plaintiff-appellants complain that as to the disclaimer provisions, the opinion below is unsupported by law and is at odds with, for example, nifla v becerra. they are correct as a matter of law, so it would take a ruling by this court to affirm the policy choices of the court below. Shortly after Talley v California, there has been a deep split in authority, with most cases following Talley, but a significant minority allowing compelled disclaimers of campaign speech due to state's strong preferences for the public's "right to know" the sources of campaign speech, perhaps out of a concern that speech by the rich would distort the political process. In Citizens United, Part IV, the court embraced these concerns, praising disclaimer rules 8-1. This has confused lower courts, widening the split in authority, since Citizens on this point directly contradicts cases such as Buckley ACLF. This case presents a good vehicle to resolve the confusion, and make a choice whether to follow the Citizens United dicta, or the line of compelled speech cases beginning at Barnett through Talley McIntyre ACLF (illinois union case) NIFLA. In Bonta, the court announced a new standard of review, toughening the permissive Buckley v Valeo test for disclosures. The court below applied the Bonta standard to disclaimers as well. This is a point worth reviewing. In Bonta, the court heightened scrutiny of political speech funded by the Koch machine. In the instant case, the Bonta standard could be used to relax scrutiny, as an alternative to what Justice Scalia dissenting in McIntyre called a kiss-of-death standard. This issue is not rare or obscure. Many of the states listed in Scalia's footnote 2 in McIntyre continue to have disclaimer statutes. The FEC requires a disclaimer for signs and literature in federal races. Congress is considering legislation to extend these disclaimers to internet ads. After its CEO was hauled before congress, Facebook began requiring disclaimers, without a direct state action link. The vast majority of campaign signs in state and local elections contain disclaimers, under an impression that they are required by law. Rhode island would go further, requiring a disclaimer of the top 5 donors. Citizens United, Part IV, was dicta, was limited to corporations, was a less restricitive means than a complete ban, so it does not cover Rhode Island's statute. If the court continues to support the policy choices it praised in Citizens United, this case is a good vehicle to do so in a holding, perhaps under the new Bonta standard. At least since FEC v McConnell, this area of law has been one of indeterminacy, where states and courts are not sure what the law is. This should be resolved one way or the other. Therefore, certiorari should be granted. The district court, the Amicus Campaign Legal Center, and the circuit court each praised the legislature's policy choices, in choosing to uphold the statute, although in doing so they ignored or mistated controlling cases such as Talley, McIntyre, Wooley v Maynard, ACLF, Town of Gilbert, Janus, and NIFLA. Only this court has the power and authority to change the law to adopt these policy choices. For every Williams v Rhodes, there is a Jenness v Fortson. The court has never held that the First Amendment is absolute. In cases like Burdick v Takushi, Clingman v Beaver, Twin Cities Area New Party, and Crawford v Marion County Election Board, the court has allowed states some breathing room in which to regulate elections, even if this imposed some burdens on First Amendment rights. Rhode Island asks for similar breathing room. There are important constitutional values on both sides of the dispute. The court takes about 80 cases out of about 8,000 petitions for cert. This case should be one of those 80. To resolve a long standing split, to inform the FEC and congress, to explore the new Bonta standard, and to protect the integrity of the election process, at a time when elections are seen as under attack. The danger the state sees is dark money distorting elections. The danger plaintiffs see is chilling of core political speech. The dispute is worthy of the court's limited time. (ending here for now 2:30 friday 2/25/22) the courts below upheld disclosure and disclaimer regulation. the disclosure case is relatively uncontroversial, but the disclaimer issue is a close question. this court's prior precedents do not support the conclusions, and further action by this court would be needed. This case presents the important question of whether to relax the standard of review in disclaimer cases, and allow rhode island to impose criminal sanctions for resisting compelled speech. a recent texas case about on-premise billboards called into question town of gilbert v reed's holding that sign cases always get strict scrutiny when, as here, they are content based. the first question is whether the first circuit correctly used the new bonta standard rather than traditional strict scrutiny. the second question is whether the result of its bonta analysis was correct. if yes, this case represents a bookend, with bonta on one end and this case on the other. discussion of amicus brief by campaign legal center discussion of lower court ruling discussion of first circuit decision discussion of citizens united. discussion of scalia dissent in mcintyre. lower court ruling: Gaspee Project v. Mederos, 482 F. Supp. 3d 11, 13 (D.R.I. 2020) (“The avowed governmental purpose for these requirements is for an electorate that is informed and aware of who or what is spending money in its elections. It is for the Court to determine whether this state interest is sufficiently important to impose the Act's burdens on political speech and whether those burdens are substantially related to achieving that end.”) The avowed governmental purpose for these requirements is for an electorate that is informed and aware of who or what is spending money in its elections. It is for the Court to determine whether this state interest is sufficiently important to impose the Act's burdens on political speech and whether those burdens are substantially related to achieving that end Gaspee Project v. Mederos, 482 F. Supp. 3d 11, 13 (D.R.I. 2020) This includes a message stating "I am ___(name of entity's chief executive officer or equivalent), and ___ (title) of ____ (entity), and I approved its content." https://casetext.com/case/gaspee-project-v-mederos must include on the communication a list of their top five donors during the one-year period prior to the date of the communication. But while "[d]isclaimer and disclosure requirements may burden the ability to speak, ... they ‘impose no ceiling on campaign-related activities ... and ‘do not prevent anyone from speaking.’ " Citizens United , 558 U.S. at 366, 130 S.Ct. 876 (quoting Buckley , 424 U.S. at 64, 96 S.Ct. 612 ; McConnell v. Federal Election Com'n , 540 U.S. 93, 201, 124 S.Ct. 619, 157 L.Ed.2d 491 (2003) ). Gaspee Project v. Mederos, 482 F. Supp. 3d 11, 16 (D.R.I. 2020) “Because disclosure and disclaimer laws are a "less restrictive alternative to more comprehensive regulations of speech," they are subject to "exacting scrutiny," a test that requires the Court to consider whether the law bears a "substantial relation" to a "sufficiently important" governmental interest. ” Gaspee Project v. Mederos, 482 F. Supp. 3d 11, 16 (D.R.I. 2020) The Board argues that the governmental interest at issue, an informed electorate, is achieved by the disclosure of who is financing political speech. This is an interest the Supreme Court has determined is sufficiently important with respect to disclosure and disclaimer laws. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 371, 130 S.Ct. 876 (holding that "disclosure permits citizens to react to the speech of corporate entities in a proper way ... [and] to make informed decisions and give proper weight to different speakers and messages"); Here the court relied on daluz and delaware strong, which were disclosure cases, not disclaimer cases. the court erroneously stated that citizens united had so held, but cu's discussion of disclaimers was dicta and not holding. it will take a further decision by this court to so hold. Indeed, "[i]n a republic where the people are sovereign, the ability of the citizenry to make informed choices among candidates for office is essential." NOM , 649 F.3d at 57 (quoting Buckley , 424 U.S. at 14-15, 96 S.Ct. 612 ). This informational interest, however, "is not limited to informing the choice between candidates for political office." Id. "As Citizens United recognized, there is an equally compelling interest in identifying the speakers behind politically oriented messages." Id. Gaspee Project v. Mederos, 482 F. Supp. 3d 11, 17 (D.R.I. 2020) "In an age characterized by the rapid multiplication of media outlets and the rise of internet reporting, the ‘marketplace of ideas’ has become flooded with a profusion of information and political messages. Citizens rely ever more on a message's source as a proxy for reliability and a barometer of political spin. Disclosing the identity and constituency of a speaker engaged in political speech thus ‘enables the electorate to make informed decisions and give proper weight to different speakers and messages.’ " Gaspee Project v. Mederos, 482 F. Supp. 3d 11, 17 (D.R.I. 2020) The Act also furthers the state's "equally compelling interest in identifying the speakers behind politically oriented messages" by requiring those who spend more than $1,000 during that window to disclose [sic] their sponsorship on all electioneering communications, including—for 501(c)(3) and exempt nonprofits only—their top five donors. here the court confused disclosure and disclaimers, which historically have involved different levels of scrutiny. - notes saturday night: one of the major themes of the later 20th century is that the first amendment protects a right of privacy against state action. the cases include naacp v alabama, talley v california, bates v little rock, griswold v connecticut, roe v wade, doe v bolton. rhode island and the first circuit reject this view. texas and others are calling for the court to overturn roe. this case presents an opportunity for the court to discuss the first amendment right of privacy versus possibly compelling state interests in a context removed from the politics of the abortion issue. this is not a case that fits easily into a "liberal" or "conservative" characterization. the faction of the court most eager to undermine roe has tended to oppose censorship of political speech in cases like bonta, janus, becerra, town of gilbert, while roe's supporters often dissented in those cases. == work on the summary of argument part. 1. there is a deep split. this is a good vehicle. 2. citizens united created confusion which has left this area of law in state of indeterminacy, which the court should try to resolve one way or the other. 3. the first circuit was wrong on the law, but makes important policy arguments this court might choose to adopt. 4. a. is bonta the correct standard of review? b. did the court below correctly apply bonta? 5. rhode island seeks, indirectly, maybe inadvertantly, to overturn roe v wade, finding state interests to override any right to privacy. some on the court may welcome this prospect. 6. the statute is more narrowly tailored than those of california in talley and ohio in mcintyre. however it is more burdensome in some respects. if the court upholds the statute, it will send a signal to the states that they have wiggle room as laboratories of democracy to promote the public's "right to know" by criminalizing certain core political speech. there are important values on both sides of the controversy, which the first circuit did not adequately address. jenness v fortson, twin cities area new party, clingman v beaver, burdick v takushi, gobitis, chaplinski, crawford v. marion county election board, buckley v valeo. if the statute is to be upheld, it needs a better reasoned opinion, by the only court with the power to distinguish cases such as nifla and talley.

monday: to do x 0. plasma $100

x 1. finish taxes.

3. print off health records for woodstock club 2 copies.

x 2. bmv memo

x 4. what else? walmart for shoes? buy a clipboard.

5. x make better list. make a comic.

6. headlight. clean car. tie rods.

7. read brief. post to /r/law school about editing.

x 1/2 8. bank, get sample check.

9. parexel laptop.

10. https://freespeechlaw.scholasticahq.com/ redraft brief as law review article. x 11. post about spaulding trial. 12. delaware ago letter. 13. went to advance to check on core charge for battery, guy was not there. get wipers. 14. pnc logon can't, past due $27. 2 bmv memo. To: BMV hearing examiner CC: bmv counsel From: Robbin Stewart Re: Rescheduling hearing. matter # _. I request that the previous telephone hearing be rescheduled. I did not attend, but it was due to excusable neglect. What had happened was that I was in baltimore doing a medical study, but was unexpectedly discharged at the start of the second month. While checking out, I inadvertantly left my laptop behind. So far the site is refusing to return my laptop. I bought another one, this one, but for about a week I was not able to sign into the new device, so I could not access my email, calendar, etc., and did not have the phone code to dial into the hearing. Time is not of the essence. Respectfully submitted, Robbin Stewart.

