Tuesday, October 31, 2023

 san franciscans for no on e v chieu

notes for brief on motion for rehearing en banc.

argument

San Francisco's disclaimer ordinance exceeds the powers of the city charter, and is void. 

303 Creative v Enniss, 2023, is controlling that the disclaimer ordinance is unconstitutional compelled speech. 

303 cites cases such as Barnette, Dale, Hurley, Tornillo, Watchtower, Wooley, Riley, Janus and NIFLA, that have long held the government may not compel  speech. Other controlling cases on point include Talley McIntyre ACLF. 

It violates the state constitution's free speech clause. Schuster, 1980, is controlling.

An ordinance which is void under the state constitution cannot pass either version of exacting scrutiny, either bonta intermediate scrutiny or mcintyre strict scrutiny. so while plaintiffs have not pled their rights under the state constitution, it remains relevant.

The ordinance also violates the California Right to Privacy enacted in 1972. 

White v. Davis. 533 P.2d 222 (Cal. 1975).

As a practical matter, the presence in a university classroom of undercover officers taking notes to be preserved in police dossiers must inevitably inhibit the exercise of free speech both by professors and students. (6) In a line of cases stretching over the past two decades, *768 the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that to compel an individual to disclose his political ideas or affiliations to the government is to deter the exercise of First Amendment rights. Thus, for example, in N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, supra, 357 U.S. 449, 462 [2 L. Ed. 2d 1488, 1499-1500], the Supreme Court struck down a court order requiring the NAACP to disclose its membership lists, declaring: "It is hardly a novel perception that compelled disclosure of affiliation with groups engaged in advocacy may constitute [an] effective ... restraint on freedom of association.... Inviolability of privacy in group association may in many circumstances be indispensable to preservation of freedom of association, particularly where a group espouses dissident beliefs." And in Talley v. California (1960) 362 U.S. 60, 64 [4 L. Ed. 2d 559, 563, 80 S. Ct. 536], the court invalidated a city ordinance requiring all handbills to include the names and addresses of the persons who had prepared the material, finding that "[t]here can be no doubt that such an identification requirement would tend to restrict freedom to distribute information and thereby freedom of expression." (See also Lamont v. Postmaster General (1965) 381 U.S. 301, 307 [14 L. Ed. 2d 398, 402, 85 S. Ct. 1493].)[4]

In like manner, covert police surveillance and intelligence gathering may potentially impose a significant inhibiting effect on the free expression of ideas.

The principal objectives of the newly adopted provision are set out in a statement drafted by the proponents of the provision and included in the state's election brochure. The statement begins: "The proliferation of government snooping and data collecting is threatening to destroy our traditional freedoms. Government agencies seem to be competing to compile the most extensive sets of dossiers of American citizens. Computerization of records makes it possible to create "cradle-to-grave" profiles of every American.



A long line of California cases find disclaimer rules unconstitutional and void. Talley, Canon City, Bongiornia, Drake, Griset, overruled on other grounds. 

The 9th circuit cases are more mixed, with case law on both sides.

Heller correctly states that McIntyre is controlling. magic mike port of portland cases.

This brief expresses no opinion on preemption by or conflict with state or federal statutes, such as the California Consumer Protection Act (CCPA) , the California Information Privacy Act, or the California Privacy Rights Act.

 Article 1, Section 1 of the California Constitution. 

Article 1 of the California Constitution provides that “all people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights, among which is pursuing and obtaining privacy.” (Davis v. Superior Court (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1008, 1013.) Medical records fall within the zone of privacy protected by the California Constitution. (See Id.Britt v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844; Hallendorf v. Superior Court (1978) 85 Cal.App.3d 553; Tylo v. Superior Court (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1397, 1387.)

10 reasons Citizens United does not control. 

