reading g chiu, listing the cases they rely on, which are the wrong cases. 8:22 April 29. 2024. been at it over 20 minutes.
Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S.
at 463
We hold that the district court
acted within its discretion to conclude that Plaintiffs did not
establish a likelihood of success on the merits.
The district court applied “exacting scrutiny,” which
“requires a ‘substantial relation’ between the disclosure
requirement and a ‘sufficiently important’ governmental
interest.” Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 366–67
(2010) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976) (per
curiam)). On de novo review, Fyock, 779 F.3d at 995, we
hold that exacting scrutiny is the correct legal standard.
Plaintiffs seek a preliminary injunction on the ground
that the secondary-contributor disclaimer requirement
violates the First Amendment. We hold that the district court
acted within its discretion to conclude that Plaintiffs did not
establish a likelihood of success on the merits.
The district court applied “exacting scrutiny,” which
“requires a ‘substantial relation’ between the disclosure
requirement and a ‘sufficiently important’ governmental
interest.”
note the bait and switch! legerdemain, attempted clever wordplay. apples and volcanos.
both words begin with the five letters "discl", but they are two completely different things. rookie mistake, or deliberate evil.
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 366–67
(2010) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976) (per
curiam)). O
next bait and switch: cite CU again!
In the electoral
context, both the Supreme Court and our court have
consistently applied exacting scrutiny to compelled
disclosure requirements and on-advertisement disclaimer
requirements. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 366–67
(holding that disclaimer and disclosure requirements are
subject to exacting scrutiny);
Lie! TCU did not hold that. It mentioned it in passing in dicta.
so the structure of the 9th circuit opinion, as mouthpiece for campaign legal center, is as follows:
1. Don't mention Barnette, Talley, tornillo, Woodley, Talley and McIntyre.
Instead, focus on a three sentence ambiguous passage in dicta in CU taken out of context, while ignoring the rest of the CU decision, which upheld strict scrutiny.
It is my sense that this is an untenuous approach. let's see where it goes.
the next case it cites is Reed, John Doe No. 1 v. Reed,, which is a disclosure case that is not a disclaimer case.
the next cases it cites are Reed, Buckley, Davis v fec. in McIntyre, the Court reversed the Ohio supreme court's use of Buckley and intermediate scrutiny. I have forgotten the issue in Davis, it's the millionaire's amendment case. ok, in Davis, at the end of the opinion, it found disclosure unconstitutional under the buckley/bonta standard.
similarly, under that approach, the California regulation would fail as well. however, Davis is a disclosure case, not a disclaimer case, so it adds little to the discussion here.
The remaining issue that we must consider is the constitutionality of §319(b)’s disclosure requirements. “[W]e have repeatedly found that compelled disclosure, in itself, can seriously infringe on privacy of association and belief guaranteed by the First Amendment.” Buckley, 424 U. S., at 64. As a result, we have closely scrutinized disclosure requirements, including requirements governing independent expenditures made to further individuals’ political speech. Id., at 75. To survive this scrutiny, significant encroachments “cannot be justified by a mere showing of some legitimate governmental interest.” Id., at 64. Instead, there must be “a ‘relevant correlation’ or ‘substantial relation’ between the governmental interest and the information required to be disclosed,” and the governmental interest “must survive exacting scrutiny.” Ibid. (footnotes omitted). That is, the strength of the governmental interest must reflect the seriousness of the actual burden on First Amendment rights. Id., at 68, 71.
The §319(b) disclosure requirements were designed to implement the asymmetrical contribution limits provided for in §319(a), and as discussed above, §319(a) violates the First Amendment. In light of that holding, the burden imposed by the §319(b) requirements cannot be justified, and it follows that they too are unconstitutional.
if the disclosure provisions of Davis were unconstitutional under a much more permissive test, it is unlikely that the San Francisco regulations will survive the much stricter exacting scrutiny test as used in grant v Meyer and McIntyre v Ohio.
ok, next?
brumsickle, an erroneous case that supports their position.
see also Family PAC v. McKenna, 685
F.3d 800, 805–06 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Disclosure requirements
are subject to exacting scrutiny, don't know that one.