Code Defect Description Severity Comments 138 Hair restraints Food employees not wearing proper hair restraint. Non-Critical Observed some employees work with food with no hair restraint. Provide and use an approved hair restraint. 171 (c) Minimize contact (Non-Critical) Bare hand contact not minimized with non ready to eat food(s). Non-Critical Ramekin noted inside the bulk containers of flour, starch and sugar in the dry storage area. Replace them with scoop with handles to reduce bare hand contact with food. 177 (a) 5 Uncovered foods (Critical) Foods are uncovered Non-Critical Observed open boxes of starch and flour in the dry storage area. Provide cover to prevent the contamination. 187 (a) (2) Cold holding Potentially hazardous cold foods not held at proper temperatures. Critical Lamb meat measured at 47 degrees F inside the cold top located in the ccook line. Employee stated that they brought it to the cold top from the WIC less than 1 hour ago. Transfer the meat to another cooler. All potentially hazardous cold holding foods should be maintained 41 degrees F at all times. 192 (a) Discarding datemarking Unmarked or expired food(s) not discarded. Critical Container of chicken salad dated on 10/3/2019 noted inside the reach in cooler located in the salad station. Discard the food 227 (a) Fixed equipment spacing/sealing Improper installation of fixed equipment and sealing. Non-Critical There is a gap between the hand sink and the wall in the kitchen prep area. Seal the hand sink to the wall. 295 (a) (b) Food contact surface(s) soiled Food contact surface(s) soiled. Critical Deli slicer located on the prep table in the kitchen is soiled. Cleana and sanitize after each use or every 4 hours. 417 (b) Storage of Personal Items Improper storage of personal item(s) with food or food contact item(s). Non-Critical Employee cell phone was stored on the prep table by the hand sink. Store personal items in designated areas. 431 (a) Walls, floors, etc/soiled Physical structure, walls, floors, and/or ceilings soiled. Non-Critical 1- Floor under the cooking equipment and hot boxes are soiled. Clean2- Celing above the hand sink in the prep area and dish machine room are heavily soiled. Clean 438 Toxic labeling Working container(s) of toxic materials not labeled with common name of contents. Critical No label provided on 3 spray bottle of chemicals with unknown blue and white liquids located under 3 bay sink and under hand sink located in the kitchen. Provide date mark with the name of content. Code Defect Description Severity Comments 438 Toxic labeling Working container(s) of toxic materials not labeled with common name of contents. Critical No label provided on 3 spray bottle of chemicals with unknown blue and white liquids located under 3 bay sink and under hand sink located in the kitchen. Provide date mark with the name of content. 439 Toxic material(s) separation Toxic material(s) improperly stored. Critical 1- Hand sanitizer was stored on the clean dish shelf. Store it away from food and food contact surfaces. Code Defect Description Severity Comments 138 Hair restraints Food employees not wearing proper hair restraint. Non-Critical Seared salmon stored below raw seafood in the low boy coolers on the cookline, store pre-cooked foods above raw proteins 171 (b) Bare hand contact (critical) Bare hand contact with ready to eat food. Critical Observed waitstaff handle crackers with their fingers to put in bread baskets, discontinue. Sous Chef addressed with server.First observation of bare hand contact, warning issued. 173 Cross-contamination Raw animal foods stored incorrectly over ready to eat foods and/or other raw foods. Critical Seared salmon stored below raw seafood in the low boy coolers on the cookline, store pre-cooked foods above raw proteins 196 Consumer advisory Establishment serving undercooked and/or raw animal product with no consumer advisory. Critical Menu with lamb, salmon, steaks, and other menu items that are cooked to order need a consumer advisory statement and a symbol to indicate which menu items are undercooked or raw----------------01/18/19 Recheck: Lamb chops are cooked to order and was not included with the consumer advisory reminder (asterisks) 199 Thawing Potentially hazardous food(s) thawing improperly. Non-Critical Frozen ROP mahi mahi filets thawing on a sheet tray on a speed rack. When thawing a vacuumed sealed fish product, must poke a hole or open the package for thawing, either under running water or under refrigeration 218 Equipment repair Equipment in need of repair. Non-Critical Dessert 2-door reach in cooler handle is broken and no longer smooth or cleanable, will need to replace handle. 234 In use utensil storage In use utensil(s) stored improperly. Non-Critical Knives and spatulas stored in sanitizer. Appropiate storage options include: in water at least 135 F, dry on a clean surface, or in the food with the handle up 334 Air gap-water supply Insufficient air gap between water inlet and flood level rim. Critical Dishmachine sprayer arms x 2 need to be elevated above the sink rim, currently hanging below the sink rim 345 (b) Hand sink improper usage Hand washing facility used for purposes other than hand washing. Critical Colander used in the bar hand sink, discontinue Code Defect Description Severity Comments 115 HACCP for reduced oxygen packaging No HACCP plan for reduced oxygen packaging. Non-Critical Establishment is ROPing various food items such as fish and cheese without a HACCP plan in place. Establishment shall cease all ROP operations. Proivde a HACCP plan to start ROPing again or do not ROP at all. 177 (a) 5 Uncovered foods (Critical) Foods are uncovered Non-Critical 1. Uncovered food items in the walk in freezer.2. Uncovered food items in both walk in coolers.3. Open bag of flour in dry storage area. Bag was closed during inspection.Cover all foods in containers or wrappings to prevent contamination.*This is a repeat violation. 177 (a) 5 Uncovered foods (Critical) Foods are uncovered Non-Critical 1. Uncovered food items in the walk in freezer.2. Uncovered food items in both walk in coolers.3. Open bag of flour in dry storage area. Bag was closed during inspection.Cover all foods in containers or wrappings to prevent contamination.*This is a repeat violation. 177 (a) 5 Uncovered foods (Critical) Foods are uncovered Non-Critical 1. Uncovered food items in the walk in freezer.2. Uncovered food items in both walk in coolers.3. Open bag of flour in dry storage area. Bag was closed during inspection.Cover all foods in containers or wrappings to prevent contamination.*This is a repeat violation. 187 (a) (2) Cold holding Potentially hazardous cold foods not held at proper temperatures. Critical Tuna salad ( 50.2*F) and herb butter (59.5*F) were not being held at proper cold holding temperatures of 41*F or below. Food items were moved into the walk in cooler. 191 Date marking Potentially hazardous ready-to-eat food not properly date marked. Critical 1. Foods not date marked in both the walk in coolers.2. Foods not date marked in both reach in cooler drawers on the cook line.Date mark all PHF ready to eat food products being held more then 24hrs.*This is a repeat violation. 234 In use utensil storage In use utensil(s) stored improperly. Non-Critical Plastic container being used as a scoop without handle was being stored inside the flour bag. Do not store in use utensils where they can contaminate food product. 239 (b) Improper storage of clean equipment Clean equipment and/or utensils stored incorrectly. Non-Critical Clean plastic containers were being stored on the floor in the dish machine area. Containers were moved during inspection and placed on racks. 242 Single-service reuse Single service and single use articles reused. Non-Critical Single service plastic container was being used as a scoop in the flour bag. Scoop was removed during inspection. Do not re-use single use items. 295 (c) Non food contact surface cleaning frequency Non-food contact surface(s) soiled. Non-Critical 1. Reach in freezer is soiled on the bottom shelf. Clean and sanitize. Code Defect Description Severity Comments 296 Food contact cleaning frequency Food contact surface(s) of equipment and/or utensils are not cleaned and sanitized between uses. Critical 1. Knife soiled on the knife rack in the kitchen area.2. Knife rack in the kitchen area soiled.3. Kitchen soiled on the knife rack in the bakery area.4. Knife rack in the bakery area soiled.Knives were removed from racks during inspection. Clean knives and knife racks. 5. Slicer soiled in the kitchen area.Clean and sanitize all food contact surfaces. 296 Food contact cleaning frequency Food contact surface(s) of equipment and/or utensils are not cleaned and sanitized between uses. Critical 1. Knife soiled on the knife rack in the kitchen area.2. Knife rack in the kitchen area soiled.3. Kitchen soiled on the knife rack in the bakery area.4. Knife rack in the bakery area soiled.Knives were removed from racks during inspection. Clean knives and knife racks. 5. Slicer soiled in the kitchen area.Clean and sanitize all food contact surfaces. 296 Food contact cleaning frequency Food contact surface(s) of equipment and/or utensils are not cleaned and sanitized between uses. Critical 1. Knife soiled on the knife rack in the kitchen area.2. Knife rack in the kitchen area soiled.3. Kitchen soiled on the knife rack in the bakery area.4. Knife rack in the bakery area soiled.Knives were removed from racks during inspection. Clean knives and knife racks. 5. Slicer soiled in the kitchen area.Clean and sanitize all food contact surfaces. 431 (a) Walls, floors, etc/soiled Physical structure, walls, floors, and/or ceilings soiled. Non-Critical 1. Mouse droppings found in dry storage and in the dish machine area. 2. Floors soiled in the kitchen under equipment, on the cook line, and at the floor wall junctures in all rooms of the establishment.3. Walls under the 3 bay sink and in the dry storage areas area soiled.3. Mop sink room floor soiled.Clean and maintain. 431 (a) Walls, floors, etc/soiled Physical structure, walls, floors, and/or ceilings soiled. Non-Critical 1. Mouse droppings found in dry storage and in the dish machine area. 2. Floors soiled in the kitchen under equipment, on the cook line, and at the floor wall junctures in all rooms of the establishment.3. Walls under the 3 bay sink and in the dry storage areas area soiled.3. Mop sink room floor soiled.Clean and maintain. 431 (a) Walls, floors, etc/soiled Physical structure, walls, floors, and/or ceilings soiled. Non-Critical 1. Mouse droppings found in dry storage and in the dish machine area. 2. Floors soiled in the kitchen under equipment, on the cook line, and at the floor wall junctures in all rooms of the establishment.3. Walls under the 3 bay sink and in the dry storage areas area soiled.3. Mop sink room floor soiled.Clean and maintain. 438 Toxic labeling Working container(s) of toxic materials not labeled with common name of contents. Critical Code Defect Description Severity Comments 173 Cross-contamination Raw animal foods stored incorrectly over ready to eat foods and/or other raw foods. Critical Raw shell eggs stored over 2 containers of sauce, one of which was not covered. Cover any food product. Store eggs so that they do not contaminate any food product. Corrected during inspection. 177 Food storage Food stored in unprotected manner. Non-Critical Boxes stored on the floor in the walk-in freezer. Store food six inches above the floor. Corrected during inspection. 177 (a) 5 Uncovered foods (Critical) Foods are uncovered Non-Critical Foods stored uncovered in walk-in coolers such as pie, creme brulee, pasta salad, hot dogs, crepes, and lobster. All food should be stored covered or in packages. Corrected during inspection. 218 Equipment repair Equipment in need of repair. Non-Critical Sprayer nozzle in the 3 bay dish area does not work properly. When in use the nozzle sprays water from the sides as well as the bottom. Reapair or replace. 234 In use utensil storage In use utensil(s) stored improperly. Non-Critical Knife stored in the sanitizer bucket. Do not store utensils or any equipment in the sanitizer bucket. Corrected during inspection. 294 Chemical sanitizer concentration Chemical sanitizer not present, not at proper concentration, and/or temperature for in-place sanitizer, manual or machine warewashing. Critical Dish machine sanitizer is reading at 0ppm. Sous Chef states that a technician has been called and will arrive later today to fix the machine. The employees will sanitize dishes in the 3 bay sink. 295 (a) (b) Food contact surface(s) soiled Food contact surface(s) soiled. Critical Deli style slicer soiled. Clean and sanitize. Clean slicer after each use or after every 4 hours during constant use. 295 (c) Non food contact surface cleaning frequency Non-food contact surface(s) soiled. Non-Critical Reach in freezer on the cook line closest to the wait staff area is soiled. Clean and sanitize. 438 Toxic labeling Working container(s) of toxic materials not labeled with common name of contents. Critical

friday did /didn't:

made a comic.

plasma $100.

signed up for plasma reward app.

sent tommy $50.

paid phone bill $40.

got a job washing dishes at a country club. i go in tomorrow.

todo tonight:

x rough out 2021 taxes.

bmv memo

work on brief 20 minutes

x clean house 20 minutes.

set alarm?

income 2021

oil 3k, 3.5 k. 1200 st louis

5600 baltimore

1000 plasma

300 rent 2000 mom what else?

studies total 6800. total all sources 10,000.

