Monday, January 23, 2023

 6. octopharma blood work. call in two weeks. jan 25th.

did: $610 to chase. laundry, stairs. paid $100 to chase. owe $1000, have $1000.

owe pnc: 400? 

paid $900 to bank america. owe $3.  

monday could: scrap metal run. 

clean front yard. 

make comic.

work on motions for injunction, brief in support. 

carroll, hendricks, dearborn, [marion] one other. 

of the 4 factors for injunctive relief, likelihood of success on the merits is the most important.

here, the likelihood is strong, and is strong enough to support a preliminary injunction.

NIFLA, Janus, Reed v Town of Gilbert are recent controlling cases.

Older controlling cases include Barnette, reversing Gobitis, Talley v California, NAACP v Alabama,

McIntyre v Ohio Elections Commission, Buckley v ACLF, Tornillo v Miami Herald, Wooley v Maynard, 

Riley v Federation of the Blind. see also Masterpiece Cakeshop, Justice Thomas concurring. 

NIFLA, 

Janus, 

Reed v Town of Gilbert 

Barnette, reversing Gobitis, 

Talley v California, 

NAACP v Alabama,

McIntyre v Ohio Elections Commission, 

Buckley v ACLF, 

Tornillo v Miami Herald, 

Wooley v Maynard, 

Riley v Federation of the Blind. 

Masterpiece Cakeshop, Justice Thomas concurring. 


In  the past there has been confusion about Citizens United or McConnell v FEC, but these have been mooted by the more recent supreme court rulings. 

NOM v McKee, Gaspee Project, Green Mountain. 

Indiana law has repeatedly found the McIntyre case to be controlling, except in Majors v Abell. 

Federal Election Comm'n v. Public Citizen, 268 F.3d 1283, 1287-91 (11th Cir. 2001) (per curiam); Gable v. Patton, 142 F.3d 940, 944-45 (6th Cir. 1998); Kentucky Right to Life, Inc. v. Terry, 108 F.3d 637, 646-48 (6th Cir. 1997).

Seymour v. Elections Enforcement Comm'n, 255 Conn. 78762 A.2d 880, 886-87 (2000).

In Majors the 7th Circuit found that McConnell had left the field too indeterminate to be able to rule for a citizen plaintiff. 

Reluctant, without clearer guidance from the Court, to interfere with state experimentation in the baffling and conflicted field of campaign finance law without guidance from authoritative precedent, we hold that the Indiana statute is constitutional.

Judge Easterbrook issued a dubitante opinion, saying:

Four decisions of the Supreme Court hold or strongly imply that the ability to speak anonymously — and thus with less concern for repercussions — is part of the "freedom of speech" protected by the first amendment against governmental interference. Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 6080 S.Ct. 5364 L.Ed.2d 559 (1960); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, 514 U.S. 334115 S.Ct. 1511131 L.Ed.2d 426 (1995); Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation, 525 U.S. 182, 199-200119 S.Ct. 636142 L.Ed.2d 599 (1999); Watchtower Bible Tract Society of New  York, Inc. v. Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 166-67122 S.Ct. 2080153 L.Ed.2d 205 (2002). 


In Majors the 7th Circuit found that McConnell had left the field too indeterminate to be able to rule for a citizen plaintiff. Judge Easterbrook issued a dubitante opinion, saying:


Stewart v Taylor, Ogden v Marendt, Mulholland v Marion County Election Board, are examples. See also AKKKK v Goshen. 

The First Amendment, applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits the enactment of laws “abridging the freedom of speech.” U. S. Const., Amdt. 1. Under that Clause, a government, including a municipal government vested with state authority, “has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content. 

Content-based laws—those that target speech based on its communicative content—are presumptively unconstitutional and may be justified only if the government proves that they are narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests.

thomas for the court in reed v town of gilbert. 

but see reagan outdoor v austin, reed is not absolute. 

Majors' doubts about McConnell do not survive Reed's reminder that the standard is strict scrutiny. Majors failed to apply any standard of scrutiny. Mulholland v Board, while it dealt with a procedural issue at the 7th circuit, may have superseded Majors.  

Plaintiff here makes claims under both the federal and state constitutions. They are likely to prevail on one or both. 

For injunctive relief to issue, they only need some likelihood of success on any one claim. 

Price v Indiana (1993) remains the leading case under article I section 9. Under Price, the Indiana constitution can go further than the federal First Amendment. Here it does not need to. In Majors, the state court declined to rule on state constitutional questions, but limited itself to a statutory construction matter.  