20 cases from 13 states have found a right of privacy under state constitutions either to find disclaimer rules unconstitutional, or involved other challenges to anonymous speech. 

ok, 2:30 p m oct 31, i put in 1.0 hours today.

gotta go wash dishes, done,     now 9 44 pm, snowing, oct 31. 



s

Saturday, October 28, 2023

 At the outset, the plurality explained Tennessee’s electioneering statute imposed a content-based restriction on political speech in a

traditional public forum and, thus, was subject to “exacting” scrutiny. Id. at 197–98. This meant the state would need to show the “regulation [was] necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it [was] narrowly drawn to achieve that end.” Id. at 198 (quoting Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)) burson v freeman. 

look, it's a better definition of exacting scrutiny!!!!

Appellate Case: 21-8058 Document: 010110939489 Date Filed: 10/23/2023 Page: 30

Moreover, that seven of the eight Justices concluded strict scrutiny applied suggests it would be inappropriate to apply Justice Scalia’s less exacting standard. See United States v. Carrizales-Toledo, 454 F.3d 1142, 1151 (10th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he Marks rule produces a determinate holding ‘only when one opinion is a logical subset of other, broader opinions.’” (quotation omitted)).

 Instead, the Court described the state’s obligation as a “modified ‘burden of proof.’” Id. at 209 n.11. The Court cautioned this modified burden “applie[d] only when the First Amendment right threatens to interfere with the act of voting itself, i.e., cases . . . in which the challenged activity physically interferes with electors attempting to cast their ballots.” Id. (emphasis added).

Fourth, to determine whether a chosen restriction is narrowly tailored, Burson posits a relaxed, or modified, “burden of proof.” The regulation must be reasonable and not significantly impinge on constitutionally protected rights. Id. at 209.

 


  

 



Wednesday, October 25, 2023

 weds 10/25/23

did

took out trash. lawyer zoom.

cleaned up room some - can see new patch of floor. pit out mouserattraps . went across street for rice $10. good coffee - bring own cup. 

looked at auctions. cleaned in brian's room. cleaned bathroom some. killed spiders. 

got up late, didn't do much. 

maybe i'll go do laundry. or surf dumpsters. 

next day. got up late. didn't do much, 1 pm, i'll bring in the trash barrels. maybe post office today.

bought 100 shares tesla at 206.

to do:

fred's tree service.

orkin man

plumber

electrician

what e;se?

fix van. buy new van.

gas for lawn mower. lawn mower stolen. 

check if i got anything at auction. nope.

took out ten bags of trash.  washed stairs and parts of floors. 

to do move stuff off stairs to brian's room, which i partly cleaned up today,

so i could try that now. 9 24 pm friday night. oct 27.

made some progress. 16 bags of trash. 

stairs almost done. washed some dishes. took a bath. cleaned some in the side yard. 

coffee break then i will try the stairs again. 11:18 pm friday night so i put in over 3 hours?

still to do unload van. 12:43 am saturday. some progress. tommy's room about 1/2 done. front hallway cleaned. working on stairs. it stopped raining so i could unload the van, if i get dressed.

3 Lots are available. 802 and 804 Maryland are also listed. Bought lots to build dream home. Purchased home Raccoon Lake instead. Best views in the city. Lots have unobstructed view of downtown skyline. Lot sit almost 2 stories high. Have preliminary plans started and have elevations with pictures. You could also have work and home setup. Retail, offices and or garage at street level. Underground parking could also be utilized. The trains using the tracks are approaching Union Station slowly.

monday did : 
paid $200 in texas taxes. marion county wants $800, pay in person,

Home Highlights

saturday i unloaded the van and loaded the 16 trash bags. 1 bag of cans from the neighbiorhood. read a case about electioneering distance rule. 



Tuesday, October 24, 2023

 Green v. Miss United States of Am., LLC (9th Cir. 2022)

Thursday, October 19, 2023

 8:01 pm 10/19/23

lie list san francisco case ninth circuit. 

to do:

outline of amicus

currently pending is a motion for rehearing before the 9th circuit

1. 303 creative

2. Schuster

2B. 20 cases from 13 states. AZ CA CO DE FL ID IL [IN] LA MA ME MO ND NY 

3 Not CU

4. lie list of march 23 opinion - that's what i'm working on now. later:

lie list of lower court opinion. lie list of clc briefs. 

