Saturday, September 23, 2023

As applied to the arizona plaintiffs, the disclaimer provision is unconstitutional as to them for two reasons. 1. It fits the naacp v alabama test.

2, 303 Creative v Ennis is controlling, and supercedes this court's earlier ruling.

Strict scrutiny applies,

The earlier ruling misconstrued citizens united as having changed the standard of scrutiny for disclaimer cases, and used the bonta standard instead of the McIntyre exacting scrutiny test, the kiss of death. 

The earlier ruling's conclusion might follow if it had been correct as to the standard. Bonta is too new to produce a determinable result.

  

303 mentions/ cites/ prior compelled speech cases such as Barnette Tornillo Riley and Wooley.

2.1 that 303 creative is controlling is supported by 20 cases from 13 states that have found a right under the state constitution. 

brush and nib v phoenix incorporates barnette tornillo riley and wooley into arizona constitutional law. so these cases control directly, as scotus cases, via the supremacy clauses, but also indirectly as a result as having been adopted  into Arizona law.

2.2 6 reasons why citizens united is not controlling:

1 case as a whole

2 corporate speech case

3 alternative to total ban

4 subsequent cases reed v town of gilbert. 

5 aside to an aside, not main focus of case

6 express advocacy loophole case, not direct disclaimer challenge

7. dicta

8. transcripts of oral argument do not mention disclaimer issue? nope. not the first one. did not find the second transcript.

9. the word disclaimer does not appear in buckley v valeo.

10. buckley v valeo:

A. General Principles

The Act's contribution and expenditure limitations operate in an area of the most fundamental First Amendment activities. Discussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates are integral to the operation of the system of government established by our Constitution. The First Amendment affords the broadest protection to such political expression in order "to assure [the] unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people." Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476, 484 (1957). Although First Amendment protections are not confined to "the exposition of ideas," Winters v. New York, 333 U. S. 507, 510 (1948), "there is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs, . . . of course includ[ing] discussions of candidates. . . ." Mills v. Alabama, 384 U. S. 214, 218 (1966). This no more than reflects our "profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open," New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 270 (1964). In a republic where the people are sovereign, the ability of the citizenry to make informed choices among candidates *15 for office is essential, for the identities of those who are elected will inevitably shape the course that we follow as a nation. As the Court observed in Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U. S. 265, 272 (1971), "it can hardly be doubted that the constitutional guarantee has its fullest and most urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office."

The First Amendment protects political association as well as political expression. The constitutional right of association explicated in NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449, 460 (1958), stemmed from the Court's recognition that "[e]ffective advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association." Subsequent decisions have made clear that the First and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee " `freedom to associate with others for the common advancement of political beliefs and ideas,' " a freedom that encompasses " `[t]he right to associate with the political party of one's choice.' " Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U. S. 51, 56, 57 (1973), quoted in Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U. S. 477, 487 (1975).

We cannot share the view that the present Act's contribution and expenditure limitations are comparable to the restrictions on conduct upheld in O'Brien. The expenditure of money simply cannot be equated with such conduct as destruction of a draft card. Some forms of communication made possible by the giving and spending of money involve speech alone, some involve conduct primarily, and some involve a combination of the two. Yet this Court has never suggested that the dependence of a communication on the expenditure of money operates itself to introduce a non speech element or to reduce the exacting scrutiny required by the First Amendment. 

By contrast, the Act's $1,000 limitation on independent expenditures "relative to a clearly identified candidate" precludes most associations from effectively amplifying the voice of their adherents, the original basis for the recognition of First Amendment protection of the freedom of association. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S., at 460. The Act's constraints on the ability of independent associations and candidate campaign organizations to expend resources on political expression "is simultaneously an interference with the freedom of [their] adherents," Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U. S. 234, 250 (1957) (plurality opinion). See Cousins v. *23 Wigoda, 419 U. S., at 487-488NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 431 (1963).

Unlike the limitations on contributions and expenditures imposed by 18 U. S. C. § 608 (1970 ed., Supp. IV), the disclosure requirements of the Act, 2 U. S. C. § 431 et seq. (1970 ed., Supp. IV),[68] are not challenged by appellants as per se unconstitutional restrictions on the exercise of First Amendment freedoms of speech and association.[69] Indeed, appellants argue that "narrowly drawn disclosure requirements are the proper solution to virtually all of the evils Congress sought to remedy." 

The particular requirements *61 embodied in the Act are attacked as overbroad—both in their application to minor-party and independent candidates and in their extension to contributions as small as $11 or $101.

 hold that § 434 (e), if narrowly construed, also is within constitutional bounds.

But we have repeatedly found that compelled disclosure, in itself, can seriously infringe on privacy of association and belief guaranteed by the First Amendment. E. g., Gibson v. Florida Legislative Comm., 372 U. S. 539 (1963); NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415 (1963); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479 (1960); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U. S. 516 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449 (1958).








1:11 sunday afternoon.




12:03 am sunday 9/24. 1 hour. 


 



 

 The Constitution protects against the compelled disclosure of political associations and beliefs. 

Such disclosures "can seriously infringe on privacy of association and belief guaranteed by the First Amendment." Buckley v. Valeo, supra, at 64, citing Gibson v. Florida Legislative Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). 

"Inviolability of privacy in group association may in many circumstances be indispensable to preservation of freedom of association, particularly where a group espouses dissident beliefs." NAACP v. Alabama, supra, at 462. The right to privacy in one's political associations and beliefs will yield *92 only to a " `subordinating interest of the State [that is] compelling,' " NAACP v. Alabama, supra, at 463 (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 265 (1957) (opinion concurring in result)), and then only if there is a "substantial relation between the information sought and [an] overriding and compelling state interest." Gibson v. Florida Legislative Comm., supra, at 546.

The Court stressed, however, that in certain circumstances the balance of interests requires exempting minor political parties from compelled disclosures. The government's interests in compelling disclosures are "diminished" in the case of minor parties. Id., at 70. Minor party candidates "usually represent definite and publicized viewpoints" well known to the public, and the improbability of their winning reduces the dangers of corruption and vote-buying. Ibid. At the same time, the potential for impairing First Amendment interests is substantially greater:

*93 "We are not unmindful that the damage done by disclosure to the associational interests of the minor parties and their members and to supporters of independents could be significant. These movements are less likely to have a sound financial base and thus are more vulnerable to falloffs in contributions. In some instances fears of reprisal may deter contributions to the point where the movement cannot survive. The public interest also suffers if that result comes to pass, for there is a consequent reduction in the free circulation of ideas both within and without the political arena." Id

We concluded that in some circumstances the diminished government interests furthered by compelling disclosures by minor parties does not justify the greater threat to First Amendment values.