13 or more states have found some right to privacy or anonymous speech under state constitutions. These include. ca co de id il la ma me ny nd oh or wa.

schuster, tattered cover, opinion of the justices people v barney, people v white, people v moses, fulton, burgess, etc., dennis v massachusetts, new york v. duryea, mcintyre, no on 119, 

Some lower court rulings have supported the talley-mcintyre line of cases and provide additional persuasive support. 

add here.








Tuesday, January 10, 2023

 sohiel. paul. big mike.

these were my set notes at cancan tuesday night. had a very good 3 minutes set. (i skipped the whole holocaust routine and just did zingers.)

what are we talking about tonight? mice, and weed and grandmas. ok,  oh and long's bakery. onlyfans. superhero names. dumpster babies, spoken word.  side chicks. i was in the teamsters so i dont have a side chick, i have a back hoe.

i can work with that. 

i'm on a subreddit for only fans. it's just pictures of fans.

my superhero name is arbitrary aardvark. i fight crime. i'm not very good at it. crime usually wins.


two weeks ago i went up at crackers, and i bombed. so i figured i should prepare better next time so i tried to look up some jokes. about the holocaust.

it turns out that when you google for holocaust jokes, you don't holocaust jokes. you get these really serious articles about how that's not funny.  

holocaust jokes

2 myths about the holocaust.

1. that it only happened to jews.

2. that it only happened once, a long time ago.

at my house right now, there's a holocaust going on. so far i've killed 50 mice, and i'm just getting started. 


my mom was born in europe, in the 1920s. 1930 was a good time to get out of europe, so she moved to kansas city. her mother, my grandmother margo, was a flapper in paris, then a housewife in kansas city, then a rosie the riveter during the war, then she was  high school french teacher. and once a year she'd put on a school assembly, and she'd have her students dance the cancan.

now i'm an old man, and i'm a cripple, so i can't do the high kicks, but it goes something like this.

"i haven't smoked weed since high school" well, i live on east washington, and i passed two high schools on the way here. 

i do medical studies. there was this study in kansas city that paid $19,000, and i got out my phone and started to call, and then i hung up, because i remembered i got high 2 weeks ago at a show at the brewery, so i got to wait 2 months before i can do a study.


so margo told me, grandson, i havent smoked weed since 19:45. i said margo that was a long time ago. she goes, not really, and she looks at her watch and says its only 20:37 now. if i need to explain that to anyone, that's military time,  and i stole that joke from benedict from channel 8. 

 

Sunday, January 08, 2023

friday: 

Provisional Ballot Status

keyboard_arrow_up

x plasma. 

call to see if i work friday

i didnt get much done today, friday. did plasma. no new mail just bills. paid $50 on a credit card. put $100 in my pocket. fixed dinner. bought ramen at the corner store. vegan chili ramen, wasn't good, but they have 3 more flavors to try. 

work on billing records

tommy issues: annualcreditreport.com. plasma. casey authorization discussion.

wednesday to do: 

x 1. laundry. gather laundry first, towels, scotty's room. in van. 

haircut?

x 2. take out trash.

x/2. 3. unload van and car. 

x 4. sort food on stairs,  take out trash.

x 5. mousetraps.

x 6. order charger from amazon. 

7. email lindy and bill.

8. casey letters.

x 9. patch hole in stained glass window and or install window before dark. 

x 10 flush. bring up a bucket of water.

11. work on billing records. maybe do a cle or work on memos. x new hampshire letter. 2.0 hours.

12. plumber

=

not today: get chase inc card, use it to pay irs bill, collect $900 bonus. consider filing to abate penalties on 2012 income tax penalties. 


work on billing notes.

monday did:

1. po box. no checks there.

2. 1.5 hours billed on cases. 1-2 pm edited marion county complaint, motion for injunction, 1/2 hour 4:30-5 pm read volokh article on compelled speech, looked up georgia and texas state con law cases. at arlington library.

x 3. reported stolen social security checks to fraud hotline. to do tomorrow: go to social security office.

4. went to best buy. got info on what charger cable to order. to do: order charger cable.

5. sorted some mail. found thermometer. found old phone. got groceries. 

6. octopharma blood work. call in two weeks. jan 25th.

7. now i don't remember. tommy did step 1 of his teeth.  took out trash. mouse 49. mouse 50.

