notes on response to affirmative defenses.
In order to state a claim, I must, and do, allege ultimate facts which, if true, constitute one or more torts.
After iqbal, federal courts use a heightened pleading standard. A claim needs to be plausible, not just in theory possible.
The facts are hard to dispute. In the 'smoking gun' letter, the county admits the conduct at issue, but claims it was lawful. In its answer, the county denies the conduct, but there is video showing me being denied a provisional ballot and twice being refused the vote.
I am unclear so far how to enter the video into the record, but I have provided copies of the video to opposing counsel.
Here, I seek a series of declaratory judgments, to, at a minimum, establish the law clearly so further incidents can be litigated for damages. this court has jurisdiction to make such determinations, at least as to federal law. Under Saucier, or Harlow v. Fitgerald, defendants, even when acting with malice, can escape liability when the law is too murky. so a party can prevail if all their case does is clarify the law.
Clarity is valuable where first amendment expression is at risk. So there is a justiciable controversy.
Additionally, I seek damages. The right to a provisional ballot is clearly established.
The state claims have no comparable QI doctrine, but are subject to the limits of the tort claims act, to which I agree as to the cap on damages, and with which I have substantially complied.
....
took break to drink coke with tommy, got reciept.
9:40 pm monday.
....
posted signs without disclaimer on my 'inoperable' van. volvo next.
billable moments today
made sign. met with brian. about editing videos.
made real estate video w brian.
x mark
rutherford
for
secretary of state
vote tuesday nov 6th.
Monday, August 27, 2018
Sunday, August 26, 2018
discovery in robbin stewart v marion county election board
witness lists
fact
expert
exhibits and video
Demand
As to each federal claim, up to $2 million per claim, as determined by a jury, but not to exceed $2 million total.
As to each state claim, up to $300,000 per claim, but not to exceed $300,000 total.
settlement offer: $30,000.
witness lists
fact
expert
1. designated representative of county board
2-7 each defendant
8 the lawyer on the phone - leslie barnes
9-15 the other precinct workers, primary, general, 2018, 2018.
16 whoever rose spoke to first time - did they explain provisional? alice roe #1
17 whoever he spoke to second time - what did they say? alice roe #2.
18. the lawyer who wrote the smoking gun memo
19. brienne, director of elections for county
20. lawyer who did the training for inspectors.
21. any staff member not listed who recalls interacting with me in either the 2016 an 2018 election
22. mike mcquillen
23. democratic county executive director
24-n. any member of phone pool
25 a. staff at provisional voting site at citycounty building. 2016. 2018.
b, list of poll workers who were trained in 2016, 2018.
expert witness list
professor richard hasen
mark smith
richard winger
mike pitts
gavin rose at aclu
robert ellis smith privacy journal
former gop county clerk sadlier
candy marendt
todd rokita
j christian adams
brad smith fec/professor
connie lawson
charlie white
asst secstate jerry bonnet
brad king
julia vaughn common cause exhibits and video
exhibits
1. election fraud grievance form hava
2. response to notice of tort claim smoking gun
3. tort claim notice draft
4. voters bill of rights
5. training manual excerpts
6. stop form
7. amicus brief
8. hasen article
9. gavin rose letter to board - request
10. gavin rose aclu letter to me.
videos emailed seperately.
exhibits and video
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
witness lists
fact
expert
exhibits and video
Demand
As to each federal claim, up to $2 million per claim, as determined by a jury, but not to exceed $2 million total.
As to each state claim, up to $300,000 per claim, but not to exceed $300,000 total.
settlement offer: $30,000.
witness lists
fact
expert
1. designated representative of county board
2-7 each defendant
8 the lawyer on the phone - leslie barnes
9-15 the other precinct workers, primary, general, 2018, 2018.
16 whoever rose spoke to first time - did they explain provisional? alice roe #1
17 whoever he spoke to second time - what did they say? alice roe #2.
18. the lawyer who wrote the smoking gun memo
19. brienne, director of elections for county
20. lawyer who did the training for inspectors.
21. any staff member not listed who recalls interacting with me in either the 2016 an 2018 election
22. mike mcquillen
23. democratic county executive director
24-n. any member of phone pool
25 a. staff at provisional voting site at citycounty building. 2016. 2018.
b, list of poll workers who were trained in 2016, 2018.
expert witness list
professor richard hasen
mark smith
richard winger
mike pitts
gavin rose at aclu
robert ellis smith privacy journal
former gop county clerk sadlier
candy marendt
todd rokita
j christian adams
brad smith fec/professor
connie lawson
charlie white
asst secstate jerry bonnet
brad king
julia vaughn common cause exhibits and video
exhibits
1. election fraud grievance form hava
2. response to notice of tort claim smoking gun
3. tort claim notice draft
4. voters bill of rights
5. training manual excerpts
6. stop form
7. amicus brief
8. hasen article
9. gavin rose letter to board - request
10. gavin rose aclu letter to me.
videos emailed seperately.
exhibits and video
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
Thursday, August 23, 2018
thursay int list
bought tire!45
coffee 5 starbux an tommy
brought van home
rote bike brought volvo home. #58!
wrote no memos
picke up trash on 3 streets. enny chester braley. grant. mostly north of washington. too ark now.
time for zonies i think.
mowe wees in alley
bought bike tawn $20
pai t electric bill 120ish.
nnet to unpack van.
need to .. i forget. write memos?
do laundry?
bath?
spray for bugs? sell houses?
bought tire!45
coffee 5 starbux an tommy
brought van home
rote bike brought volvo home. #58!
wrote no memos
picke up trash on 3 streets. enny chester braley. grant. mostly north of washington. too ark now.
time for zonies i think.
mowe wees in alley
bought bike tawn $20
pai t electric bill 120ish.
nnet to unpack van.
need to .. i forget. write memos?
do laundry?
bath?
spray for bugs? sell houses?
Monday, August 20, 2018
internal affairs complaint
marion county sheriff's department
case number____ officer assigned ____
date ______ time _____
complaintant information
name _____ dob ____ age ____ gender M F Q
fone fone
[ ] indy in [ ] other ______ zip _____-____
employee info: name unit ID
division shift rank
[repeat as needed]
incident information
where did the incident occur
date and time
cad #
case #
complaint
use as much space as needed
notary info
sign and date
marion county sheriff's department
case number____ officer assigned ____
date ______ time _____
complaintant information
name _____ dob ____ age ____ gender M F Q
fone fone
[ ] indy in [ ] other ______ zip _____-____
employee info: name unit ID
division shift rank
[repeat as needed]
incident information
where did the incident occur
date and time
cad #
case #
complaint
use as much space as needed
notary info
sign and date
20 questions for h an h.
[got interrupte,h coffee w tommy, roveowntown foun out motion was enie. now 4;15.]
21. miller wrote that Palafox could not reinspect because she had 1000 cases.
that was the moment i decided that further attempts to appease and cooperate would be useless.
of those 1000 cases, how many involved counterclaims?
22. how many were against lawyers, or involved a law office?
these are not hypothetical questions; i expect answers. the raw data will suffice if the info i am requesting is unknown.
23. how many were against clergy?
24. how many were patients, current or former, of the health an hostpital corporation?
25. does h an h have any procedures in place for dealing with the mentally ill?
26. of the 1000, how many are suffering from life threatening diseases?
27. how many had been jailed for allegations of violent felonies? name any such case.
28. in the 1000 cases, how many resulted in filing a court case?
29. how many resulted in an aministrative hearing?
30. how many resulted in the denial of a hearing, after a written request?