Buckley v. Valeo set forth the following test for determining when the First Amendment requires exempting minor parties from compelled disclosures:

"The evidence offered need show only a reasonable probability that the compelled disclosure of a party's contributors' names will subject them to threats, harassment, or reprisals from either Government officials or private parties." Id., at 74.

 

We long have recognized that significant encroachments on First Amendment rights of the sort that compelled disclosure imposes cannot be justified by a mere showing of some legitimate governmental interest. Since NAACP v. Alabama we have required that the subordinating interests of the State must survive exacting scrutiny.[

The strict test established by NAACP v. Alabama is necessary because compelled disclosure has the potential for substantially infringing the exercise of First Amendment rights. [see] Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U. S. 1, 97 (1961).

The disclosure requirements, as a general matter, directly serve substantial governmental interests. In determining whether these interests are sufficient to justify the requirements we must look to the extent of the burden that they place on individual rights.

It is undoubtedly true that public disclosure of contributions to candidates and political parties will deter some individuals who otherwise might contribute. In some instances, disclosure may even expose contributors to harassment or retaliation. These are not insignificant burdens on individual rights, and they must be weighed carefully against the interests which Congress has sought to promote by this legislation.


 In this process, we note and agree with appellants' concession[81] that disclosure requirements—certainly in most applications—appear to be the least restrictive means of curbing the evils of campaign ignorance and corruption that Congress found to exist.[82] Appellants argue, however, that the balance tips against disclosure when it is required of contributors to certain parties and candidates. We turn now to this contention.

B. Application to Minor Parties and Independents

It is true that the governmental interest in disclosure is diminished when the contribution in question is made to a minor party with little chance of winning an election. As minor parties usually represent definite and publicized viewpoints, there may be less need to inform the voters of the interests that specific candidates represent.


The Government's interest in deterring the "buying" of elections and the undue influence of large contributors on officeholders also may be reduced where contributions to a minor party or an independent candidate are concerned, for it is less likely that the candidate will be victorious. But a minor party sometimes can play a significant role in an election. Even when a minor-party candidate has little or no chance of winning, he may be encouraged by major-party interests in order to divert votes from other major-party contenders.

 We are not unmindful that the damage done by disclosure to the associational interests of the minor parties and their members and to supporters of independents could be significant. These movements are less likely to have a sound financial base and thus are more vulnerable to falloffs in contributions. In some instances fears of reprisal may deter contributions to the point where the movement cannot survive. The public interest also suffers if that result comes to pass, for there is a consequent reduction in the free

 circulation of ideas both within[85] and without[86] the political arena.


We recognize that unduly strict requirements of proof could impose a heavy burden, but it does not follow that a blanket exemption for minor parties is necessary. Minor parties must be allowed sufficient flexibility in the proof of injury to assure a fair consideration of their claim. The evidence offered need show only a reasonable probability that the compelled disclosure of a party's contributors' names will subject them to threats, harassment, or reprisals from either Government officials or private parties. The proof may include, for example, specific evidence of past or present harassment of members due to their associational ties, or of harassment directed against the organization itself. A pattern of threats or specific manifestations of public hostility may be sufficient. New parties that have no history upon which to draw may be able to offer evidence of reprisals and threats directed against individuals or organizations holding similar views.

Where it exists the type of chill and harassment identified in NAACP v. Alabama can be shown. We cannot assume that courts will be insensitive to similar showings when made in future cases.

=

2 57 am 9/26/23

The First Amendment “has its fullest and most urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office.” Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971). It safeguards the ability of a candidate to use personal funds to finance campaign speech, protecting his freedom “to speak without legislative limit on behalf of his own candidacy.” Buckley, 424 U. S., at 54. This broad protection, we have explained, “reflects our profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.” Id., at 14 (internal quotation marks omitted). cruz,

Quite apart from this record evidence, the burden on First Amendment expression is “evident and inherent” in the choice that candidates and their campaigns must confront. Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721, 745 (2011); see also id., at 746 (“we do not need empirical evidence to determinate that the law at issue is burdensome”); Davis v. Federal Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724, 738–740 (2008) (requiring no empirical evidence of a burden).  cruz

Brief for United States Senator Roy Blunt et al. as Amici Curiae id.


(“When the Government restricts speech, the Government bears the burden of proving the constitutionality of its actions.”)

The parties debate whether strict or “closely drawn” scrutiny should apply in answering that question. Buckley, 424 U. S., at 25. We need not resolve this dispute because, under either standard, the Government must prove at the outset that it is in fact pursuing a legitimate objective. See McCutcheon, 572 U. S., at 210. It has not done so here.


This Court has recognized only one permissible ground for restricting political speech: the prevention of “quid pro quo” corruption or its appearance. id

However well intentioned such proposals may be, the First Amendment—as this Court has repeatedly emphasized—prohibits such attempts to tamper with the “right of citizens to choose who shall govern them.” McCutcheon, 572 U. S., at 227; see also Davis, 554 U. S., at 742; Bennett, 564 U. S., at 750. id

And in drawing that line, “the First Amendment requires us to err on the side of protecting political speech rather than suppressing it.” Ibid 3:09 dead battery, stopping for now.

=

a week later, 12:02 pm 9/30/23


i'm looking now at doing an amicus in smith v helzer.


just popped in to see if i can write up a quick top 10 controlling cases.


1. barnette

2. talley

3. mcIntyre

4. aclf

5. tornillo

6. riley

7. wooley

8. janus

9. NIFLA

10. 303 Creative.




















 




Wednesday, September 20, 2023

 The Constitution protects against the compelled disclosure of political associations and beliefs. Such disclosures "can seriously infringe on privacy of association and belief guaranteed by the First Amendment." Buckley v. Valeo, supra, at 64, citing Gibson v. Florida Legislative Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).

Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm. (Ohio), 459 U.S. 87 (1982)


 "Inviolability of privacy in group association may in many circumstances be indispensable to preservation of freedom of association, particularly where a group espouses dissident beliefs." NAACP v. Alabama, supra, at 462.


 The right to privacy in one's political associations and beliefs will yield *92 only to a " `subordinating interest of the State [that is] compelling,' " NAACP v. Alabama, supra, at 463 (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 265 (1957) (opinion concurring in result)), and then only if there is a "substantial relation between the information sought and [an] overriding and compelling state interest." Gibson v. Florida Legislative Comm., supra, at 546.

