this is not a public blog, just a place hwere i can leave myself notes. nothing to see here folks, move along.
Saturday, November 16, 2002
has been historically viewed as punishment, also follows Hudson. In Hudson, the Court stated, "neither money penalties nor debarment have historically been viewed as punishment. We have long recognized that 'revocation of a privilege voluntarily granted,' such as a debarment, 'is characteristically free of the punitive criminal element.'" Id. (quoting Helvering, 303 U.S. at
Even if the legislature intended to create a civil penalty, the penalty may still be "criminal" for purposes of double jeopardy analysis. The second step of the analysis requires us to determine "'whether the statutory scheme was so punitive either in purpose or effect,'" id. (quoting Ward, 448 U.S. at 248 -49), to convert the intended civil penalty into a criminal one. To answer this latter question, the Court directs our attention to the factors established in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963). Those seven factors are as follows:
[w]hether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, whether it has historically been regarded as punishment, whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter, whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment--retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned.
[w]hether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, whether it has historically been regarded as punishment, whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter, whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment--retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned.
that the criminal indictment violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 2 See id. at *4. The Supreme Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause did not bar the later criminal prosecution because the administrative proceedings were civil and not criminal. See id. at *8. In so holding, the Court "disavow[ed] the method of analysis used in United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448 , 109 S. Ct. 1892, 1901-1902, 104 L.Ed.2d 487 (1989), and reaffirm[ed] the previously established rule exemplified in United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-249 , 100 S. Ct. 2636, 2641-2642, 65 L.Ed.2d 742 (1980)." Id. at *2.
the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit
No. 95-2665
MARK B. LEBOW, In Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412 (1987), the Supreme Court stated that "[r]emedies intended to punish culpable individuals, as opposed to those intended simply to extract compensation or restore the status quo, were [historically] issued by courts of law, not courts of equity." Id. at 422. Accordingly, the Tull Court held that an
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
AMERICAN TRANS AIR, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 91 C 8063--John F. Grady, Judge. Accordingly, the Tull Court held that an indi- vidual who was sued by the government under the Clean Water Act had a Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial to determine his liability for civil penalties authorized by the Act. Id. at 425. /
In sum, Lebow's claim is similar to common-law tort and contract actions, and he has the right to seek punitive damages, which the Supreme Court has characterized as a legal remedy. Thus, Lebow raises a legal claim, and the Seventh Amendment guarantees his right to a trial by jury. In addition, because ATA would not have been en- titled to judgment as a matter of law, the district court's error in denying him a jury trial was not harmless. Ac- cordingly, we must remand the case for a jury trial. To the extent that Lebow seeks both legal and equitable relief, the jury shall impose any legal relief, while the judge shall impose any equitable relief. See Lytle v. House- hold Mfg., Inc., 494 U.S. 545, 550-52 (1990). The jury, however, decides common issues of fact, and the jury's factual findings are binding on the judge. See id.; Dombeck v. Milwaukee Valve Co., 40 F.3d 230, 236 (7th Cir. 1994). The judgment of the district court is REVERSED, and the case is REMANDED for a jury trial.
ARGUED FEBRUARY 8, 1996--DECIDED JUNE 6, 1996 jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. Const. amend. V. The Supreme Court has long recognized that the guarantee against double jeopardy "protects against multiple punishments for the same offense." North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969); see also Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399 (1938) ("[T]he double jeopardy clause prohibits merely punishing twice, or attempting a second time to punish criminally, for the same offense."). The parties have not contested the elements of double jeopardy other than the second punishment issue; the sole question before us, then, is whether the trading ban imposed by the Commission constitutes the kind of second punishment forbidden by the Double Jeopardy Clause.
No. 95-2665
MARK B. LEBOW, In Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412 (1987), the Supreme Court stated that "[r]emedies intended to punish culpable individuals, as opposed to those intended simply to extract compensation or restore the status quo, were [historically] issued by courts of law, not courts of equity." Id. at 422. Accordingly, the Tull Court held that an
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
AMERICAN TRANS AIR, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 91 C 8063--John F. Grady, Judge. Accordingly, the Tull Court held that an indi- vidual who was sued by the government under the Clean Water Act had a Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial to determine his liability for civil penalties authorized by the Act. Id. at 425. /
In sum, Lebow's claim is similar to common-law tort and contract actions, and he has the right to seek punitive damages, which the Supreme Court has characterized as a legal remedy. Thus, Lebow raises a legal claim, and the Seventh Amendment guarantees his right to a trial by jury. In addition, because ATA would not have been en- titled to judgment as a matter of law, the district court's error in denying him a jury trial was not harmless. Ac- cordingly, we must remand the case for a jury trial. To the extent that Lebow seeks both legal and equitable relief, the jury shall impose any legal relief, while the judge shall impose any equitable relief. See Lytle v. House- hold Mfg., Inc., 494 U.S. 545, 550-52 (1990). The jury, however, decides common issues of fact, and the jury's factual findings are binding on the judge. See id.; Dombeck v. Milwaukee Valve Co., 40 F.3d 230, 236 (7th Cir. 1994). The judgment of the district court is REVERSED, and the case is REMANDED for a jury trial.