6. 9th circuit opinions - aclu v heller rosen v port of portland magic mike v city of seattle that one about discovery and california constitution

1. 303 creative

1A Barnette Tornillo Riley Watchtower Wooley. Hurley, Dale.

not mentioned: talley mcintyre aclf 



2. Schuster

2B. 20 cases from 13 states. AZ CA CO DE FL ID IL [IN] LA MA ME MO ND NY 

2C california cases

drake bongiorni canon city schuster griset 

3 Not CU

3a 6-10 reasons why not CU.

1 dicta. 2 express advocacy loophole case 3 exacting is a contronym 4. subissue to a subissue, not main focus of cases as in mcintyre aclf talley 4. fails to mention talley 5. how the case was affected by bopp's removal 6. disclaimer does not appear in oral argument transcript. 7. corporate speech case. 8. taken out of context.9.  there, it was a less restrictive means than a complete ban. here, no such ban is contemplated.   10. not a superprecedent; overruled by reed v town of gilbert, janus nifla 303.

4. lie list of march 23 opinion - that's what i'm working on now. [8:34 pm work continuing here]


later:

lie list of lower court opinion. lie list of clc briefs. 

6. 9th circuit opinions - aclu v heller rosen v port of portland magic mike v city of seattle that one about discovery and california constitution

GRABER, Circuit Judge: lie list

1. Under California law, certain political advertisements run by a committee must name the committee’s top contributors.

 depends on whether a void staTUTE IS A LAW. 

2 Plaintiffs have not shown a likelihood of success on the merits. [they have]

 San Francisco’s requirement is substantially related to the governmental interest in informing voters of the source of funding for election-related communications. (ok)

3  The ordinance does not create an excessive burden on Plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights relative to that interest, and it is sufficiently tailored to the governmental interest. Accordingly, we affirm.

wrong. it's a severe burden under washingon ,,, chicago strict sc.. norman v reed harold washington. 

poor fit with objective since chills speech

4. Advertisements must include the words “[a]d paid for by [the name of the committee].” Id. § 84502(a)(1). They also must state “committee major funding from,” followed by the names of the top contributors to the committee. Id. § 84503(a). “Top contributors” are defined as “the persons from whom the committee paying for an advertisement has received its three highest cumulative contributions of fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) or more.” Id. § 84501(c)(1). Depending on the medium, the advertisement must follow certain formatting requirements. See id. §§ 84504.1 (video); 84504.2 (print); 84504.4 (radio and telephone); 84504.3 (electronic media); 84504.6 (online platforms).

all of this void of course.

On November 5, 2019, San Francisco voters passed Proposition F. Referred to by proponents as the “Sunlight on Dark Money Initiative,” Proposition F changed the disclaimer requirements for advertisements paid for by independent political committees, among other provisions. After the passage of Proposition F, “all committees making expenditures which support or oppose any candidate for City elective office or any City measure” must comply with the City’s new disclaimer requirements, in addition to the state’s requirements. S.F. Code § 1.161(a).

wonder if they were lied to about it being void and unconstitutional. 

is there a city charter?

 what's that case about california right to privacy? 8 44 pause here while i go research looking for tyhat case.

Federal courts in California have held that there is a right to privacy that can be raised in response to discovery requests.  Johnson by Johnson v. Thompson, 971 F.2d 1487, 1497 (10th Cir.1992); DeMasi v. Weiss, 669 F.2d 114, 119-120 (3rd Cir.1982).  The right to privacy in, “California primarily derives from the California Constitution's declaration that individuals have an inalienable right to privacy. Art. I § 1.”  Davis v. Leal (E.D. Cal. 1999) 43 F.Supp.2d 1102, 1110–11. 