Id. Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm. (Ohio), 459 U.S. 87

https://www.thefire.org/supreme-court/federal-election-commission-v-wisconsin-right-life-inc

https://www.thefire.org/supreme-court/neil-randall-et-al-v-william-h-sorrell-et-al

https://www.thefire.org/supreme-court/wisconsin-right-life-inc-v-federal-election-commission

https://www.thefire.org/supreme-court/republican-party-minnesota-et-al-v-suzanne-white-chairperson-minnesota-board-judicial

https://www.thefire.org/supreme-court/federal-election-commission-v-cruz

https://www.thefire.org/supreme-court/city-austin-texas-v-reagan-national-advertising-austin-llc-et-al

https://www.thefire.org/supreme-court/janus-v-american-federation-state-county-and-municipal-employees-council-31

https://www.thefire.org/supreme-court/national-institute-family-and-life-advocates-v-becerra

https://www.thefire.org/supreme-court/minnesota-voters-alliance-v-manskyhttps://www.thefire.org/supreme-court/masterpiece-cakeshop-ltd-v-colorado-civil-rights-commission

https://www.thefire.org/supreme-court/reed-v-town-gilbert














Monday, September 11, 2023

 monday

bike

mower

scrap run

clean yard

clean van

county complaint


,,,




 

Gaspee project v mederoz notes for amivus [to do: find a template for amicus] Reasons for cert Circuit split. After talley footnote two After mcintyre After aclf Citizens caused confusion. First case for bonta. The instant case conflicts with about a dozen supreme court cases about compelled speech, and undermines the authority of the court’s precedents. Summary of argument: This case presents two issues, one about disclosure, a close case, and one about disclaimers, a plain error the court should reverse. This brief is about the disclaimer issue. This is the first case to attempt to apply the new standard announced in Bonta, and maybe gets it wrong, so the court could take it for that reason, to further explicate the new Bonta standard. In Bonta, several concurring opinions suggested that a stricter yet scrutiny may be needed. This case would be an opportunity to address those concerns. This brief first details the circuit split on whether censorship by disclaimer is constitutional, as a reason to take the case to resolve the split. In Citizens United, 2010, the court issued dicta 8-1 praising such censorship, in the limited context of corporate speech, after ruling 9-0 in buckley v aclf that disclaimer rules are unconstitutional, so lower courts have been confused and the split widened. The Court should clarify that what it meant in Citizens was limited to corporate speech and was not the holding of the case. Town of Vincent v Reed, holding that political sign rules get strict scrutiny, should have cleared this up, but didn’t. Something like Cooper v Aaron is needed to clear the air and settle the matter. The second part of the brief addresses the merits of the disclaimer claim, and argues that Talley and McIntyre should be followed, not ignored. Ideally, the court should give plaintiffs some kind of teeth, so that officials who defy Talley can be penalized, and plaintiffs who challenge the obstacles to democratic process can be rewarded. An endless cycle of injunctions is not enough. Currently, election officials have little incentive to follow the law, rather than the statutes, or their own personal political preferences. This is corruption and oathbreaking, and prevents free and open elections, leaving the form, but not the substance. Talley v California in 1960 announced a rule that the government may not require disclaimers on literature such as a political flier. Yet in McIntyre, footnote 2 of Justice Scalia’s dissent indicate that nearly 50 states had such rules. (A number of these rules had already been found unconstitutional, which Scalia neglected to mention.) The majority of courts followed Talley, but a minority refused; there has been a split in the circuits ever since, a split that continues today as Gaspee Project shows. McIntyre was intended to resolve the split, holding that strict scrutiny applies and that there is no election exception to the rule in Talley. The Ohio Supreme Court had erred in applying intermediate scrutiny under Valeo, and allowing censorship by requiring disclaimers, over a dissent. Buckley v ACLF carefully distinguished between disclaimers, which get strict scrutiny, and disclosure, which got Valeo’s permissive “exacting” scrutiny. This was a case about a petition drive to legalize marijuana in Colorado. And yet the split continued. In McConnell, the court denied one particular as-applied challenge to a disclaimer, where the argument was that the statement in question was not express advocacy. The court disagreed. Justice Thomas, dissenting, would have applied McIntyre. In McConnell, the Court, at note 88, stated that McIntyre was still good law. Nonetheless, this confused Judge Posner at the 7th circuit, in Majors v Abell, and the split continued. [possibly quote posner about indeterminacy.] Zwickler v Golden, 1969 disclaimer case improperly dismissed on mootness grounds. Zwickler’s congressman had become a judge, but Zwickler was still going to write to his new congressman about his position on Israel, so the case wasn’t really moot. This confusion became worse after Citizens United, discussed below. [make list by year of the cases on the wrong side of the split.] Notably, the federal election Commission has continued to try to enforce disclaimer rules contrary to the rule in talley, and has an ongoing controversy about to what extent to apply these rules to the internet. They seek to “burn the village to roast the pig.” Reno v ACLU. The FEC often deadlocks, with the gop members refusing to enforce the unconstitutional disclaimer rules, while the democratic members keep trying. It is important that the court resolve the issue in a way the FEC must follow, and cease its improper censorship of federal elections. Similarly at the FCC, which censors speech on radio and TV. Ct. case. 255 C. 78. Seymour v. Elections Enforcement Comm. Supreme Court of Connecticut. Dec 19, 2000. 762 A.2d 880 (Conn. 2000) Riley in kenticky v terry? Kentucky Right To Life, Inc. v. Terry, 108 F.3d 637 (6th Cir.1997), cert denied, 522 U.S. 860, 118 S.Ct. 162, 139 L.Ed.2d 106 (1997). Gable v patton https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-6th-circuit/1396718.html Ky.Rev.Stat. § 121.190(1) Worely Worley, et al. v. FL Secretary of State, et al., No. 12-14074 (11th Cir. 2013) Nom v mckee Public citizen 11th circuit https://www.fec.gov/legal-resources/court-cases/fec-v-public-citizen-inc/ Majors v abell State v acey 633 S.W.2d 306 (1982) https://law.justia.com/cases/tennessee/supreme-court/1982/633-s-w-2d-306-2.html Wilkinson? Green mountain futures Morefield v. Moore, 540 S.W.2d 873 (1976) Supreme Court of Kentucky. Zwickler v. Coota, 290 F. Supp. 244 (D.C.E.D.N.Y.1968), In United States v. Insco, 365 F. Supp. 1308 (D.C.M.D.Fla.1973), a Florida statute made it a criminal offense to publish or distribute any "writing or other statement" relating to or concerning a candidate for election to the federal Congress unless it contained the name or names of the persons or organizations responsible for it. Jack P. Insco, a Republican, and William Gunter, a Democrat, were the nominees of their respective parties for election to the House of Representatives in 1972, a presidential year. Insco was indicted for causing to be distributed a quantity of bumper stickers reading "McGOVERN-GUNTER"[3] which did not bear the name of the sponsor. On a motion to dismiss the indictment the federal district court held that Talley did not apply and that the statute did not violate the First Amendment. 1 Morefield v Moore, 2 Wilkinson v Jones, 3 KY RtL v terry, 4 Gable v Patton, Freedom Forum v FEC are examples of cases where Kentucky courts have refused to Follow the rule in Talley. The geographic scope of the Kentucky exception varies over time - see Peterslie v NC, State v. Petersilie, 432 S.E.2d 832 (1993), 334 N.C. 169. Wilkinson v. Jones, 876 F. Supp. 916 (W.D. Ky. 1995) [Freedom Forum v FEC was an express advocacy case; plaintiff did not refer to talley or mcintyre.] Vermont v. Green Mountain Future, 2012 VT 87. N carolina peterslie merits. Talley mcintyre aclf watchtower Barnette Wooley tornillo riley Aid v open society janus nifla v beccera , the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the “freedom of speech prohibits the government from telling people what they must say.” Agency for Int’l Dev. v. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 570 U.S. 205, 213 (2013) Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2463 (2018) 1 sentence from each. Other L.D. Management Co. v. Gray, No. 20-5547 (6th Cir. 2021) Ky case about billboards, lion’s den https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1252601/download ky wedding photographer, brief by usa. The Supreme Court has made plain that the government cannot “[c]ompel[] individuals to mouth support for views they find objectionable.” Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2463 (2018). Just last year, in fact, the Eighth Circuit held that Minnesota could not force wedding videographers to film weddings that they did not wish to film. Telescope Media Grp. v. Lucero, 936 F.3d 740, 750-758 (8th Cir. 2019). The same principle applies here. 2000 Ct. case. 255 C. 78. Seymour v. Elections Enforcement Comm. Supreme Court of Connecticut. Dec 19, 2000. 762 A.2d 880 (Conn. 2000) 1997 Riley in kenticky v terry? Kentucky Right To Life, Inc. v. Terry, 108 F.3d 637 (6th Cir.1997), cert denied, 522 U.S. 860, 118 S.Ct. 162, 139 L.Ed.2d 106 (1997). 1998 Gable v patton https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-6th-circuit/1396718.html Ky.Rev.Stat. § 121.190(1) 2013 Worley, et al. v. FL Secretary of State, et al., No. 12-14074 (11th Cir. 2013) 2012 Nom v mckee National Organization for Marriage v. McKee, 723 F. Supp. 2d 245 2012. 2001 Public citizen 11th circuit https://www.fec.gov/legal-resources/court-cases/fec-v-public-citizen-inc/ Majors v abell Majors v Abell, 317 F.3d 719 (7th Cir. 2003), 1982 State v acey 633 S.W.2d 306 (1982) https://law.justia.com/cases/tennessee/supreme-court/1982/633-s-w-2d-306-2.html Wilkinson? Green mountain futures 1976 Morefield v. Moore, 540 S.W.2d 873 (1976) Supreme Court of Kentucky. Zwickler v. Coota, 290 F. Supp. 244 (D.C.E.D.N.Y.1968), 1973 In United States v. Insco, 365 F. Supp. 1308 (D.C.M.D.Fla.1973), a Florida statute made it a criminal offense to publish or distribute any "writing or other statement" relating to or concerning a candidate for election to the federal Congress unless it contained the name or names of the persons or organizations responsible for it. Jack P. Insco, a Republican, and William Gunter, a Democrat, were the nominees of their respective parties for election to the House of Representatives in 1972, a presidential year. Insco was indicted for causing to be distributed a quantity of bumper stickers reading "McGOVERN-GUNTER"[3] which did not bear the name of the sponsor. On a motion to dismiss the indictment the federal district court held that Talley did not apply and that the statute did not violate the First Amendment. 1 Morefield v Moore, 2 Wilkinson v Jones, 3 KY RtL v terry, 4 Gable v Patton, Freedom Forum v FEC are examples of cases where Kentucky courts have refused to Follow the rule in Talley. The geographic scope of the Kentucky exception varies over time - see Peterslie v NC, 1993 State v. Petersilie, 432 S.E.2d 832 (1993), 334 N.C. 169. 1995 Wilkinson v. Jones, 876 F. Supp. 916 (W.D. Ky. 1995) [Freedom Forum v FEC was an express advocacy case; plaintiff did not refer to talley or mcintyre.] 2012 Vermont v. Green Mountain Future, 2012 VT 87. N carolina peterslie merits. Talley mcintyre aclf watchtower Barnette Wooley tornillo riley Aid v open society janus nifla v beccera , the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the “freedom of speech prohibits the government from telling people what they must say.” Agency for Int’l Dev. v. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 570 U.S. 205, 213 (2013) Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2463 (2018) 1 sentence from each. Other L.D. Management Co. v. Gray, No. 20-5547 (6th Cir. 2021) Ky case about billboards, lion’s den https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1252601/download ky wedding photographer, brief by usa. The Supreme Court has made plain that the government cannot “[c]ompel[] individuals to mouth support for views they find objectionable.” Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2463 (2018). Just last year, in fact, the Eighth Circuit held that Minnesota could not force wedding videographers to film weddings that they did not wish to film. Telescope Media Grp. v. Lucero, 936 F.3d 740, 750-758 (8th Cir. 2019). The same principle applies here.

