Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)

 2. [Natural Rights.] All men have certain natural, essential, and inherent rights among which are, the enjoying and defending life and liberty; acquiring, possessing, and protecting, property; and, in a word, of seeking and obtaining happiness.

[Art.] 2-b. [Right of Privacy.] An individual's right to live free from governmental intrusion in private or personal information is natural, essential, and inherent.

[Art.] 10. [Right of Revolution.] Government being instituted for the common benefit, protection, and security, of the whole community, and not for the private interest or emolument of any one man, family, or class of men; therefore, whenever the ends of government are perverted, and public liberty manifestly endangered, and all other means of redress are ineffectual, the people may, and of right ought to reform the old, or establish a new government. The doctrine of nonresistance against arbitrary power, and oppression, is absurd, slavish, and destructive of the good and happiness of mankind.
June 2, 1784

[Art.] 11. [Elections and Elective Franchises.] All elections are to be free

[Art.] 14. [Legal Remedies to be Free, Complete, and Prompt.] Every subject of this State is entitled to a certain remedy, by having recourse to the laws, for all injuries he may receive in his person, property, or character; to obtain right and justice freely, without being obliged to purchase it; completely, and without any denial; promptly, and without delay; conformably to the laws.
June 2, 1784

[Art.] 22. [Free Speech; Liberty of the Press.] Free speech and Liberty of the press are essential to the security of Freedom in a State: They ought, therefore, to be inviolably preserved.

[Art.] 32. [Rights of Assembly, Instruction, and Petition.] The People have a right, in an orderly and peaceable manner, to assemble and consult upon the common good, give instructions to their Representatives, and to request of the legislative body, by way of petition or remonstrance, redress of the wrongs done them, and of the grievances they suffer.

 New text may 25th.

43. In re Ind. Newspapers, Inc., No. 49A02-1103-PL-23, ___ N.E.2d ___ (Ind. Ct. App., Feb. 21, 2012).(Indiana constitution and First Amendment.) 44. Dendrite 45. Doe v Cahill (Del.) 46. Digital Music News LLC v. Superior Court (Cal. Ct. App. May 14, 2014) (California constitutional right to privacy). 47. It is well-settled that “an author's decision to remain anonymous, like other decisions concerning omissions or additions to the content of a publication, is an aspect of the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment.” In re Anonymous Online Speakers, 661 F.3d 1168, 1173 (9th Cir. 2011) 48. Hartman v O'Connor 1:20cv163 (S.D. Ohio Sep. 29, 2021)(judicial speech withstood strict scrutiny) 49. Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. v. Kelley, 291 F.Supp.2d 1052, 1069 (D.Minn. 2003), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 427 F.3d 1106 (8th Cir. 2005). 50. Riley v. Jankowski, 713 N.W.2d 379 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006)

=

 To do list

Stewart & associates. 

1. H n h/ gupta.

2. San francisco

3. Starke

4. Carroll

5. Hendrix

Stewart & associates. 

6. H n h/ gupta.

7. San francisco

The current status of this case is that we are waiting on the supreme court to rule or not on an interlocutory appeal. 

Perhaps for long term strategic reasons, plaintiff focuses almost entirely on Bonta. And the defense focuses mostly on an imaginary version of citizens united that never existed, but certainly no longer does in light of subsequent cases such as reed v town, nifla, masterpiece, Cruz, 303, and so forth. 

Meanwhile, I am submitting this amicus brief to discuss first San Francisco law, then California law, then US law. 

San Francisco’s best known case might be Yick Wo v. Hopkins. In that case, an overtly neutral regulation of wooden laundries was found to actually be racist and to offend due process. [need that line about preserve other rights.]

Here, times have changed, a little. San Francisco’s void disclaimer rules are racist and sexist. Doxxing is one of the worst sins of the new online era. 

Talley v California, 1960, did not involve San Francisco, but another municipality. The holding of Talley was that local governments in California cannot require disclaimers on political speech. This specific holding, never overruled, governs this case. All that discussion of tiers of scrutiny under bonta and citizens is misplaced, when this case has already decided the specific question of law before us - can a california municipality impose a disclaimer rule?