2021 expenses miles 3000. = 1500. hotel 1300. tolls 50 days 40 days x 50 = 2000.

bar stuff 400 subtotal

4250.

6800 - 4250 = 2550.

fica on 2550 = 16% =

2550 x 0.16= $408. so tax due this year $408. ok.

scrap $100. + 16. = 424. so tax due this year $408 on gross earnings of $10,000.

I have $270 at paypal from bj, but get a check function wasn't working. try again in a few days?

call mark.

clean around stairs. wash potatoes.

laundry.

scrap yard.

install light bulb for car.

2/1/22 dumpster dive.

https://freespeechlaw.scholasticahq.com/

clean car. make better list. open margin account. sorted recycling. obtained box of doorknobs/brass. bought $5 aspirin rooting compound, duct tape. obtained 1 month extention for brief. picked up one bag of trash. thursday went to bank. failed trip. did plasma $100 - $3 expenses. tommy $50, 3 phone calls. posted brief draft to reddit working on section about becerra. washed dishes. fell off wagon again. went to car parts store next door, next need usb cable to try to charge battery. charger might broken. property tax dueling letters attny gen indiana unclaimed del attny gen letters call mark re brief. what else? electric bill $200. get cash. check checkbook credit union, are those checks good?

thursday:

tires

bank

po box if time after tires. comedy

did: $plasma $100

bought battery $170. waiting on installation.

friday:

did: moved money. got mail. got coffee. bought 4 shares tsla @ 830. washed dishes.

to do:

tax estimate. clean car clean house laundry emails re the brief email baltimore re laptop. doing now: brian re 1099.