Timeline of the split - a non-exhaustive list of cases that refused to follow Talley.

Table 1.

1. 1973 Insco, dcmd fla

2. 1976 Moorefield v Moore, KY

3. 1982 TN v Acey, TN

4. 1993 NC v Petersilie, NC

5. 1994 McIntyre v. OH (overruled), OH

6. 1995 Wilkinson v Jones, KY

7. 1997 KY RTL v Terry, 6th

8. 1997 Arkansas Right to Life v. Butler, 29 F. Supp.2d 540

9. 1998 Gable v Patton, 6th

10. 2000 Seymour v Ct, CT

11. 2001 Public Citizen v FEC, 11th

12. 2003, 2004 Majors v Abell, 7th

13. 2012, NOM v McKee, 1st.

14. 2012 VT v Green Mountain Future, VT.

15. 2013, Worely v Roberts 749 F. Supp. 2d 1321 (N.D. Fla. 2010) (better cite, 11th?)

16. 2015 Iowa Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Tooker 133 F. Supp. 3d 1179 (S.D. Iowa 2015)(corporations)

17. 2019 Lewison v. Hutchinson, 929 N.W.2d 444 (Minn. Ct. App. 2019)

18. 2020, 2021, Gaspee Project v Mederos. First

19 Helzer, Alaska, not final, injunction denied.

20. San Franciscans (9th Cir 2023.)

21 CAP and Arizona Free Enterprise v Secretary of State, (2023), Americans for Prosperity v.

Additionally, there have been attorney general opinions in at least Delaware and Nebraska. So on one side of the split there are 21 cases from the First, Sixth, Seventh, and 11th circuits, plus CT, KY, NC, TN, VT, plus AGOs in at least NE and DE. On the other side are at least 50 cases from a number of jurisdictions. This includes at least the 9th Circuit, 10th, and the states of WA, OR, LA, MA, ME, DE, CO, CA, NY, IL, ID, ND, TX. So there is a significant split, that this court should attempt to resolve. Wilson v Stocker, Heller v ACLU of Nevada, 9th (and see Yamada),

Table 2: Cases which follow Talley v California.