31. what is professional courtesy?
32. in any case in which there was an appearance by counsel, list the name of counsel and the case number.
33. list any reported cases in which h+h is a party.
34. what is the doctrine of mutual assured destuction?
35. which employees of h + h are members of the bar?
36. list the employees of h+h, with contact information.
37.
38.
39.
40.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
[got interrupte,h coffee w tommy, roveowntown foun out motion was enie. now 4;15.]
21. miller wrote that Palafox could not reinspect because she had 1000 cases.
that was the moment i decided that further attempts to appease and cooperate would be useless.
of those 1000 cases, how many involved counterclaims?
22. how many were against lawyers, or involved a law office?
these are not hypothetical questions; i expect answers. the raw data will suffice if the info i am requesting is unknown.
23. how many were against clergy?
24. how many were patients, current or former, of the health an hostpital corporation?
25. does h an h have any procedures in place for dealing with the mentally ill?
26. of the 1000, how many are suffering from life threatening diseases?
27. how many had been jailed for allegations of violent felonies? name any such case.
28. in the 1000 cases, how many resulted in filing a court case?
29. how many resulted in an aministrative hearing?
30. how many resulted in the denial of a hearing, after a written request?
31. what is professional courtesy?
32. in any case in which there was an appearance by counsel, list the name of counsel and the case number.
33. list any reported cases in which h+h is a party.
34. what is the doctrine of mutual assured destuction?
35. which employees of h + h are members of the bar?
36. list the employees of h+h, with contact information.
37.
38.
39.
40.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
Sunday, August 19, 2018
raft only o not file.
caption
defendant's supplement to counter-claim and cross-claim;
1. after the answer and claims were filed, Palifox, conspirng with h+h,
has continued to invade my home.
2. each time has been pursuant to a warrant or inspection order.
3. the first one came too quickly to have a reasonable time to respond, and failed to provie th best available notice per procedural due process caselaw - schneider? sneckloth?
4. it violates norms of fairness for the court not to send emailed copies of documents to unrepresented parties, but instead to only send postcards with a one line summary of the document. it gives a giant hea start to the home team. i am not asking to court to fix this in my case - i've done that by filing an appearance in my own case - but to make a permanent change to require a good faith effort to provide e-notification as well as snailmail or pony express.
5 It was defective in that it was a general warrrant which failed to specify the scope of the search or limit the force available to a rational level.
confusingly, it did not seem have been issue pursuant to a motion or affidavit or anything; it just appearred.
more detail on the efects has been set forth in the first motion to quash, whch was partially granted.
6. whether the defects would be visible to a reasonable inspector, negating a possible qi argument, I do not know. It could depend on their training and supervision.
7. For the second incident, I filed a motion to quash. On the morning of the inspection, at 10;37 am, the court granted the moton, but only in part: it limited the scope of the search to the agreed areas, which were the front porch and two bedrooms. The inspection took place at 1:30 pm, 13:30.
8. The deputy and Palafox handed me a copy of the old, now void, order. I told the deputy that a motion to quash had been filed. He said that didn't matter, or similar words.
9. Palafox knew, should have known, or had reason to know the order was now void. she assumed the risk.
10. The officer acted recklessly in failing to find out the orer had been quashed in part. without a valid warrant in his possession, the entry was unlawful, an was a fourth amenment violation.
11. if the result was a foreseeable result of a county policy to not bother to check if a quashable order has been acted on by the court, when such a motion is pending, then the county could be liable under monell.
However, if this was a unique and unforeseeable event, the county would not have monell liability.
discovery will be require to see whether this is a pattern or practice, if there is no explicit policy.
A failure to train and supervise could lead to such liability.
Tomorrow there is again a scheduled inspection with an overbroad warrant, a man with a plan and a gun.
I do not know whether the warrant will be quashed,n if it is, whether I am legally entitle ot efen my home against unauthorie invasion. I do not yet know if I will live long enough to file this.
Leslie Barnes. - woman on phone in video.
Leslie Ann Barnes
PO Box 199191
Licensed
Avvo Rating: 7.8
Practice areas
Civil rights, Family, Government, Election campaigns and political law, Education
Leslie Barnes
Counsel, Bolder Advocacy
Leslie comes to Alliance from Justice from private and government practice.
Having worked as Co-General Counsel for the Indiana Election Division, she has helped guide candidates, nonprofits, and local election officials through more than 30 election cycles. She has served as a resource for judges and lawmakers, often testifying as a subject matterexpert on election law and policy.
Most recently she worked as a civil rights attorney. As part of her work with the Indiana State Bar Association, she worked with a group of attorneys and clients to develop a process to protect the safety of transgender clients, by sealing their name and gender confirmation records from public access. Leslie is excited to join her colleagues in helping nonprofits shape policy, engage voters, and improve the lives of the communities they serve.
A graduate of Purdue and Indiana Universities, she is new to the D.C. area and welcomes recommendations for restaurants, theaters, or inside tips for the museums.
health and hospital corp
v. cause no.
49D041806-ov-022888
robbin stewart
v.
yoceli palafox.
interrogatories and requests for admission and producton of documents:
questions for officer john doe #16.
1. Name? Are you a living american citizen?
2. what's your zip code?
3. are you employed?
4. did you check with the court as to the status of the motion to quash before attempting to serve a challenged warrant?
5. where do you work?
6. what is your job title?
7. what are your duties?
8. what was your training as to how to serve adminstrative warrants?
9. provide any training materials including books, written materials, software, video.
10. who trained you?
11. what is the capitol of california?
12. what is today's date?
13. what is the hippocratic oath?
14. who were the deputies who served the earlier warrants?
15. have you endangered my health?
16. what is a general warrant?
17. is there a reason warrants are required?
18. how were they obtained?
19. what was the make and model of the gun you brought with you to my house?
20 what are the rules of engagement for the use of force in serving an adminsistrative warrant? provide any written policy manual.
21 are those different if the site is a law office, or a church?
22. what is your chain of command; list each superior and their job title, on up to the sheriff.
23. do you recieve overtime pay for depositions?
24 does the sheriff?
send your answers in writing, via counsel if possible, within 30 days to this same address and to gtbear at gmail.com.
- robbin stewart, jd, llm, etc.
v. cause no.
49D041806-ov-022888
robbin stewart
v.
yoceli palafox.
interrogatories and requests for admission and producton of documents:
questions for officer john doe #16.
1. Name? Are you a living american citizen?
2. what's your zip code?
3. are you employed?
4. did you check with the court as to the status of the motion to quash before attempting to serve a challenged warrant?
5. where do you work?
6. what is your job title?
7. what are your duties?
8. what was your training as to how to serve adminstrative warrants?
9. provide any training materials including books, written materials, software, video.
10. who trained you?
11. what is the capitol of california?
12. what is today's date?
13. what is the hippocratic oath?
14. who were the deputies who served the earlier warrants?
15. have you endangered my health?
16. what is a general warrant?
17. is there a reason warrants are required?
18. how were they obtained?
19. what was the make and model of the gun you brought with you to my house?
20 what are the rules of engagement for the use of force in serving an adminsistrative warrant? provide any written policy manual.
21 are those different if the site is a law office, or a church?
22. what is your chain of command; list each superior and their job title, on up to the sheriff.
23. do you recieve overtime pay for depositions?
24 does the sheriff?
send your answers in writing, via counsel if possible, within 30 days to this same address and to gtbear at gmail.com.
- robbin stewart, jd, llm, etc.
health and hospital corp
v. cause no.
robbin stewart 49D041806-ov-022888
v.
yoceli palafox.
interrogatories and requests for admission and producton of documents:
20 questions for yoceli palafox.
