did wednesday.
got a microwave. need to test it.
made a list.
bank, withdrew $100.
tuesday
unloaded car
paid electric bill $200.
saw 16 cops cars between 12 and 2 am, if i count the firetruck and ambulance. the game.
to do: write down mileage. call tommy. call mom.
buy gas, or did i?
write downt he items from my list.
this is not a public blog, just a place hwere i can leave myself notes. nothing to see here folks, move along.
Wednesday, September 29, 2021
Thursday, September 23, 2021
Gaspee project v mederoz notes for amivus
Reasons for cert
Circuit split.
After talley footnote two
After mcintyre
After aclf
Citizens caused confusion.
First case for bonta.
Ct. case. Riley in kenticky v terry?
Gable v patton
Worely
Public citizen 11th circuit
Majors v abell State v acey
Wilkinson?
Green mountain futures
N carolina peterslie
merits.
Talley mcintyre aclf watchtower
Barnette Wooley tornillo riley
Aid v open society janus nifla v beccera
1 sentence from each.
Bailey v. Maine Commission on Governmental Ethics, 2012 WL 4588564 No. 1:11-CV-00179-NT, (D. Me. Sept. 30, 2012): http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCOURTS-med-1_11-cv-00179/pdf/USCOURTS-med-1_11-cv-00179-3.pdf
contact@ballsandstrikes.org
"We have acknowledged that drivers who display a State’s selected license plate designs convey the messages communicated through those designs. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U. S. 705 , n. 15, 715 (1977) (observing that a vehicle “is readily associated with its operator” and that drivers displaying license plates “use their private property as a ‘mobile billboard’ for the State’s ideological message”). And we have recognized that the First Amendment stringently limits a State’s authority to compel a private party to express a view with which the private party disagrees. See id., at 715; Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U. S. 557, 573 (1995) ; West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 642 (1943) . But here, compelled private speech is not at issue." walker v texas.
Tuesday, September 21, 2021
Friday, September 17, 2021
notes on gaspee project v mederos.
to do: motion to intervene.
to do: draft of amicus in support of cert.
to do: email volokh
to do: make better list
to do: write to justice r dissenting re support for amicus.
to do: submission to balls and strikes.
to do: submission to eugene's free speech journal. other stuff
to do: draft of amicus in support of cert.
keep working on disciplinary complaint
100 interogatories for hendricks
records request for hendricks.
plasma
check for studies
clean house
talk to jake
to do: draft of amicus in support of cert.
interest of amicus. stewart v taylor. majors v abell, anonymous v delaware, fec comments. privacy project amicus in crawford v marion county. summary of argument the case presents two issues, which the court below erred by treating as a single issue. 1. under the bonta standard, do plaintiffs present a triable issue on their disclosure claim? 2. are talley and mcintyre still good law, such that the disclaimer rule is facially invalid? this brief is focused on the second question. the court should take the case on the second issue, regardless of whether or not it takes the first issue. the case is important as the first case applying the new standard of review set out in AIP v Bonta. the case is important because it widens the circuit split that has existed since shortly after Talley v California, narrowed but did not end after McIntyre v. Ohio, widened again after Citizens United, and has not been resolved by cases such as Janus, NIFLA v Becarra, Masterpiece, or Bonta. the case is important because voting rights are preservative of all other rights, and to be meaningful voting must be informed by a free flow of election speech, such as the voting guide at issue here. what is needed is a ruling like cooper v aaron, so that manuel talley's great grandchildren can finally enjoy the benifits of the ruling in his case. 60 plus years is too long to wait. the case is important because it can provide guidance to the FEC and congress, which are currently illegally refusing to follow Talley and McIntyre. In Buckley v. ACLF, all 9 members of the court held that McIntyre is good law, and disclaimer regulations such as name badges for petitioners are unlawful, while upholding disclosure under the permissive Valeo standard. But in dicta in Citizens United, 8 members of the court lumped disclaimers in with disclosure, in discussing why an as applied challenge had failed for other reasons. In so doing, the court sowed confusion and discord, muddying the waters, so that public officials acting in bad faith can argue the rights established by Talley and McIntyre were not clearly established, and thus evade liability for their wrongdoing. At the moment, whether a citizen can be jailed for putting a "Vote for Smith" sign in their yard or on their home page depends on which state they live in and which circuit that state is in. National uniformity would be a better policy, and is required by the First Amendment.
to do: motion to intervene.
to do: draft of amicus in support of cert.
to do: email volokh
to do: make better list
to do: write to justice r dissenting re support for amicus.
to do: submission to balls and strikes.