This right to privacy is not the same as a privilege and is therefore, “not an absolute bar to discovery.”  Allen v. Woodford (E.D. Cal., Jan. 30, 2007, No. CVF051104OWWLJO) 2007 WL 309485, at *6–7.  By contrast, courts must balance the need for information against the claimed right to privacy.  Ragge v. MCA/Universal Studios (C.D.Ca.1995) 165 F.R.D. 601, 604 (right of privacy may be invaded for litigation purposes).  In other words, the right to privacy is not absolute and the courts will engage in a balancing test weighing the right to privacy against the right to reasonable discovery.

 here there is no counterbalancing due process right to discovery. any "right to know" created by the void initiative is subordinate to the state constitution and the first amendment

privileges and immunities clause as well as due process, equal protection, incorporation doctrine. 

cal const:

free speech

privacy

elections?

8:52 pm . 10/19/23 might stop for the night. 

  

All political power is inherent in the people. Government is instituted for their protection, security, and benefit, and they have the right to alter or reform it when the public good may require. art 2 section 1. cal const.


  

Voting shall be secret. art 2 section 7. suggests a public policy. 


 art 1 section 2  

(a) Every person may freely speak, write and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of this right. A law may not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press.


(b) A publisher, editor, reporter, or other person connected with or employed upon a newspaper, magazine, or other periodical publication, or by a press association or wire service, or any person who has been so connected or employed, shall not be adjudged in contempt by a judicial, legislative, or administrative body, or any other body having the power to issue subpoenas, for refusing to disclose the source of any information procured while so connected or employed for publication in a newspaper, magazine or other periodical publication, or for refusing to disclose any unpublished information obtained or prepared in gathering, receiving or processing of information for communication to the public.


press shield law. suggests a policy of respecting anonymity


  

(a) The people have the right to instruct their representatives, petition government for redress of grievances, and assemble freely to consult for the common good.

(b) (1) The people have the right of access to information concerning the conduct of the people’s business, and, therefore, the meetings of public bodies and the writings of public officials and agencies shall be open to public scrutiny.

(2) A statute, court rule, or other authority, including those in effect on the effective date of this subdivision, shall be broadly construed if it furthers the people’s right of access, and narrowly construed if it limits the right of access. A statute, court rule, or other authority adopted after the effective date of this subdivision that limits the right of access shall be adopted with findings demonstrating the interest protected by the limitation and the need for protecting that interest.

(3) Nothing in this subdivision supersedes or modifies the right of privacy guaranteed by Section 1 or affects the construction of any statute, court rule, or other authority to the extent that it protects that right to privacy, including any statutory procedures governing discovery or disclosure of information concerning the official performance or professional qualifications of a peace officer.

(4) Nothing in this subdivision supersedes or modifies any provision of this Constitution, including the guarantees that a person may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or denied equal protection of the laws, as provided in Section 7.

expresses policy in support of privacy clause.

  

(a) A person may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law or denied equal protection of the laws; art 1 section 7. 


the san francisco disclaimer rule violates both due process and equal protection. 

  

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable seizures and searches may not be violated;


  

The right of the people to be secure in their ... papers, and effects against unreasonable seizures and searches may not be violated. the imposition of a disclaimer is an unreasonable seizure. 


  

Cruel or unusual punishment may not be inflicted or excessive fines imposed.


here, any fine is excessive. in talley, the court found a $10 fine excessive. in mcintyre, the court found a $100 fine excessive. ok 9 21 stopped; too tired for reasonable legal fee.


9:26 nevermind. 


Under the new ordinance, ads run by primarily formed independent expenditure and ballot measure committees must include a disclaimer listing their top three contributors of $5,000 or more. Id. § 1.161(a)(1). Additionally, “[i]f any of the top three major contributors is a committee, the disclaimer must also disclose both the name of and the dollar amount contributed by each of the top two major contributors of $5,000 or more to that committee.” Id. The ad also must inform voters that “[f]inancial disclosures are NO ON E V. DAVID CHIU 9 available at sfethics.org” or, if an audio ad, provide a substantially similar statement that specifies the website. S.F. Code § 1.161(a)(2). Printed disclaimers that id


here, there is an attempt to commandeer the content of the ad with another ad, this one for sfethics.org. 


need one point out that this is unethical? 