1. Are you a living american, bigger than a breadbox?
2. what's your zip code?
3. have you ever been employed?
4. where have you worked?
5. where do you work?
6. what is your job title?
7. what are your duties?
8. what was your training?
9. provide any training materials including books, written materials, software, video.
10. who trained you?
11. what is the capitol of california?
12. what is today's date?
13. what is the hippocratic oath?
14. what is the mission of your employer?
15. have you endangered my health?
16. what is a general warrant?
17. is there a reason warrants are required?
18. how were they obtained?
19. what was the make and model of the gun the officer brought with him and you to my house?
20 each time, so the second time, and
then the third.
that's all for now. expect more of these. your response is due no later than 30 days.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
v. cause no.
robbin stewart 49D041806-ov-022888
v.
yoceli palafox.
interrogatories and requests for admission and producton of documents:
20 questions for yoceli palafox.
1. Are you a living american, bigger than a breadbox?
2. what's your zip code?
3. have you ever been employed?
4. where have you worked?
5. where do you work?
6. what is your job title?
7. what are your duties?
8. what was your training?
9. provide any training materials including books, written materials, software, video.
10. who trained you?
11. what is the capitol of california?
12. what is today's date?
13. what is the hippocratic oath?
14. what is the mission of your employer?
15. have you endangered my health?
16. what is a general warrant?
17. is there a reason warrants are required?
18. how were they obtained?
19. what was the make and model of the gun the officer brought with him and you to my house?
20 each time, so the second time, and
then the third.
that's all for now. expect more of these. your response is due no later than 30 days.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
d's first affirmative defense is that i have failed to state a claim. this references by implication the heightened pleading iqbal-twombly standard.
The essential claim of the case is that the refusal to let me cast either a provisional or regular ballot is tortious. At a minimum, I can seek a declaratory jugment that my rights were violated, even if damages are not as feely available as I hope.
the heighened pleading standard has allowed federal courts to reduce their dockets. many an unrepresented indigent plaintiff sees their case fail at that juncture, when they have difficultly pointing to a case on point, or to any evidence in support of their factual claims, or in submitting a timely filing that complies with enough of the rules.
here, though, at least some of the claims rely on well established law.
would it be enough, for example, if the united states supreme court were to rule that marion county must allow provisional ballots? In crawford, it did. In crawford, at least for the three justice controlling opinion, the availability of a provisional vote was one of the safeguards that upheld the statute.
would it be enough, if the Indiana Supeme Court were to rule in a way that assume provisional ballots would remain an option? League of women voters v Rokita is the closest case on point, but at the moment I do not recall if it held anything as to provisional ballots.
additionally, plaintiff here can point to his prior cases. res judicata cuts both ways. plaintiff's prior cases, which he lost, establish that there is a right to a provisional ballot.
next, the facts.
there is a smoking gun letter from the county in response to the notice of tort claim. this letter admits the facts while claiming no violation took place, because there was no right to a provisional ballot.
if not, why did the electon authorities send him back to the precinct?
if not, why did they call him at 4 pm and say the problem was fixed and he could now go vote?
if not, why do numerous documents state that a voter without ID should be given a provisional ballot, and why does the board hold a hearing to count some, but not other, provisional ballots?
my designated evidence includes the smoking gun letter, various documents in which the government makes claims about ID or provisional ballots, and
video taken during the incident.
on this law with these facts, a claim has been stated which establishes a prima facie case satisfying the iqbal-twombly hurdle.
The essential claim of the case is that the refusal to let me cast either a provisional or regular ballot is tortious. At a minimum, I can seek a declaratory jugment that my rights were violated, even if damages are not as feely available as I hope.
the heighened pleading standard has allowed federal courts to reduce their dockets. many an unrepresented indigent plaintiff sees their case fail at that juncture, when they have difficultly pointing to a case on point, or to any evidence in support of their factual claims, or in submitting a timely filing that complies with enough of the rules.
here, though, at least some of the claims rely on well established law.
would it be enough, for example, if the united states supreme court were to rule that marion county must allow provisional ballots? In crawford, it did. In crawford, at least for the three justice controlling opinion, the availability of a provisional vote was one of the safeguards that upheld the statute.
would it be enough, if the Indiana Supeme Court were to rule in a way that assume provisional ballots would remain an option? League of women voters v Rokita is the closest case on point, but at the moment I do not recall if it held anything as to provisional ballots.
additionally, plaintiff here can point to his prior cases. res judicata cuts both ways. plaintiff's prior cases, which he lost, establish that there is a right to a provisional ballot.
next, the facts.
there is a smoking gun letter from the county in response to the notice of tort claim. this letter admits the facts while claiming no violation took place, because there was no right to a provisional ballot.
if not, why did the electon authorities send him back to the precinct?
if not, why did they call him at 4 pm and say the problem was fixed and he could now go vote?
if not, why do numerous documents state that a voter without ID should be given a provisional ballot, and why does the board hold a hearing to count some, but not other, provisional ballots?
my designated evidence includes the smoking gun letter, various documents in which the government makes claims about ID or provisional ballots, and
video taken during the incident.
on this law with these facts, a claim has been stated which establishes a prima facie case satisfying the iqbal-twombly hurdle.
Friday, August 17, 2018
“This evidence supports the notion that strict voter identification laws prevent otherwise eligible individuals from voting, and have disproportionately negative impacts on minority citizens,” write the study’s two authors, Bernard L. Fraga of Indiana University a
Tuesday, August 14, 2018
If you are having problems with an issue relating to the Social Security Administration (SSA), my office may be able to help.
Some examples of situations my office may be able to help with are: checking the status of applications for disability and retirement benefits, contacting the SSA payment center to locate and/or aid with distribution of monthly payments, contacting your local SSA office to try to help resolve an over/under payment issues and providing information on the appeals process.
test ok. post about wanting to be an amicus in tyson timms.
in 2008 i joined an amicus in crawford v marion county election board.
while the other amici were organizations, i was an indiana voter whose provisional vote ha not been counted. i wante to show real people were affected.
now it is 2018, and i m seeking counsel for an amicus in the merits round of
tyson timms v indiana.
i have a current case in marion county indiana, case number, 49d04-1806-ov-022888, in which i have alleged as a defense that the proposed fine is excessive under the 8th amendment as incorporated by the 14th.
also, i may amend my counterclaim to add a count concerning the taking of my car, a 1990 geo prim.
so far as i know, the geo prim itself lacks standing to be an amicus.
i am not asking anyone to re-invent the wheel, but would prefer to join a brief already in progress, so i will be contacting counsel. i am inept at networking,
but this message is a start. time is of the essence, if briefs are due in early september.
in 2008 i joined an amicus in crawford v marion county election board.
while the other amici were organizations, i was an indiana voter whose provisional vote ha not been counted. i wante to show real people were affected.
now it is 2018, and i m seeking counsel for an amicus in the merits round of
tyson timms v indiana.
i have a current case in marion county indiana, case number, 49d04-1806-ov-022888, in which i have alleged as a defense that the proposed fine is excessive under the 8th amendment as incorporated by the 14th.
also, i may amend my counterclaim to add a count concerning the taking of my car, a 1990 geo prim.
so far as i know, the geo prim itself lacks standing to be an amicus.
i am not asking anyone to re-invent the wheel, but would prefer to join a brief already in progress, so i will be contacting counsel. i am inept at networking,
but this message is a start. time is of the essence, if briefs are due in early september.