to do: submission to eugene's free speech journal. other stuff
to do: draft of amicus in support of cert.
keep working on disciplinary complaint
100 interogatories for hendricks
records request for hendricks.
plasma
check for studies
clean house
talk to jake
to do: draft of amicus in support of cert.
interest of amicus. stewart v taylor. majors v abell, anonymous v delaware, fec comments. privacy project amicus in crawford v marion county. summary of argument the case presents two issues, which the court below erred by treating as a single issue. 1. under the bonta standard, do plaintiffs present a triable issue on their disclosure claim? 2. are talley and mcintyre still good law, such that the disclaimer rule is facially invalid? this brief is focused on the second question. the court should take the case on the second issue, regardless of whether or not it takes the first issue. the case is important as the first case applying the new standard of review set out in AIP v Bonta. the case is important because it widens the circuit split that has existed since shortly after Talley v California, narrowed but did not end after McIntyre v. Ohio, widened again after Citizens United, and has not been resolved by cases such as Janus, NIFLA v Becarra, Masterpiece, or Bonta. the case is important because voting rights are preservative of all other rights, and to be meaningful voting must be informed by a free flow of election speech, such as the voting guide at issue here. what is needed is a ruling like cooper v aaron, so that manuel talley's great grandchildren can finally enjoy the benifits of the ruling in his case. 60 plus years is too long to wait. the case is important because it can provide guidance to the FEC and congress, which are currently illegally refusing to follow Talley and McIntyre. In Buckley v. ACLF, all 9 members of the court held that McIntyre is good law, and disclaimer regulations such as name badges for petitioners are unlawful, while upholding disclosure under the permissive Valeo standard. But in dicta in Citizens United, 8 members of the court lumped disclaimers in with disclosure, in discussing why an as applied challenge had failed for other reasons. In so doing, the court sowed confusion and discord, muddying the waters, so that public officials acting in bad faith can argue the rights established by Talley and McIntyre were not clearly established, and thus evade liability for their wrongdoing. At the moment, whether a citizen can be jailed for putting a "Vote for Smith" sign in their yard or on their home page depends on which state they live in and which circuit that state is in. National uniformity would be a better policy, and is required by the First Amendment.
Wednesday, September 15, 2021
Tuesday, September 14, 2021
Saturday, September 11, 2021
notes on possible disciplinary complaint
[4] Lawyers holding public office assume legal responsibilities going beyond those of other citizens. A lawyer's abuse of public office can suggest an inability to fulfill the professional role of lawyers.
What this complaint is about is that x serves on the hendricks county election board, and is engaged in illegal unconstitutional censorship. as an attorney, he should have heard of the first amendment. @too snarky. 8 pm thursday.
On the one hand, the rules require me to report a violation of the rules.
On the other hand, this complaint should be taken with a grain of salt, as it is part pf a larger dispute that will probably involve litigation.
I have been a member of the Indiana bar since 1993, and have never filed a disciplinary complaint against anyone, even if there were a couple of times I probably should have done so; it is not something I take lightly.
Public officials enjoy a quasi- absolute immunity when they act in a quasi-judicial capacity, as x did in ruling on my complaint against sheriff candidate terry judy.
Public officials enjoy qualified immunity when they impose unconstitutional policies where the law is not clearly established. Here, the law is clearly established, yet I am aware courts often treat qualified immunity as absolute immunity. Public Officials too often treat holding office as a license to engage in unlawful behavior. So a disciplinary complaint may be the only available option.
x is to be commended for serving on the county election board. this is the sort of pro bono service that is encouraged. however, such service still has a duty of competence.
Citizens are deemed to know the law. And the plain text of the first amendment is clear that the government cannot interfere with freedom of the press. The Supreme Court established that disclaimer rules are unconstitutional in 1960. They have restated this in 1995, 1999, 2005, and 2019.
Further, in my complaint letter that initiated the election board meeting at issue, I cited some of the relevant cases. So this was not some accident or oversight, but deliberate and
willful refusal to follow controlling cases.
?
?