Plaintiffs take the position that disclaimer and disclosure are
“terms of art,” and argue that the City’s ordinance should be
reviewed under strict scrutiny because it is a “hybrid
disclaimer/disclosure requirement.”
[Plaintiffs are correct.]
But Plaintiffs cite no
authority that makes a similar distinction.7
[maybe. so we provide a little, ACLF being the best case, supported by tables one and 2. oh! McIntyre is the authority that makes that distinction. in McIntyre, the court specifically rejected the use of disclosure lax review from Buckley for the kiss of death strictest most exacting scrutiny.
did plaintiffs not cite McIntyre? I suspect they did.
oh there's footnote 7:
See, e.g., Gaspee Project v. Mederos, 13 F.4th 79,
95 (1st Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 2647 (2022); Smith v. Helzer,
No. 3:22-CV-00077-SLG, 2022 WL 2757421, at *10 (D. Alaska July 14,
2022), appeal docketed, No. 22-35612 (9th Cir. argued Feb. 9, 2023).
We hold that Americans for Prosperity Foundation does not alter the
existing exacting scrutiny standard.
what gaspee and helzer have in common is the same set of lawyers and the same set of lies.
But Plaintiffs cite no
authority that makes a similar distinction.7 Indeed, they acknowledge that the Supreme Court has applied exacting
scrutiny to both disclosure rules, John Doe No. 1, 561 U.S.
at 196, and disclaimer requirements, Citizens United, 558
U.S. at 366–67.
[the court is correct here. plaintiffs concede far too much. plaintiffs seem to want to test bonta, rather than relying on McIntyre and such. that's why I need to file this amicus, and may need to intervene. however, grant v Meyer exacting scrutiny is enough. better pull that up Jamie.
Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414 (1988)
When I lived in Colorado in the 1980s I met Paul Grant via the Libertarian Party. Later we both became lawyers.
In Meyer v Grant (1988) and then Buckley v ACLF (1999?) the Court upheld Grant's right to pay petitioners, and to not have them have to wear disclaimer nametags.
Grant had the idea that while the Libertarian party was not winning at the polls, Colorado's citizen initiative process could be used to win victories on popular libertarian issues, including trucking deregulation, property tax reform, and marijuana legalization. A majority of states now allow medical or adult use marijuana based in large part on Grant's strategy. As a disabled senior citizen, being able to obtain medical marijuana inexpensively in nearby Michigan is an example of the personal freedoms the Libertarians fought for.
The Meyer v Grant case sheds light on how versatile the exacting scrutiny standard is:
"The First Amendment is a value-free provision whose protection is not dependent on 'the truth, popularity, or social utility of the ideas and beliefs which are offered.' NAACP v. Button, [371 U.S. 415, 371 U. S. 445 (1963)].""The very purpose of the First Amendment is to foreclose public authority from assuming a guardianship of the public mind. . . . In this field, every person must be hisPage 486 U. S. 420own watchman for truth, because the forefathers did not trust any government to separate the true from the false for us."
Having decided to confer the right, the State was obligated to do so in a manner consistent with the Constitution, because ... this case involves "core political speech."