Robinson, Kimberly Shawntee - Indianapolis, IN
4911 East 56th StreetIndianapolis, IN 46220- 5719
Law Office of Kimberly Shawntee Robinson
https://www.linkedin.com/in/kimberly-s-robinson-b8633512/
SUMMARY OF QUALIFICATIONS:
Tenacious, articulate, experienced Trial Attorney. Detail oriented, professional and tackles legal issues with analytical yet creative mindset. Excels at legal research, written analysis, and oral advocacy. Self-starter who enjoys collaborating with others to achieve successful outcomes. Strong time management and organizational skills. Quickly adapts to the ever-changing demands of the legal practice and embraces challenges with a growth mindset.
SKILLS AND TALENTS:
• Research and Communication - Selected by The Indiana Lawyer to write criminal case summaries due to exceptional research, writing, and communication skills. Criminal charges dismissed, convictions overturned and sentences reduced due to thorough research and analysis of complex legal issues.
• Instruction and Teaching – Selected as faculty by the National Institute for Trial Advocacy (NITA), the nation's leading provider of legal advocacy skills training for lawyers. Long-standing presenter, facilitator and instructor of Continuing Legal Education (CLE) courses and programs.
• Litigation - Thrive in courtroom setting litigating cases in State and Federal Courts and Administrative Hearings. Tried scores of jury and bench trials resulting in acquittal, dismissal and hung jury.
• Negotiation - Excellent negotiator. Effective at influencing others, including adversaries, judicial officials, and clients.
SUMMARY OF QUALIFICATIONS:
Tenacious, articulate, experienced Trial Attorney. Detail oriented, professional and tackles legal issues with analytical yet creative mindset. Excels at legal research, written analysis, and oral advocacy. Self-starter who enjoys collaborating with others to achieve successful outcomes. Strong time management and organizational skills. Quickly adapts to the ever-changing demands of the legal practice and embraces challenges with a growth mindset.
SKILLS AND TALENTS:
• Research and Communication - Selected by The Indiana Lawyer to write criminal case summaries due to exceptional research, writing, and communication skills. Criminal charges dismissed, convictions overturned and sentences reduced due to thorough research and analysis of complex legal issues.
• Instruction and Teaching – Selected as faculty by the National Institute for Trial Advocacy (NITA), the nation's leading provider of legal advocacy skills training for lawyers. Long-standing presenter, facilitator and instructor of Continuing Legal Education (CLE) courses and programs.
• Litigation - Thrive in courtroom setting litigating cases in State and Federal Courts and Administrative Hearings. Tried scores of jury and bench trials resulting in acquittal, dismissal and hung jury.
• Negotiation - Excellent negotiator. Effective at influencing others, including adversaries, judicial officials, and clients.
SOCIAL SERVICES221- 2364
Provides assessments and counseling services to individuals, families and groups. Conducts home visits to assess needs. Provides adolescent and school-based counseling services; anger management, parenting and safe-sitter classes. Conducts depression and substance abuse screenings. Provides referral and information services.
Carl L. Drummer
Provides assessments and counseling services to individuals, families and groups. Conducts home visits to assess needs. Provides adolescent and school-based counseling services; anger management, parenting and safe-sitter classes. Conducts depression and substance abuse screenings. Provides referral and information services.
Members of the Board
Joyce Q. Rogers, Chairperson
Joyce Rogers is charged with increasing the presence and significance of Indiana University among prospective and current minority students, alumni, business and community leaders, and donors. She is focusing primarily on securing private support for the university’s diversity and inclusiveness initiatives, particularly those related to the IU Bloomington campus. Rogers works with the IU Office of the Vice President for Diversity, Equity, and Multicultural Affairs (DEMA), the IU Foundation, and campus senior officers in developing and executing student recruitment, external relations, and fundraising strategies that support and advance diversity and inclusiveness initiatives at IU. She is also defining and managing a board of advisors to support DEMA in fulfilling its mission. Rogers comes to IU from Ivy Tech Community College where she was vice president for development. Under her leadership, the Ivy Tech Foundation’s assets increased by nearly $100 million and the foundation’s total managed assets grew to more than $150 million. Also with her direction, the foundation advanced a statewide development plan with a $500 million goal by 2019; rebranded and created a statewide marketing plan for development; implemented a statewide database system to increase accountability; and established the college’s first statewide alumni program, doubling assets the first year. Before joining Ivy Tech, Rogers was president and CEO of the Indiana Black Expo, Inc. (IBE). In this role, she managed the organization’s youth and family programs and more than 50 events annually — including the largest African American event of its kind in the nation. Before joining IBE, Rogers was director of contract management for the Indiana Family and Social Services Administration. Rogers has been highly engaged in a wide variety of community, civic, and professional organizations and nationally recognized for her efforts in diversity and inclusion.
Committees: Public Health, Finance
Gregory S. Fehribach, Vice-Chairperson
Gregory S. Fehribach was appointed to the Health & Hospital Corporation of Marion County Board of Directors in 2004 by the Mayor of City of Indianapolis. Fehribach, an attorney with a disability who uses an electric wheelchair as a mobility aid device, founded the Fehribach Group in 1995. Widely considered a leading consultant on accessible design projects, Fehribach evaluates every project using a comprehensive approach that encompasses a multitude of factors, from ADA compliance, to diversity management, to ensuring a client’s return on investment. Fehribach is a graduate of Ball State University where he earned both his Bachelor of Science and his Master of Arts degrees. A graduate of Ohio Northern University’s Pettit College of Law, Fehribach has practiced law since 1986. He is currently affiliated with Indianapolis law firm Doninger Tuohy & Bailey LLP. Active in his community and profession, Fehribach has provided his perspective on accessibility as well as legal expertise to a number of organizations.
Committees: Eskenazi Health, Long Term Care, Finance
David F. Canal, MD
David Canal, MD, Frederic W. Taylor Professor of Surgery graduated from the Indiana University School of Medicine in 1983 with highest distinction and completed his general surgical training at IU. Dr. Canal joined the IU General Surgery faculty in 1988. He is a pioneer of minimally invasive surgical techniques and developed the laparoscopic program at Indiana University. He has taught many residents and surgeons, throughout the State of Indiana, basic and advanced laparoscopic techniques. He pioneered the use of the daVinci Robotic assist device for general surgeons in the State of Indiana. Dr. Canal has a tremendous interest in resident education and served as the Program Director of the Indiana University General Surgery Residency program for 15 years. Dr. Canal serves as the Chief of Service-Surgery and Medical Director of Specialty Care for Eskenazi Health. As an American Board of Surgery certified general surgeon, Dr. Canal’s surgical career has spanned broad-based general surgical procedures and continues with a focus on breast care. He is an active member of the American College of Surgeons and just completed his sixth year as Governor representing the Indiana Chapter.
Carl L. Drummer
Carl Drummer is a Director of Public Affairs at Ice Miller. Drummer joined Ice Miller in 2009, after serving as Center Township trustee of Marion County, state of Indiana, since 1996. At age 32, when Drummer was elected trustee, he was the youngest African American to hold a political office at that time in Marion County, in either political party. He served as deputy trustee from 1991-1993. From 1993-1996 he served as the chief deputy constable, Center Township Small Claims Court.