ARGUED FEBRUARY 8, 1996--DECIDED JUNE 6, 1996 jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. Const. amend. V. The Supreme Court has long recognized that the guarantee against double jeopardy "protects against multiple punishments for the same offense." North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969); see also Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399 (1938) ("[T]he double jeopardy clause prohibits merely punishing twice, or attempting a second time to punish criminally, for the same offense."). The parties have not contested the elements of double jeopardy other than the second punishment issue; the sole question before us, then, is whether the trading ban imposed by the Commission constitutes the kind of second punishment forbidden by the Double Jeopardy Clause.
a jury trial. No circuit has discussed whether an employee suing his employer under the RLA for discharging him because of his union activities is entitled to a jury trial. /8 We con- clude that Lebow has a Seventh Amendment right to pre- sent his claim to a jury.
The Seventh Amendment states that "[i]n suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved." By using the phrase "suits at common law," the Constitu- tion mandates jury trials for legal actions but not for equitable actions. Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 564 (1990).
The federal courts have long since abolished the distinc- tion between "courts of law" and "courts of equity;" therefore the Supreme Court has adopted a two-part test to determine whether a claim qualifies as legal or equitable. First, we must "compare the . . . action to 18th-century actions brought in the courts of England prior to the merger of the courts of law and equity. Second, we examine the remedy sought and determine whether it is legal or equitable in nature. The second inquiry is the more im- portant in our analysis." Terry, 494 U.S. at 565 (internal citations and quotations omitted); cf. Markman v. West- view Instruments, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1384, 1389-90 (1996).
Despite the lack of a precise eighteenth-century counter- part, Lebow's unlawful discharge claim, in our view, may be appropriately analogized to a common-law breach of contract action. In Terry, the Supreme Court concluded that although an employee's suit against a union for breach of duty of fair representation had no true eighteenth- century analogue, it was, at least in part, similar to a common-law breach of contract action.
factor in the Terry analysis is the nature of the remedies that a plaintiff wishes to obtain. "The Seventh Amendment . . . requires a jury trial upon demand[ ] if the statute creates legal rights and remedies, enforceable in an action for damages in the or- dinary courts of law." Curtis, 415 U.S. at 194 .
The Seventh Amendment states that "[i]n suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved." By using the phrase "suits at common law," the Constitu- tion mandates jury trials for legal actions but not for equitable actions. Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 564 (1990).
The federal courts have long since abolished the distinc- tion between "courts of law" and "courts of equity;" therefore the Supreme Court has adopted a two-part test to determine whether a claim qualifies as legal or equitable. First, we must "compare the . . . action to 18th-century actions brought in the courts of England prior to the merger of the courts of law and equity. Second, we examine the remedy sought and determine whether it is legal or equitable in nature. The second inquiry is the more im- portant in our analysis." Terry, 494 U.S. at 565 (internal citations and quotations omitted); cf. Markman v. West- view Instruments, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1384, 1389-90 (1996).
Despite the lack of a precise eighteenth-century counter- part, Lebow's unlawful discharge claim, in our view, may be appropriately analogized to a common-law breach of contract action. In Terry, the Supreme Court concluded that although an employee's suit against a union for breach of duty of fair representation had no true eighteenth- century analogue, it was, at least in part, similar to a common-law breach of contract action.
factor in the Terry analysis is the nature of the remedies that a plaintiff wishes to obtain. "The Seventh Amendment . . . requires a jury trial upon demand[ ] if the statute creates legal rights and remedies, enforceable in an action for damages in the or- dinary courts of law." Curtis, 415 U.S. at 194 .
Friday, November 15, 2002
test. it's late, i'm drunk and stoned, i have to get up in the morning.
dannon was wonderful tonight. totsboy@hotmail.com. metro idol is a hit. www.metro-indy.com
i wrote several letters and cleared out a lot my hotmail spam. i walked downtown and back.
dumpsterdived lasagna and candied walnuts off mass ave. avacados on my way home. there are now 5 hispanic markets in walking distance... seems like overkill. wwdn is down for the moment.
dannon was wonderful tonight. totsboy@hotmail.com. metro idol is a hit. www.metro-indy.com
i wrote several letters and cleared out a lot my hotmail spam. i walked downtown and back.
dumpsterdived lasagna and candied walnuts off mass ave. avacados on my way home. there are now 5 hispanic markets in walking distance... seems like overkill. wwdn is down for the moment.
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