Sunday, March 31, 2024

                                                               No. 23-926 

                                                                 IN THE 

                                           Supreme Court of the United States 

                                    ———— 

NO ON E, SAN FRANCISCANS OPPOSING THE AFFORDABLE CARE HOUSING PRODUCTION ACT, ET AL., Petitioners, 

v. 

DAVID CHIU, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SAN FRANCISCO CITY ATTORNEY, ET AL., Respondents. _____________________________________________________________________________________

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit _____________________________________________________________________________________  

                                         BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE ROBBIN STEWART


toc

table of cases

interest of amicus

questions presented

summary  of argument

argument 

conclusion

certifications

no on E outline

cut through Gordian knot - Talley controls.

a stay should be granted. each of the 4 winter conditions are met. 

however, the case is not yet final.so a full grant of cert might not be needed at this time. 

statute requires strict scrutiny

   mcintyre

   Reed v town of gilbert

  Norman v Reed.

exacting scrutiny is a contronym. it means different things at different times and places. 

6 reasons why citizens United does not control

schuster - violates state constitution

California, although it had enacted an election disclosure requirement as early as 1901, see Act of Mar. 15, 1901, ch. 138, §1, 1901 Cal. Stats. 297, abandoned its law (then similar to Ohio's) in 1983, see Act of Sept. 11, 1983, ch. 668, 1983 Cal. Stats. 2621, after a California Court of Appeal, relying primarily on our decision in Talley, had declared the provision unconstitutional, see Schuster v. Imperial County Municipal Court, 109 Cal. App. 3d 887, 167 Cal. Rptr. 447 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1042 (1981). scalia dissenting note 3? 4?

violates right to privacy under state constitution - not adjudicated. 

13 states under state constitutions

9th circuit precedent

might violate city charter

wick yo v Hopkins

violates SCOTUS precedents - Barnette, tornillo, Woodley v Maynard, Riley, Buckley v aclf, watchtower v Stratton, Talley v California, McIntyre v Ohio, Janus, nifla, 303. 



  to prove a claim under Statute of Frauds, Statute of Wills, or the parole evidence rule. Herman and MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 74 L.Ed.2d 548, 549, 103 S.Ct. 683 (1983). • the adverse parties are at a gross disadvantage in disputing an allegation. State v. Sugar, 100 N.J. 214 (1985). • when the threatened loss resulting from civil proceedings is comparable to the consequences of a criminal proceeding. In re Polk License Revocation, 90 N.J. 550, 563 (1982). • before a decision is made to withdraw a life sustaining treatment from an incompetent nursing home patient. Matter of Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 382 (1985). • in a civil commitment proceeding. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 60 L.Ed.2d 323, 99 S.Ct. 1804 (1079). • whenever the interests of the natural parents in the care, custody and management of their child are threatened. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 754, 71 L.Ed.2d 599, 102 S.Ct. 1388 (1982)

Clear and Convincing Evidence

The clear-and-convincing-evidence standard goes by descriptions such as "clear, cogent, unequivocal, satisfactory, convincing" evidence. Generally, this standard is reserved for civil lawsuits where something more than money is at stake, such as civil liberties. Examples include:

  • restraining orders
  • dependency cases (loss of parental rights)
  • probate of wills, and
  • conservatorships.

(Conservatorship of Wendland, 26 Cal. 4th 519 (2001); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).)

"Clear and convincing" means the evidence is highly and substantially more likely to be true than untrue; the trier of fact must have an abiding conviction that the truth of the factual contention is highly probable. (Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310 (1984).

Saturday, March 30, 2024

 rust outline

interest of amicus

statute

canons of construction

doctrine of constitutional avoidance

facially invalid under anderson

17th amendment standard of review. 



no on E outline

cut through Gordian knot - Talley controls.

a stay should be granted. each of the 4 winter conditions are met. 

however, the case is not yet final.so a full grant of cert might not be needed at this time. 

statute requires strict scrutiny

   mcintyre

   Reed v town of gilbert

  Norman v Reed.

exacting scrutiny is a contronym. it means different things at different times and places. 

6 reasons why citizens United does not control

schuster - violates state constitution

violates right to privacy under state constitution - not adjudicated. 