No. 21-890 ======================================================= Supreme Court of the United States [needs gothic font] ____________ Gaspee Project And Illinois Opportunity Project, Petitioners, V. Diane C. Mederos, Stephen P. Erickson, Jennifer L. Johnson, Richard H. Pierce, Isadore S. Ramos, David H. Sholes, And William E. West, In Their Official Capacities As Members Of The Rhode Island State Board Of Elections, Respondents. __________ On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Amicus Curiae Brief of Robbin Stewart in Support of Petitioners *[Redacted] info as counsel of record [pagebreak] Table of Contents Table of Authorities Interests of the Amicus Curiae Summary of Argument Argument I. There is a deep split in lower courts. Question presented. Talley v California is being resisted by states and courts. At least 36 cases have sided with Talley, while at least 12 cases side against. The circuit courts have split 5-4. At least 12 states have ruled with Talley as well as their state constitutions, while at least 2 went the other way. II. Citizens United Part IV created confusion. States and lower courts, as here, are misreading Citizens United to have overruled Talley and McIntyre. This is error because the text at issue is dicta, is out of context, is limited to corporations, was a less restrictive means than a total ban, is at odds with prior precedent, and has been superseded by more recent cases including Becerra. III. The case is important because free elections require free speech. IV. This could be the Court's first opportunity to explore the new Bonta standard. V. The case could be decided under state law, avoiding the federal question. Conclusion. Table of Authorities A–1 A–Lectrician, Inc. v. Snipes, (9th Cir. 2015) ACLU of Georgia v. Miller, (977 F.Supp. 1228 (N.D.Ga 1997), ACLU of Nevada v Heller 378 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2004), ACLU v. Reno, 117 S.Ct. 2329 (1997), AID v Open Society, 570 U S 205 (2013) ALA v. Pataki, 969 F.Supp 160 (1997), Anonymous v Delaware,Civ. No. 17453 (Del. Ch. May. 10, 2000), Arkansas v Butler, 983 F. Supp. 1209 (W.D. Ark. 1997). Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990) Bailey v. Maine Commission on Governmental Ethics, 2012 WL 4588564 No. 1:11-CV-00179-NT, (D. Me. Sept. 30, 2012) Barnette , W.VA Board v., 319 US 624 (1943) Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960) Becerra, NIFLA v., 585 US _ (2018) Bonta, Americans for Prosperity Foundation v., 594 U S __. Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 564 U.S. 379, 388 (2011) Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation, 525 U.S.182 (1999), Canon v. Justice Court (1964) 61 Cal.2d 446, 457, 39 Cal.Rptr. 228, 393 P.2d 428, Ctr. for Individual Freedom, Inc. v. Tennant, 849 F. Supp. 2d 659 (S.D.W. Va. 2011) Citizens PAC Political Action Committee v. Davidson, 236 F. 3d 1174 (8th Cir. 2000) Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) City of Bogalusa v. May, 212 So.2d 408 (1968), Commonwealth v. Dennis, 329 N.E.2d 706 (Mass. 1975), Cooper v Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) Crawford v Marion County Election Board, 553 U.S. 181 (2008), Cyberspace v. Engler, 55 F.Supp.2d 737 (E.D. Mich 1999), Dennis v. Massachusetts, 329 N.E.2d 706 (Mass. 1975), Doe v. 2theMart, 140 F.Supp.2d 1088, Doe v. Mortham, 708 So.2d 929 (Fla.1998), Ex Parte Harrison, 110 S.W. 709, 212 Mo. 88 (M0 1908), Gable v Patton, 142 F.3d 940 (6th Cir. 1998). Gaspee Project And Illinois Opportunity Project, v. Mederos, Gobitis v. Minersville, 310 US 586 (1940) Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293 (1961) Griset v. Fair Political Practices Commission, 69 Cal. App. 4th 818, 82 Cal. Rptr.2d 25 (1999), reversed on other grounds, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) Hansen v Westerville, 43 F.3d 1472 (6th Cir. 1994) Idaho v. Barney, 448 P.2d 195 (1968), Illinois v. White, 506 NE2d 1284 (Ill. 1987), In re Opinion of the Justices, 324 A.2d 211 (Del. 1974), Janus v. AFSCME, 585 U.S. ___ (2018) KRLPAC v. Terry 108 F.3d 637 (6th Cir. 1997), Louisiana v. Fulton, 3.37 So.2d 866 (La. 1976), Louisiana. v. Moses, 655 So. 2d 779 (La. Ct. App. 1995), Majors v Abell, 317 F.3d 719 (7th Cir. 2003), 792 N.E.2d 22 (Ind. 2003), 361 F.3d 349, 361 F.3d 349, 358. (7th Cir. 2004), Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, 584 U.S. ___ (2018) McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003) McIntyre, Estate of, v. Ohio Elections Comm’n., 514 U.S. 334 (1995) Morefield v. Moore, 540 S.W.2d 873, 874-75 (Ky. 1976), N. Dakota v. N.D. Ed. Assoc., 262 N.W.2d 731, NAACP v Alabama ex rel. Patterson, National Organization for Marriage v McKee, 649 F.3d 34 (1st Cir. 2011), National Institute of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018) New York v. Duryea, 351 NYS2d 978 (1974), Norman v Reed. 502 U.S. 279 (1992) Ogden v. Marendt, 264 F.Supp. 2d 785 (S.D. Ind. 2003) (S.D. Ind 2004), Opinion of the Justices, 306 A.2d 18 (Maine 1973), People v Barney, 448 P.2d 195 (1968), 92 Idaho 581. People v. Bongiorni, 205 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 856 (Sup. Ct. 1962), People v. Drake (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d Supp. 32, 159 Cal.Rptr. 161, People v. Duryea, 351 N.Y.S.2d 978 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974). People v. White, 506 N.E.2d 1284, (I11. 1987), Printing Industries of the Gulf Coast v. Hill, 382 F.Supp. 8011 (S.D.Tx 1974), 42 L.Ed.26 33 dismissed as moot, Public Citizen v. FEC, (11th cir. 2001), 99-14823. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155 (2015), Reno v ACLU, 521 US 844 (1997) Riley v. Federation of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781 (1998), Roe v Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) Schuster v. Imperial County Mun. Ct., 167 Cal. Rptr. 447 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1042, Seymour v. Elections Enf. Comm’n (Con. 2000) Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) ShrinkMissouri v. Maupin, 892 F. Supp. 1246 (E.D. Mo. 1995), aff'd, 71 F.3d 1422 (8th Cir. 1995), Smithers v Fla. Elections, http://www.fec.state.fl.us/decisions/Smithers96-85.PDF, State v. Acey, 633 S.W.2d 306 (Tenn. 1982), State v. Burgess, 543 So. 2d 1332 (La. 1989), State v. Green Mountain Future, 2013 Vt. 87 (Vt. 2013) State v. North Dakota Educ. Ass'n, 262 N.W.2d 731, 736 (N.D. 1978), State v. Petersilie, 334 N.C. 169, 432 S.E.2d 832 (1993), Stewart v Taylor, 953 F. Supp. 1047 (S.D. Ind. 1997), Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957) Talley v California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960) Tattered Cover v Thornton, 44 P.3d 1044 (2002), Texas v. Doe, 61 S. W. 3d 99, (Tx. Cr.App. 5/14/2003), Tornillo v. Miami Herald, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) Valeo, Buckley v., 424 U.S. 1 (1976) Washington ex rel Public Disclosure v. 119 Vote No!, 957 P.2d 691 (1998), Watchtower v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002), West Virginians for Life, Inc. v. Smith, 919 F. Supp. 954 (S.D. W. Va. 1996), Wilkinson v Jones 876 F.Supp (W.D.Ky 1995), Wilson v Stocker, 819 F.2d 943 (10th Cir. 1987), Wooley v Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977), Worley v. Fla. Secretary of State, 717 F.3d 1238 (11th Cir. 2013), Yes to Life PAC v. Webster, 74 F.Supp.2d 37 (D.Me. 1999), 84 F. Supp. 2d 150 (D. Me. 2000). Zwickler v. Koota, 290 F. Supp. 244 (E. D. N. Y. 1968), vacated on other grounds (mootness) sub nom. Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103 (1969), Other Authorities: First Amendment Supreme Court Rule 37.6, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Doug_Guetzloe Martin Shaeffer, Meiklejohn, Alexander (1872 – 1964) [pagebreak] Interest of the Amicus Curiae Robbin Stewart, the amicus here, was the successful plaintiff in Stewart v Taylor, 953 F. Supp. 1047 (S.D. Ind. 1997), which found Indiana's disclaimer statute unconstitutional. Elections officials had confiscated his sign that read "Robbin Stewart for Township Board - Vote Tuesday". The court held "Stewart contends that this case is governed by McIntyre. Stewart is correct." The Indiana legislature then repassed the statute, with irrelevant changes. Stewart was lead counsel in Majors v Abell, 317 F.3d 719 (7th Cir. 2003), 792 N.E.2d 22 (Ind. 2003), 361 F.3d 349 (7th Cir. 2004.) in which Judge Posner upheld the new statute in light of indeterminacy caused by McConnell v FEC. Judge Easterbrook issued a dubitante opinion, 361 F.3d 349, 358, pointing out that four controlling Supreme Court precedents side with Majors. Majors has been cited at least 64 times. Stewart was cocounsel in Anonymous v Delaware, Civ. No. 17453 (Del. Ch. May. 10, 2000), in which the Court of Chancery dismissed the case on the grounds that the disclaimer statute was so obviously unconstitutional per McIntyre that there was no genuine controversy. However, post-Citizens United, Delaware is now enforcing a disclaimer statute, and the state's Attorney General has refused to issue an Attorney General Opinion in light of cases such as Janus and Becerra. Stewart has also filed comments with the FEC as to their disclaimer regulations. Stewart has participated in distributing campaign literature in a variety of campaigns since 1970, has held appointed public office in four states, has won primaries and lost general elections, and blogs about election law at http://ballots.blogspot.com, where he engages in express advocacy without disclaimers. He has spent over $1000 on signage. His speech is being chilled in Indiana, Rhode Island, Delaware, and elsewhere. He has filed amicus briefs in several disclaimer cases. One such brief helped get charges dropped against Martin Shaeffer, a Clarkburg WV city council-member who was arrested and jailed for helping publish a political newsletter. He was an amicus, along with the Privacy Project, in Crawford v Marion County Election Board, after he was prevented from voting because he has a sincere, possibly mistaken, belief that he has a right to vote without showing ID. https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legal-work/fa3a4f2682405f5e42_jbm6bhn9i.pdf. His work has focused on ballot access, campaign speech and finance, and privacy issues. [footnote 1] Amicus Curiae has obtained written consents to file from Movant and Respondent. Per Supreme Court Rule 37.6, Amicus Curiae states that no counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, and no persons other than Amicus Curiae and its counsel made any monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation and submission of this brief. Amicus Curiae is an individual and has no shareholders or partners. Summary of the Argument: 1. There is a deep circuit split which the court should resolve. 2. Dicta in Citizens United, part IV, has created confusion among lower courts and legislatures, which the court should clarify. 3. A major purpose of the First Amendment is to enable free elections. Public confidence in elections has been shaken in recent years, when incumbents can rig the elections by chilling the speech of their critics. The case is important, so that the First Circuit's acceptance of censorship of campaign speech can be overturned, and so that the states listed in Justice Scalia's footnote 2 in McIntyre are put on notice that these statutes remain void. 4. This case presents an opportunity to review an erroneous application of the Bonta standard, which may be something the court wants to explore. Conclusion: The court should grant cert, and rule broadly for plaintiffs, upholding Talley v. California as controlling law, not just narrowly striking down the unconstitutional top 5 donors disclaimer provision. 5. While neither party raises the issue, this case might be resolvable on state grounds. The Rhode Island constitution has a free speech provision. The court could, on its own motion, certify a question to the Rhode Island Supreme Court, as to whether there is any state right which could allow the federal question to be avoided. Most states which have raised the issue of a state constitutional right to anonymous speech have found one. Argument There is a deep circuit split which the Court should resolve. The question presented is: Rhode Island law requires most issue advocacy groups that mention a candidate or referendum in a communication before an election to register with the State and disclose most donors of at least $1,000. The law also requires that such communications include a disclaimer of the sponsoring group as well as an on-advertisement disclaimer of the group’s top five donors of at least $1,000 during the preceding year. Does Rhode Island’s on-advertisement donor disclaimer law impermissibly compel speech in violation of National Institute of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018)? This brief is in support of Gaspee Project, et al.’s petition for certiorari, https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/21/21-890/204745/20211210150814345_Gaspee%20Cert%20Petition%20v11%20FA.pdf, seeking review of an erroneous decision of the First Circuit which allows Rhode Island to require a disclaimer on certain political literature, including listing the top 5 donors, so that they can be singled out for harassment. The Gaspee Project wants to distribute a voting guide providing information to voters. In 1960 the court in Talley v California ruled that anonymous speech is constitutionally protected, and therefore an ordinance requiring a disclaimer was void. The opening paragraph of Gaspee Project's complaint cites to Talley and McIntyre, which should have been enough. Talley was one of the civil rights cases, along with NAACP v Alabama ex rel. Patterson, Bates v. Little Rock, Shelton v. Tucker, Gibson v. Florida Legis. Comm'n, Gremillion v. NAACP, Sweezy v. New Hampshire. These cases found a right to privacy and political association. Political association is a modern phrasing of the rights to assembly and petition, textually present in the First Amendment. Both the speech and press clauses are also implicated. Rhode Island seeks a return to the Jim Crow era, and prefers Gobitis over Barnette. Rhode Island here is making an attack on the right to privacy. There are current controversies as to the full extent of the privacy right discussed in Griswold and Roe v Wade, but all members of the court have agreed there is some First Amendment right to privacy and autonomy that prohibits compelled speech outside of narrow exceptions not at issue here. See Janus, Becerra, and concurrences in Masterpiece Bakeshop. Regardless of intent, the effect of disclaimer rules has been to severely burden speech, especially that of minorities, such as blacks (Talley), women (McIntyre), political minorities (ACLF), immigrants with relatives in the old country, and sundry other cases less easy to categorize. Although Talley is the law of the land, states and some lower courts refused to accept it, much as Alabama vigorously resisted NAACP for many years. The NAACP case reached the Supreme Court four times before Alabama finally backed down. California did not accept Talley, and continued to pass new unconstitutional disclaimer rules each time one was struck down, and still enforces them today. People v. Bongiorni, 205 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 856 (Sup. Ct. 1962), Canon v. Justice Court (1964) 61 Cal.2d 446, 457, 39 Cal.Rptr. 228, 393 P.2d 428, People v. Drake (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d Supp. 32, 159 Cal.Rptr. 161, Schuster v. Imperial County Mun. Ct., 167 Cal. Rptr. 447 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1042, Griset v. Fair Political Practices Commission, 69 Cal. App. 4th 818, 82 Cal. Rptr.2d 25 (1999), reversed on other grounds, NIFLA v Becerra, 585 U.S. ___ (2018). Louisiana has a similar history of as soon as one disclaimer statute is struck down, another is enacted, in an ongoing cycle. Louisiana v. Fulton, 3.37 So.2d 866 (La. 1976), State v. Burgess, 543 So. 2d 1332 (1989), Louisiana. v. Moses, 655 So. 2d 779 (La. Ct. App. 1995). In Kentucky, courts have upheld disclaimer rules four times, defying Talley. Morefield v. Moore, 540 S.W.2d 873, 874-75 (Ky. 1976), Wilkinson v Jones 876 F.Supp (W.D.Ky 1995), KRLPAC v. Terry (6th Cir. 1997), Gable v Patton, (6th Cir. 1998). In note 2 of his dissent in McIntyre, Justice Scalia cataloged how nearly every state has a disclaimer statute. What is needed is something like Cooper v Aaron that after 60 years really settles the matter, and lets election officials know that if they continue to violate the rule of Talley they can expect to pay damages. So a narrow ruling just about the 5 top donors is not enough. It is a waste of judicial resources to allow bad actors getting off scot-free for intentional violations of freedom of campaign speech, with substantial harm to the integrity of the election process, and an endless cycle of injunctions and declaratory judgments that fail to deter subsequent violations. A majority of cases have followed Talley, and later McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, but about 1/3 of the cases have refused to do so, and about 2/3rds of the states still enforce some unconstitutional disclaimer statute. This is unacceptable. Cases following Talley include: City of Bogalusa v. May, 212 So.2d 408 (1968), People v. Bongiorni, 205 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 856 (Sup. Ct. 1962), Doe v. Mortham, 708 So.2d 929 (Fla.1998), Griset v. Fair Political Practices Commission, 69 Cal. App. 4th 818, 82 Cal. Rptr.2d 25 (1999), reversed on other grounds, Printing Industries of the Gulf Coast v. Hill, 382 F.Supp. 8011 (S.D.Tx 1974), 42 L.Ed.26 33 dismissed as moot, Idaho v. Barney, 448 P.2d 195 (1968), Louisiana. v. Moses, 655 So. 2d 779 (La. Ct. App. 1995), Lousiana v. Fulton, 3.37 So.2d 866 (La. 1976), New York v. Duryea, 351 NYS2d 978 (1974), In re Opinion of the Justices, 324 A.2d 211 (Del. 1974), Opinion of the Justices, 306 A.2d 18 (Maine 1973) Ogden v. Marendt, 264 F.Supp. 2d 785 (S.D. Ind. 2003) (S.D. Ind 2004), ShrinkMissouri v. Maupin, 892 F. Supp. 1246 (E.D. Mo. 1995), aff'd, 71 F.3d 1422 (8th Cir. 1995), Schuster v. Imperial County Mun. Ct., 167 Cal. Rptr. 447 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1042. Smithers v Fla. Elections, http://www.fec.state.fl.us/decisions/Smithers96-85.PDF, Texas v. Doe, 61 S. W. 3d 99, (Tx. Cr.App. 5/14/2003), West Virginians for Life, Inc. v. Smith, 919 F. Supp. 954 (S.D. W. Va. 1996), Yes to Life PAC v. Webster, Zwickler v. Koota, 290 F. Supp. 244 (E. D. N. Y. 1968), vacated on other grounds (mootness) sub nom. Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103 (1969), Doe v. 2theMart,140 F.Supp.2d 1088, ACLU of Georgia v. Miller, (977 F.Supp. 1228 (N.D.Ga 1997), ACLU v. Reno, 117 S.Ct. 2329 (1997), ALA v. Pataki, 969 F.Supp 160 (1997), Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation, 525 U.S.182 (1999), Cyberspace v. Engler, 55 F.Supp.2d 737 (E.D. Mich 1999), Dennis v. Massachusetts, 329 N.E.2d 706 (Mass. 1975), Ex Parte Harrison, 110 S.W. 709 (Mo 1908) (on state grounds), Illinois v. White, 506 NE2d 1284 (Ill. 1987), McIntyre v. Ohio, 514 U.S. 334 (1995), N.Dakota v. N.D. Ed. Assoc., 262 N.W.2d 731, Washington ex rel Public Disclosure v. 119 Vote No!, 957 P.2d 691 (1998), Riley v. Federation of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781 (1998), Stewart v. Taylor, 953 F.Supp.1047 (S.D.Ind.1997), Texas v. Doe, (Tx. Cr.App. 5/14/2003), Watchtower v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002), West Virginians for Life, Inc. v. Smith, 919 F. Supp. 954 (S.D. W. Va. 1996), Wilson v Stocker, 819 F.2d 943, 950 (10th Cir. 1987), Wooley v Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977), Yes to Life PAC v. Webster, 74 F.Supp.2d 37 (D.Me. 1999), 84 F. Supp. 2d 150 (D. Me. 2000). Cases resisting Talley include: United States v. Scott, 195 F. Supp. 440, 443 (D.N. D. 1961), , State v. Acey, 633 S.W.2d 306 (Tenn. 1982), Morefield v. Moore, 540 S.W.2d 873, 874-75 (Ky. 1976), State v. Petersilie, 334 N.C. 169, 432 S.E.2d 832 (1993), Worley v. Fla. Secretary of State, 717 F.3d 1238 (11th Cir. 2013), Majors v Abell, 317 F.3d 719 (7th Cir. 2003), 792 N.E.2d 22 (Ind. 2003), 361 F.3d 349 (7th Cir. 2004), Wilkinson v Jones 876 F.Supp (W.D.Ky 1995), Seymour v @ Election Comm’n. (Con. 2000), State v. Green Mountain Future, 2013 Vt. 87 (Vt. 2013), NOM v McKee, 649 F.3d 34 (1st Cir. 2011), Terry, Gable v Patton, Arkansas v Butler, 983 F. Supp. 1209 (W.D. Ark. 1997). Public Citizen v. FEC (11th Cir.), Bailey v. Maine Commission on Governmental Ethics, 2012 WL 4588564 No. 1:11-CV-00179-NT, (D. Me. Sept. 30, 2012), (see Bailey v. Maine Commission on Governmental Ethics: Another Step Toward the End of Political Privacy, Engage Volume 14, Issue 2 July 2013). Circuits following Talley include 4th (West Virginians for Life, Inc. v. Smith, 919 F. Supp. 954 (S.D. W. Va. 1996)), 8th (Citizens PAC Political Action Committee v. Davidson, 236 F. 3d 1174 (8th Cir. 2000)), 9th (ACLU of Nevada v Heller 378 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2004), but see A–1 A–Lectrician, Inc. v. Snipes), and 10th (Wilson v Stocker, 819 F.2d 943 (10th Cir. 1987)). Circuits improperly ruling against Talley include the First, Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh, in the instant case, KYRTL v. Terry, Gable v Patton, Majors v Abell, and Public Citizen, Worley v Florida. Additionally, at least 12 states have found a right to anonymous speech in their state constitution, while two states decided the other way. The states include CA, CO, DE, ID, IL, LA, OH, MA, ME, MO, ND, and NY. Schuster v. Imperial County Municipal Court, 167 Cal. Rptr. 447 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980), Tattered Cover v Thornton, 44 P.3d 1044 (2002), In re Opinion of the Justices, 324 A.2d 211 (Del. 1974), People v Barney, State v. Burgess, 543 So.2d 1332 (La. 1989) People v. White, 506 N.E.2d 1284, (I11. 1987), Commonwealth v. Dennis, 329 N.E.2d 706 (Mass. 1975), Opinion of the Justices, 306 A.2d 18 (Me. 1973), Ex Parte. Harrison, 212 Mo. 88 (M0 1908), State v. North Dakota Educ. Ass'n, 262 N.W.2d 731, 736 (N.D. 1978), People v. Duryea, 351 N.Y.S.2d 978 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974). Ohio’s lockstep doctrine accepts McIntyre as controlling the state constitution as well. However, Ohio still enforces its disclaimer statute. States ruling the other way include NC, TN, Peterslie, State v Acey. This is a deep split. The court has made at least two previous attempts to resolve the split, in McIntyre, and Buckley v. ACLF. The question presented in McIntyre was whether there was an elections exception to Talley. The court found none. Ohio had used Valeo's permissive "exacting scrutiny" standard. While retaining the label "exacting scrutiny", McIntyre applied a strict form of scrutiny, requiring narrow tailing and an overriding state interest. Justice Scalia, dissenting, called this a "kiss of death" standard. While Margaret McIntyre has been described as a lone pamphleteer, she was actually a spokesperson for a larger group of about 60 people, as described in Hansen v Westerville, 43 F.3d 1472 (6th Cir 1994). Rhode Island here misreads McIntyre as only creating an exception for little ladies with home computers who spend under $1000, and misreads McConnell's electioneering communications discussion to allow disclaimers for issue speech when targeted and close to the election, thinking that this would satisfy the "In for a calf is not in for a cow" concurrence in McIntyre. As discussed below, Rhode Island misreads Citizens United as having implicitly repealed Talley, McIntyre, ACLF, Watchtower, etc. The statutes in Talley and McIntyre were broad, while Rhode Island’s is more narrow, but that is not why they were found unconstitutional. Americans have a right to speak about elections, unbound by compelled government speech. Buckley v ACLF carefully distinguished disclosure, which got permissive scrutiny under Valeo, and disclaimers, which get stricter scrutiny under McIntyre. Yet courts continued to rule adversely at times, and then the split got wider after McConnell and Citizens United rejected as-applied issue advocacy arguments brought by James Bopp. Mr. Bopp favors disclaimer statutes, as long as they are limited to express advocacy, so his arguments have been indirect. There is a deep split among lower courts, both state and federal, as to whether Talley and McIntyre remain good law and prohibit disclaimer rules. The Court should grant cert. to resolve this issue. Dicta in Citizens United, part IV, has created confusion among lower courts and legislatures, which the court should clarify. Citizens United was a case that held that strict scrutiny applies to political speech, overturned the anomalous Austin ruling, and greatly expanded constitutional protection of election speech. But states have seized on certain loose language about disclaimers, out of context, and some courts have followed, as the First Circuit did below, reasoning that Citizens implicitly overruled not just Austin, but Talley, Mcintyre, ACLF, Wooley, maybe even Barnette. This is error, for the following reasons. The language in Citizens about disclaimers is dicta, not holding. Citizens was a case about corporate speech, and does not authorize disclaimer rules for individuals, as the statutes of Rhode Island, Maine, and Vermont attempt to do. In Citizens, disclaimers were a less restrictive alternative to a complete ban. Rhode Island has no such ban, so the Citizens discussion does not apply. If Citizens had intended to overturn McIntyre et al., it would have explained why and how it was doing so, as it did in overruling Austin. If Citizens had overruled McIntyre, it would have itself been overruled by later cases such as Reed v. Town of Gilbert, AID v Open Society, Janus, and NIFLA v Becerra. Nonetheless, the dicta in Citizens has confused lower courts and legislatures, and the court should take this case to once again clearly establish that Talley and McIntyre remain good law, and states cannot compel the content of political ads. Perhaps in some future case, the Court may allow a disclaimer rule limited to speech by corporations. There are some sound policy reasons to do so, and Citizens hints at such a future case. But Citizens did not do so, and the Rhode Island statutes are not limited to corporate speech. In Citizens, echoing a similar failed strategy in McConnell v. FEC, plaintiffs argued that their speech was not express advocacy, and so the disclaimer and disclosure rules did not apply. The court disagreed, in Part IV, and found that the speech at issue was at least the functional equivalent of express advocacy, so its attempted loophole was closed. This was the holding. The court then went on in dicta to praise disclaimers and disclosure, lumping them together, as less restrictive means to advance the state interests. It is these statements that have been taken out of context. Plaintiffs had not argued that the disclaimer rule was facially void, only that they had found an exception. The current case does directly challenge the unconstitutional statute, and thus makes a good vehicle for the court to clarify its remarks in Citizens United. Perhaps in this case the Court will decide to overrule McIntyre, Talley, Barnette, Wooley, and Tornillo. If so it should do so explicitly, not sotto voce. A major purpose of the First Amendment is to enable free elections. Public confidence in elections has been shaken in recent years, when incumbents can rig elections by chilling the speech of their critics. The case is important, so that the First Circuit's acceptance of censorship of campaign speech can be overturned, and so that the states listed in Justice Scalia's footnote 2 in McIntyre are put on notice that these statutes remain void. The United States is an experiment in a libertarian constitutional democratic republic, in which the people are sovereign, instead of subjects of a monarch. The people govern themselves by choosing representatives via free and open elections. In order to do so, there must be free speech so that issues and candidates can be fully discussed. This is the Meiklejohn theory of the purpose of the First Amendment; that it makes democracy possible. It may be nice to have nude dancing and art and literature and liquor prices, but a core function of the First Amendment is to protect free and open elections. Here, the usual presumption of constitutionality is reversed, and censorship of political speech is suspect, presumptively invalid, subject to close, exacting, strict, kiss of death, scrutiny. What Rhode Island is doing here, perhaps with the best of intentions, criminalizes core political speech, and also imposes civil penalties without a mens rea element. Both of these severely chill speech, and detract from the integrity of the election process. Talley reversed a $10 fine. McIntyre reversed a $100 fine. The consequences in Rhode Island are more dire. And, as plaintiffs have argued, the 5 donor requirement goes well beyond the mere attribution requirements found invalid in Talley and McIntyre. When free speech is taken away, we are left with Potemkin elections, which retain the form but not the substance. The courts, and this Court, have an important role in safeguarding elections. It is not surprising that the Rhode Island legislature seeks to deter criticism, or here, accurate feedback, about the Rhode Island legislature. In such cases, no deference is due. “At the Gaspee Project, it is our duty to hold accountable lawmakers who ignore your best interests.” http://gaspeeproject.org/about. The right to petition allows citizens to express their ideas, hopes, and concerns to their government and their elected representatives, whereas the right to speak fosters the public exchange of ideas that is integral to deliberative democracy as well as to the whole realm of ideas and human affairs. Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 564 U.S. 379, 388 (2011). Actual jailings for disclaimer violations are rare, but not unknown. Harrison, Dennis, Schaeffer, and Geutzloe are among those who have been jailed. Ex Parte Harrison (Mo 1908), Commonwealth v Dennis (MA. 1975), http://shaeffercase.blogspot.com, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Doug_Guetzloe. Currently before congress is an election "reform" bill which would extend the FEC's unconstitutional disclaimer requirements to the internet, what Reno v ACLU called burning the global village to roast the pig. This court should take this case to better inform congress, the FEC, legislators, and lower courts, that there are constitutional limits to how election speech can be chilled. This would be the Court's first opportunity to explore the new Bonta standard. In this case, the First Circuit erroneously applied the new Bonta standard, instead of McIntyre's kiss of death standard. In doing so, it treated Bonta as as permissive as Valeo, essentially treating Bonta as an indeterminate "personal preferences of the judges" standard. If this case is allowed to stand, it will not be the only lower court to rule this way. This may be the first case to apply Bonta. The court could choose to take this case as a chance to further explore the Bonta standard. State Grounds 5. While neither party raises the issue, this case might be resolvable on state grounds. The Rhode Island constitution has a free speech provision. The court could, on its own motion, certify a question to the Rhode Island Supreme Court, as to whether there is any state right which could allow the federal question to be avoided. This would be a case of first impression, and the Rhode Island court would have no obligation to respond, but might choose to do so. Most states which have raised the issue of a state constitutional right to anonymous speech have found one. While the issue of whether there is a state constitutional right to anonymous speech remains unresolved, the state’s interests, whether legitimate, compelling, overriding, or narrowly tailored, are diminished. So there is an implicit state claim inside the federal claim. Conclusion: The court should grant cert., and rule broadly for plaintiffs, upholding Talley v. California, not just narrowly striking down the unconstitutional top 5 donors disclaimer provision. Alternatively, if there are six votes in support, it could summarily reverse, perhaps with an order for reconsideration in light of NIFLA v Becerra. Certification to the Rhode Island Supreme Court is another option. (word count). @ 3379 of 4386 Respectfully submitted, [Closing Signature Block with clearly identified counsel of record] FEBRUARY 4 2022