Committees: Quality, Public Health, Midtown Community Mental Health Center, Audit and Compliance, Eskenazi Health
Charles S. Eberhardt, II
Charles S. Eberhardt, II graduated with a BS from Earlham College in 1987. After graduation, Eberhardt worked for one year with the lobbyist of Dehart & Darr, PC in Washington DC and all fifty states as a legal assistant on matters pertaining to interstate commerce and taxation. Eberhardt then attended Boston University, where he received his Juris Doctorate and Masters in Business Administration in 1992. While in law school, Eberhardt clerked for Brown Rudnick (Boston, MA), Baker Daniels (Indianapolis, IN) and Locke Reynolds (Indianapolis, IN). Upon graduation from Boston University, he accepted an Associate position with Locke Reynolds, before partnering with three other attorneys to form Siegel Eberhardt Carter & Dassow. Eberhardt’s clients included Eli Lilly, Ameritech, Smoot Construction, Tyscot Record Company, Oscar Robertson & Associates, A Rainbow House Academies and the City of Indianapolis. In 1996, Eberhardt left the full time practice of law to pursue an entrepreneurial opportunity. Mr. Eberhardt formed Community Spirits with his partner and bought 16 retail package stores in Indianapolis. He is now the sole owner of 21 package stores in Indianapolis, as well as several commercial real estate properties. Eberhardt is married to Darlene (Kinslow) Eberhardt and they have four sons: Darryl, Stevie, Tres and Johnathan.
PUBLIC COMMENTS
OTHER BUSINESS
DATE OF NEXT MEETING
- May 15, 2018
MEETING ADJOURNED
Monday, August 13, 2018
(c)Motions for judgment on the pleadings. A party may file a motion for judgment on the pleadings on the basis that no answer has been filed, or that the pleadings disclose that there are no material issues of fact to be resolved and that party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
8/14 tuesay 12;43 am. been at it an hour or so. 2;41 now, a rough -raft finishe. 3 13 trying to/ take a beak, but still working on it mentslly.
research for response to a motion for jugment on the pleaings.
'by counsel' - what is the role of miller here? is she efen ing palafox?
has she entere an appearance?
i shoul email her.
anyway,
1 faile to file tort claim
2 faile to join aitional parties per rule 13.h.
3 faile to allege
a] criminal
b] outsi e scope of employment - tricksy
c] malicious
] wilful, wanton,
e] calculate to benefit the employee personally.
4 fails to state a claim. 12 b 6.
5 immune.
ok, those are the 5 claims. now i will iscuss them.
as i unerstna the filing, it is not a motion for summary jugment, but more akin to a 12 b 6.
(c)Motions for judgment on the pleadings. A party may file a motion for judgment on the pleadings on the basis that no answer has been filed, or that the pleadings disclose that there are no material issues of fact to be resolved and that party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
while i hope there are no facts at issue, i o not see this motion so much as an a-mission of the facts, as merely challenging that if the facts were as state-, no claim woul be state=.
1 faile to file tort claim
2 faile to join aitional parties per rule 13.h.
3 faile to allege
a] criminal
b] outsi e scope of employment - tricksy
c] malicious
] wilful, wanton,
e] calculate to benefit the employee personally.
4 fails to state a claim. 12 b 6.
5 immune.
1 faile to file tort claim
2 faile to join aitional parties per rule 13.h.
3 faile to allege
a] criminal
b] outsi e scope of employment - tricksy
c] malicious
] wilful, wanton,
e] calculate to benefit the employee personally.
4 fails to state a claim. 12 b 6.
5 immune.
ok, those are the 5 claims. now i will iscuss them.
1 faile to file tort claim
i will stipulate that no tort claim notice has yet been file.
[coul write one]
the complaint against me was esignate as an emergency, which waives certain usual stanar-s for process. plaintiffs sought a positive injunction, essentially seeking to compel me into a kin- of serfom, with no rea-ily available means of escape. perhaps exile woul= work.
tort claims are a slower process. i woul= argue first that by proceeing against me h an h has waive= its tort claim rights. it is reasonably forseable that a =efen=ant woul= raise compulsory or permissive counterclaims or cross claims. inee, the term 'compulsory' is rather suggestive on the point.
an the kin of counter an cross claims are just those of which they alreay ha reason to have notice:
palafox is the chief witness for the persecution.
she knew she entere without a warrant,
took pictures,
an use those pictures as a pretext
to obtain three warrants to enter arme an authorie to use whatever force 'necessary'.
uner those circumstances, counterclaims shoul be the norm, not something of which they lacke notice.
however,
if the court grants leave, i am willing to postpone action on the state claims so that the county (an the tort claims boar, whatever that is) can mull over my tort claim, which i will file on request. this woul slightly bifurcate the proceeings, but so long as iscovery can continue, this woul work for me.
i o ask that the court preserve the status quo uring any such break in the action, by granting no injunctions orers or otherwise uring the interlu-e.
my personal experience has been that tort claims are perfunctorily enie, an exist mostly as a trap for tthe unwary. my tort claim against the county in a iffenet matter was enie. @exhibit.
i o nt yet have statistics on what percent of tort claims the h an h grants. i now request those recors, to the extent that they exist. if no such stats exists, i reques the unerlying ata, all tort claims file int he past ear, an the responses. number of laims pai. amount pai. average amount pai.
i suspect the tort claim is an empty formality. however, i have no objection to a court orere hol, preferably on those claims only.
plaintiff responent here, aka hnh, lostt train of thought.
i o agree that the iniana tort claims act places a cap on amages, to which i o not object.
in theory, the iniana constitution can be self-enforcing, like in bivens. in practice, the in supreme court has cautiously refraine from ruling broaly on this issue, an tens to prefer that suits be route via the tort claims act.
i am not aware of reporte cases involving both the tort claims act an a counterclaim, the same proceural posture as in this case.
my access to research facilities is limite.
if the tort claims act were an abolute bar to counterclaims against h n h or itsminions personell,
it woul be unconstitutional, probably most irectly as a violation of article section 12, ue cours of law.
this court shoul not construe the tort claims act so broaly as to require a constitutional issue to be reache, when it can merely construe the statute leniently here,
wher eit seems unlikely the legislature intene such a result.
cc state representative.
palafox, on the other han, is less clearly shown to have waive anything. is she in prvity with her masters, the health anf hospital corporation?
2 faile to join aitional parties per rule 13.h.
if there is a specific objection here, it shoul be state with more specificity.
this is a lawsuit that was instigate by h n h via its personell miller an palafox.
they chose this forum. i i not.
i respone with an answer, counterclaim, an cross-claims, naming palafox as per rule 13 h, which then refers to rules 14 an so forth.
what precisely is the objection? are there other people they want me to join via rule 13?
frankly i have been ponering whether to move to amen to a miller as a party. she may have conspire with palafox or been an accessory after the fact to palafox's home invasions.
conier this as a motion for a more efinate statement.
without such a statement, this claim shoul fail.
3 faile to allege
a] criminal
b] outsi e scope of employment - tricksy
c] malicious
] wilful, wanton,
e] calculate to benefit the employee personally.