While Talley governs this case, it is helpful to know that McIntyre (1995) clarified that there is no “elections exception” to Talley. McIntyre and Talley remain good law today.

In Talley, Manuel Talley was a black man married to a white woman in 1960, years before Loving. If he had been doxxed at his home address, this would have endangered his children. The Supreme Court reversed his ten dollar fine. Talley, NAACP v Alabama, and Bates v Little Rock are a trio of civil rights cases that establish the modern right to privacy and political association. The position San Francisco takes here is that of Jim Crow. 

I am not suggesting that any of the defendants here hold individially racist views; rather they are supporting institutional racism in a way neither constitution allows.  

The Talley case is the landmark in this area of law. Any court case about disclaimers that fails to mention Talley is suspect. Talley informed the next San Francisco case, Farzad Ghafari v People, 1978:

The rights of freedom of speech, peaceful assembly and free association fn. 2 are unquestionably protected activities which "lie at the foundation of a government based upon the consent of an informed citizenry ..." (Bates v. Little Rock (1960) Britt v. Superior Court (1978) [1] Appellants contend that the statute is overbroad on its face because it flatly prohibits anonymity under circumstances where these protected activities may be involved and because the restriction is not required by a compelling state interest nor is it implemented in the least restrictive manner possible. We agree.

The proposition that, under certain circumstances, anonymity is essential to the exercise of constitutional rights is not a novel one. "Inviolability of privacy in group association may in many circumstances be indispensable to preservation of freedom of association, particularly where a group espouses dissident beliefs." (N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama (1958) Britt v. Superior Court) "Persecuted groups and sects from time to time throughout history have been able to criticize oppressive practices and laws either anonymously or not at all." (Talley v. California (1960) [87 Cal. App. 3d 261].

The People argue that section 650a in no way restricts the legitimate exercise of First Amendment freedoms. The assertion is patently in error. The fact that the state, through this statute, takes no direct action to restrict the exercise of constitutional rights is not dispositive, for in the area of First Amendment liberties, "abridgement of such rights, even though unintended, may inevitably follow from varied forms of governmental action." (N.A.A.P. v. Alabama, supra,

Second, if arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply them ... 

Section 650a denies equal protection of the laws.

[5] Appellants claim that the distinction in section 650a between anonymous entertainment or amusement and anonymous public issue communication is a violation of the equal protection clause. (U.S. Const., 14th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 7.) Because section 650a affects fundamental First Amendment rights, it is not clothed with the usual presumption of constitutionality which most legislation enjoys in the face of an equal protection argument. Rather, "the state must first establish that it has a compelling interest which justifies the law and then demonstrate that the distinctions drawn by the law are necessary to further that purpose." (People v. Olivas (1976) 17 Cal. 3d 236, 251 [131 Cal. Rptr. 55, 551 P.2d 375].) The state has not met this burden. As discussed above, the state cannot show that section 650a is necessary to a compelling state interest--

Content control is the essence of forbidden censorship under the equal protection clauses. 

Speech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government.

FN 5. In light of our holding, it is unnecessary for us to reach the other issues raised by petitioners, namely, that section 650a violates the right of privacy (Cal. Const., art. I, § 1; see White v. Davis (1975) 13 Cal. 3d 757 [120 Cal. Rptr. 94, 533 P.2d 222]),

FN 6. The ironies of history. The state vigorously defends a statute which, if 205 years ago the Royal Colony of Massachusetts had had an analogue thereof, Samuel Adams and Paul Revere, with their band of colonials disguised as Indians, might never have reached Boston Harbor, the greatest Tea Party in our history would never have occurred, and there, unlike here, there was an intent to do a wrongful act.

Next I will look at California law.

Following Talley, most of the case law is based on the First Amendment, until Schuster.