1 ACLU v Heller, 378 F3d 979 (9th Cir. 2004),

2 American Civil Liberties Union of Ga. v. Miller, 977 F.Supp. 1228 (N.D. Ga. 1997),

3 Anonymous v. Delaware, 2000 Del. Ch. Lexis 84 (2000),

4 Broward Coalition v Browning, 2008 WL 4791004 (N.D. Fl 2008), [Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S 182, 200, 119 S.Ct 636, 142 L.Ed.2d 599 (1999),]

4.5 Brush and Nib v. Phoenix (AZ 2019)

5 City of Bogalusa v. May, 212 So.2d 408 (La. 1968),

6 Commonwealth v Dennis, 368 Mass. 92, 329 N.E.2d 706 (1974),

7 Cyberspace v Engler, (E.D.MI 2001)

8 Doe v 2theMart, 140 F.Supp.2d 1088, 29 Media L. Rep. 1970 (2001),

9 Doe v. Mortham, 708 So.2d 929 (Fla.1998)

10 Ex Parte Harrison, 110 S.W. 709 (Mo 1908), 11 Griset v. Fair Political Practices Commission, 69 Cal. App. 4th 818, 82 Cal. Rptr.2d 25 (1999), reversed on other grounds, 14 [Hansen v. Westerville City Sch. Dist., Nos. 93-3231, 93-3303, 1994 WL 622153 (6th Cir. Nov. 7, 1994), unpublished opinion, cert. denied 115 S. Ct. 2611 (1995). http://bulk.resource.org/courts.gov/c/F3/43/43.F3d.1472.93-3303.93-3231.html, ]

12 Idaho v. Barney, 448 P.2d 195 (1968), 14, 23 13 Illinois v White, 506 NE2d 1284 (Ill. 1987),

14 In re Opinion of the Justices, 324 A.2d 211 (Del. 1974),

15 Louisiana. v. Moses, 655 So. 2d 779 (La. Ct. App. 1995),

16 Louisiana v. Fulton, 337 So.2d 866 (La. 1976), [McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 357, 115 S.Ct. 1511, 131 L.Ed.2d 426 ](1995), 6, 8, 10, 11, 12, 17, 18, 21, 23 [Miami Herald v Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974)]

17 Michael James Berger, aka Magic Mike v. City of Seattle, (9th Cir. 6/24/2009) ,

18 Mulholland v. Marion County Election Bd. (S.D. Ind __) [NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 463, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 1172, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488 (1958)] 19 New York v. Duryea, 351 NYS2d 978 (1974), 20 Ogden v. Marendt, 264 F.Supp. 2d 785 (S.D. Ind. 2003) (S.D. Ind 2004),

21 Opinion of the Justices, 306 A.2d 18 (Maine 1973),

22 People v Drake, (Cal.),

23 People v. Bongiorni, 205 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 856 (Sup. Ct. 1962), 13

24 Printing Industries of the Gulf Coast v. Hill, 382 F.Supp. 8011 (S.D.Tx 1974), 42 L.Ed.26 33 dismissed as moot, [Riley v. Federation of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781 (1998)]

 

25 Rosen v. Port of Portland, 641 F.2d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir.1981),

26 Schuster v. Imperial County Mun. Ct., 167 Cal. Rptr. 447 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1042, 14, 23

27 ShrinkMO v. Maupin, 892 F. Supp. 1246 (E.D. Mo. 1995), aff'd, 71 F.3d 1422,

28 Smithers v Fla. Elections, http://www.fec.state.fl.us/decisions/Smithers96-85.PDF,

29 State of Louisiana v. Burgess, 543 So.2d 1332 (1989),

30 State v. N. Dakota Ed. Assoc., 262 N.W.2d 731 (N.D. 1978),

31 Stewart v Taylor, 953 F.Supp.1047 (S.D.Ind.1997),

32 Tattered Cover (CO), [Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 65, 80 S.Ct. 536, 4 L.Ed.2d 559 (1960)] 33 Texas v. John Doe, 61 S.W.3d 99, (Tx.App. 2001)

34 Town of Lantana v Pelczynski, 290 So. 2d 566 (Fla. App. 1974),

35 Vermont Right to Life v. Sorrell, 221 F.3d 376, 392 (2d Cir. 2000),

36 Virginia Society for Human Life Inc. v. Caldwell, 152 F3d 268 (4th Cir. 1998),

37 Washington ex rel. Public Disclosure v. 119 Vote No!, 957 P.2d 691 1998), [Watchtower v Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002)]

38 West Virginians for Life v Smith, 919 F. Supp 954 (S.D.W.Va. 1996), 960 F Supp 1036 (1996), 39 Wilson v Stocker, 819 F.2d 943, (10th Cir. 1999), [Wooley v Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977)],

40 Yes to Life PAC v. Webster, http://www.med.uscourts.gov/opinions/Hornby/2000/DBH_02072000_2-99cv318_YES_PAC_V_WEBSTER.pdf ,

41 Peter Zenger’s case, http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/Ftrials/zenger/zenger.html

42 Zwickler v. Koota, 290 F. Supp. 244 (E. D. N. Y. 1968), vacated on mootness grounds sub nom. Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103 (1969),

Oregon Attorney General Opinion 8266.

[42.5] Citizens for Responsible Gov't State PAC v. Davidson, 236 F.3d 1174, (10th Cir. 2000) So this includes at least the 9th Circuit, 10th, and the states of WA, OR, LA, MA, ME, DE, CO, CA, NY, IL, ID, ND, TX. So there is a significant split, that this court should attempt to resolve.

43. In re Ind. Newspapers, Inc., No. 49A02-1103-PL-23, ___ N.E.2d ___ (Ind. Ct. App., Feb. 21, 2012).(Indiana constitution and First Amendment.)

44. Dendrite

45. Doe v Cahill (Del.)

46. Digital Music News LLC v. Superior Court (Cal. Ct. App. May 14, 2014) (California constitutional right to privacy).

47. It is well-settled that “an author's decision to remain anonymous, like other decisions concerning omissions or additions to the content of a publication, is an aspect of the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment.” In re Anonymous Online Speakers, 661 F.3d 1168, 1173 (9th Cir. 2011) 48. Hartman v O'Connor 1:20cv163 (S.D. Ohio Sep. 29, 2021)(judicial speech withstood strict scrutiny)

49. Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. v. Kelley, 291 F.Supp.2d 1052, 1069 (D.Minn. 2003), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 427 F.3d 1106 (8th Cir. 2005).