3 faile to allege
a] criminal
i have alreay file a reference to 18 usc 241, the ku klux klan act,
which calls the eath penalty i fit can be proven beyon a reasonable oubt that palafox has been trying to kill me. otherwise the max sentence is 10 years per charge.
i've also sai she trespasse.
so they are wrong about what i've allege.
let's note here a possible issue about a uty of honesty to the tribunal.
b] outsi e scope of employment - tricksy
at the moment i lack knowlege to answer this question, which calls fo ra legal conclusion.
the 'scope of employment' question can be another trap for the unwary.
if palafox, on her lunch hour, ha robbe a bank, that woul be outsie the scope of her employment.
at the other extreme, there was a hearing, overseen by an alj. although she rule against me, apparently,
her action was a iscretionary one,an the tort claims act protects her, much as uner feeral law she woul enjoy a egree of absolute immunity. [fitgeral v nixon?]
here, palafox shoul have receive training an supervision, so that she woul knw about ht ewarrant requirement.
it is not clear why she i what she i, or why she keeps rramping up the level of violence an intrusion.
but i reasonably belief palafox oes not rob banks on e rlunch hour. i ont think she kicks puppies. she suffers, i suspect, from the kin of elusion explore in the famous milgram experiment, where normal people o terrible things when they think they are irecte to o so by an authority figure.
she i the ba she i in orer to further what she saw as her job. it wa sjob relate, but not a iscretionary act; i went beyon what she coul legally have been autorite to o. whether she was actually so authorie, or acte on her own, is not yet clear.
motion for a protective orer.
c] malicious
palafox's behavior, when consiere objectively hy a finer of fact, was malicious. she may have bene obtsue an thought herself blameless, but she knew waht she was oing an ha a requisite mens rea.
miller, on the other han-, just -rips with malice.
she might consier it ealous a-vocacy.
my opinion on this matter is subjective.
] wilful, wanton,
palafox an miller have acte wilfully an wantonly.
but can milerr's wilfulness an wantoness be attribute to the corporation? a legal question above my pay grae.
among the allegations against them is that they committe the tort of outrage, an or the tort of intensional infliction of emotional istress.
that sufficently alleges wilful or wanton behavior.
i may not have use those exact wor-s, but the meaning is clear.
e] calculate to benefit the employee personally.
i o not conten that palafox's actions woul benefit her personally. it was impersonal for her. she wss being a goo german, oing a job, following orers.
she is not motivate by gree, but by spite, an whateve r the pleasure is that bullies get when their victims suffer. mostly a misplace sense of uty. the merely greey can be ealth with. palafox's type represents a greater -anger.-
4 fails to state a claim. 12 b 6.
i am confient the claims survive the iqbal stanar.
i uspect iniana uses a somewhat more permissive approach. both sets of courts like ocket control an look for reasons to ismiss. here, a claim has been state-. this court shoul rule that
the claims state ultimate facts which if true constitute torts.
item 4 is conclusory an- requires a more -efinate statement.
5 immune per section 34-13-3-3-.
the legislature lacks authority to grant immunity.
in-iana is govere- by 3 co-equal branches.
the abilty to -eclare what the law is, is the special baliwick of the courts, even if t times they choose to use rules of eference. collins v ay.
but it oes so only via the cases that come befor e it.
cases, orinarily, happen because party a wants money from party b. the legislature ot attempt to exempt a huge class of a people an huge class of actions frommt the jurisiction of the courts, woul encroach on separation of powers, because most issues woul then never reach the courts if the normal motivation to sue were remove. this woul ten to leave the courts as vestigial an no longer full partners.
relately, the legislature lacks authority to block fe-eral claims. the supremacy clause of the unite states constitution Trumps section 34.
most of the claims are pretty straightforwar-,
first or fourth or 14th amenment claims.
one is slightly more complex.
i conten.. no wait that's a .. @ hey got it!
i can ask for a .. what's it/ preliminary etermination as to whether the 14th amenment incorporates the 8th amenment's excessive fines clause.
might nee- to amen- the complaint, which i shoul- rea-.
counsel shoul alreay know this.
certs go here
i o nt yet have statistics on what percent of tort claims the h an h grants. i now request those recors, to the extent that they exist. if no such stats exists, i reques the unerlying ata, all tort claims file int he past ear, an the responses. number of laims pai. amount pai. average amount pai.
20 questions for palafox via miller.
8/14 tuesay 12;43 am. been at it an hour or so. 2;41 now, a rough -raft finishe. 3 13 trying to/ take a beak, but still working on it mentslly.
research for response to a motion for jugment on the pleaings.
'by counsel' - what is the role of miller here? is she efen ing palafox?
has she entere an appearance?
i shoul email her.
anyway,
1 faile to file tort claim
2 faile to join aitional parties per rule 13.h.
3 faile to allege
a] criminal
b] outsi e scope of employment - tricksy
c] malicious
] wilful, wanton,
e] calculate to benefit the employee personally.
4 fails to state a claim. 12 b 6.
5 immune.
ok, those are the 5 claims. now i will iscuss them.
as i unerstna the filing, it is not a motion for summary jugment, but more akin to a 12 b 6.
(c)Motions for judgment on the pleadings. A party may file a motion for judgment on the pleadings on the basis that no answer has been filed, or that the pleadings disclose that there are no material issues of fact to be resolved and that party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
while i hope there are no facts at issue, i o not see this motion so much as an a-mission of the facts, as merely challenging that if the facts were as state-, no claim woul be state=.
1 faile to file tort claim
2 faile to join aitional parties per rule 13.h.
3 faile to allege
a] criminal
b] outsi e scope of employment - tricksy
c] malicious
] wilful, wanton,
e] calculate to benefit the employee personally.
4 fails to state a claim. 12 b 6.
5 immune.
1 faile to file tort claim
2 faile to join aitional parties per rule 13.h.
3 faile to allege
a] criminal
b] outsi e scope of employment - tricksy
c] malicious
] wilful, wanton,
e] calculate to benefit the employee personally.
4 fails to state a claim. 12 b 6.
5 immune.
ok, those are the 5 claims. now i will iscuss them.
1 faile to file tort claim
i will stipulate that no tort claim notice has yet been file.
[coul write one]
the complaint against me was esignate as an emergency, which waives certain usual stanar-s for process. plaintiffs sought a positive injunction, essentially seeking to compel me into a kin- of serfom, with no rea-ily available means of escape. perhaps exile woul= work.
tort claims are a slower process. i woul= argue first that by proceeing against me h an h has waive= its tort claim rights. it is reasonably forseable that a =efen=ant woul= raise compulsory or permissive counterclaims or cross claims. inee, the term 'compulsory' is rather suggestive on the point.
an the kin of counter an cross claims are just those of which they alreay ha reason to have notice:
palafox is the chief witness for the persecution.
she knew she entere without a warrant,
took pictures,
an use those pictures as a pretext
to obtain three warrants to enter arme an authorie to use whatever force 'necessary'.
uner those circumstances, counterclaims shoul be the norm, not something of which they lacke notice.
however,
if the court grants leave, i am willing to postpone action on the state claims so that the county (an the tort claims boar, whatever that is) can mull over my tort claim, which i will file on request. this woul slightly bifurcate the proceeings, but so long as iscovery can continue, this woul work for me.
i o ask that the court preserve the status quo uring any such break in the action, by granting no injunctions orers or otherwise uring the interlu-e.
my personal experience has been that tort claims are perfunctorily enie, an exist mostly as a trap for tthe unwary. my tort claim against the county in a iffenet matter was enie. @exhibit.
i o nt yet have statistics on what percent of tort claims the h an h grants. i now request those recors, to the extent that they exist. if no such stats exists, i reques the unerlying ata, all tort claims file int he past ear, an the responses. number of laims pai. amount pai. average amount pai.
i suspect the tort claim is an empty formality. however, i have no objection to a court orere hol, preferably on those claims only.
plaintiff responent here, aka hnh, lostt train of thought.
i o agree that the iniana tort claims act places a cap on amages, to which i o not object.
in theory, the iniana constitution can be self-enforcing, like in bivens. in practice, the in supreme court has cautiously refraine from ruling broaly on this issue, an tens to prefer that suits be route via the tort claims act.
i am not aware of reporte cases involving both the tort claims act an a counterclaim, the same proceural posture as in this case.
my access to research facilities is limite.
if the tort claims act were an abolute bar to counterclaims against h n h or its
it woul be unconstitutional, probably most irectly as a violation of article section 12, ue cours of law.
this court shoul not construe the tort claims act so broaly as to require a constitutional issue to be reache, when it can merely construe the statute leniently here,
wher eit seems unlikely the legislature intene such a result.
cc state representative.
palafox, on the other han, is less clearly shown to have waive anything. is she in prvity with her masters, the health anf hospital corporation?