Canon v. Justice Court (1964) 61 Cal. 2d 446 [39 Cal. Rptr. 228, 393 P.2d 428],  liked the general idea of a disclaimer statute, but found that this particular one was defective. Bongiorni struck down another California statute based on Talley. People v. Bongiorni, 205 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 856 (Sup. Ct. 1962.) Drake, 1979. The mere unsigned reference to an election of a candidate or a measure on a ballot can, without more, be a crime under the terms of this [97 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 36] statute. We see no compelling state interest that would justify criminalizing innocent activities along with injurious activities. https://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/3d/97/supp32.html.

Schuster ruled that disclaimer statutes violate both constitutions. Schuster v. Imperial County Mun. Ct., 167 Cal. Rptr. 447 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1042. That holding remains binding today. San Francisco’s disclaimer rules, under Schuster, violate the state constitution. Therefore they are not “legitimate” state interests under the Bonta test, and are not overiding state interests under the McIntyre test. Plaintiffs have not made claims under the state constitution, but the two are interconnected in  this way.

Marcia Bedrock – Republican Chair President
Jeff Houston – Democrat Chair

Bernadette Manuel – County Clerk/Election Board Secretary 

Doe v Bedrock.

write a sample complaint.

to county attorney

Justin Schramm

Schramm Law Group

Monticello St.

Winamac Indiana

Thank you for speaking with me briefly after the recent election board hearing.

Nice business card.

When we met, I was in zealous advocacy mode.

Today I have been thinking that perhaps I should try a more problem-solving approach instead first.

Let me review the basics.

No indiana county election board has the power to decide the text of a candidate's speech or press.

This point is clearly established by my prior case on the same point, under the previous statute. Stewart v Taylor, 953 F.Supp.1047 (S.D.Ind.1997)

The United State Supreme Court agrees in cases as early as 1960 and as recently as 2023. 

The election board is obligated, legally, ethically and morally, to obey its oath to uphold the state constitution. There would be consequences for failure to do so.

In 1997 I naively agreed to settle my case for $7,000. The Mulholland case later settled for $70,000.

I do not know what the award or settlement in the Ogden v Marendt case was. 

It would be reasonable these days for a county intent on litigating this point to budget about $700,000 until this matter is resolved.  

Knox is a nice town. Starke County may have a large budget for pointless lawsuits; I don't know. 

Several times I have brought lawsuits trying to get a judicial determination about disclaimer rules under the state constitution. These typically get resolved on federal grounds instead.  So I would welcome one more. 

I would rather work this out with  a few relatively polite letters quickly, rather than litigate for 3 to 10 years, at my standard rates of $235/hr. I have a plaintiff, John Doe for now, teed up and ready for me to file, if we are unable to resolve things.  

Please read at least one of the controlling cases - Talley, McIntyre, ACLF, NIFLA, Janus, or 303 LLC.

Maybe the first most important lesson in dealing with this line of cases about disclaimers is don't confuse them with cases about disclosure, which get far more permissive review. 

I would like to think that at the hearing, at which no one brought up any free speech rights under either constitution, the board simply did not know the law, rather than openly defying  the law. It is your obligation to inform and educate them. 

The board acted wisely in deciding not to fine the candidate. However, its threat to do so was sufficient to confer standing, either on the candidate, or anyone else whose speech was chilled.

The county may be liable under Monell. The board, or their staff, may have individual liability, enough to defeat any attempted defense of QI. The 4 citizens who filed the complaints have no qualified immunity.

Will the county offer to defend them if they are sued?

What I need the board to do, after you have read enough of the cases to be competent to advise them, is to write  the candidate a letter of apology and retract its finding that she violated the rules. There are no such rules. The statute was void ab initio. 

   If we cannot reach an agreement, my client intends to intervene in this matter, requesting a copy of the flyer in dispute, making  101 copies, and making them available for distribution in Starke county as well as online. In fact i'll go ahead and request the flier now: as a public records request, and pre-suit inquiry, please send me a copy of the item which was discussed at the hearing. Email is best but USPS is fine too:

Robbin Stewart. P O Box 29164 Cumberland IN 46229. I agree to pay the customary postage or copying  fees. 

It will not be an accident, or blameable on the printer. We will not apologize or grovel.  We have the right to say, for example, vote for smith, or, robbin stewart for township board vote tuesday.