13 states under state constitutions

9th circuit precedent

might violate city charter

wick yo v Hopkins

violates SCOTUS precedents - Barnette, tornillo, Woodley v Maynard, Riley, Buckley v aclf, watchtower v Stratton, Talley v California, McIntyre v Ohio, Janus, nifla, 303. 

 

2344 Saint Paul St, Indianapolis, IN 46203


California, although it had enacted an election disclosure requirement as early as 1901, see Act of Mar. 15, 1901, ch. 138, §1, 1901 Cal. Stats. 297, abandoned its law (then similar to Ohio's) in 1983, see Act of Sept. 11, 1983, ch. 668, 1983 Cal. Stats. 2621, after a California Court of Appeal, relying primarily on our decision in Talley, had declared the provision unconstitutional, see Schuster v. Imperial County Municipal Court, 109 Cal. App. 3d 887, 167 Cal. Rptr. 447 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1042 (1981). scalia dissenting note 3? 4?

Wednesday, March 27, 2024

 did/ didn't Tuesday.

1. had a very good hearing with adam at 11 am. 

2. got some gravel at Ritter and put into pothole. 

3. got 6 bags of leaves, moved leaves to back yard. 

4. planted perriennial wildflowers front and back yard. ... weeds. 

5. went to the club $15 coffee and toast read more of the rust motions.

6, 

7. dishes and kitchen floor. oh it's time to see if the dishwater is hot. it was, 14, 2 more loads of dishes.

8, 9, 10, 11, bank, cashed 3 checks. emailed tommy thanks for his mom. emails to and from Adam. 

12. sorted some boxes. 

13. email from rod confirming I will spend $350 on their lawyer to review the contract. 

ask about deed in escrow, and how we prove it. 

I could probably go fill the van.  1 48 am, I guess I spent over an hour on the kitchen.

wednesday plan: noon zoom. or, wake up, drive to Michigan st.  350.

    Thursday 50 pounds of beets, will make borscht. 

friday

1 went to the club. read rust filing. 

2. cleaned the yard. $45. 

3. took load of metal. 

4. next load loaded

5. got box of bananas and such. 

6. shopped at Bodega. 

7. got 3 bags of leaves. 

8. took out trash.

9. bacon.

10 picked up recycling on street, 1 box. 

11. lawyer meeting rescheduled

saturday

one load metal to sculpture studio

2 bags potatoes

pitchforked back yard more. 

clean stairs some

making borscht

Tuesday, March 26, 2024

indiana judicial canon 2. 6 

[1] The right to be heard is an essential component of a fair and impartial system of justice. Substantive rights of litigants can be protected only if procedures protecting the right to be heard are observed.

 Among the factors that a judge should consider when deciding upon an appropriate settlement practice for a case are (1) whether the parties have requested or voluntarily consented to a certain level of participation by the judge in settlement discussions, (2) whether the parties and their counsel are relatively sophisticated in legal matters, (3) whether the case will be tried by the judge or a jury, (4) whether the parties participate with their counsel in settlement discussions, (5) whether any parties are unrepresented by counsel, and (6) whether the matter is civil or criminal.  there's more like this, in the judicial canons, that I should review when awake.

(A) A judge shall not initiate, permit, or consider ex parte communications, or consider other communications made to the judge outside the presence of the parties or their lawyers, concerning a pending* or impending matter,* except as follows:

(1) When circumstances require it, ex parte communication for scheduling, administrative, or emergency purposes, which does not address substantive matters, is permitted, provided:


 I owe $120 to water co, $5 to 5th 3rd. property taxes. $100 on internet bill. review insurances.

did: paid $40 on chase card, which now has a $12k limit. I wonder what the rate is. 

cashed 3 checks. oh I need to send tommy's mom a thank you note. 

 This Court’s stay is in the public’s interest because it preserves a law—duly

passed by the General Assembly and clothed in the presumption of 

constitutionality—that provides order in Indiana’s primary election system.

Rokita lie list. 2/20/24 Indiana Supreme court filing.


Monday, March 25, 2024

 affirmative defenses:

defendant relies on the protections of Article I sections 1, 3, 11, 12, 16, 19, and 20.

Sunday, March 24, 2024

 notes on rust petition for review

The court relies heavily on Burdick v Takushi, a case about how a ban of the write-in vote is a minor burden. But recently in New Hampshire President Biden won the primary via write-in votes, and has gone on to win more primaries. [murkowski?]