https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/office/create-a-table-of-authorities-ddd126ae-52bc-4299-9558-06dd0e4fe8c0

RN116354310

Gaspee Project And Illinois Opportunity Project, v. Mederos, Talley v California Citizens United Part IV McIntyre Becerra Bonta Stewart v Taylor, 953 F. Supp. 1047 (S.D. Ind. 1997), Majors v Abell, 317 F.3d 719 (7th Cir. 2003), 792 N.E.2d 22 (Ind. 2003), 361 F.3d 349 (7th Cir. 2004.) 361 F.3d 349, 358. Anonymous v Delaware,Civ. No. 17453 (Del. Ch. May. 10, 2000), Janus Martin Shaeffer, Crawford v Marion County Election Board, Supreme Court Rule 37.6, NAACP v Alabama ex rel. Patterson, Bates v. Little Rock, Shelton v. Tucker, Gibson v. Florida Legis. Comm'n, Gremillion v. NAACP, Sweezy v. New Hampshire. Gobitis Barnette Griswold Roe v Wade Huminski v. Corsones, 396 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2004), Balancing Courtroom Safety and Free Expression: Huminski v. Corsones, Robert M. Howard,The Justice System Journal, Vol. 27, No. 1 (2006) National Institute of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018) Masterpiece Bakeshop. People v. Bongiorni, 205 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 856 (Sup. Ct. 1962), Canon v. Justice Court (1964) 61 Cal.2d 446, 457, 39 Cal.Rptr. 228, 393 P.2d 428, People v. Drake (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d Supp. 32, 159 Cal.Rptr. 161, Schuster v. Imperial County Mun. Ct., 167 Cal. Rptr. 447 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1042, Griset v. Fair Political Practices Commission, 69 Cal. App. 4th 818, 82 Cal. Rptr.2d 25 (1999), reversed on other grounds, Louisiana v. Fulton, 3.37 So.2d 866 (La. 1976), State v. Burgess, 543 So. 2d 1332 (1989), Louisiana. v. Moses, 655 So. 2d 779 (La. Ct. App. 1995). Morefield v. Moore, 540 S.W.2d 873, 874-75 (Ky. 1976), Wilkinson v Jones 876 F.Supp (W.D.Ky 1995), KRLPAC v. Terry (6th Cir. 1997), Gable v Patton, (6th Cir. 1998). Cooper v Aaron City of Bogalusa v. May, 212 So.2d 408 (1968), People v. Bongiorni, 205 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 856 (Sup. Ct. 1962), Doe v. Mortham, 708 So.2d 929 (Fla.1998), Griset v. Fair Political Practices Commission, 69 Cal. App. 4th 818, 82 Cal. Rptr.2d 25 (1999), reversed on other grounds, Printing Industries of the Gulf Coast v. Hill, 382 F.Supp. 8011 (S.D.Tx 1974), 42 L.Ed.26 33 dismissed as moot, Idaho v. Barney, 448 P.2d 195 (1968), Louisiana. v. Moses, 655 So. 2d 779 (La. Ct. App. 1995), Lousiana v. Fulton, 3.37 So.2d 866 (La. 1976), New York v. Duryea, 351 NYS2d 978 (1974), In re Opinion of the Justices, 324 A.2d 211 (Del. 1974), Opinion of the Justices, 306 A.2d 18 (Maine 1973) Ogden v. Marendt, 264 F.Supp. 2d 785 (S.D. Ind. 2003) (S.D. Ind 2004), ShrinkMissouri v. Maupin, 892 F. Supp. 1246 (E.D. Mo. 1995), aff'd, 71 F.3d 1422 (8th Cir. 1995), Schuster v. Imperial County Mun. Ct., 167 Cal. Rptr. 447 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1042. Smithers v Fla. Elections, http://www.fec.state.fl.us/decisions/Smithers96-85.PDF, Texas v. Doe, 61 S. W. 3d 99, (Tx. Cr.App. 5/14/2003), West Virginians for Life, Inc. v. Smith, 919 F. Supp. 954 (S.D. W. Va. 1996), Yes to Life PAC v. Webster, Zwickler v. Koota, 290 F. Supp. 244 (E. D. N. Y. 1968), vacated on other grounds (mootness) sub nom. Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103 (1969), Doe v. 2theMart,140 F.Supp.2d 1088, ACLU of Georgia v. Miller, (977 F.Supp. 1228 (N.D.Ga 1997), ACLU v. Reno, 117 S.Ct. 2329 (1997), ALA v. Pataki, 969 F.Supp 160 (1997), Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation, 525 U.S.182 (1999), Cyberspace v. Engler, 55 F.Supp.2d 737 (E.D. Mich 1999), Dennis v. Massachusetts, 329 N.E.2d 706 (Mass. 1975), Ex Parte Harrison, 110 S.W. 709 (Mo 1908) (on state grounds), Illinois v. White, 506 NE2d 1284 (Ill. 1987), McIntyre v. Ohio, 514 U.S. 334 (1995), N.Dakota v. N.D. Ed. Assoc., 262 N.W.2d 731, Washington ex rel Public Disclosure v. 119 Vote No!, 957 P.2d 691 (1998), Riley v. Federation of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781 (1998), Stewart v. Taylor, 953 F.Supp.1047 (S.D.Ind.1997), Texas v. Doe, (Tx. Cr.App. 5/14/2003), Watchtower v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002), West Virginians for Life, Inc. v. Smith, 919 F. Supp. 954 (S.D. W. Va. 1996), Wilson v Stocker, 819 F.2d 943, 950 (10th Cir. 1987), Wooley v Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977), Yes to Life PAC v. Webster, 74 F.Supp.2d 37 (D.Me. 1999), 84 F. Supp. 2d 150 (D. Me. 2000). State v. Acey, 633 S.W.2d 306 (Tenn. 1982), Morefield v. Moore, 540 S.W.2d 873, 874-75 (Ky. 1976), State v. Petersilie, 334 N.C. 169, 432 S.E.2d 832 (1993), Worley v. Fla. Secretary of State, 717 F.3d 1238 (11th Cir. 2013), Public Citizen 11th cir. Majors v Abell, 317 F.3d 719 (7th Cir. 2003), 792 N.E.2d 22 (Ind. 2003), 361 F.3d 349 (7th Cir. 2004), Wilkinson v Jones 876 F.Supp (W.D.Ky 1995), Seymour v Connecticutt State v. Green Mountain Future, 2013 Vt. 87 (Vt. 2013) NOM v McKee, 649 F.3d 34 (1st Cir. 2011), Terry, Gable v Patton, Arkansas v Butler, 983 F. Supp. 1209 (W.D. Ark. 1997). West Virginians for Life, Inc. v. Smith, 919 F. Supp. 954 (S.D. W. Va. 1996)), Citizens PAC Political Action Committee v. Davidson,236 F. 3d 1174 (8th Cir. 2000)), ACLU of Nevada v Heller 378 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2004), but see A–1 A–Lectrician, Inc. v. Snipes, Wilson v Stocker, 819 F.2d 943 (10th Cir. 1987). Schuster v. Imperial County Municipal Court, 167 Cal. Rptr. 447 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980), Tattered Cover v Thornton, 44 P.3d 1044 (2002), In re Opinion of the Justices, 324 A.2d 211 (Del. 1974), People v Barney, State v. Burgess, 543 So.2d 1332 (La. 1989) People v. White, 506 N.E.2d 1284, (I11. 1987), Commonwealth v. Dennis, 329 N.E.2d 706 (Mass. 1975), Opinion of the Justices, 306 A.2d 18 (Me. 1973), Ex Parte. Harrison, 212 Mo. 88 (M0 1908), State v. North Dakota Educ. Ass'n, 262 N.W.2d 731, 736 (N.D. 1978), People v. Duryea, 351 N.Y.S.2d 978 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974). Valeo Austin Norman v Reed. Hansen v Westerville, 43 F.3d 1472. Town of Vincent v Reed, AID v Open Society, McConnell v. FEC Tornillo Watchtower Meiklejohn First Amendment https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Doug_Guetzloe Reno v ACLU

yoshi. spaulding. $5500. 9 days. various sessions. find out when my end of study date was.

Gaspee project v mederoz notes for amivus

Reasons for cert Circuit split. After talley footnote two After mcintyre After aclf Citizens caused confusion. First case for bonta. Ct. case. Riley in kenticky v terry? Gable v patton Worely Public citizen 11th circuit Majors v abell State v acey Wilkinson? Green mountain futures N carolina peterslie merits. Talley mcintyre aclf watchtower Barnette Wooley tornillo riley Aid v open society janus nifla v beccera 1 sentence from each.

Bailey v. Maine Commission on Governmental Ethics, 2012 WL 4588564 No. 1:11-CV-00179-NT, (D. Me. Sept. 30, 2012): http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCOURTS-med-1_11-cv-00179/pdf/USCOURTS-med-1_11-cv-00179-3.pdf contact@ballsandstrikes.org "We have acknowledged that drivers who display a State’s selected license plate designs convey the messages communicated through those designs. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U. S. 705 , n. 15, 715 (1977) (observing that a vehicle “is readily associated with its operator” and that drivers displaying license plates “use their private property as a ‘mobile billboard’ for the State’s ideological message”). And we have recognized that the First Amendment stringently limits a State’s authority to compel a private party to express a view with which the private party disagrees. See id., at 715; Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U. S. 557, 573 (1995) ; West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 642 (1943) . But here, compelled private speech is not at issue." walker v texas.

interest of amicus. stewart v taylor. majors v abell, anonymous v delaware, fec comments. privacy project amicus in crawford v marion county.

summary of argument the case presents two issues, which the court below erred by treating as a single issue. 1. under the bonta standard, do plaintiffs present a triable issue on their disclosure claim? 2. are talley and mcintyre still good law, such that the disclaimer rule is facially invalid? this brief is focused on the second question. the court should take the case on the second issue, regardless of whether or not it takes the first issue. the case is important as the first case applying the new standard of review set out in AIP v Bonta. the case is important because it widens the circuit split that has existed since shortly after Talley v California, narrowed but did not end after McIntyre v. Ohio, widened again after Citizens United, and has not been resolved by cases such as Janus, NIFLA v Becarra, Masterpiece, or Bonta.

the case is important because voting rights are preservative of all other rights, and to be meaningful voting must be informed by a free flow of election speech, such as the voting guide at issue here. what is needed is a ruling like cooper v aaron, so that manuel talley's great grandchildren can finally enjoy the benifits of the ruling in his case. 60 plus years is too long to wait. the case is important because it can provide guidance to the FEC and congress, which are currently illegally refusing to follow Talley and McIntyre.