The meeting began with a recitation of the pledge of alegience.

I was wondering whether saying the pledge is mandatory at these meetings.

When I did not stand for the pledge, no disrespect was intended. I had managed to misplace my cane.

Second, I was wondering whether the board would be willing to adopt the pledge as a statement of policy.

The candidate, I did not catch her name, was not afforded "liberty" or "justice for all."

Are you and the board familiar with Barnette, and Gobitis? 

I think it's great that the meetings begin with the pledge, as long as no one is made to feel compelled to participate. Some clear statement to the effect that the pledge is optional would be appropriate. 

In reference to your meeting, I drove 4 hours, spent 2 hours in Knox, and spent 100 hours preparing.

That's roughly equivalent to 104 hours, which if a judge finds reasonable, at my customary rates of $235/hr, = (23500 + 940 = 24460), would be around $25,000, just to open the file and begin billing for the case.

Here is a table of cases. 

1 ACLU v Heller, 378 F3d 979 (9th Cir. 2004), 

2 American Civil Liberties Union of Ga. v. Miller, 977 F.Supp. 1228 (N.D. Ga. 1997), 

3 Anonymous v. Delaware, 2000 Del. Ch. Lexis 84 (2000), 

4 Broward Coalition v Browning, 2008 WL 4791004 (N.D. Fl 2008),, [Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S 182, 200, 119 S.Ct 636, 142 L.Ed.2d 599 (1999),] 

5 City of Bogalusa v. May, 212 So.2d 408 (La. 1968), 

6 Commonwealth v Dennis, 368 Mass. 92, 329 N.E.2d 706 (1974), 

7 Cyberspace v Engler, (E.D.MI 2001) 

8 Doe v 2theMart, 140 F.Supp.2d 1088, 29 Media L. Rep. 1970 (2001), 

9 Doe v. Mortham, 708 So.2d 929 (Fla.1998) 

10 Ex Parte Harrison, 110 S.W. 709 (Mo 1908), 

11 Griset v. Fair Political Practices Commission, 69 Cal. App. 4th 818, 82 Cal. Rptr.2d 25 (1999), reversed on other grounds, 14 [Hansen v. Westerville City Sch. Dist., Nos. 93-3231, 93-3303, 1994 WL 622153 (6th Cir. Nov. 7, 1994), unpublished opinion, cert. denied 115 S. Ct. 2611 (1995). http://bulk.resource.org/courts.gov/c/F3/43/43.F3d.1472.93-3303.93-3231.html, ]

 12 Idaho v. Barney, 448 P.2d 195 (1968), 14, 23 

13 Illinois v White, 506 NE2d 1284 (Ill. 1987), 

14 In re Opinion of the Justices, 324 A.2d 211 (Del. 1974), 

15 Louisiana. v. Moses, 655 So. 2d 779 (La. Ct. App. 1995), 

16 Louisiana v. Fulton, 337 So.2d 866 (La. 1976), [McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 357, 115 S.Ct. 1511, 131 L.Ed.2d 426 ](1995), 6, 8, 10, 11, 12, 17, 18, 21, 23 

[Miami Herald v Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974)] 

17 Michael James Berger, aka Magic Mike v. City of Seattle, (9th Cir. 6/24/2009) , 

18 Mulholland v. Marion County Election Bd. (S.D. Ind __) [NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 463, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 1172, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488 (1958)] 

19 New York v. Duryea, 351 NYS2d 978 (1974), 

20 Ogden v. Marendt, 264 F.Supp. 2d 785 (S.D. Ind. 2003) (S.D. Ind 2004), 

21 Opinion of the Justices, 306 A.2d 18 (Maine 1973), 

22 People v Drake, (Cal.), 

23 People v. Bongiorni, 205 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 856 (Sup. Ct. 1962), 13 

24 Printing Industries of the Gulf Coast v. Hill, 382 F.Supp. 8011 (S.D.Tx 1974), 42 L.Ed.26 33 dismissed as moot, [Riley v. Federation of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781 (1998)] 