“The majority's analysis ignores the inevitable and significant write-in ban imposes on some individual voters ․”)

we suggest "burden a", as in "and significant burden a write-in ban....

The majority's analysis ignores the inevitable and significant burden a write-in ban imposes upon some individual voters by preventing them from exercising their right to vote in a meaningful manner. - Alan burdick v takushi

I think there is one more of these editing glitches, which is why I am trying to closely re-read the opinion. I saw it before but did not mark the spot. found it an hour later

By contrast, the rights of candidates is less defined and has not been awarded a fundamental status.

we bring this to the court's attention because of the scrivener's error.

additionally, of course, a candidate's rights include voting rights, political association, and privacy. voting rights and political association are considered fundamental, and privacy used to be, before Dobbs, and might still be in the voting context. [see if this fits, look at context of phrase.] Here Rust asserts his own fundamental rights as a voter, is politically associated with the 4000 people who signed his petition and the unknown thousands of dozens who will vote for him.

In this arena, precedent affording protection for candidacy “can be best described as a legal morass.” Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 710 (11th Cir. 2010). We can thus confidently say that Rust does not have a fundamental right to run for United States Senate in Indiana, let alone as “the Republican Party's nominee” for that place on the ballot. Ind. Republican State Comm. Amicus Br. at 9.

Held: Ohio's early filing deadline places an unconstitutional burden on the voting and associational rights of petitioner Anderson's supporters. Pp. 460 U. S. 786-806.

Trump v. Anderson, 601 U.S. ___ (2024) .

Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, 533 U.S. 181 (2008) ..

lopez-torres

“[S]ince the right to exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and political rights, any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized.” Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964).

McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 572 U.S. 185, 191 (2014) (“There is no right more basic in our democracy than the right to participate in electing our political leaders.”).

The First Amendment has its fullest and most urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office. This broad protection, we have explained, reflects our profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open. Cruz v FEC. The First Amendment requires us to err on the side of protecting political speech rather than suppressing it. Id.




All the above is pretty meager, given that we are considering restrictions on “the most fundamental First Amendment activities”—the right of candidates for political office to make their case to the American people.

Moreover, deference to [Congress] would be especially inappropriate where, as here, the legislative act may have been an effort to insulate legislators from effective electoral challenge. Id.

Four years later in Duke v. Massey, 87 F.3d 1226 (11th Cir. 1996), the Eleventh Circuit again denied Duke relief, but this time it applied strict scrutiny. Id. at 1234.

The majority's analysis ignores the inevitable and significant burden a write-in ban imposes upon some individual voters by preventing them from exercising their right to vote in a meaningful manner. - Alan burdick v takushi

112 S.Ct. 2059 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (emphasis added); see also id. at 448, 112 S.Ct. 2059 (“The majority's analysis ignores the inevitable and significant write-in ban imposes on some individual voters ․”)


That is because “speech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government.” Garrison v. Louisiana379 U. S. 64, 74–75 (1964). Accordingly, “speech on public issues occupies the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values, and is entitled to special protection.” Connick v. Myers461 U. S. 138, 145 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted). Snyder v Phelps.

Saturday, March 23, 2024

 Anderson v Celebrezze, 

Norman v Reed, 

Harman v Forssenius 

Term Limits 

 YuLee 

Freeman v Burson, 

Dale 

Hurley. 

Elrod v Burns.

Burdick 

Norman v Reed

Case No.S-PL-371|March 6, 2024Page 2of 41Msa, Justice.John Rust seeks the Republican nomination for United States Senator from ump v Anderson, 

Anderson v Celebrezze, 

Norman v Reed, 

Harman v Forssenius 

Term Limits 

 YuLee 

Freeman v Burson, 

Dale 

Hurley. 

Elrod v Burns.

Burdick 

Norman v Reed

 need to find what i've written on San Francisco case, before I go and write it all again.

No. 23-_________ ============================================================================================

==================== In The Supreme Court of the United States --------------------------------- ♦ --------------------------------- 

NO ON E, SAN FRANCISCANS OPPOSING THE AFFORDABLE HOUSING PRODUCTION ACT; EDWIN M. LEE ASIAN PACIFIC DEMOCRATIC CLUB PAC SPONSORED BY NEIGHBORS FOR A BETTER SAN FRANCISCO ADVOCACY; and TODD DAVID, Petitioners, 

v. 