Printed disclaimers that identify a “major contributor or secondary major contributor” must list the dollar amount of relevant contributions made by each named contributor. S.F. Code § 1.161(a)(1); S.F. Ethics Comm’n Reg. (“S.F. Reg.”) 1.161-3(a)(4). Print ads must include the disclaimers in text that is “at least 14-point, bold font.” S.F. Code § 1.161(a)(3). Audio and video advertisements must begin by speaking the required disclaimers of major contributors and secondary major contributors, but need not disclose the dollar amounts of those donors’ contributions. Id. §§ 1.161(a)(5); 1.162(a)(3).


Printed disclaimers that identify a “major contributor or secondary major contributor” must list the dollar amount of relevant contributions made by each named contributor. S.F. Code § 1.161(a)(1); S.F. Ethics Comm’n Reg. (“S.F. Reg.”) 1.161-3(a)(4). 


this clearly is a matter that at least some donors would prefer to keep private. 

 





Print ads must include the disclaimers in text that is “at least 14-point, bold font.” S.F. Code § 1.161(a)(3). 


the constitution does not allow for this degree of micromanagement. 


Audio and video advertisements must begin by speaking the required disclaimers of major contributors and secondary major contributors, but need not disclose the dollar amounts of those donors’ contributions. Id. §§ 1.161(a)(5); 1.162(a)(3).


the constitution does not allow for this degree of micromanagement. 9:34. pm


In addition, video ads must display a text banner that contains similar information to that required in print ads. Cal. Gov’t Code § 84504.1; S.F. Code § 1.161(a)(1).

 


the constitution does not allow for this degree of micromanagement


Violations of the City’s campaign finance laws are punishable by civil, criminal, and administrative penalties. S.F. Code § 1.170.


talley and mcintyre only involved small civil fines. criminal penalties are far more chilling to the speech of a reasonable person. 


 A committee’s treasurer may be held personally liable for violations by the committee. Id. § 1.170(g). Any individual who suspects a possible violation may file a complaint with the Ethics Commission, City Attorney, or District Attorney.


this would discourage and chill  any reasonable person from becoming treasurer. this in turn unduly burdens the rights of association and petition. implicating both constitutions. 


vote for smith v vote for smith, Ad paid for by San Franciscans Supporting Prop. B 2022. Committee major funding from: 1. Concerned Parents Supporting the Recall of Collins, Lopez and Moliga ($5,000) – contributors include Neighbors for a Better San Francisco Advocacy Committee ($468,800), Arthur Rock ($350,000). 2. BOMA SF Ballot Issues PAC ($5,000). 3. Edwin M. Lee Asian Pacific Democratic Club PAC sponsored by Neighbors for a Better San Francisco Advocacy ($5,000) – contributors include Neighbors for a Better San Francisco Advocacy Committee ($100,000), David Chiu for Assembly 2022 ($10,600). Financial disclosures are available at sfethics.org.


True:

On May 11, 2022, Plaintiffs filed this action. Plaintiffs allege that the secondary-contributor disclaimer requirement violates the First Amendment, both on its face and as applied against Plaintiffs. In their prayer for relief, Plaintiffs request a declaration that the requirement violates the First Amendment, on its face and as applied to Plaintiffs; an injunction barring enforcement of the secondary-contributor requirement, in general and against Plaintiffs specifically; and nominal damages. 

True: (sort of)

To obtain a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must establish “that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).


false:

The district court applied “exacting scrutiny,” which “requires a ‘substantial relation’ between the disclosure requirement and a ‘sufficiently important’ governmental interest.” Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 366–67 (2010) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976) (per curiam)). On de novo review, Fyock, 779 F.3d at 995, we hold that exacting scrutiny is the correct legal standard.


wrong for at least 3 reasons:

1 wrong definition of exacting where mcintyre governs

thus was exactly what the supreem court of ohio got wrong in mcintyre, leading the court to grant cert. 

