure of who is speaking “enables the electorate to make informed decisions and give proper weight to different speakers and messages.” Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 371. “
however disclosure and disclaimers are two completely different things. oh look! it's the CU bait and switch again. I wonder, just wonder, if campaign legal center filed any briefs in family pack. off to do a bit of research.
family pack is a wash state bopp case. not a disclaimer case.
William R. Maurer, Seattle, WA; William H. Mellor and Paul M. Sherman, Arlington, VA, for amicus curiae Institute for Justice. so it does not support the court's opinion at all.
---
3 See, e.g., Jenkins v. Waldron, 11 Johns. 114, 191–92 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1814); Rail v. Potts, 27 Tenn. (8 Hum.) 225, 226 (1847); Long v. Long, 10 N.W. 875, 875 (Iowa 1881); Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 U.S. 58, 64 (1900); Wayne v. Venable, 260 F. 64, 66 (8th Cir. 1919); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 269 (1939).
these are cases Hasen found in a Harvard student note. they are old cases in which people got (or tried to get) damages for voting wrongs.