DAVID CHIU, in his official capacity as San Francisco City Attorney; SAN FRANCISCO ETHICS COMMISSION; BROOKE JENKINS, in her official capacity as San Francisco District Attorney; and CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, Respondents. --------------------------------- ♦ 

On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari To The United States Court Of Appeals For The Ninth Circuit ----

♦ --------------------------------- PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI --------------------------------- ♦ --------------------------------- JAMES R. SUTTON THE SUTTON LAW FIRM 150 Post Street, Suite 405 San Francisco, CA 94108 415.732.7700 jsutton@campaignlawyers.com ALAN GURA Counsel of Record BRETT R. NOLAN INSTITUTE FOR FREE SPEECH 1150 Connecticut Ave., N.W., Suite 801 Washington, DC 20036 202.301.3300 agura@ifs.org Counsel for Petitioners ========================================================================================


Friday, March 22, 2024


outline rust brief

cover

toc

  needs expanded

table of cases

Anderson v Celebrezze, 

Norman v Reed, 

Harman v Forssenius 

Term Limits 

Burson v Freeman

Dale 

Hurley. 

Elrod v Burns.

Burdick 

Norman v Reed

Trump v. Anderson, 601 U.S. ___ (2024) .

interest of amicus

certifications: horning claims to be an individual. no party paid for this brief. word count. 

summary of argument

1.

The court below failed to set out any standard in its review of the 17th Amendment claim. Retroactively removing Rust in 2024 ex post facto because of his votes in 2014 and his failure to vote in 2018, violates any norms of fairness and is not some minor burden. It is arbitrary and capricious. In a case of first impression, Trump v Anderson, Anderson v Celebrezze, Norman v Reed, and Harman v Forssenius may provide guidance. This case presents a good vehicle to explicate the 17th Amendment.

2.

The court below erred in following Burdick v Takushi's permissive review rather than using either Anderson, as clarified in Crawford v Marion County, or Norman v Reed. Arbitrarily kicking Rust off the ballot because of his votes in 2014, under rules not enacted until 2021, is a severe burden not just on Rust but on the GOP rank and file who are deprived of an election for senate. 2 of the 5 dissented, finding that the legislation could not be applied to Rust even if it were facially valid. They were correct. 

3. The court below also erred in using the Salerno standard for facial challenges, in a First Amendment case. 

4. the court should apply strict scrutiny, or the upper section of the Anderson v Celebrezze balancing test. 

The Norman and Celebrezze cases may be directly controlling on their facts. Trump v Anderson is not directly controlling, because it is a section 3 case, but is the court's most recent decision in a federal election ballot access case, and provides guidance.  and see Term Limits.

Deciding to apply strict scrutiny would not be the end of the case. In cases such as  lopez-torres and Burson v Freeman, the court balanced the competing compelling interests of different groups of voters. Here, the court might want to strike a blow for the party's right to exclude, as in Dale or Hurley. But it should do so under a proper standard of review. 

5. The procedural posture of the case at the moment is [emergency motion for a stay?]

Here, plaintiff has a moderate chance of success on either claim. The public interest strongly favors holding a free and equal election. The burden falls far more heavily on Rust than on Morales. The harm is irreparable. Elrod v Burns. If Rust eventually loses, perhaps on remand, after the election has taken place, any votes for him can just be discarded. But if the election is not held, Banks and Morales could be seen as having rigged the election, with an appearance of corruption, which is not fair to either of them. 

Here there is a mild burden on the asocciational rights of the GOP bosses, who would prefer to exclude Rust. But there is no valid mechanism to do so. Rust has qualified under the old statute, and the new statute cannot yet be applied to him. 

The court should grant a stay and allow the May primary to take place with Rust's name included. Later the case could be GVR'd, summarily reversed, or given full briefing and argument. This court could reach the merits, or could establish the correct legal standard and remand.  

argument

1.

The court below failed to set out any standard in its review of the 17th Amendment claim. Retroactively removing Rust because of his votes in 2014 and his failure to vote in 2018 violates any norms of fairness, and is not some minor burden. It is arbitrary and capricious. In a case of first impression, Trump v Anderson, Anderson v Celebrezze, Norman v Reed, and Harman v Forssenius may provide guidance. This case presents a good vehicle to explicate the 17th Amendment.

2.