In Buckley v. ACLF, all 9 members of the court held that McIntyre is good law, and disclaimer regulations such as name badges for petitioners are unlawful, while upholding disclosure under the permissive Valeo standard. But in dicta in Citizens United, 8 members of the court lumped disclaimers in with disclosure, in discussing why an as applied challenge had failed for other reasons. In so doing, the court sowed confusion and discord, muddying the waters, so that public officials acting in bad faith can argue the rights established by Talley and McIntyre were not clearly established, and thus evade liability for their wrongdoing. At the moment, whether a citizen can be jailed for putting a "Vote for Smith" sign in their yard or on their home page depends on which state they live in and which circuit that state is in. National uniformity would be a better policy, and is required by the First Amendment.

friday plan

call st louis call baltimore

call mom and tommy

put away groceries clean car

write motion re bmv.

call missouri and kansas

work on brief

check email

make comic

maybe check mailbox.

i'm forgetting something. wednesday:

lawyer zoom

did 1/2 page of the brief, a start

washed car, washed dishes. washed self.

took out trash

put $1200 in bank, paid $200 on electric bill.

talked to tommy.

it felt productive but now it doesn't look like so much.

still to do:

sort mail

brief

mice killed today 1, month 5. thursday: stopped by church, no dinners due to covid. cleaned car slightly. good set tonight. picked out two boxes of food but sheriifs van so i will go back later. got a parking ticket. slept late and did not get much of anything done.

2:30 wednesday 12/29. 3:20. taking a break to go to the bank. COVER INFORMATION > Docket number 21-890 >The party names as they appear on the docket > State whether the case is “On Petition” (at the Petition stage) or “on Writ” (at the Merits stage) > The Lower Court as it appears on the docket > The Name of Your Amicus (or Amici) [See below] > The Party Supported [See below] > The address block or blocks selecting only ONE counsel of record @ 21-890 Gaspee Project et al. v Mederos et al. On Petition from First Circuit Court of Appeals Amicus Curiae Brief of Robbin Stewart in Support of Petitioners *Mark Small info as counsel of record Table of Contents Table of Authorities Interests of the Amicus Curiae (with required footnote) Argument 1 Argument 2 Argument 3 Argument 4 Conclusion Closing Signature Block with clearly identified counsel of record Table of Contents Table of cases I. There is a deep split in lower courts. II. Citizens United Part IV created confusion. III. The case is important because free elections require free speech. IV. This would be the Court's first opportunity to explore the new Bonta standard. Conclusion Table of Authorities (still needs table of authorities) Interests of the Amicus Curiae Robbin Stewart, the amicus here, was the successful plaintiff in Stewart v Taylor, 953 F. Supp. 1047 (S.D. Ind. 1997), which found Indiana's disclaimer statute unconstitutional. Elections offcials had confiscated his sign that read "Robbin Stewart for Township Board - Vote Tuesday". The district court held "Stewart contends that this case is governed by McIntyre. Stewart is correct." The Indiana legislature then repassed the statute, with irrelevant changes. Stewart was lead counsel in Majors v Abell,317 F.3d 719 (7th Cir. 2003), 792 N.E.2d 22 (Ind. 2003),361 F.3d 349,(7th Cir. 2004.) in which Judge Posner upheld the statute in light of indeterminacy caused by McConnell v FEC. Judge Easterbrook issued a dubitante opinion, 361 F.3d 349, 358, pointing out that four controlling Supreme Court precedents sided with Majors. The Supreme Court clerk properly denied a petition for certiorari because it had been filed a day late. Majors has been cited at least 64 times. Stewart was cocounsel in Anonymous v Delaware,Civ. No. 17453 (Del. Ch. May. 10, 2000),in which the Court of Chancery dismissed the case on the grounds that the disclaimer statute was so obviously unconstitutional per McIntyre that there was no genuine controversy. However, post-Citizens United, Delaware is now enforcing a disclaimer statute, and the state's Attorney General has refused to issue an Attorney General Opinion in light of cases such as Janus and Becerra. He has filed comments with the FEC as to their disclaimer regulations. Stewart has participated in distributing campaign literature in a variety of campaigns since 1970, has held appointed public office in four states, has won primaries and lost general elections, and blogs about election law at http://ballots.blogspot.com, where he engages in express advocacy without disclaimers. He has spent over $1000 on signage. His speech is being chilled in Indiana, Rhode Island, Delaware, and elsewhere. He intends to continue to be politically active. He has filed amicus briefs in several disclaimer cases. One such brief helped get charges dropped against Martin Shaeffer, a Clarkburg WV city councilmember who was arrested and jailed for helping publish a political newsletter. He was an amicus, along with the Privacy Project, in Crawford v Marion County Election Board, after he was prevented from voting because he has a sincere, possibly mistaken, belief that he has a right to vote without showing ID. His work has focused on ballot access, campaign speech and finance, and privacy issues. [footnote 1] Amicus Curiae has obtained written consents to file from Movant and Respondent. Per Supreme Court Rule 37.6, Amicus Curiae states that no counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, and no persons other than Amicus Curiae and its counsel made any monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation and submission of this brief. Amicus Curiae is an individual and has no shareholders or partners. Argument 1 There is a deep circuit split which the court should resolve. Argument 2 Dicta in Citizens United, part IV, has created confusion among lower courts and legislatures, which the court should clarify. Argument 3. A major purpose of the First Amendment is to enable free elections. Public confidence in elections has been shaken in recent years, when incumbents can rig the elections by chilling the speech of their critics. The case is important, so that the First Circuit's acceptance of censorship of campaign speech can be overturned, and so that the states listed in Justice Scalia's footnote 2 in McIntyre are put on notice that these statutes remain void. Argument 4: This case presents an opporunity to review an erroneous appication of the Bonta standard, which may be something the court wants to explore. Conclusion: The court should grant cert, and rule broadly for plaintiffs, upholding Talley v. California, not just narrowly striking down the unconstitutional top 5 donors disclaimer provision. Table of Cases Argument 1 There is a deep circuit split which the Court should resolve. In 1960 the court in Talley v California ruled that anonymous speech is constitutionally protected, and therefor an ordinance requiring a disclaimer was void. The opening paragraph of Gaspee Project's complaint cites to Talley and McIntyre, which should have been enough. Talley was one of the civil rights cases, along with NAACP v Alabama ex rel. Patterson, Bates v Little Rock, Shelton v. Tucker, Gibson v. Florida Legis. Comm'n, Gremillion v. NAACP, Sweezy v. New Hampshire. These cases found a right to privacy and political association. Political association is a modern phrasing of the rights to assembly and petition, textually present in the First Amendment. Both the speech and press clauses are also implicated. Rhode Island here seeks a return to the Jim Crow era, and prefers Gobitis over Barnette. Rhode Island here is making an attack on the right to privacy. There are current controversies as to the full extent of the privacy right discussed in Griswold and Roe v Wade, but I think all members of the court agree there is some First Amendment right to privacy and autonomy that prohibits compelled speech outside of narrow exceptions not at issue here. See Janus, Becerra, and concurrences in Masterpiece.

Regardless of intent, the effect of disclaimer rules has been to severely burden the speech of minorities, such as blacks (Talley), women (McIntyre), political minorities (ACLF), immigrants with relatives in the old country, and sundry other cases less easy to categorize. For example, in Anonymous v. Delaware, the until-now anonymous plaintiff did not want to risk interfering with another pending case, later settled for around a million dollars. Huminski v. Corsones, 396 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2004), Balancing Courtroom Safety and Free Expression: Huminski v. Corsones, Robert M. Howard,The Justice System Journal, Vol. 27, No. 1 (2006).