8. took photos of room.

9. bought gas. $30? forgot to write down how much. $3.15/gln. 

to do. bill's birthday in a few days. email lindy.

find charger thingy for phone.

get bag from car. 

put out moosetraps 

so to do:

x 1. 2 hr CLE. manage 

x 4. make comic.

3. read rest of volokh article. working on it. 

5. read casey letters.

2. i have dinner on the stove. burned dinner again.

6. clean car.

7. laundry.

could go get bookshelves from kroger.

email church re hams. 

8. start billing notes for january, december.

9. order charger

tuesday:

haircut

x plasma

x car insurance office on s keystone. it'll be too late when i get out of here.

real estate 16th st. get info ready.

x standup can can.

x social security office

x oil change. $55.

 plan for sunday: 

3. x 20 minutes sorting stairs and car. sorted scotty's room. i cleaned for an hour and now my back hurts.

2. find casey envelope, work on casey situation. have not found yet. found an envelope monday.

maybe a transfer of claim to tommy.

1. x go through mail. threw away junk mail.

maybe laundry.

what else?

monday haircut.

write to star bank president.

5. cle's, but not yet, it's too easy. do harder stuff first. 

go to gym maybe. 

4. work on hendricks complaint. find emails, put them in a folder.

7. x before/after pics of room. 

8. put mattress under mattress. pick up clothes.


 plan for week: get cases ready to file. talk to process server? 

think about how to get loan. maybe meet with bank of indianapolis. 

clean out car. find work shoes. wash kitchen floor. plasma tuesday and friday. upload comedy set to youtube. buy charger cable. are my taxes done?

go through comic for the year adding up expenses. go through old to do lists to see what goes on this year's list. more cles. 3.5 so far so do 2.5 more. 

make appointment w land bank about status of temple street properties.

contact a realtor re fmv 4015, does the 16th street property have a fmv?

plan for 2023

write 2022 annual report.

file 4 or more sign cases, carroll, hendricks, marshall, dearborn.

 - work on opening brief, memo in support of preliminary injunction.

weekly billing summary. records must be contemporaneous. 

find counsel for marion county case. 

amicus cases:

1 new hampshire

2. san franscisco

3. alaska


also pending: disciplinary complaint in minnesota. 

what else? inherit money. fix pipes, fix furnace, fix roof. obtain home insurance?




Friday, January 06, 2023

first friday at circle center








 

Thursday, January 05, 2023

 plan for thursday:

 x go pay bank of america bill. maybe go join the gym. paid $900.

research set for tonight. 

work on complaints and documents.

x put away trash can. 

x run battery in car for a while. car won't start. recharge battery, if i can get it out. 

x what else? hydrate; x plasma tomorrow.

mouse count 44. bought mousetraps. watered plans. took out some spoiled food. bought a shirt and tie, coffee x 2, sandwich at 3 carrots. 1/2 hour work on carroll complaint edit. killed a mouse. took out some recycling. 




note: spent 3 hours drafting and filing a disciplinary complaint against an alj in minnesota as part of my research in doe v carroll county. 3.0 hours between 10 am and 1:59 pm january 5th.


 To: 
Lawyers Professional Responsibility Board Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility

445 Minnesota Street
Suite 2400
St. Paul, Minnesota 55101-2139


This is a complaint against Suzanne Todnem, James E. LaFave, and Jim Mortenson,

three administrative judges of the office of administrative hearings.  The possibly unethical conduct involves them serving as a panel in Murphy v Grote,

https://mn.gov/oah/assets/0325-38781-murphy-grote-campaign-violation-report_tcm19-557184.pdf,

and assessing a $150 fine against a mayor in retaliation for his constitutionally protected core political speech. In doing so, they violated the mayor's rights to free speech and free elections under the US and Minnesota constitutions, which they have sworn to uphold.

They were acting in a quasijudicial capacity, and are probably immune from any civil or criminal consequences; attorney discipline is the exclusive remedy.

I'm just some guy in Indiana. I am no expert in Minnesota's rules for attorneys or administrative law judges. A rabbi I have spoken to about these issues counseled me that my task is to bring the issue to the attention of the disciplinary body, and that you can take it from there. I frankly expect that is likely the complaint will get dismissed as being "too political" or something of that sort. At most I am seeking an official reprimand; this is not a case calling for suspension, disbarment, etc. Only if the unethical conduct continued after reprimand would further action be appropriate.