The court below erred in following Burdick v Takushi's permissive review rather than using either Anderson, as clarified in Crawford v Marion County, or Norman v Reed. Arbitrarily kicking Rust off the ballot because of his votes in 2014, under rules not enacted until 2022, is a severe burden not just on Rust but on the GOP rank and file who are deprived of an election for senate. 2 of the 5 dissented, finding that the legislation could not be applied to Rust even if it were facially valid. They were correct. 

3. The court below also erred in using the Salerno standard for facial challenges, in a First Amendment case. By this formulation, a statute that only infringed the voting rights of 99% of the population would be ok. 

4. the court should apply strict scrutiny, or the upper section of the Anderson v Celebrezze balancing test. 

talk about Crawford and its discussion of Anderson. reread Trump v Anderson look for a quote. 

look for any case where indiana loses at SCOTUS. hess v Indiana, hudnut v aba booksellers, what else? Edmond v Indianapolis yick wo v Hopkins.

any case that talks about strict scrutiny.

the Indiana Supreme Court identifies both lines  of cases. on the one hand there is Burdick, Jenness v Fortson, Clingman v Beaver, Timmons v New Party, Munro v (Washington?)

on the other there is Norman, Williams v Rhodes, Anderson v Celebrezze, Crawford v Marion County Election Board 

N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. López Torres, 552 U.S. 196, 202 (2008)

citing Democratic Party of U.S. v. Wisc. ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107, 122 (1981))

The Framers of the United States Constitution "conceived of a Federal Government directly responsible to the people, possessed of direct power over the people, and chosen directly, not by the States, but by the people." U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 821 (1995) Morales.

lie list item: Here, the Affiliation Statute is cloaked with "the presumption of constitutionality until clearly overcome by a contrary showing." Horner v. Curry, 125 N.E.3d 584, 588 (Ind. 2019).

Rust's First and Fourteenth Amendment challenges fail because the Affiliation Statute imposes a minor, reasonable and nondiscriminatory restriction that advances a litany of important state regulatory interests.







The Norman and Celebrezze cases may be directly controlling on their facts. Trump v Anderson is not directly controlling, because it is a section 3 case, but is the court's most recent decision in a federal election ballot access case, and provides guidance.  and see Term Limits.

 A s the court below points out, Term Limits v Thornton is not directly controlling, because here Indiana has not added a qualification. But the Term Limits case is relevant for its discussion of the roles of the states in carrying out federal elections . 

Deciding to apply strict scrutiny would not be the end of the case. In cases such as YuLee and Freeman v Burson, the court balanced the competing compelling interests of different groups of voters. Here, the court might want to strike a blow for the party's right to exclude, as in Dale or Hurley. But it should do so under a proper standard of review. 

5. The procedural posture of the case at the moment is [emergency motion for a stay?]

Here, plaintiff has a moderate chance of success on either claim. The public interest strongly favors holding a free and equal election. The burden falls far more heavily on Rust than on Morales. The harm is irreparable. Elrod v Burns. If Rust eventually loses, perhaps on remand, after the election has taken place, any votes for him can just be discarded. But if the election is not held, Banks and Morales could be seen as riggers, and corrupt, which is not fair to either of them. 

Here there is a mild burden on the associational rights of the GOP bosses, who would prefer to exclude Rust. But there is no valid mechanism to do so. Rust has qualified under the old statute, and the new statute cannot yet be applied to him. 

The court should grant a stay and allow the May primary to take place with Rust's name included. Later the case could be GVR'd, summarily reversed, or given full briefing and argument. This court could reach the merits, or could establish the correct legal standard and remand.  







argument

conclusion: this court should grant a stay and grant certiorari because  of the importance of the case, and the need to act quickly. 

Rust v Morales is a dispute about the 2024 Indiana GOP primary for US Senate.
Amicus Andrew Horning is the Libertarian Party candidate for US Senate from Indiana this fall. He will be severely burdened if Rust is removed from the ballot, and Banks is selected rather than elected. Horning expects to come in third, and runs primarily to discuss and impact issues. This is different than Rust's interests. Rust was a long shot to win the GOP primary, and would not be a shoe-in in November, but he was running to win, not merely to emote. Horning has standing to intervene, but chooses to participate as an amicus instead. 

Horning has run several times before, and has a significant following in Indiana. quote results from ballot pedia. he is likely to continue to run.