A Colorado statute allows a proposed state constitutional amendment to be placed on a general election ballot if its proponents can obtain the signatures of at least 5 percent of the total number of qualified voters on an "initiative petition" within a 6-month period, but makes it a felony to pay petition circulators. Concluding that they would need the assistance of paid personnel to obtain the required signatures within the allotted time, appellee proponents of a constitutional amendment that would remove motor carriers from the Colorado Public Utilities Commission's jurisdiction brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against appellant state officials, seeking a declaration that the statutory payment prohibition violated their First Amendment rights. The District Court upheld the statute, but the Court of Appeals ultimately reversed, holding that the statute violates the First Amendment, as made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment.Held: The statutory prohibition against the use of paid circulators abridges appellees' right to engage in political speech in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Pp. 486 U. S. 420-428.(a) The statute is subject to exacting scrutiny, since the circulation of an initiative petition seeking to deregulate the Colorado trucking industry necessarily constitutes "core political speech," for which First Amendment protection is at its zenith. The statute burdens such speech in two ways: First, it limits the number of voices who will convey appellees' message and the hours they can speak and, therefore, limits the size of the audience they can reach. Second, it makes it less likely that appellees will garner the number of necessary signatures, thus limiting their ability to make the matter the focus of statewide discussion. The statute's burden on speech is not relieved by the fact that other avenues of expression remain open to appellees, since the use of paid circulators is the most effective, fundamental, and perhaps economical means of achieving direct, one-on-one communication, and appellees' right to utilize that means is itself protected by the First Amendment. Nor is the statutory burden rendered acceptable by the State's claimed authority to impose limitations on the scope of the state-created right to legislate by initiative; the power to ban initiatives entirely does not includePage 486 U. S. 415the power to limit discussion of political issues raised in initiative petitions. Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U. S. 328, distinguished. Pp. 486 U. S. 420-425.(b) The State has failed to sustain its burden of justifying the statutory prohibition. The argument that justification is found in the State's interest in assuring that an initiative has sufficient grass roots support to be placed on the ballot is not persuasive, since that interest is adequately protected by the requirement that the specified number of signatures be obtained. Nor does the State's claimed interest in protecting the integrity of the initiative process justify the prohibition, because the State has failed to demonstrate the necessity of burdening appellees' ability to communicate in order to meet its concerns. It cannot be assumed that a professional circulator -- whose qualifications for similar future assignments may well depend on a reputation for competence and integrity -- is any more likely to accept false signatures than a volunteer motivated entirely by an interest in having the proposition placed on the ballot. Moreover, other statutory provisions dealing expressly with the potential danger of false signatures are adequate to minimize the risk of improper circulation conduct. Pp. 486 U. S. 425-428.828 F.2d 1446, affirmed.STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.In Colorado, the proponents of a new law, or an amendment to the State Constitution, may have their proposal placed on the ballot at a general election if they can obtain enough signatures of qualified voters on an "initiative petition" withinPage 486 U. S. 416a 6-month period. One section of the state law regulating the initiative process makes it a felony to pay petition circulators. [Footnote 1] The question in this case is whether that provision is unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, sitting en banc, held that the statute abridged appellees' right to engage in political speech, and therefore violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal Constitution. We agree.IColorado is one of several States that permits its citizens to place propositions on the ballot through an initiative process. Colo.Const., Art. V, § 1; Colo.Rev.Stat. §§ 1-40-101 to 1-40-119 (1980 and Supp.1987). Under Colorado law, proponents of an initiative measure must submit the measure to the State Legislative Council and the Legislative Drafting Office for review and comment. The draft is then submitted to a three-member title board, which prepares a title, submission clause, and summary. After approval of the title, submission clause, and summary, the proponents of the measure then have six months to obtain the necessary signatures, which must be in an amount equal to at least five percent of the total number of voters who cast votes for all candidates for the Office of Secretary of State at the last preceding general election. If the signature requirements are met, the petitions may be filed with the Secretary of State, and the measure will appear on the ballot at the next general election. Colo.Rev.Stat. §§ 1-40-101 to 1-40-105 (1980 and Supp.1987).Page 486 U. S. 417State law requires that the persons who circulate the approved drafts of the petitions for signature be registered voters. Colo.Const., Art. V, § 1(6). Before the signed petitions are filed with the Secretary of State, the circulators must sign affidavits attesting that each signature is the signature of the person whose name it purports to be and that, to the best of their knowledge and belief, each person signing the petition is a registered voter. Colo.Rev.Stat. § 1-40-109 (Supp.1987). The payment of petition circulators is punished as a felony. Colo.Rev.Stat. § 1-40-110 (1980), n. 1, supra.Appellees are proponents