The panel of ALJ's purported to act pursuant to a Minnesota statute. But they know, should know, or have reason to know that the statute is void because it is unconstitutional, and does not empower them to fine anyone for core protected political speech. 

The current statute, if I understand it, is not the same exact version that has previously been ruled unconstitutional. It has been slightly renumbered and re-enacted. But in substance it is the same.  It requires campaign literature to have an identification disclaimer. These Jim-Crow era disclaimer rules have been ruled unconstitutional for the past 62 years. They are racist (Talley v California), sexist (McIntyre v Ohio Election Commission), and have a history of being used for religious discrimination (Watchtower v Stratton, Wooley v Maynard, Barnette v Board.)

The Minnesota disclaimer statute has been found unconstitutional by both state and federal courts, as well as in an attorney general opinion by Hubert Humphrey. 

Minnesota Citizens Concerned v. Kelley
427 F.3d 1106 (8th Cir. 2005)

Riley v. Jankowski
713 N.W.2d 379 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006).


Also there have been recent Supreme Court cases, such as NIFLA v Becerra, reiterating that disclaimer rules are still unconstitutional. 

I wrote to the office on December 27th sharing these concerns. The $150 fine against the mayor of Lexington is dated December 28th. There could be a fact question as to whether they had actually received and read my letter before they improperly voted to fine the Mayor for his constitutionally protected speech. Their misconduct would be more culpable if they were on notice that their actions were unlawful. 

The above cases address that the statute is void under the First Amendment. I also contend that the statute violate the Minnesota Bill of Rights. I am not aware of any Minnesota case law directly on point, but 13 other states have found that disclaimer rules violate their state constitutions. I can provide those cases on request.

I am somewhat unclear which ethical rules apply to ALJs. Below, I list some ethical rules which might apply, either directly or by analogy.

1.1 competence

Rule 3.1Meritorious Claims and Contentions

A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law. 

Rule 3.3Candor Toward the Tribunal

(a)

 A lawyer shall not knowingly:

(1) make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal, or fail to correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer;

(2) fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel; or

(b)

 A lawyer who represents a client in an adjudicative proceeding and who knows that a person intends to engage, is engaging or has engaged in criminal or fraudulent conduct related to the proceeding shall take reasonable remedial measures, including, if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal.

Rule 3.8Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor

The prosecutor in a criminal case shall:

(a)

 refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable cause;

Rule 4.1Truthfulness in Statements to Others

In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly make a false statement of fact or law.

Rule 8.3Reporting Professional Misconduct

(a)

 A lawyer who knows that another lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, shall inform the appropriate professional authority.

(b)

 A lawyer who knows that a judge has committed a violation of the applicable Code of Judicial Conduct that raises a substantial question as to the judge's fitness for office shall inform the appropriate authority.

A JUDGE SHALL UPHOLD AND PROMOTE THE INDEPENDENCE, INTEGRITY, AND IMPARTIALITY OF THE JUDICIARY, AND SHALL AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY.

Rule 1.1Compliance with the Law

A judge shall comply with the law, including the Code of Judicial Conduct.

Rule 1.2Promoting Confidence in the Judiciary

A judge shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary, and shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.

Rule 2.2Impartiality and Fairness

A judge shall uphold and apply the law, and shall perform all duties of judicial office fairly and impartially.

Rule 2.5Competence, Diligence, and Cooperation

(A) A judge shall perform judicial and administrative duties competently and diligently.

How these rules apply, or might apply, to the case in which they issued a fine for constitutionally protected speech, is that they wrote:

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 

1. The Panel is authorized to consider this matter pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 211B.35 (2022). 

2. Complainant bears the burden of proving the allegations in the Complaint. The standard of proof of a violation of Minn. Stat. § 211B.04 is a preponderance of the evidence.

But section 211 is void and unconstitutional, and confers no power to the panel. Their appointment as ALJs is not a license to conspire to violate civil rights. Their action was ultra vires and in excess of their authority. They lacked probable cause, and had a duty to dismiss the complaint. 

I also have concerns about the use of a preponderance of the evidence standard, in a case where the government is the real party in interest. I would think that a clear and convincing evidence would be required to comport with due process under both constitutions. But this is more of a hunch than a certainty. I am no expert on what Minnesota law requires for due process. What I do know is the law about disclaimers, and the panel clearly violated it here, in a way that involved impropriety and the appearance of impropriety. 