2 violates reed v town of gilbert, 303, 

3 valeo does not contain word disclaimer. 

9 55 pm. 10/19/23


The court's holding violates binding federal case law, and is questionable as a matter of state law. 


4 fails important government interest test because state constitution. 


Regardless of the beliefs sought to be advanced by association, “compelled disclosure requirements are reviewed under exacting scrutiny.” Ams. for Prosperity Found. v. Bonta, 141 S. Ct. 2373, 2383 (2021) (


makes the disclaimers are not disclosures mistake. 


In the electoral context, both the Supreme Court and our court have consistently applied exacting scrutiny to compelled disclosure requirements and on-advertisement disclaimer requirements. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 366–67 (holding that disclaimer and disclosure requirements are subject to exacting scrutiny);


kind of a lie, at least its tricky. lie #2 here is CU did not hold this; that part of CU was dicta. 10"04 pm.


Brumsickle, 624 F.3d at 1005 (applying exacting scrutiny to Washington law that required disclaimers on political advertising and disclosure of certain contributions and expenditures); < dunno, will need to review.

 See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 366–67 (holding that disclaimer and disclosure requirements are subject to exacting scrutiny); John Doe No. 1 v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 196 (2010) (applying exacting scrutiny to disclosure requirement); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64 (requiring that compelled disclosure requirements survive exacting scrutiny); Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 744 (2008) (evaluating whether disclosure requirements satisfy exacting scrutiny); Brumsickle, 624 F.3d at 1005 (applying exacting scrutiny to Washington law that required disclaimers on political advertising and disclosure of certain contributions and expenditures); see also Family PAC v. McKenna, 685 F.3d 800, 805–06 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Disclosure requirements are subject to exacting scrutiny.”).5

error > those are all disclosure cases, not disclaimer cases, except brumsickle. which appears erroneous for exactly that reason.[but i need to review that case.]


SEC. 4.100. FINDINGS.
   The City and County of San Francisco (“City”) has a paramount interest in protecting the integrity of its government institutions. To further this interest, individuals should be encouraged to report possible violations of laws, regulations, and rules governing the conduct of City officers and employees, City contrctors, and employees of City contractors.
   This Chapter 1 fulfills the Charter’s requirements for two City programs relating to whistleblowers, as required by Charter Appendix Section F1.107. First, as required by the Charter, the Office of the Controller has authority to receive and investigate whistleblower complaints concerning deficiencies in the quality and delivery of City government services, wasteful and inefficient City government practices, misuse of City funds, and improper activities by City officers, employees, and contractors.
   Second, as required by the Charter, this ordinance protects the confidentiality of whistleblowers, and protects City officers and employees from retaliation for filing whistleblower complaints or providing assistance with the investigation of such complaints. As set forth in this Chapter 1, the Ethics Commission has primary responsibility for ensuring such protections.

states a policy in favor of protecting whistleblowers from doxxing.

did not find much in the city charter. 10:29 pm. 
In addition to disclosures for independent expenditures, the Disclosure Law sets forth requirements for "political advertising," defined as "any advertising displays, newspaper ads, billboards, signs, brochures, articles, tabloids, flyers, letters, radio or television presentations, or other means of mass communication, used for the purpose of appealing, directly or indirectly, for votes or for financial or other support or opposition in any election campaign." Id. § 42.17.020(38). An advertisement must identify its sponsor: written political advertising' must include the sponsor's name and address; radio and television ads must state the sponsor's name; and advertising undertaken as an independent expenditure must state that the advertisement was not approved by any candidate. See id. § 42.17.510(1)-(4).
this is brumsickle.
clearly erroneous analysis, gets disclaimers mixed 

 up with disclosure
10:44 pm. dustbin of history. wish i could look up wash cases. 