of an amendment to the Colorado Constitution that would remove motor carriers from the jurisdiction of the Colorado Public Utilities Commission. In early 1984, they obtained approval of a title, submission clause, and summary for a measure proposing the amendment, and began the process of obtaining the 46,737 signatures necessary to have the proposal appear on the November, 1984, ballot. Based on their own experience as petition circulators, as well as that of other unpaid circulators, appellees concluded that they would need the assistance of paid personnel to obtain the required number of signatures within the allotted time. They then brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Secretary of State and the Attorney General of Colorado, seeking a declaration that the statutory prohibition against the use of paid circulators violates their rights under the First Amendment. [Footnote 2]Page 486 U. S. 418After a brief trial, the District Judge entered judgment upholding the statute on alternative grounds. First, he concluded that the prohibition against the use of paid circulators did not burden appellees' First Amendment rights because it did not place any restraint on their own expression or measurably impair efforts to place initiatives on the ballot. [Footnote 3] The restriction on their ability to hire paid circulators to speak for them was not significant, because they remained free to use their money to employ other spokesmen who could advertise their cause. Second, even assuming, arguendo, that the statute burdened appellees' right to engage in political speech, the District Judge concluded that the burden was justified by the State's interests in (a) making sure that anPage 486 U. S. 419initiative measure has a sufficiently broad base to warrant its placement on the ballot, and (b) protecting the integrity of the initiative process by eliminating a temptation to pad petitions.A divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed for the reasons stated by the District Court. After granting rehearing en banc, however, the court reversed. The en banc majority concluded that the record demonstrated that petition circulators engage in the communication of ideas while they are obtaining signatures, and that the available pool of circulators is necessarily smaller if only volunteers can be used."Thus, the effect of the statute's absolute ban on compensation of solicitors is clear. It impedes the sponsors' opportunity to disseminate their views to the public. It curtails the discussion of issues that normally accompanies the circulation of initiative petitions. And it shrinks the size of the audience that can be reached. . . . In short, like the campaign expenditure limitations struck down in Buckley, the Colorado statute imposes a direct restriction which 'necessarily reduces the quantity of expression. . . .' Buckley, 424 U.S. at 424 U. S. 19."828 F.2d 1446, 1453-1454 (CA10 1987) (citations omitted).The Court of Appeals then rejected the State's asserted justifications for the ban. It first rejected the suggestion that the ban was necessary either to prevent fraud or to protect the public from circulators that might be too persuasive:"The First Amendment is a value-free provision whose protection is not dependent on 'the truth, popularity, or social utility of the ideas and beliefs which are offered.' NAACP v. Button, [371 U.S. 415, 371 U. S. 445 (1963)].""The very purpose of the First Amendment is to foreclose public authority from assuming a guardianship of the public mind. . . . In this field, every person must be hisPage 486 U. S. 420own watchman for truth, because the forefathers did not trust any government to separate the true from the false for us.""Thomas v. Collins, [323 U.S. 516, 323 U. S. 545 (1945)] (Jackson, J., concurring)."Id. at 1455. The court then rejected the suggestion that the ban was needed to assure that the initiative had a broad base of public support because, in the court's view, that interest was adequately protected by the requirement that the petition be signed by five percent of the State's eligible voters. Finally, the Court of Appeals rejected an argument advanced by a dissenting judge that, since Colorado had no obligation to afford its citizens an initiative procedure, it could impose this condition on its use. Having decided to confer the right, the State was obligated to do so in a manner consistent with the Constitution, because, unlike Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U. S. 328 (1986), which involved only commercial speech, this case involves "core political speech."IIWe fully agree with the Court of Appeals' conclusion that this case involves a limitation on political expression subject to exacting scrutiny. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 424 U. S. 45 (1976). The First Amendment provides that Congress"shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."The Fourteenth Amendment makes that prohibition applicable to the State of Colorado. As we explained in Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 310 U. S. 95 (1940),"[t]he freedom of speech and of the press, which are secured by the First Amendment against abridgment by the United States, are among the fundamental personal rights and liberties which are secured to all persons by the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgment by a State. "Page 486 U. S. 421Unquestionably, whether the trucking industry should be deregulated in Colorado is a matter of societal concern that appellees have a right to discuss publicly without risking criminal sanctions."The freedom of speech and of the press guaranteed by the Constitution embraces at the least the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully all matters of public concern without previous restraint or fear of subsequent punishment."Id. at 310 U. S. 101-102. The First Amendment "was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people." Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476, 354 U. S. 484 (1957). Appellees seek by petition to achieve political change in Colorado; their right freely to engage in discussions concerning the need for that change is guarded by the First Amendment.