25 Rosen v. Port of Portland, 641 F.2d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir.1981), 

26 Schuster v. Imperial County Mun. Ct., 167 Cal. Rptr. 447 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1042, 14, 23 

27 ShrinkMO v. Maupin, 892 F. Supp. 1246 (E.D. Mo. 1995), aff'd, 71 F.3d 1422, 

28 Smithers v Fla. Elections, http://www.fec.state.fl.us/decisions/Smithers96-85.PDF, 

29 State of Louisiana v. Burgess, 543 So.2d 1332 (1989), 

30 State v. N. Dakota Ed. Assoc., 262 N.W.2d 731 (N.D. 1978), 

31 Stewart v Taylor, 953 F.Supp.1047 (S.D.Ind.1997), 

32 Tattered Cover (CO), [Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 65, 80 S.Ct. 536, 4 L.Ed.2d 559 (1960)] 

33 Texas v. John Doe, 61 S.W.3d 99, (Tx.App. 2001) 

34 Town of Lantana v Pelczynski, 290 So. 2d 566 (Fla. App. 1974), 

35 Vermont Right to Life v. Sorrell, 221 F.3d 376, 392 (2d Cir. 2000), 

36 Virginia Society for Human Life Inc. v. Caldwell, 152 F3d 268 (4th Cir. 1998), 

37 Washington ex rel. Public Disclosure v. 119 Vote No!, 957 P.2d 691 1998), [Watchtower v Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002)] 

38 West Virginians for Life v Smith, 919 F. Supp 954 (S.D.W.Va. 1996), 960 F Supp 1036 (1996), 

39 Wilson v Stocker, 819 F.2d 943, (10th Cir. 1999), [Wooley v Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977)], 

40 Yes to Life PAC v. Webster, http://www.med.uscourts.gov/opinions/Hornby/2000/DBH_02072000_2-99cv318_YES_PAC_V_WEBSTER.pdf , 

41 Peter Zenger’s case, http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/Ftrials/zenger/zenger.html 

42 Zwickler v. Koota, 290 F. Supp. 244 (E. D. N. Y. 1968), vacated on mootness grounds sub nom. Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103 (1969), 

Oregon Attorney General Opinion 8266. 

Citizens for Responsible Gov't State PAC v. Davidson, 236 F.3d 1174, (10th Cir. 2000)

==

cross claims and counterclaims.

action in replevin re the ovens.

trespassing claim, Washington and Gupta. 

taking claim state con

taking claim 5th a

timbs claim - state

timbs claim - federal

1983 claim federal

contrary to public policy

rlupia

section 3. 

section 11, 4th a.

unclean hands

clear and convincing evidence standard not applied. so lien is invalid. 

cross claims and counterclaims.

action in replevin re the ovens.

trespassing claim, Washington and Gupta. 

I had sent Gupta written notice to have her staff stop trespassing. That document is in the case file. At some later point, a man entered my property and interrogated me about the case. He introduced himself as being from H + H. He gave me a card. His name might have been Washington. I gave the card to my then-attorney, who has as of yet not returned the case file. He had recently been hospitalized, and might not be returning to the practice of law. 

Washington's entry, without a warrant, was trespassing under Indiana law under which damages are presumed. It is more difficult to categorize Gupta's role. Was she an accomplice? Does she share joint liability? 

He made no attempt to enter the home or the vehicles. Our conversation took place on the driveway, within the curtilage of the home. 

Normally with a minor technical infraction of this sort, I would brush it off and let it go. But here, I am listing counterclaims and crossclaims as part of my defense to the home invasion.

In addition to being trespass, it was a civil rights violation under 42 usc 1983 etc seq. 

Washington's trespass is attributed to his employer, H + H, via respondiat superior. Not so with the 1983 claim, which requires personal involvement. Gupta's personal involvement was that she received the letter, and had a duty to inform Washington, or whatever our John Doe's name is.

taking claim state con

taking claim 5th a

timbs claim - state

the taking was an excessive fine under the 8th a, timbs v Indiana, and the state constitution, article 1, especially section (16?)+

6+

1983 claim federal

due course of law claim section 12

due process of law claim 14th

= protection claim 14th.