???
n rmore, the purpose of the Rules can be subverted when they are invoked by opposing parties as procedural weapons. The fact that a rule is a just basis for a lawyer's self-assessment, or for sanctioning a lawyer under the administration of a disciplinary authority, does not imply that an antagonist in a collateral proceeding or transaction has standing to seek enforcement of the Rule. Nevertheless, since the Rules do establish standards of conduct by lawyers, a lawyer's violation of a Rule may be evidence of breach of the applicable standard of conduct. (a) A lawyer who knows that another lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, shall inform the appropriate professional authority. Rule 8.4. Misconduct It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: (b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects; (c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation; (d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice; (f) knowingly assist a judge or judicial officer in conduct that is a violation of applicable rules of judicial conduct or other law; or (g) engage in conduct, in a professional capacity, manifesting, by words or conduct, bias or prejudice based upon race, gender, religion, national origin, disability, sexual orientation, age, socioeconomic status, or similar factors. Legitimate advocacy respecting the foregoing factors does not violate this subsection. A trial judge's finding that preemptory challenges were exercised on a discriminatory basis does not alone establish a violation of this Rule. Rule 8.2. Judicial and Legal Officials (a) A lawyer shall not make a statement that the lawyer knows to be false or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge, adjudicatory officer or public legal officer, or of a candidate for election or appointment to judicial or legal office. [1] A lawyer, as a member of the legal profession, is a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system and a public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of justice. Whether or not engaging in the practice of law, lawyers should conduct themselves honorably. [4] In all professional functions a lawyer should be competent, prompt and diligent. [5] A lawyer's conduct should conform to the requirements of the law, both in professional service to clients and in the lawyer's business and personal affairs. A lawyer should use the law's procedures only for legitimate purposes and not to harass or intimidate others. A lawyer should demonstrate respect for the legal system and for those who serve it, including judges, other lawyers and public officials. While it is a lawyer's duty, when necessary, to challenge the rectitude of official action, it is also a lawyer's duty to uphold legal process.
?
?
???
n rmore, the purpose of the Rules can be subverted when they are invoked by opposing parties as procedural weapons. The fact that a rule is a just basis for a lawyer's self-assessment, or for sanctioning a lawyer under the administration of a disciplinary authority, does not imply that an antagonist in a collateral proceeding or transaction has standing to seek enforcement of the Rule. Nevertheless, since the Rules do establish standards of conduct by lawyers, a lawyer's violation of a Rule may be evidence of breach of the applicable standard of conduct. (a) A lawyer who knows that another lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, shall inform the appropriate professional authority. Rule 8.4. Misconduct It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: (b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects; (c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation; (d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice; (f) knowingly assist a judge or judicial officer in conduct that is a violation of applicable rules of judicial conduct or other law; or (g) engage in conduct, in a professional capacity, manifesting, by words or conduct, bias or prejudice based upon race, gender, religion, national origin, disability, sexual orientation, age, socioeconomic status, or similar factors. Legitimate advocacy respecting the foregoing factors does not violate this subsection. A trial judge's finding that preemptory challenges were exercised on a discriminatory basis does not alone establish a violation of this Rule. Rule 8.2. Judicial and Legal Officials (a) A lawyer shall not make a statement that the lawyer knows to be false or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge, adjudicatory officer or public legal officer, or of a candidate for election or appointment to judicial or legal office. [1] A lawyer, as a member of the legal profession, is a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system and a public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of justice. Whether or not engaging in the practice of law, lawyers should conduct themselves honorably. [4] In all professional functions a lawyer should be competent, prompt and diligent. [5] A lawyer's conduct should conform to the requirements of the law, both in professional service to clients and in the lawyer's business and personal affairs. A lawyer should use the law's procedures only for legitimate purposes and not to harass or intimidate others. A lawyer should demonstrate respect for the legal system and for those who serve it, including judges, other lawyers and public officials. While it is a lawyer's duty, when necessary, to challenge the rectitude of official action, it is also a lawyer's duty to uphold legal process.
Wednesday, September 08, 2021
wednesday
took out trash
driver's record $4. dispute w bmv. needs memo.
made notes on brief
tire $50
photocopied/printed passport stuff.
what else?
going to helium tonight.should leave soon. unpack car.
did: van sold for $800 + a washer and dryer.
did: emails to tommy and bj re mail, and mark small re possible case.
trash is probably a day late due to holiday. mouse #33. need to put out mousetraps. Worley v. Fla. Sec’y of State, 717 F.3d 1238 (11th Cir. 2013) https://www.courtlistener.com/audio/71649/yes-on-prop-b-v-city-and-county-of-sf/ Nat’l Org. for Marriage v. Daluz, 654 F.3d 115 (1st Cir. 2011) ..............................................................................15 Nat’l Org. for Marriage v. McKee, 649 F.3d 34 (1st Cir. 2011) (“NOM I”)...................................................... passim Nat’l Org. for Marriage v. McKee, 669 F.3d 34 (1st Cir. 2012) (“NOM II”).. Bailey v. Maine Commission on Governmental Ethics, 2012 WL 4588564 No. 1:11-CV-00179-NT, (D. Me. Sept. 30, 2012): http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCOURTS-med-1_11-cv-00179/pdf/USCOURTS-med-1_11-cv-00179-3.pdf Kentucky Right to Life, Inc. v. Terry, 108 F.3d 637 Washington Post v. McManus 4th cir. Oregon Attorney General Opinion No. 8266 (March 10, 1999). Van Hollen v. Federal Election Commission, Any opinions expressed in this paper should not be attributed to any of Eric Wang’s clients, or those of his firm.