Although Talley is the law of the land, states and some lower courts refused to accept it, much as Alabama vigorously resisted NAACP for many years. The NAACP case reached the Supreme Court four times before Alabama finally backed down. California did not accept Talley,and continued to pass unconstitutional disclaimer rules, and still enforces them today. People v. Bongiorni, 205 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 856 (Sup. Ct. 1962),Canon v. Justice Court (1964) 61 Cal.2d 446, 457, 39 Cal.Rptr. 228, 393 P.2d 428, People v. Drake (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d Supp. 32, 159 Cal.Rptr. 161, Schuster v. Imperial County Mun. Ct., 167 Cal. Rptr. 447 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1042, Griset v. Fair Political Practices Commission, 69 Cal. App. 4th 818, 82 Cal. Rptr.2d 25 (1999), reversed on other grounds. @ add NIFLA v Becerra. Louisiana has a similar history of as soon as one disclaimer statute is struck down, another is enacted, in an ongoing cycle. Lousiana v. Fulton, 3.37 So.2d 866 (La. 1976), State v. Burgess, 543 So. 2d 1332 (1989),Louisiana. v. Moses, 655 So. 2d 779 (La. Ct. App. 1995), In Kentucky, courts have upheld disclaimer rules four times, defying Talley. (@ cite terry, gable v patton, wilkinson) In note 2 of his dissent in McIntyre, Justice Scalia cataloged how nearly every state has a disclaimer statute. What is needed is something like Cooper v Aaron that after 60 years really settles the matter, and lets election officials know that if they continue to violate the rule of Talley they can expect to pay damages. So a narrow ruling just about the 5 top donors is not enough. It is a waste of judicial resources to allow bad actors getting off scot-free for intentional violations of freedom of campaign speech, with substantial harm to the integrity of the election process,and an endless cycle of injunctions and declaratory judgments that fail to deter subsequent violations. The split began in 1961, and continues in 2022. A majority of cases have followed Talley, and later McIntyre v. Ohil Elections Commission, but about 1/3 of the cases have refused to do so, and about 2/3rds of the states still enforce some disclaimer statute. Cases following Talley include: City of Bogalusa v. May, 212 So.2d 408 (1968), People v. Bongiorni, 205 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 856 (Sup. Ct. 1962), Doe v. Mortham, 708 So.2d 929 (Fla.1998), Griset v. Fair Political Practices Commission, 69 Cal. App. 4th 818, 82 Cal. Rptr.2d 25 (1999), reversed on other grounds, Printing Industries of the Gulf Coast v. Hill, 382 F.Supp. 8011 (S.D.Tx 1974), 42 L.Ed.26 33 dismissed as moot, Idaho v. Barney, 448 P.2d 195 (1968), Louisiana. v. Moses, 655 So. 2d 779 (La. Ct. App. 1995), Lousiana v. Fulton, 3.37 So.2d 866 (La. 1976), New York v. Duryea, 351 NYS2d 978 (1974), In re Opinion of the Justices, 324 A.2d 211 (Del. 1974), Opinion of the Justices, 306 A.2d 18 (Maine 1973) Ogden v. Marendt, 264 F.Supp. 2d 785 (S.D. Ind. 2003) (S.D. Ind 2004), ShrinkMissouri v. Maupin, 892 F. Supp. 1246 (E.D. Mo. 1995), aff'd, 71 F.3d 1422 (8th Cir. 1995), Schuster v. Imperial County Mun. Ct., 167 Cal. Rptr. 447 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1042. Smithers v Fla. Elections, http://www.fec.state.fl.us/decisions/Smithers96-85.PDF, Texas v. Doe, 61 S. W. 3d 99, (Tx. Cr.App. 5/14/2003), Vermont Right to Life v. Sorrell, 221 F.3d 376, 392 (2d Cir. 2000) [?], West Virginians for Life, Inc. v. Smith, 919 F. Supp. 954 (S.D. W. Va. 1996), Yes to Life PAC v. Webster, Zwickler v. Koota, 290 F. Supp. 244 (E. D. N. Y. 1968), vacated on other grounds (mootness) sub nom. Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103 (1969), Doe v.2theMart,140 F.Supp.2d 1088, ACLU of Georgia v. Miller, (977 F.Supp. 1228 (N.D.Ga 1997),ACLU v. Reno, 117 S.Ct. 2329 (1997), ALA v. Pataki, 969 F.Supp 160 (1997), Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation, 525 U.S.182 (1999), Cyberspace v. Engler, 55 F.Supp.2d 737 (E.D. Mich 1999), Dennis v. Massachusetts, 329 N.E.2d 706 (Mass. 1975), Ex Parte Harrison, 110 S.W. 709 (Mo 1908)(on state grounds), Griset v CalFPPC (1999), reversed on other grounds, Illinois v. White, 506 NE2d 1284 (Ill. 1987), Louisiana. v. Moses, 655 So. 2d 779 (La. Ct. App. 1995), McIntyre v. Ohio, 514 U.S. 334 (1995), N.Dakota v. N.D. Ed. Assoc., 262 N.W.2d 731, New York v. Duryea, 351 NYS2d 978 (1974), Washington ex rel Public Disclosure v. 119 Vote No!, 957 P.2d 691 (1998) Ogden v. Marendt, (S.D. Ind 2004),Riley v. Federation of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781 (1998),Stewart v. Taylor, 953 F.Supp.1047 (S.D.Ind.1997), Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960), Texas v. Doe, (Tx. Cr.App. 5/14/2003), Watchtower v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002), West Virginians for Life, Inc. v. Smith, 919 F. Supp. 954 (S.D. W. Va. 1996), Wilson v Stocker, 819 F.2d 943, 950 (10th Cir. 1987), Wooley v Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977), Yes to Life PAC v. Gardner. Cases resisting Talley include: needs work state v acey, peterslie, worley, majors v abell, wilkinson, connecticut case, green mountain futures, NOM v McKee, Terry, Gable v Patton, Arkansas v Butler, Circuits resisting Talley include: First (Nom v McKee), Sixth (Gable v Patton), Seventh (Majors v Abell), Eleventh (Worley v Florida). Circuits following Talley include 4th (WVfL v Smith), 8th, (236 F. 3d 1174 (8th Cir. 2000) - Citizens PAC Political Action Committee v. Davidson), 9th (ACLU of Nevada v Heller), 10th (Wilson v Stocker). Additionally, at least 12 states have found a right to anonymous speech in their state constitution, while at least three states decided the other way. The states include CA, CO, DE, ID, IL,LA, OH, MA,ME,MO, ND, NY. Schuster, Tattered Cover, Opinion of the Justices (DE), People v Barney, State v Burgess, People v White, Dennis v Mass., Opinion of the Justices (ME), Ex Rel. Harrison, ND Ed Assoc., People v Duryea. States ruling the other way include NC, TN, Ky. Peterslie, State v Acey, Wilkinson. This is a deep split. The court has made at least two previous attempts to resolve the split, in McIntyre, and ACLF. The question presented in McIntyre was whether there was an elections exception to Talley. Ohio had used Valeo's permissive "exacting scrutiny" standard. While retaining the label "exacting scrutiny" McIntyre applied a strict form of scrutiny, requiring narrow tailing and an overiding state interest. Justice Scalia, dissenting, called this a "kiss of death" standard. Rhode Island here misreads McIntyre as only creating an exception for little ladies with home computers who spend under $1000, and misreads McConnell's electionering communications discussion to allow disclaimers for issue speech when targeted and close to the election, thinking that this would satisfy the "In for a calf is not in for a cow" concurence in McIntyre. As discussed below, Rhode Island misread Citizens United as having implicitly repealed Talley, McIntyre, ACLF, Watchtower, etc. Buckley v ACLF carefully distinguished disclosure, which gets permissive scrutiny under Valeo, and disclaimers, which get stricter scrutiny under McIntyre. Yet courts continued to rule adversely at times, and then the split got wider after McConnell and Citizens United rejected as-applied issue advocacy arguments brought by James Bopp. There is a deep split among lower courts, both state and federal, as to whether Talley and McIntyre remain good law and prohibit disclaimer rules. The Court should grant cert to resolve this issue. Dicta in Citizens United, part IV, has created confusion among lower courts and legislatures, which the court should clarify. Citizens United was a case that held that strict scrutiny applies to political speech, overturned the anamalous Austin ruling,and greatly expanded constitutional protection of election speech. But states have seized on certain loose language about disclaimers, out of context,and some courts followed, as the First Circuit did below, as holding that Citizens implicitly overuled not just Austin, but Talley, Mcintyre, ACLF, Wooley, maybe even Barnette. This is error, for the folowing reasons. The language in Citizens about disclaimers is dicta, not holding. Citizens was a case about corporate speech, and does not authorize disclaimer rules for individuals, as the statutes of Rhode Island, Maine, and Vermont attempt to do. In Citizens, disclaimers were a less restrictive alternative to a complete ban. Rhode island has no such ban, so the Citizens discussion does not apply. If Citizens had intended to overturn McIntyre et al.,it would have explained why and how it was doing so, as it did in overruling Austin. If Citizens had overruled McInytre, it would have itself been overuled by later cases such as Town of Vincent v Reed, AID v Open Society, NIFLA v Becerra, and Janus. Nonetheless, the dicta in Citizens has confused lower courts and legislatures, and the court should take this case to once again clearly establish that Talley and McIntyre remain good law, and states cannot compel the content of political ads. Perhaps in some future case, the Court may allow a disclaimer rule limited to speech by corporations. There are some sound policy reasons to do so, and Citizens hints at such a future case. But Citizens did not do so, and the Rhode Island statutes are not limited to corporate speech. In Citizens, echoing a similar issue in McConnell, plaintiffs argued that their speech was not express advocacy, and so the disclaimer and disclosure rules did not apply. The court disagreed, in Part IV, and found that the speech at issue was at least the functional equivalent of express advocacy, so its attempted loophole was closed. This was the holding. The court then went on in dicta to praise disclaimers and disclosure, lumping them together, as less restrictive means to advance the state interests. It is these statements that have been taken out of context. Plaintiffs had not argued that the disclaimer rule was facially void, only that they had found an exception. The current case does directly challenge the unconstitutional statute, and thus makes a good vehicle for the court to clarify its remarks in Citizens United. Perhaps in this case the Court will decide to overule McIntyre, Talley, Barnette, Wooley, and Tornillo. If so it should do so explicitly, not sotto voce. A major purpose of the First Amendment is to enable free elections. Public confidence in elections has been shaken in recent years, when incumbents can rig the elections by chilling the speech of their critics. The case is important, so that the First Circuit's acceptance of censorship of campaign speech can be overturned, and so that the states listed in Justice Scalia's footnote 2 in McIntyre are put on notice that these statutes remain void. The United States is an experiment in a libertarian constitutional democratic republic, in which the people are sovereign, instead of having a monarch. The people govern themselves by choosing representatives via free and open elections. In order to do so, there must be free speech so that issues and candidates can be fully discussed. This is the Meiklejohn theory of the purpose of the First Amendment; that it makes democracy possible. It may be nice to have nude dancing and art and literature and liquor prices, but the core function of the First Amendment is to protect free and open elections. Here, the usual presumption of constitutionality is reversed, and censorship of political speech is suspect, presumptively invalid, subject to close, exacting, strict, kiss of death, scrutiny. What Rhode Island is doing here, perhaps with the best of intentions, criminalizes core political speech, and also imposes civil penalties without a mens rea element. Both of these severely chill speech, and detract from the integrity of the election process. Talley reversed a $10 fine. McIntyre reversed a $100 fine. The consequences in Rhode Ilsand are more dire. And, as plaintiffs have argued, the 5 donor requirement goes well beyong the mere attribution requirements found invalid in Talley and McIntyre. When free speech is taken away,we are left with Potemkin elections, which retain the form but not the substance. The courts,and this court, have an important role in safegarding elections. Actual jailings for disclaimer violations are rare, but not unknown. Harrison, Dennis, Schaeffer,and Doug Geutzloe are among thiose who have been jailed. Ex rel Harrison (Mo 1908), Dennis v Mass (MA. 1972), shaeffercase.blogspot.com, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Doug_Guetzloe. Currently congress has a partisan split on an election "reform" bill which would extend the FEC's unconstitutional disclaimer requirements to the internet, what Reno v ACLU called burning the global village to roast the pig. This court should take this case to better inform congress, the FEC, legislators, and lower courts, that there are constitutional limits to how election speech can be chilled. In this case, the First Circuit erroneously applied the new Bonta standard, instead of McIntyre's kiss of death standard. In doing so, it treated Bonta as as permissive as Valeo, essentially treating Bonta as an indeterminate "personal preferences of the judges" standard. If this case is allowed to stand, it will not be the only lower court to rule this way. As far as I know this may be the first case to apply Bonta. The court could choose to take this case as a chance to further explore the Bonta standard. Conclusion: The court should grant cert., and rule broadly for plaintiffs, upholding Talley v. California, not just narrowly striking down the unconstitutional top 5 donors disclaimer provision. (word count) [Closing Signature Block with clearly identified counsel of record] = The cover of an amicus brief must comply with all of the requirements applicable to the cover of other booklet-format briefs. Rules 33.1(e), 33.1(g) and 34.1. At the petition stage, an amicus brief should have a cream cover; at the merits stage, an amicus brief in support of the petitioner or in support of neither party should have a light green cover, and an amicus brief in support of the respondent should have a dark green cover. Rule 33.1(g). In consolidated cases, the Court’s docket may provide more = Forty copies of an amicus brief must be submitted in booklet form. Rule 33.1(f).

to do tonight call mom call tommy work on brief work on bmv motion "Paddy and his gay friend walk into a bar and a lesbian waitress walks up them"

sunday: 5 boxes to food not bombs. came back with a full car. went to a trivia night. was winning at first but lost bad, but it was nice. forgot to go to zonies to meet that new dancer. saturday: went to see tommy. brought food, we did laundry, had sex, i went home. friday did/didn't 1. deposited $4000. balance $1600. took 3 trips to bank. 2. called bmv, found out my hearing was the 15th. have 7 days to undo dismissal. need to write that up. 3. got back into chromebook /google account. had to change password and give up my phone number. i guess i didnt do much else today. should go unload car. == thursday bank. paid off ^620, chase, deposited $2000 sent tommy $50. standup went well. bought moosetraps. ==weds. forgot to call re hearing. po box. paid off 5th 3rd. trash, dishes, scotty, started unloading car. to do friday: unload car get more moousetraps. defrost fridge? go see tommy. lube. to do eventually resume to team america tires brief