Horning is a frequent candidate, having run as a Libertarian for senate, house, governor, mayor, and county office beginning in 1996.   He typically comes in third. He got 5% for senate in 2016, 4% for house in _, 45% for Congress district 7 running as a Republican in __, I want to say 20% for mayor, maybe 10%.

2016 See also: Indiana's 8th Congressional District election, 2016
Andrew Horning 4.6% 13,655

2012 See also: United States Senate elections in Indiana, 2012

Horning ran in the 2012 election for the U.S. Senate, representing Indiana. He won the nomination on the Libertarian ticket.[8] 

According to the website Daily Kos, this race was one of nine top-ballot 2012 races that contained Libertarian candidates who received more total votes than was the difference between the Democratic winner and the GOP runner-up. In this case, Horning took in over 4,800 more votes than the number that separated Donnelly and Mourdock.[9]

PARTYCANDIDATEVOTE %VOTES
Democratic Joe Donnelly 50% 1,281,181
Republican Richard Mourdock 44.3% 1,133,621
Libertarian Andy Horning 5.7% 145,282

Candidate, Indiana State Governor, 2000, 2008

Candidate, United States House of Representatives, Indiana, District 7, 2002, 2004

Candidate, Mayor of Indianapolis, 1999

Candidate, Marion County Recorder, 1998

Candidate, Indiana State House of Representatives, District 96, 1996 



0%15
    IndependentAmy Willis0%3
Total Votes2,560,102
Source: Indiana Secretary of State "United States Senate Election Results"



Rust is a Republican, and while he wants to be the nominee, he will support the winner of the primary. Thus the idea of running as an independent or Libertarian would  be counter to his interests, and would be an unwanted burden on the Libertarians, and not a minor one. The Libertarian Party is not a graveyard for excluded major party candidates. It is not an adequate alternative, in the way that plaintiff Burdick had several options and thus overall was not severely burdened by not being able to write in Mickey Mouse.  

Rust is a Republican, and while he wants to be the nominee, he will support the winner of the primary. Thus the idea of running as an independent or Libertarian would  be counter to his interests. 

In Norman v Reed, the court said that when an election law severely burdens rights, strict scrutiny must be used. Unfortunately "severe burden" was left undefined. However, in that case, 25,000 extra signatures on a ballot access petition was found to be a severe burden. Here, to appear as an independent would take over 25,000 signatures, and thus be a severe burden under the controlling precedent of Norman. The difference is even without the extra 25000 + signatures, being on the ballot as an independent would be a consolation prize, not the desired objective. So Rust would be doubly severely burdened.   







summary of argument

a stay should be granted. p has some likelihood of success on either of two claims, irreparable harm to the integrity of the election process, balance of the burdens, and the public interest favor a stay.

this case presents a rare 17th amendment case, and is important for that reason. 

in this case a state supreme court allowed state officials to remove a candidate for senate, leaving the gop primary uncontested for his opponent.  meanwhile this court, under a different section of the 14rh amendment, refused to allow Colorado to remove ex-president Trump from the ballot.  

without a ruling from this court carefully explaining how these cases are legally distinct, it might seem to the public that the indiana court is just imposing its own personal preferences, rather than acting according to rules of law. 

the facts here are complex. to participate in the gop primary, a would-be candidate must obtain 4500 signatures, which it is undisputed Rust has done, and qualify as a republican by one of two routes, either by obtaining the consent of the county chair, or by having chosen GOP in the most recently voted primary. In 2022 a statute now requires the  two most recent primaries, not just one. The state is attempting to enforce this retroactively against Rust. While Rust has not cited to the ex post facto clause of either the federal or state constitution, he has cited to the 14th amendment, which requires due process, equal protection, privileges or immunities, and incorporates the First Amendment. Due process, and its state analog due course of law, incorporate fundamental fairness, such that the new statute cannot be held against Rust until 2026. The state court did not seem to notice this problem. Barring Rust from the ballot because of choices he made in 2014 is a severe burden. 

The court below erred in two important ways. First, the court seems to have applied a deferential Burdick  v Takushi test in its 14th A analysis, rather than Anderson or Norman v Reed. This conflicts with Trump v Anderson, which regarded Anderson v Celebrezze as influential or controlling. It also conflicts with Crawford v Marion County Election Board, which required the Anderson test. In Crawford, the district court in Indianapolis and the 7th circuit had erred in applying deferential review under Takushi, in a case about voter ID. The Supreme  Court split 3-3-3, with the controlling opinion upholding the ruling below but not its reasoning. This case could be similar. 