The First Amendment protects appellees' right not only to advocate their cause, but also to select what they believe to be the most effective means for so doing.
Here, by contrast, the speech at issue is "at the core of our electoral process and of the First Amendment freedoms," Buckley, [424 U.S. at 424 U. S. 39 (quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S. 23, 393 U. S. 32 (1968))] -- an area of public policy where protection of robust discussion is at its zenith." We agree with the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the statute trenches upon an area in which the importance of First Amendment protections is "at its zenith." For that reason the burden that Colorado must overcome to justify this criminal law is well nigh insurmountable.
6 In ACLU of Nevada v. Heller, 378 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2004), we held
that strict scrutiny applied to statutes that affect the content of election
communications. 378 F.3d at 987. But we have since acknowledged
that intervening Supreme Court decisions clarified that we apply
exacting scrutiny to disclosure and disclaimer requirements. See
Brumsickle, 624 F.3d at 1005 (citing John Doe No. 1, 561 U.S. at 196,
and Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 366–67).
7 Citing Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. B
the State's interest in protecting the integrity of the initiative process does not justify the prohibition because the State has failed to demonstrate that it is necessary to burden appellees' ability to communicate their message in order to meet its concerns.
"[L]egislative restrictions on advocacy of the election or defeat of political candidates are wholly at odds with the guarantees of the First Amendment."
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 424 U. S. 50. That principle applies equally to "the discussion of political policy generally or advocacy of the passage or defeat of legislation." Id. at 424 U. S. 48. The Colorado statute prohibiting the payment of petition circulators imposes a burden on political expression that the State has failed to justify. The Court of Appeals correctly held that the statute violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Its judgment is therefore affirmed.
It is so ordered.
"[L]egislative restrictions on advocacy of the election or defeat of political candidates are wholly at odds with the guarantees of the First Amendment."
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 424 U. S. 50.
footnotes
But the fact that advocacy may persuade the electorate is hardly a reason to suppress it. . . ."
"[T]he concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment. . . ."
"Buckley, 424 U.S. at 424 U. S. 48-49. . . . [T]he people in our democracy are entrusted with the responsibility for judging and evaluating the relative merits of conflicting arguments."
Cf. Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U. S. 45, 456 U. S. 60 (1982) ("The State's fear that voters might make an ill-advised choice does not provide the State with a compelling justification for limiting speech").
I had been thinking this was 8 am Tuesday morning but it was still Monday night.
“This type of scrutiny is necessary even
if any deterrent effect on the exercise of First Amendment
rights arises, not through direct government action, but
indirectly as an unintended but inevitable result of the
government’s conduct in requiring disclosure.” Buckley,
424 U.S. at 65.
note here this is Buckley, talking about disclosure, so it has very little to do with a disclaimer case, which has a whole different set of rules, also called exacting scrutiny.
now watch how the next sentence attempts another bait and switch, by trying to fool the reader into thinking Buckley was a disclaimer case:
“This type of scrutiny is necessary even
if any deterrent effect on the exercise of First Amendment
rights arises, not through direct government action, but
indirectly as an unintended but inevitable result of the
government’s conduct in requiring disclosure.” Buckley,
424 U.S. at 65. wrong cite i'll try again.
Courts have upheld other laws, even where
there was some deterrent effect, because “[d]isclaimer and
disclosure requirements may burden the ability to speak, but
they ‘impose no ceiling on campaign-related activities,’
Buckley, 424 U.S., at 64, and ‘do not prevent anyone from
speaking,’ McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 201 (2003).”