50. Riley v. Jankowski, 713 N.W.2d 379 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006).

Table 3, table 2 cleaned up

Gaspee project v mederoz notes for amivus [to do: find a template for amicus] Reasons for cert Circuit split. After talley footnote two After mcintyre After aclf Citizens caused confusion. First case for bonta. The instant case conflicts with about a dozen supreme court cases about compelled speech, and undermines the authority of the court’s precedents. Summary of argument: This case presents two issues, one about disclosure, a close case, and one about disclaimers, a plain error the court should reverse. This brief is about the disclaimer issue. This is the first case to attempt to apply the new standard announced in Bonta, and maybe gets it wrong, so the court could take it for that reason, to further explicate the new Bonta standard. In Bonta, several concurring opinions suggested that a stricter yet scrutiny may be needed. This case would be an opportunity to address those concerns. This brief first details the circuit split on whether censorship by disclaimer is constitutional, as a reason to take the case to resolve the split. In Citizens United, 2010, the court issued dicta 8-1 praising such censorship, in the limited context of corporate speech, after ruling 9-0 in buckley v aclf that disclaimer rules are unconstitutional, so lower courts have been confused and the split widened. The Court should clarify that what it meant in Citizens was limited to corporate speech and was not the holding of the case. Town of Vincent v Reed, holding that political sign rules get strict scrutiny, should have cleared this up, but didn’t. Something like Cooper v Aaron is needed to clear the air and settle the matter. The second part of the brief addresses the merits of the disclaimer claim, and argues that Talley and McIntyre should be followed, not ignored. Ideally, the court should give plaintiffs some kind of teeth, so that officials who defy Talley can be penalized, and plaintiffs who challenge the obstacles to democratic process can be rewarded. An endless cycle of injunctions is not enough. Currently, election officials have little incentive to follow the law, rather than the statutes, or their own personal political preferences. This is corruption and oathbreaking, and prevents free and open elections, leaving the form, but not the substance. Talley v California in 1960 announced a rule that the government may not require disclaimers on literature such as a political flier. Yet in McIntyre, footnote 2 of Justice Scalia’s dissent indicate that nearly 50 states had such rules. (A number of these rules had already been found unconstitutional, which Scalia neglected to mention.) The majority of courts followed Talley, but a minority refused; there has been a split in the circuits ever since, a split that continues today as Gaspee Project shows. McIntyre was intended to resolve the split, holding that strict scrutiny applies and that there is no election exception to the rule in Talley. The Ohio Supreme Court had erred in applying intermediate scrutiny under Valeo, and allowing censorship by requiring disclaimers, over a dissent. Buckley v ACLF carefully distinguished between disclaimers, which get strict scrutiny, and disclosure, which got Valeo’s permissive “exacting” scrutiny. This was a case about a petition drive to legalize marijuana in Colorado. And yet the split continued. In McConnell, the court denied one particular as-applied challenge to a disclaimer, where the argument was that the statement in question was not express advocacy. The court disagreed. Justice Thomas, dissenting, would have applied McIntyre. In McConnell, the Court, at note 88, stated that McIntyre was still good law. Nonetheless, this confused Judge Posner at the 7th circuit, in Majors v Abell, and the split continued. [possibly quote posner about indeterminacy.] Zwickler v Golden, 1969 disclaimer case improperly dismissed on mootness grounds. Zwickler’s congressman had become a judge, but Zwickler was still going to write to his new congressman about his position on Israel, so the case wasn’t really moot. This confusion became worse after Citizens United, discussed below. [make list by year of the cases on the wrong side of the split.] Notably, the federal election Commission has continued to try to enforce disclaimer rules contrary to the rule in talley, and has an ongoing controversy about to what extent to apply these rules to the internet. They seek to “burn the village to roast the pig.” Reno v ACLU. The FEC often deadlocks, with the gop members refusing to enforce the unconstitutional disclaimer rules, while the democratic members keep trying. It is important that the court resolve the issue in a way the FEC must follow, and cease its improper censorship of federal elections. Similarly at the FCC, which censors speech on radio and TV. Ct. case. 255 C. 78. Seymour v. Elections Enforcement Comm. Supreme Court of Connecticut. Dec 19, 2000. 762 A.2d 880 (Conn. 2000) Riley in kenticky v terry? Kentucky Right To Life, Inc. v. Terry, 108 F.3d 637 (6th Cir.1997), cert denied, 522 U.S. 860, 118 S.Ct. 162, 139 L.Ed.2d 106 (1997). Gable v patton https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-6th-circuit/1396718.html Ky.Rev.Stat. § 121.190(1) Worely Worley, et al. v. FL Secretary of State, et al., No. 12-14074 (11th Cir. 2013) Nom v mckee Public citizen 11th circuit https://www.fec.gov/legal-resources/court-cases/fec-v-public-citizen-inc/ Majors v abell State v acey 633 S.W.2d 306 (1982) https://law.justia.com/cases/tennessee/supreme-court/1982/633-s-w-2d-306-2.html Wilkinson? Green mountain futures Morefield v. Moore, 540 S.W.2d 873 (1976) Supreme Court of Kentucky. Zwickler v. Coota, 290 F. Supp. 244 (D.C.E.D.N.Y.1968), In United States v. Insco, 365 F. Supp. 1308 (D.C.M.D.Fla.1973), a Florida statute made it a criminal offense to publish or distribute any "writing or other statement" relating to or concerning a candidate for election to the federal Congress unless it contained the name or names of the persons or organizations responsible for it. Jack P. Insco, a Republican, and William Gunter, a Democrat, were the nominees of their respective parties for election to the House of Representatives in 1972, a presidential year. Insco was indicted for causing to be distributed a quantity of bumper stickers reading "McGOVERN-GUNTER"[3] which did not bear the name of the sponsor. On a motion to dismiss the indictment the federal district court held that Talley did not apply and that the statute did not violate the First Amendment. 