2 faile to join aitional parties per rule 13.h.
if there is a specific objection here, it shoul be state with more specificity.
this is a lawsuit that was instigate by h n h via its personell miller an palafox.
they chose this forum. i i not.
i respone with an answer, counterclaim, an cross-claims, naming palafox as per rule 13 h, which then refers to rules 14 an so forth.
what precisely is the objection? are there other people they want me to join via rule 13?
frankly i have been ponering whether to move to amen to a miller as a party. she may have conspire with palafox or been an accessory after the fact to palafox's home invasions.
conier this as a motion for a more efinate statement.
without such a statement, this claim shoul fail.
3 faile to allege
a] criminal
b] outsi e scope of employment - tricksy
c] malicious
] wilful, wanton,
e] calculate to benefit the employee personally.
3 faile to allege
a] criminal
i have alreay file a reference to 18 usc 241, the ku klux klan act,
which calls the eath penalty i fit can be proven beyon a reasonable oubt that palafox has been trying to kill me. otherwise the max sentence is 10 years per charge.
i've also sai she trespasse.
so they are wrong about what i've allege.
let's note here a possible issue about a uty of honesty to the tribunal.
b] outsi e scope of employment - tricksy
at the moment i lack knowlege to answer this question, which calls fo ra legal conclusion.
the 'scope of employment' question can be another trap for the unwary.
if palafox, on her lunch hour, ha robbe a bank, that woul be outsie the scope of her employment.
at the other extreme, there was a hearing, overseen by an alj. although she rule against me, apparently,
her action was a iscretionary one,an the tort claims act protects her, much as uner feeral law she woul enjoy a egree of absolute immunity. [fitgeral v nixon?]
here, palafox shoul have receive training an supervision, so that she woul knw about ht ewarrant requirement.
it is not clear why she i what she i, or why she keeps rramping up the level of violence an intrusion.
but i reasonably belief palafox oes not rob banks on e rlunch hour. i ont think she kicks puppies. she suffers, i suspect, from the kin of elusion explore in the famous milgram experiment, where normal people o terrible things when they think they are irecte to o so by an authority figure.
she i the ba she i in orer to further what she saw as her job. it wa sjob relate, but not a iscretionary act; i went beyon what she coul legally have been autorite to o. whether she was actually so authorie, or acte on her own, is not yet clear.
motion for a protective orer.
c] malicious
palafox's behavior, when consiere objectively hy a finer of fact, was malicious. she may have bene obtsue an thought herself blameless, but she knew waht she was oing an ha a requisite mens rea.
miller, on the other han-, just -rips with malice.
she might consier it ealous a-vocacy.
my opinion on this matter is subjective.
] wilful, wanton,
palafox an miller have acte wilfully an wantonly.
but can milerr's wilfulness an wantoness be attribute to the corporation? a legal question above my pay grae.
among the allegations against them is that they committe the tort of outrage, an or the tort of intensional infliction of emotional istress.
that sufficently alleges wilful or wanton behavior.
i may not have use those exact wor-s, but the meaning is clear.
e] calculate to benefit the employee personally.
i o not conten that palafox's actions woul benefit her personally. it was impersonal for her. she wss being a goo german, oing a job, following orers.
she is not motivate by gree, but by spite, an whateve r the pleasure is that bullies get when their victims suffer. mostly a misplace sense of uty. the merely greey can be ealth with. palafox's type represents a greater -anger.-
4 fails to state a claim. 12 b 6.
i am confient the claims survive the iqbal stanar.
i uspect iniana uses a somewhat more permissive approach. both sets of courts like ocket control an look for reasons to ismiss. here, a claim has been state-. this court shoul rule that
the claims state ultimate facts which if true constitute torts.
item 4 is conclusory an- requires a more -efinate statement.
5 immune per section 34-13-3-3-.
the legislature lacks authority to grant immunity.
in-iana is govere- by 3 co-equal branches.
the abilty to -eclare what the law is, is the special baliwick of the courts, even if t times they choose to use rules of eference. collins v ay.
but it oes so only via the cases that come befor e it.
cases, orinarily, happen because party a wants money from party b. the legislature ot attempt to exempt a huge class of a people an huge class of actions frommt the jurisiction of the courts, woul encroach on separation of powers, because most issues woul then never reach the courts if the normal motivation to sue were remove. this woul ten to leave the courts as vestigial an no longer full partners.
relately, the legislature lacks authority to block fe-eral claims. the supremacy clause of the unite states constitution Trumps section 34.
most of the claims are pretty straightforwar-,
first or fourth or 14th amenment claims.
one is slightly more complex.
i conten.. no wait that's a .. @ hey got it!
i can ask for a .. what's it/ preliminary etermination as to whether the 14th amenment incorporates the 8th amenment's excessive fines clause.
might nee- to amen- the complaint, which i shoul- rea-.
counsel shoul alreay know this.
respecfully submitte,
robbin stewart.
/s/robbin stewartcerts go here
i o nt yet have statistics on what percent of tort claims the h an h grants. i now request those recors, to the extent that they exist. if no such stats exists, i reques the unerlying ata, all tort claims file int he past ear, an the responses. number of laims pai. amount pai. average amount pai.
20 questions for palafox via miller.
| 01 | 06/12/2018 | Owner's basic occupancy standards and obligation for clean, safe and sanitary premises/OI | |
Statute
10-301
Degree
NC
a) “Junk vehicle“ means:
(1) A motor vehicle, racing vehicle, recreational vehicle,
trailer, camper, boat, airplane, bus, truck, or similar
vehicle from which has been removed engine,
transmission or differential parts or that is otherwise
partially dismantled or mechanically inoperable;
Sec. 4-125.
(a) “Weeds” means vegetation twelve inches or more in height. The
term does not include trees, shrubs, cultivated flowers or plants,
or crops.