  






 


 












 

 





 



 THURSDAY i bought a capriotti's sub $12, 5 ties 3 shirts $25. found some flower bulbs, retail $100, . dollar store stuff, a $5 pipe. coffee at a vegan place in broad ripple. forgot to take out the trash. no billable work done. looked at some properties. did a stock trade. got some work done around 8-10.

p should go get those bu;bs and put them in the scotch tins,

i did (friday)! tulips daffodils hyacinth crocus allium 

friday. $10 star, $10 schwab. paid $300 on electric bill. bought gas $3.09. chinese dinner $20.

did a stock trade. 


Tuesday, October 17, 2023

 While NOM concedes that exacting scrutiny applies to review of Maine's independent expenditure and disclaimer and attribution laws, it contends that Maine's PAC definitions are subject to strict scrutiny. 

3. Disclaimer and Attribution Provisions

Finally, we agree with the district court that “ Citizens United has effectively disposed of any attack on Maine's attribution and disclaimer requirements.” Nat'l Org. for Marriage, 723 F.Supp.2d at 267

NOM argues that Maine's “attribution and disclaimer requirements are so great that the government's interest does not reflect the burden on speech,” as the required disclosures will “distract readers and listeners from NOM's message.” We disagree. The requirements are minimal, calling only for a statement of whether the message was authorized by a candidate and

whether the message was authorized by a candidate and disclosure of the name and address of the person who made or financed the communication. Me.Rev.Stat. tit. 21–A, § 1014(1)–(2). These are precisely the requirements approved in Citizens United,

 see 130 S.Ct. at 913–14 (citing 2 U.S.C. § 441d), and they bear a close relation to Maine's interest in dissemination of information regarding the financing of political messages. The disclaimer and attribution requirements are, on their face, unquestionably constitutional.

NOM argues that, though Citizens United and other courts may have approved disclaimer and attribution limitations in the precise circumstances before them, such measures have never been approved per se. That may be so, but the mere fact that disclaimer and attribution requirements have not been considered in the environment in which we review them now does not weaken our conclusion that the requirements withstand exacting scrutiny.

but maine 1973 opinion of the justices bylines on newspaper editorials 306 A.2d 18 (Me. 1973)

The principles enunciated in Talley, supra, emphasizing that the important relationship between anonymity and the free exercise of speech and press demands the existence of a compelling governmental interest to justify legislative restrictions upon it, are fully applicable. No compelling State interest is shown which would support the mandate of L.D. No. 1775 that editorial authorship must be disclosed.

Question No. 2: Does Legislative Document No. 1775 constitute a regulation or restraint on freedom of the press in violation of Article I, Section 4 of the Maine Constitution?

Answer: The question is answered in the affirmative.

The Maine Constitution is no less restrictive than the Constitution of the United States in this respect.

This court is unable to find sufficient distinction between the distribution of handbills generally and the distribution of handbills concerning elections to justify departure from the rule laid down by the United States Supreme Court.

People v. Bongiorni 1962. 2:16 pm wednesday 10/18/2023.

“While exacting scrutiny does not require that disclosure regimes be the least restrictive means of achieving their ends, it does require that they be narrowly tailored to the government's asserted interest.” Id. [bonta] “Narrow tailoring is  crucial where First Amendment activity is chilled -even if indirectly-'[b]ecause First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive.'” Id. at 2384 (quoting NAACP v. Button371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)). More specifically, the Supreme Court has often recognized the “deterrent effect on the exercise of First Amendment rights” that arises as an “inevitable result of the government's conduct in requiring disclosure.” Id. at 2383 (quoting Buckley424 U.S. at 65).

New Ga. Project v. Carr
United States District Court, Northern District of Georgia 2022


BRUSH NIB STUDIO LC v. CITY OF PHOENIX (AZ 2019)

The enduring strength of the First Amendment is that it allows people to speak their minds and express their beliefs without government interference. Duka, Koski, and Brush & Nib (“Plaintiffs”) have the right to refuse to express such messages under article 2, section 6 of the Arizona Constitution....  2:31 pm. wednesday.