1 Morefield v Moore, 2 Wilkinson v Jones, 3 KY RtL v terry, 4 Gable v Patton, Freedom Forum v FEC are examples of cases where Kentucky courts have refused to Follow the rule in Talley. The geographic scope of the Kentucky exception varies over time - see Peterslie v NC, State v. Petersilie, 432 S.E.2d 832 (1993), 334 N.C. 169. Wilkinson v. Jones, 876 F. Supp. 916 (W.D. Ky. 1995) [Freedom Forum v FEC was an express advocacy case; plaintiff did not refer to talley or mcintyre.] Vermont v. Green Mountain Future, 2012 VT 87. N carolina peterslie merits. Talley mcintyre aclf watchtower Barnette Wooley tornillo riley Aid v open society janus nifla v beccera , the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the “freedom of speech prohibits the government from telling people what they must say.” Agency for Int’l Dev. v. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 570 U.S. 205, 213 (2013) Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2463 (2018) 1 sentence from each. Other L.D. Management Co. v. Gray, No. 20-5547 (6th Cir. 2021) Ky case about billboards, lion’s den https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1252601/download ky wedding photographer, brief by usa. The Supreme Court has made plain that the government cannot “[c]ompel[] individuals to mouth support for views they find objectionable.” Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2463 (2018). Just last year, in fact, the Eighth Circuit held that Minnesota could not force wedding videographers to film weddings that they did not wish to film. Telescope Media Grp. v. Lucero, 936 F.3d 740, 750-758 (8th Cir. 2019). The same principle applies here. 2000 Ct. case. 255 C. 78. Seymour v. Elections Enforcement Comm. Supreme Court of Connecticut. Dec 19, 2000. 762 A.2d 880 (Conn. 2000) 1997 Riley in kenticky v terry? Kentucky Right To Life, Inc. v. Terry, 108 F.3d 637 (6th Cir.1997), cert denied, 522 U.S. 860, 118 S.Ct. 162, 139 L.Ed.2d 106 (1997). 1998 Gable v patton https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-6th-circuit/1396718.html Ky.Rev.Stat. § 121.190(1) 2013 Worley, et al. v. FL Secretary of State, et al., No. 12-14074 (11th Cir. 2013) 2012 Nom v mckee National Organization for Marriage v. McKee, 723 F. Supp. 2d 245 2012. 2001 Public citizen 11th circuit https://www.fec.gov/legal-resources/court-cases/fec-v-public-citizen-inc/ Majors v abell Majors v Abell, 317 F.3d 719 (7th Cir. 2003), 1982 State v acey 633 S.W.2d 306 (1982) https://law.justia.com/cases/tennessee/supreme-court/1982/633-s-w-2d-306-2.html Wilkinson? Green mountain futures 1976 Morefield v. Moore, 540 S.W.2d 873 (1976) Supreme Court of Kentucky. Zwickler v. Coota, 290 F. Supp. 244 (D.C.E.D.N.Y.1968), 1973 In United States v. Insco, 365 F. Supp. 1308 (D.C.M.D.Fla.1973), a Florida statute made it a criminal offense to publish or distribute any "writing or other statement" relating to or concerning a candidate for election to the federal Congress unless it contained the name or names of the persons or organizations responsible for it. Jack P. Insco, a Republican, and William Gunter, a Democrat, were the nominees of their respective parties for election to the House of Representatives in 1972, a presidential year. Insco was indicted for causing to be distributed a quantity of bumper stickers reading "McGOVERN-GUNTER"[3] which did not bear the name of the sponsor. On a motion to dismiss the indictment the federal district court held that Talley did not apply and that the statute did not violate the First Amendment. 1 Morefield v Moore, 2 Wilkinson v Jones, 3 KY RtL v terry, 4 Gable v Patton, Freedom Forum v FEC are examples of cases where Kentucky courts have refused to Follow the rule in Talley. The geographic scope of the Kentucky exception varies over time - see Peterslie v NC, 1993 State v. Petersilie, 432 S.E.2d 832 (1993), 334 N.C. 169. 1995 Wilkinson v. Jones, 876 F. Supp. 916 (W.D. Ky. 1995) [Freedom Forum v FEC was an express advocacy case; plaintiff did not refer to talley or mcintyre.] 2012 Vermont v. Green Mountain Future, 2012 VT 87. N carolina peterslie merits. Talley mcintyre aclf watchtower Barnette Wooley tornillo riley Aid v open society janus nifla v beccera , the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the “freedom of speech prohibits the government from telling people what they must say.” Agency for Int’l Dev. v. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 570 U.S. 205, 213 (2013) Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2463 (2018) 1 sentence from each. Other L.D. Management Co. v. Gray, No. 20-5547 (6th Cir. 2021) Ky case about billboards, lion’s den https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1252601/download ky wedding photographer, brief by usa. The Supreme Court has made plain that the government cannot “[c]ompel[] individuals to mouth support for views they find objectionable.” Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2463 (2018). Just last year, in fact, the Eighth Circuit held that Minnesota could not force wedding videographers to film weddings that they did not wish to film. Telescope Media Grp. v. Lucero, 936 F.3d 740, 750-758 (8th Cir. 2019). The same principle applies here. Timeline of the split - a non-exhaustive cases that refused to follow Talley. 1. 1973 Insco, dcmd fla 2. 1976 Moorefield v Moore, KY 3. 1982 TN v Acey, TN 4. 1993 NC v Petersilie, NC 5. 1994 McIntyre v. OH (overruled), OH 6. 1995 Wilkinson v Jones, KY 7. 1997 KY RTL v Terry, 6th 8. 1997 Arkansas Right to Life v. Butler, 29 F. Supp.2d 540 9. 1998 Gable v Patton, 6th 10. 2000 Seymour v Ct, CT 11. 2001 Public Citizen v FEC, 11th 12. 2003, 2004 Majors v Abell, 7th 13. 2012, NOM v McKee, 1st. 14. 2012 VT v Green Mountain Future, VT. 15. 2013, Worely v Roberts 749 F. Supp. 2d 1321 (N.D. Fla. 2010) (better cite, 11th?) 16. 2015 Iowa Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Tooker 133 F. Supp. 3d 1179 (S.D. Iowa 2015)(corporations) 17. 2019 Lewison v. Hutchinson, 929 N.W.2d 444 (Minn. Ct. App. 2019) 18. 2020, 2021, Gaspee Project v Mederos. First Additionally, there have been attorney general opinions in at least Delaware and Nebraska. So on one side of the split there are 16 cases from the First, Sixth, Seventh, and 11th circuits, plus CT, KY, NC, TN, VT, plus AGOs in at least NE and DE. On the other side are at least 43 cases from a number of jurisdictions. This includes at least the 9th Circuit, 10th, and the states of WA, OR, LA, MA, ME, DE, CO, CA, NY, IL, ID, ND, TX. So there is a significant split, that this court should attempt to resolve. Wilson v stocker, Heller v ACLU of Nevada, 9th (and see Yamada),