This court might prefer to emphasize the GOP's interests in not being forced to affiliate with someone they don't like, as in Dale, Hurley, 303, Masterpiece Cakeshop. You wouldn't know it from the opinion below, but this is a gay panic case; the gop is trying to exclude Rust  at a time when his race could serve as a referendum on the state GOP's allegedly anti-lgbtq legislative agenda. 

But here the gop can point to no bylaw, as in Tashjian, and its attempt to apply the statute retroactively violates due process equal protection privileges or immunities and the First Amendment.

There is no supreme court case on the 17th A. Does the phrase "of the people" count for anything? In Harmon, the court interpreted the 24th A as preventing paperwork obstacles to voting, even if they were not literally a poll tax. More recently, the court has tried to adhere more closely to the text of the constitution. We know that the intent of the progressive era reform of the 17th A was to allow parties to be controlled by the rank and file rather than the bosses.  But perhaps this is not sufficiently spelled out in the text. Using either a tiers of scrutiny approach or text history and tradition, the 17th should require some meaningful standard, not simply the announcement of a conclusion. Here, it is difficult to see what 17th Amendment standard would allow the state to apply the new statute retroactively. 

In Anderson v Celebrezze, Ohio had set an unconstitutionally early deadline for ballot access. Here, Indiana has done the same thing. This is not a minor trivial burden.  


Second, in its 17th Amendment analysis, it failed to set out any standard of review, so a future court is left with no guidance.    

(I made a few edits in the emailed version)

 












 Thursday did / didn't


1 hr meet w lawyer

took load to scotties

got load wood chips

donated lettuce

club coffee toast fries

trash out. food bank run. 

wednesday paid $1100 on card

zoom. loaded van. cleaned back yard.

to do

x $75 bank of America 

x duke 300 at Kroger 301.50. also groceries $10. 

x more wood chips, gravel. filled pothole in alley. 

outline 2 briefs

 - did outline for one brief. tomorrow I hope to start the other. before that I should do chores for 20 minutes. it is 11:18 pm Friday night, so i'm home working, which suits me fine. 

started this one at brad's 5 -6 pm. $17. 

did 2 loads of dishes. need to refill pot. need to find my timer. 

brown brown and his Mexican friend are back and will stay in the front room. he will do $500 a month of work. I will show him scotty's place.


stuff to do next: stairs, front porch, front stoop, back yard, buckets. find timer.

plan: onion potato leaves/wood chips

find Carroll county complaint

Tuesday, March 19, 2024

 agenda

rust 14th and 17th.

Text of Section 24:

Ex Post Facto Laws

No ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts, shall ever be passed.[1]
Section 31

Text of Section 31:

Right of Assemblage and Petition

No law shall restrain any of the inhabitants of the State from assembling together in a peaceable manner, to consult for their common good; nor from instructing their representatives; nor from applying to the General Assembly for redress of grievances.[1]

Section 32

San Francisco case

h+H

counterclaim

trespass, (common law claim, so respondent superior) due process violation,  4th amendment violation, right to counsel violation, is that 5th or 6th. $1 each. + 1983, 1985 fees.

answer. generally deny,     

ing to seek joint stipulations of law and fact.


affirmative defenses

     unripe, failure to exhaust administrative remedies

     liberty interest under section 1


WE DECLARE, That all people are created equal; that they are endowed by their CREATOR with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; 

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.--That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, --That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness

section 2
All people shall be secured in the natural right to worship ALMIGHTY GOD, according to the dictates of their own consciences.[1]

Text of Section 3:

Freedom of Religious Opinions

No law shall, in any case whatever, control the free exercise and enjoyment of religious opinions, or interfere with the rights of conscience.[1]





No preference shall be given, by law, to any creed, religious society, or mode of worship; and no person shall be compelled to attend, erect, or support, any place of worship, or to maintain any ministry, against his consent.[1]

insert bit about Larry and his non answer to my what is faith question.