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 366 (citations altered).
Buckley v Valeo, unlike Buckley v ACLF, is not a disclaimer case. mcconnell, like CU, is an express advocacy case, and is not on point here.
whatever effect McConnell had in 2003 has been eroded in a death of 1000 cuts. Bcra has never been found unconstitutional in totality, but it has been sliced and diced by cases such as Cruz, Davis, cu, wrtl I + II.
Its relevance to disclaimer cases has been eroded by newer and controlling free speech cases, including Reed v city of Gilbert (hey look, they have the wrong Reed as well as the wrong Buckley.]
Janus, NIFLA, 303, see also Masterpeice Cake shop, decided on other grounds.
To survive exacting scrutiny, a law must satisfy all three
steps of the inquiry. The threshold question is whether there
is a “substantial relation” between the challenged law and a
“sufficiently important” governmental interest. Citizens
United, 558 U.S. at 366–67 (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted); see Ams. for Prosperity Found., 141 S. Ct.
at 2384 (describing a substantial relation as “necessary but
not sufficient”).
Courts have long recognized the governmental interest
in the disclosure of the sources of campaign funding:
[D]isclosure provides the electorate with
information as to where political campaign
money comes from and how it is spent by
the court errs here. under McIntyre and 303, the states interest must be overriding or compelling, not merely important.
agree:
Next, “[t]o withstand this scrutiny, the
strength of the governmental interest must reflect the
seriousness of the actual burden on First Amendment
rights.”
Courts have long recognized the governmental interest
in the disclosure of the sources of campaign funding:
[D]isclosure provides the electorate with
information as to where political campaign
money comes from and how it is spent by..
hey look! a bait and switch! the court here is talking about disclosures when it should be talking about disclaimers. disclaimers and dyslexia and disclosure are each different things and should not be randomly substituted for each other. they are terms of art. words have meaning and power.
in McIntyre the court rejected an informational interest as satisfying exacting scrutiny. San Francisco cannot refight this battle, unless it chooses to join texas in a succession or nullification controversy.
“[T]he people in our democracy are entrusted with the
responsibility for judging and evaluating the relative merits
of conflicting arguments.” agree. San Francisco cannot substitute its judgements for those of its people. San Francisco cannot dictate the text of political signs, in either sense of the word dictate.
Understanding what entity is funding a
communication allows citizens to make informed choices in
the political marketplace. Alaska Right to Life Comm. v.
Miles, 441 F.3d 773, 793 (9th Cir. 2006)
isn't that just an express advocacy case? I forget its details right now.
10:20 pm Monday night. been at this a while. still raining.
We have “repeatedly recognized an important (and even
compelling) informational interest in requiring ballot
measure committees to disclose information about
contributions.” Family PAC, 685 F.3d at 806. Disclosure
of who is speaking “enables the electorate to make informed
decisions and give proper weight to different speakers and
messages.” Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 371. “
however disclosure and disclaimers are two completely different things. oh look! it's the CU bait and switch again. I wonder, just wonder, if campaign legal center filed any briefs in family pack. off to do a bit of research.
family pack is a wash state bopp case. not a disclaimer case.
William R. Maurer, Seattle, WA; William H. Mellor and Paul M. Sherman, Arlington, VA, for amicus curiae Institute for Justice. so it does not support the court's opinion at all.
---
3 See, e.g., Jenkins v. Waldron, 11 Johns. 114, 191–92 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1814); Rail v. Potts, 27
Tenn. (8 Hum.) 225, 226 (1847); Long v. Long, 10 N.W. 875, 875 (Iowa 1881); Wiley v. Sinkler, 179
U.S. 58, 64 (1900); Wayne v. Venable, 260 F. 64, 66 (8th Cir. 1919); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268,
269 (1939).
these are cases Hasen found in a Harvard student note. they are old cases in which people got (or tried to get) damages for voting wrongs.