1 ACLU v Heller, 378 F3d 979 (9th Cir. 2004),

2 American Civil Liberties Union of Ga. v. Miller, 977 F.Supp. 1228 (N.D. Ga. 1997),

3 Anonymous v. Delaware, 2000 Del. Ch. Lexis 84 (2000),

4 Broward Coalition v Browning, 2008 WL 4791004 (N.D. Fl 2008),

5 City of Bogalusa v. May, 212 So.2d 408 (La. 1968),

6 Commonwealth v Dennis, 368 Mass. 92, 329 N.E.2d 706 (1974),

7 Cyberspace v Engler, (E.D.MI 2001)

8 Doe v 2theMart, 140 F.Supp.2d 1088, 29 Media L. Rep. 1970 (2001),

9 Doe v. Mortham, 708 So.2d 929 (Fla.1998)

10 Ex Parte Harrison, 110 S.W. 709 (Mo 1908), 11 Griset v. Fair Political Practices Commission, 69 Cal. App. 4th 818, 82 Cal. Rptr.2d 25 (1999), reversed on other grounds,

11.5. [Hansen v. Westerville City Sch. Dist., Nos. 93-3231, 93-3303, 1994 WL 622153 (6th Cir. Nov. 7, 1994), unpublished opinion, cert. denied 115 S. Ct. 2611 (1995). [facts behind mcintyre case.]

http://bulk.resource.org/courts.gov/c/F3/43/43.F3d.1472.93-3303.93-3231.html, ]

12 Idaho v. Barney, 448 P.2d 195 (1968), 14, 23 13 Illinois v White, 506 NE2d 1284 (Ill. 1987),

14 In re Opinion of the Justices, 324 A.2d 211 (Del. 1974),

15 Louisiana. v. Moses, 655 So. 2d 779 (La. Ct. App. 1995),

16 Louisiana v. Fulton, 337 So.2d 866 (La. 1976),

17 Michael James Berger, aka Magic Mike v. City of Seattle, (9th Cir. 6/24/2009) ,

18 Mulholland v. Marion County Election Bd. (S.D. Ind __)

19 New York v. Duryea, 351 NYS2d 978 (1974), 20 Ogden v. Marendt, 264 F.Supp. 2d 785 (S.D. Ind. 2003) (S.D. Ind 2004),

21 Opinion of the Justices, 306 A.2d 18 (Maine 1973),

22 People v Drake, (Cal.),

23 People v. Bongiorni, 205 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 856 (Sup. Ct. 1962), 13

24 Printing Industries of the Gulf Coast v. Hill, 382 F.Supp. 8011 (S.D.Tx 1974), 42 L.Ed.26 33 dismissed as moot.

25 Rosen v. Port of Portland, 641 F.2d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir.1981),

26 Schuster v. Imperial County Mun. Ct., 167 Cal. Rptr. 447 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1042, 14, 23

27 ShrinkMO v. Maupin, 892 F. Supp. 1246 (E.D. Mo. 1995), aff'd, 71 F.3d 1422,

28 Smithers v Fla. Elections, http://www.fec.state.fl.us/decisions/Smithers96-85.PDF,

29 State of Louisiana v. Burgess, 543 So.2d 1332 (1989),

30 State v. N. Dakota Ed. Assoc., 262 N.W.2d 731 (N.D. 1978),

31 Stewart v Taylor, 953 F.Supp.1047 (S.D.Ind.1997),

32 Tattered Cover (CO),

33 Texas v. John Doe, 61 S.W.3d 99, (Tx.App. 2001)

34 Town of Lantana v Pelczynski, 290 So. 2d 566 (Fla. App. 1974),

35 Vermont Right to Life v. Sorrell, 221 F.3d 376, 392 (2d Cir. 2000),

36 Virginia Society for Human Life Inc. v. Caldwell, 152 F3d 268 (4th Cir. 1998),

37 Washington ex rel. Public Disclosure v. 119 Vote No!, 957 P.2d 691 1998),

38 West Virginians for Life v Smith, 919 F. Supp 954 (S.D.W.Va. 1996), 960 F Supp 1036 (1996), 39 Wilson v Stocker, 819 F.2d 943, (10th Cir. 1999),

40 Yes to Life PAC v. Webster, http://www.med.uscourts.gov/opinions/Hornby/2000/DBH_02072000_2-99cv318_YES_PAC_V_WEBSTER.pdf ,

41 Peter Zenger’s case, http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/Ftrials/zenger/zenger.html

42 Zwickler v. Koota, 290 F. Supp. 244 (E. D. N. Y. 1968), vacated on mootness grounds sub nom. Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103 (1969),

Oregon Attorney General Opinion 8266.

Citizens for Responsible Gov't State PAC v. Davidson, 236 F.3d 1174, (10th Cir. 2000)

43. In re Ind. Newspapers, Inc., No. 49A02-1103-PL-23, ___ N.E.2d ___ (Ind. Ct. App., Feb. 21, 2012).

44. Dendrite

45. Doe v Cahill (Del.)

46. Digital Music News LLC v. Superior Court (Cal. Ct. App. May 14, 2014) (California constitutional right to privacy).

47. In re Anonymous Online Speakers, 661 F.3d 1168, 1173 (9th Cir. 2011)

48. Hartman v O'Connor 1:20cv163 (S.D. Ohio Sep. 29, 2021)(judicial speech withstood strict scrutiny)

49. Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. v. Kelley, 291 F.Supp.2d 1052, 1069 (D.Minn. 2003), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 427 F.3d 1106 (8th Cir. 2005).

50. Riley v. Jankowski, 713 N.W.2d 379 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006)

Table 4: Cases under state constitutions.

These cases include AZ, CA, CO, DE, FL, ID, IL, IN, LA, MO, ND, NY, and [OH], at least 13 states.  

[reorder by date or alphabetical]

1 Commonwealth v Dennis, 368 Mass. 92, 329 N.E.2d 706 (1974),

2 Doe v. Mortham, 708 So.2d 929 (Fla.1998)

3 Ex Parte Harrison, 110 S.W. 709 (Mo 1908),

4 Idaho v. Barney, 448 P.2d 195 (1968),

5 Illinois v White, 506 NE2d 1284 (Ill. 1987),

6 In re Opinion of the Justices, 324 A.2d 211 (Del. 1974),

7 Louisiana. v. Moses, 655 So. 2d 779 (La. Ct. App. 1995),

8 Louisiana v. Fulton, 337 So.2d 866 (La. 1976),

9 New York v. Duryea, 351 NYS2d 978 (1974),

10 Opinion of the Justices, 306 A.2d 18 (Maine 1973),

11 Schuster v. Imperial County Mun. Ct., 167 Cal. Rptr. 447 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1042,

12 State of Louisiana v. Burgess, 543 So.2d 1332 (1989),

13 State v. N. Dakota Ed. Assoc., 262 N.W.2d 731 (N.D. 1978),

14 Tattered Cover (CO),

15 Washington ex rel. Public Disclosure v. 119 Vote No!, 957 P.2d 691 1998), [did this case address state claims?]

16 Peter Zenger’s case, http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/Ftrials/zenger/zenger.html (1735)

Oregon Attorney General Opinion 8266.

17. In re Ind. Newspapers, Inc., No. 49A02-1103-PL-23, ___ N.E.2d ___ (Ind. Ct. App., Feb. 21, 2012).

18. Digital Music News LLC v. Superior Court (Cal. Ct. App. May 14, 2014) (California constitutional right to privacy).

[19. Ohio, a lockstep state, considers McIntyre v Ohio Elections Commission as determinative of the state constitutional issue.]

20. Brush and Nib v Phoenix, (AZ 2019)

5 pm to 6:04, 9/6/2023 so is that 6 hours today?