Text of Section 11:

Search and Seizure

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search or seizure, shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.[1]
Section 12



All courts shall be open; and every person, for injury done to him in his person, property, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law. Justice shall be administered freely, and without purchase; completely, and without denial; speedily, and without delay.[1]

Text of Section 14:

Double Jeopardy and Self-incrimination

No person shall be put in jeopardy twice for the same offense.[1]

Text of Section 16:

Excessive Bail or Fines, Cruel and Unusual Punishment

Excessive fines shall not be imposed. All penalties shall be proportioned to the nature of the offense.[1]

timbs v Indiana 8th a claim

Text of Section 19:

Criminal Cases--Jury Determination

In all criminal cases whatever, the jury shall have the right to determine the law and the facts.[1]

Section 20

Text of Section 20:

Civil Cases--Right of Trial by Jury

In all civil cases, the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate.[1]

Section 21

Section 21






Text of Section 21:

Compensation for Services and Property

No person's particular services shall be demanded, without just compensation. No person's property shall be taken by law, without just compensation; nor, except in case of the State, without such compensation first assessed and tendered.[1]












     excessive fine under both constitutions

     double jeopardy - do some discovery under the ticket.

     demand for jury trial

  unclean hands

 

discovery

proposed stipulations of fact and law

standard of proof - is it clear and convincing?

Members of the Med. Licensing Bd. of Ind. v. Planned Parenthood N.W. Haw., Alaska, Ind., Ky., No. 22S-PL-338 (Ind. Sup. Ct., Jun, 30, 2023). 

https://law.justia.com/cases/indiana/supreme-court/2023/22s-pl-00338.html


test

test

test

e disa

gree.
We dO ur review of Section 1’s text, history, structure, and purpose, as well as the caselaw interpreting it, leads us to conclude(A) Section 1 is a Lockean Natural Rights Guarantee securing fundamental rights and limiting governmental authority to the police power, and (B) the provision is judicially enf

We disagree.Our review of Section 1’stext, history, structure, and purpose, as well as the caselaw interpretingit, leads us to conclude(A) Section 1 is a Lockean Natural Rights Guarantee securing fundamental rights and limiting governmental authority to the police power, and (B) the provision is judicially enfrrrttttOur review of Section 1’stext, history, structure, and purpose, as well as the leads us to

conclude(A) Section 1 is a Lockean Natural Rights Guarantee securing fundamental rights and limiting governmental authority
to the police power, and (B) the provi

sion i t

, leads us to conclude(A) Section 1 is a Lockean Natural Rights Guarantee securing fundamental rights and limiting governmental authority to the police power, and (B) the provision is judicially enforceable. A.Sd it.” Paul Stieler Enters., Inc. v. City of Evansville, 2 N.E.3d 1269, 127273 (Ind. 2014) (quotations omitted). Wefind that common understanding by examining “the language of the text in the context of the history surrounding its drafting and ratification, the purpose and structure of our constitution, and case law interpreting the specific provisions.” Id.at 1273(quotations omitted). As with every provision inthe Constitution, we treat Section 1 with “particular deference, as though every word had been hammered into place.” Meredith v. Pence, 984 N.E.2d 1213, 1218 (Ind. 2013) (quotations omitted).Article 1, Section 1statesin full: WE DECLARE, That all people are created equal; that they are endowed by their CREATOR with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; that all power is inherent in the people; and that all free governments









We disagree.Our review of Section 1’stext, history, structure, and purpose, as well as the caselaw interpretingit, leads us to conclude(A) Section 1 is a Lockean Natural Rights Guarantee securing fundamental rights and limiting governmental authority to the police power, and (B) the provision is judicially enforceable. A.Section 1 is a Lockean Natural Rights Guarantee.Interpreting Article 1, Section 1requires us to uncover the common understanding of both those who framed” our Constitution“and those who ratified it.” Paul Stieler Enters., Inc. v. City of Evansville, 2 N.E.3d 1269, 127273 (Ind. 2014) (quotations omitted). Wefind that common understanding by examining “the language of the text in the context of the history surrounding its drafting and ratification, the purpose and structure of our constitution, and case law interpreting the specific provisions.” Id.at 1273(quotations omitted). As with every provision inthe Constitution, we treat Section 1 with “particular deference, as though every word had been hammered into place.” Meredith v. Pence, 984 N.E.2d 1213, 1218 (Ind. 2013) (quotations omitted).Article 1, Section 1statesin full: WE DECLARE, That all people are created equal; that they are endowed by their CREATOR with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; that all power is inherent in the people; and that all free governments