Ok, that is the gist of my complaint. Feel free to contact me at gtbear at gmail com if you have questions. Please keep me posted on what you decide. 

Respectfully submitted, Robbin Stewart. 

notes on minnesota  attorney professional responsibility rules


draft only do not file until reviewed.

To: Minnesota Attorney Disciplinary Commission

This is a complaint against Suzanne Todnem, James E. LaFave, and Jim Mortenson,

three administrative judges of the office of administrative hearings.  The possibly unethical conduct involves them serving as a panel in Murphy v Grote,

https://mn.gov/oah/assets/0325-38781-murphy-grote-campaign-violation-report_tcm19-557184.pdf,

and assessing a $150 fine against a mayor in retaliation for his constitutionally protected core political speech. In doing so, they violated the mayor's rights to free speech and free elections under the US and Minnesota constitutions, which they have sworn to uphold.

They were acting in a quasijudicial capacity, and are probably immune from any civil or criminal consequences; attorney discipline is the exclusive remedy.

I'm just some guy in Indiana. I am no expert in Minnesota's rules for attorneys or administrative law judges. A rabbi I have spoken to about these issues counseled me that my task is to bring the issue to the attention of the disciplinary body, and that you can take it from there. I frankly expect that is likely the complaint will get dismissed as being "too political" or something of that sort. At most I am seeking an official reprimand; this is not a case calling for suspension, disbarment, etc. Only if the unethical conduct continued after reprimand would further action be appropriate.

The panel of ALJ's purported to act pursuant to a Minnesota statute. But they know, should know, or have reason to know that the statute is void because it is unconstitutional, and does not empower them to fine anyone for core protected political speech. 

The current statute, if I understand it, is not the same exact version that has previously been ruled unconstitutional. It has been slightly renumbered and re-enacted. But in substance it is the same.  It requires campaign literature to have an identification disclaimer. These Jim-Crow era disclaimer rules have been ruled unconstitutional for the past 62 years. They are racist (Talley v California), sexist (McIntyre v Ohio Election Commission), and have a history of being used for religious discrimination (Watchtower v Stratton, Wooley v Maynard, Barnette v Board.)

The Minnesota disclaimer statute has been found unconstitutional by both state and federal courts, as well as an attorney general opinion by Hubert Humphrey. 

Minnesota Citizens Concerned v. Kelley
427 F.3d 1106 (8th Cir. 2005)

Riley v. Jankowski
713 N.W.2d 379 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006).


Also there have been recent Supreme Court cases, such as NIFLA v Becerra, reiterating that disclaimer rules are still unconstitutional. 

I wrote to the office on December 27th sharing these concerns. The $150 fine against the mayor of Lexington is dated December 28th. There could be a fact question as to whether they had actually received and read my letter before they improperly voted to fine the Mayor for his constitutionally protected speech. Their misconduct would be more culpable if they were on notice that their actions were unlawful. 

The above cases address that the statute is void under the First Amendment. I also contend that the statute violate the Minnesota Bill of Rights. I am not aware of any Minnesota case law directly on point, but 13 other states have found that disclaimer rules violate their state constitutions. I can provide those cases on request.

I am somewhat unclear which ethical rules apply to ALJs. Below, I list some ethical rules which might apply, either directly or by analogy.

1.1 competence

Rule 3.1Meritorious Claims and Contentions

A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law. 

Rule 3.3Candor Toward the Tribunal

(a)

 A lawyer shall not knowingly:

(1) make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal, or fail to correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer;

(2) fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel; or

(b)

 A lawyer who represents a client in an adjudicative proceeding and who knows that a person intends to engage, is engaging or has engaged in criminal or fraudulent conduct related to the proceeding shall take reasonable remedial measures, including, if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal.

Rule 3.8Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor

The prosecutor in a criminal case shall:

(a)

 refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable cause;

Rule 4.1Truthfulness in Statements to Others

In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly make a false statement of fact or law.

Rule 8.3Reporting Professional Misconduct

(a)

 A lawyer who knows that another lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, shall inform the appropriate professional authority.

(b)

 A lawyer who knows that a judge has committed a violation of the applicable Code of Judicial Conduct that raises a substantial question as to the judge's fitness for office shall inform the appropriate authority.

A JUDGE SHALL UPHOLD AND PROMOTE THE INDEPENDENCE, INTEGRITY, AND IMPARTIALITY OF THE JUDICIARY, AND SHALL AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY.