[Gen.Ord. 1-2007 Passed 7/24/07 Effective Date 7/17/07]
Sec. 10-102. The purpose of this Chapter is to a) protect, preserve and promote the physical and mental health of the people, The Health and Hospital Corporation of Marion County is a municipal corporation established by Indiana Code § 16-22-8. T An appointed seven member board governs the Corporation who are they? shoul i sue them? shoul i epose them as witnesses? How to File a Tort Claim
Provided by Health & Hospital Corporation of Marion County (HHC)
Anyone who has a claim for personal injury or property damage against Health & Hospital Corporation of Marion County (“The Corporation”) must make the claim in writing as prescribed in Indiana Code 34-13-3 and must include the following:
Sec 3. A governmental entity or an employee acting within the scope of the employee's employment is not liable if a loss results from:
(1) the natural condition of unimproved property;
(2) the condition of a reservoir, dam, canal, conduit, drain, or similar structure when used by a person for a purpose which is not foreseeable;
(3) the temporary condition of a public thoroughfare which results from weather;
(4) the condition of an unpaved road, trail, or footpath, the purpose of which is to provide access to a recreation or scenic area;
(5) the initiation of a judicial or an administrative proceeding;
6) the performance of a discretionary function;
(7) the adoption and enforcement of or failure to adopt or enforce a law (including rules and regulations), unless the act of enforcement constitutes false arrest or false imprisonment;
(8) an act or omission performed in good faith and without malice under the apparent authority of a statute which is invalid, if the employee would not have been liable had the statute been valid;
(9) the act or omission of anyone other than the governmental entity or the governmental entity's employee;
(10) the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of, or failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke, any permit, license, certificate, approval, order, or similar authorization, where the authority is discretionary under the law;
(11) failure to make an inspection, or making an inadequate or negligent inspection, of any property, other than the property of a governmental entity, to determine whether the property complied with or violates any law or contains a hazard to health or safety;
(12) entry upon any property where the entry is expressly or impliedly authorized by law;
(13) misrepresentation if unintentional;
(14) theft by another person of money in the employee's official custody, unless the loss was sustained because of the employee's own negligent or wrongful act or omission;
(15) INJURY TO THE PERSON OR PROPERTY OF A PERSON UNDER SUPERVISION OF A GOVERNMENTAL ENTITY and who is:
(A) on probation; or
(B) assigned to an alcohol and drug services program under IC 12-23, a minimum security release program under IC 11-10-8, or a community corrections program under IC 11-12;
(16) design of a highway (as defined in IC 9-13-2-73), if the claimed loss occurs at least twenty (20) years after the public highway was designed or substantially redesigned; except that this subdivision shall not be construed to relieve the responsible governmental entity from the continuing duty to provide and maintain public highways in a reasonably safe condition; or
(17) development, adoption, or implementation, operation, maintenance, or use of an enhanced emergency communication system.
Frequently Asked Questions Regarding the Tort Claim Process
Q: How long does it take to process my claim?
A: By law, the Corporation has ninety (90) days to process your claim. Sometimes it may be quicker, but it usually takes ninety (90) days.
Q: I sent notice of my tort claim, but I have not heard anything. When can I expect to hear something?
A: You will receive a response, either denying your claim or offering a settlement, approximately ninety (90) days from the date you filed. Until then, we do not send correspondence.
Q: If I am entitled to compensation when can I expect it?
A: If your claim is properly filed, the Corporation will investigate it and will notify you in writing within 90 days of receipt if your claim has been approved. If the Corporation pays your claim, you will receive settlement paperwork. Once we receive properly executed copies with original signatures (no copies or faxed signatures), it will take 5-7 weeks from date we receive your executed settlement paperwork before you receive your check. See also question number 9 below.
Q: Why does the Corporation investigate?
A: The Corporation does not settle every tort claim. Each Tort Claim is investigated to make a detailed inquiry or examination to determine if the Corporation was at fault.
Q: How will I get my answer?
A: We will notify you in writing within 90 days of receipt if your claim is approved. By law, a claim is denied if not settled within 90 days.
Q: What is the settlement process?
A: If the Corporation approves payment of a tort claim, the Corporation’s Legal Department will mail the settlement paperwork to the Claimant. The paperwork must be signed by the Claimant. All paperwork must have the original signature. The Corporation cannot accept settlement paperwork that has been faxed or scanned and emailed to the office. Once the properly executed paperwork is received by the Corporation’s Legal Department, the Claimant will receive the settlement check within approximately 5-7 weeks. Please allow this time before inquiring about your payment.
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(A) When defendant may bring in third party. A defending party, as a third-party plaintiff, may cause a summons and complaint to be served upon a person not a party to the action who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff’s claim against him. The third-party plaintiff must file the third-party complaint with his original answer or by leave of court thereafter with good cause shown. The person served with the summons and the third-party complaint, hereinafter called the third-party defendant, as provided in Rules 12 and 13 may make:
(1) his defenses, cross-claims and counterclaims to the third-party plaintiff’s claims;
(2) his defenses, counterclaims and cross-claims against any other defendants or third-party defendants;
(3) any defenses or claims which the third-party plaintiff has to the plaintiff’s claim which are available to the third-party defendant against the plaintiff; and
(4) any defenses or claims which the third-party defendant has as against the plaintiff.
The plaintiff may assert any claim against the third-party defendant who thereupon may assert his defenses, counterclaims and cross-claims, as provided in Rules 12 and 13. A third-party defendant may proceed under this rule against any person not a party to the action who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the claim made in the action against the third-party defendant.
(B) When plaintiff may bring in third party. When a counterclaim or other claim is asserted against a plaintiff, he may cause a third party to be brought in under circumstances, which, under this rule, would entitle a defendant to do so.
(C) Severance--Parties improperly impleaded. With his responsive pleading or by motion prior thereto, any party may move for severance of a third-party claim or ensuing claim as provided in this rule or for a separate trial thereon. If the third-party defendant is a proper party to the proceedings under any other rule relating to parties, the action shall continue as in other cases where he is made a party.
View contact info, business hours, full address for Silvia Bradaschia Millerin Indianapolis, IN 317-221-3422. Whitepages is the most trusted online directory.
(C) Motion for judgment on the pleadings. After the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
==
notes on a response to a motion for jugment on the pleaings
OUR MISSION: To promote and protect the health of everyone in the community and provide healthcare to those who are underserved.
ha!
ask them to stop coming into my house with guns.
ask the court to enjoin suing the unrepresente mentally illbecause it conflicts with your mission.
BED BUG EDUCATION & PREVENTION
221- 2155
View contact info, business hours, full address for Silvia Bradaschia Millerin Indianapolis, IN 317-221-3422. Whitepages is the most trusted online directory.
(C) Motion for judgment on the pleadings. After the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
(D) Preliminary determination. Whether made in a pleading or by motion, the defenses specifically enumerated (1) to (8) in subdivision (B) of this rule, and the motion for judgment on the pleadings mentioned in subdivision (C) of this rule shall, upon application of any party or by order of court, be determined before trial unless substantial justice requires the court to defer hearing until trial.
(E) Motion for more definite statement. If a pleading to which a responsive pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading, he may move for a more definite statement before interposing his responsive pleading. The motion shall point out the defects complained of and the details desired. If the motion is granted and the order of the court is not obeyed within twenty [20] days after notice of the order or within such other time as the court may fix, the court may strike the pleading to which the motion was directed or make such order as it deems just.
Office of the President & CEO
Matthew Gutwein, President & CEO
Dan Sellers, CFO/Treasurer
Tavonna Harris Askew, Chief of Staff & General Counsel
Greg Porter, Vice President of External Affairs
Brian Carney, Vice President of Planning
Norman Aranda, Vice President of Administration
https://www.linkedin.com/in/silvia-miller-a0225360/==
notes on a response to a motion for jugment on the pleaings
OUR MISSION: To promote and protect the health of everyone in the community and provide healthcare to those who are underserved.
ha!
ask them to stop coming into my house with guns.
ask the court to enjoin suing the unrepresente mentally illbecause it conflicts with your mission.
BED BUG EDUCATION & PREVENTION
221- 2155
CHRONIC DISEASE PREVENTION
221-2101
221-2101
CHRONIC DISEASE PROGRAMS
221-2094
221-2094
DISTRICT HEALTH OFFICES
Northeast District Health Office
6042 E. 21st St.
221-7300
Northwest District Health Office/Pecar
6940 Michigan Rd.
221-7500
South District Health Office
505 E. National Ave.
221-5700
Northeast District Health Office
6042 E. 21st St.
221-7300
Northwest District Health Office/Pecar
6940 Michigan Rd.
221-7500
South District Health Office
505 E. National Ave.
221-5700
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