Monday, October 16, 2023

1 AZ   Brush and Nib v Phoenix (AZ 2019)

2 CA  Schuster v. Imperial County Mun. Ct., 167 Cal. Rptr. 447 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1042,

3 CO Tattered Cover (CO),

4 DE In re Opinion of the Justices, 324 A.2d 211 (Del. 1974),

5 FL Doe v. Mortham, 708 So.2d 929 (Fla.1998)

6 ID Idaho v. Barney, 448 P.2d 195 (1968),

7 IL Illinois v White, 506 NE2d 1284 (Ill. 1987),

8 LA Louisiana. v. Moses, 655 So. 2d 779 (La. Ct. App. 1995),

Louisiana v. Fulton, 337 So.2d 866 (La. 1976), State of Louisiana v. Burgess, 543 So.2d 1332 (1989),

9 ME  Opinion of the Justices, 306 A.2d 18 (Maine 1973),

10 MA Commonwealth v Dennis, 368 Mass. 92, 329 N.E.2d 706 (1974)

11 MO  Ex Parte Harrison, 110 S.W. 709 (Mo 1908),

12 ND State v. N. Dakota Ed. Assoc., 262 N.W.2d 731 (N.D. 1978)

13 NY New York v. Duryea, 351 NYS2d 978 (1974),

= =

MO 3 Ex Parte Harrison, 110 S.W. 709 (Mo 1908)

ID 4 Idaho v. Barney, 448 P.2d 195 (1968),

ME 10 Opinion of the Justices, 306 A.2d 18 (Maine 1973),

 DE 6 In re Opinion of the Justices, 324 A.2d 211 (Del. 1974), 

MA 1 Commonwealth v Dennis, 368 Mass. 92, 329 N.E.2d 706 (1974)

NY 9 New York v. Duryea, 351 NYS2d 978 (1974),

Louisiana v. Fulton, 337 So.2d 866 (La. 1976),

ND 13 State v. N. Dakota Ed. Assoc., 262 N.W.2d 731 (N.D. 1978),

CA 11 Schuster v. Imperial County Mun. Ct., 167 Cal. Rptr. 447 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1042,

IL 5 Illinois v White, 506 NE2d 1284 (Ill. 1987), 

12 State of Louisiana v. Burgess, 543 So.2d 1332 (1989),

LA 7 Louisiana. v. Moses, 655 So. 2d 779 (La. Ct. App. 1995)

FL 2 Doe v. Mortham, 708 So.2d 929 (Fla.1998)

CO 14 Tattered Cover (CO),

 AZ 0.  Brush and Nib v Phoenix (AZ 2019)

 MA 1 Commonwealth v Dennis, 368 Mass. 92, 329 N.E.2d 706 (1974),

FL 2 Doe v. Mortham, 708 So.2d 929 (Fla.1998)

MO 3 Ex Parte Harrison, 110 S.W. 709 (Mo 1908),

ID 4 Idaho v. Barney, 448 P.2d 195 (1968),

IL 5 Illinois v White, 506 NE2d 1284 (Ill. 1987),

DE 6 In re Opinion of the Justices, 324 A.2d 211 (Del. 1974),

LA 7 Louisiana. v. Moses, 655 So. 2d 779 (La. Ct. App. 1995),

8 Louisiana v. Fulton, 337 So.2d 866 (La. 1976),

NY 9 New York v. Duryea, 351 NYS2d 978 (1974),

ME 10 Opinion of the Justices, 306 A.2d 18 (Maine 1973),

CA 11 Schuster v. Imperial County Mun. Ct., 167 Cal. Rptr. 447 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1042,

12 State of Louisiana v. Burgess, 543 So.2d 1332 (1989),

ND 13 State v. N. Dakota Ed. Assoc., 262 N.W.2d 731 (N.D. 1978),

CO 14 Tattered Cover (CO),