took out trash
driver's record $4. dispute w bmv. needs memo.
made notes on brief
tire $50
photocopied/printed passport stuff.
what else?
going to helium tonight.should leave soon. unpack car.
did: van sold for $800 + a washer and dryer.
did: emails to tommy and bj re mail, and mark small re possible case.
trash is probably a day late due to holiday. mouse #33. need to put out mousetraps. Worley v. Fla. Sec’y of State, 717 F.3d 1238 (11th Cir. 2013) https://www.courtlistener.com/audio/71649/yes-on-prop-b-v-city-and-county-of-sf/ Nat’l Org. for Marriage v. Daluz, 654 F.3d 115 (1st Cir. 2011) ..............................................................................15 Nat’l Org. for Marriage v. McKee, 649 F.3d 34 (1st Cir. 2011) (“NOM I”)...................................................... passim Nat’l Org. for Marriage v. McKee, 669 F.3d 34 (1st Cir. 2012) (“NOM II”).. Bailey v. Maine Commission on Governmental Ethics, 2012 WL 4588564 No. 1:11-CV-00179-NT, (D. Me. Sept. 30, 2012): http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCOURTS-med-1_11-cv-00179/pdf/USCOURTS-med-1_11-cv-00179-3.pdf Kentucky Right to Life, Inc. v. Terry, 108 F.3d 637 Washington Post v. McManus 4th cir. Oregon Attorney General Opinion No. 8266 (March 10, 1999). Van Hollen v. Federal Election Commission, Any opinions expressed in this paper should not be attributed to any of Eric Wang’s clients, or those of his firm.
AFFIDAVIT REGARDING A CHANGE OF NAME
3. Applicant's Former Name
4. Applicant's Date of Birth
Middle
6. Number of Years You Have Known the Applicant 7. Your Relationship to the Applicant
By Former Name
8. Explain the difference in the applicant's former name and the name currently used. State whether the current
name is used exclusively and for all purposes or if it is used as an "also known as" name. (Attach a separate
sheet of paper if more space is needed.)
OATH: I declare under penalty of perjury that the information given above by me is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief; that the applicant named
above has been known by both his or her present and former names as stated; and that the applicant is known by his or her present name to friends and relatives, and in
the community in which he or she is residing.
(Jr.,Sr.,III)
(mm-dd-yyyy) (City and State)
Last Suffix
First
(Jr.,Sr.,III)
Middle
PURPOSE An Affidavit Regarding a Change of Name may be submitted with an application for a U.S. passport when the name which is used by the applicant is (1)
substantially different from that shown on the evidence of citizenship or (2) has been adopted without formal court proceedings and was not acquired by a marriage. The
affiant (preferably a blood relative) must have personal knowledge of the applicant's use of both names. To support a change of name that has been adopted without formal
court proceedings or by a marriage, the applicant must present original or certified copies of three or more public documents evidencing that the applicant has used the
acquired name publicly and exclusively for five years or longer. Affidavits Regarding a Change of Name from at least two persons, attesting that they have known the
applicant by both names and that the applicant has used the new name exclusively for at least five years, may be provided in place of one of the public documents if the
applicant cannot obtain a third public document. The affidavit must be accompanied by a photocopy of the front and back of the affiant's identification. Final
determination of the name(s) to be shown in the U.S. passport will be made by Passport Services based on all submitted evidence. Completed affidavits will be retained
and requests for copies of this affidavit should be made at the time of execution. An affidavit is not needed if an applicant presents a court order or marriage certificate
documenting the change of his or her name. This affidavit must be signed in front of a notary, unless it is submitted to an authorized Passport Agent or Acceptance Agent.
U.S. Department of State OMB APPROVAL NO. 1405-0133
EXPIRES: 10-31-2020
ESTIMATED BURDEN: 40 MINUTES
Address of Affiant
Identifying Document
Presented:
Subscribed and Sworn to before me this day of
at
Name of Passport Agent, Acceptance Agent, or Notary Public Location
DS-60 07-2017 Page 1 of 2
NOTARY
SEAL (Number and Street, City, State, and Zip Code )
(Affirmed)
(Passport Agency or City & State)
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