Rule 1.1Compliance with the Law

A judge shall comply with the law, including the Code of Judicial Conduct.

Rule 1.2Promoting Confidence in the Judiciary

A judge shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary, and shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.

Rule 2.2Impartiality and Fairness

A judge shall uphold and apply the law, and shall perform all duties of judicial office fairly and impartially.

Rule 2.5Competence, Diligence, and Cooperation

(A) A judge shall perform judicial and administrative duties competently and diligently.

How these rules apply, or might apply, to the case in which they issued a fine for constitutionally protected speech, is that they wrote:

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 

1. The Panel is authorized to consider this matter pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 211B.35 (2022). 

2. Complainant bears the burden of proving the allegations in the Complaint. The standard of proof of a violation of Minn. Stat. § 211B.04 is a preponderance of the evidence.

But section 211 is void and unconstitutional, and confers no power to the panel. Their appointment as ALJs is not a license to conspire to violate civil rights. Their action was ultra vires and in excess of their authority. They lacked probable cause, and had a duty to dismiss the complaint. 

I also have concerns about the use of a preponderance of the evidence standard, in a case where the government is the real party in interest. I would think that a clear and convincing evidence would be required to comport with due process under both constitutions. But this is more of a hunch than a certainty. I am no expert on what Minnesota law requires for due process. What I do know is the law about disclaimers, and the panel clearly violated it here, in a way that involved impropriety and the appearance of impropriety. 

Ok,, that is the gist of my complaint. Feel free to contact me at gtbear at gmail com if you have questions. Please keep me posted on what you decide. 

Respectfully submitted, Robbin Stewart. 


draft only do not file until reviewed.   
 


Monday, January 02, 2023

 to do this week, cases stuff. so today is monday. markets closed. 1: am to 3:32 and counting.

0. go through old lists, make new list of stuff that didnt get done in 2022. examples:

casey foley real estate

american airlines. 

nebraska. nebraska. bryant emergency room bill. maybe even security deposit in lincoln. salvation army thift store theft.

move 100 shares of tesla to schwab account from chase. 

pay off bank of america and get $200, pass go.

catch up billing records for eric barnes. 

look up free dental clinic for tommy.

so for tonight i could: 

1. casey

2. cle

3. hour on cases.

4. unload van

5 make a comic.










1 call senate candidate in gary.

2. work on carroll county complaint

3 hendricks

4 marshall county public records request

5. decatur county complaint, no damages.

complaint. motion for fictitious name. interrogatories. trial notebook. exhibits. offer of settlement. proposed findings of agreed fact and law. waiver of service of process. 

6 sf ca amicus

7 alaska amicus

8 mousetraps. 33rd mouse. 

5. decatur county complaint, no damages.

indiana style caption

 in the @blank court of decatur county indiana

John Doe, plaintiff

v                                        cause number  _____ judge ____

Decatur County Election Board, defendants

COMPLAINT

 1 Introduction. This is a suit to enjoin and declare unconstitutional Indiana's disclaimer statute, IC 3-9-3-2.5, and the county's policy of enforcing a disclaimer policy.

2. Jurisdiction: This is a court of general jurisdiction. This court has subject matter jurisdiction via the Indiana Declaratory Judgment Act and 42 USC 1983 et seq. 

3. Venue is in Decatur County, Indiana, where defendants have their offices.  

4. Parties:

Plaintiff John Doe is a voter who lives in Marion County Indiana. He makes and distributes political signs throughout Indiana, including Decatur county. A motion to proceed under a fictitious name is filed herewith. The signs contain express advocacy, often for Libertarian party candidates. In the past his signs have been seized by election officials for lack of a disclaimer.

5. Defendants comprise the Decatur County Election Board, and are 

Adina Roberts - Clerk, @ and @. They are named in their official capacity.

6. The Indiana Attorney General, currently Todd Rokita, is not a party, but has a right to notice and the right to intervene within 30 days, because the suit challenges the constitutionality of a statute. 

7. Facts:
Shortly after the previous statute was declared unconstitutional per McIntyre v Ohio, Indiana passed IC 3-9-3-2.5, in 1997, re-enacting the unconstitutional statute with  minor immaterial changes. The statute makes it a crime to make 100 signs such as "Vote for Smith". Instead, it compels a disclaimer, such as "Vote for Smith, Paid for by Doe, 123 Main Street." The statute is set forth in Table I.

8. During the 2022 fall election cycle, the Decatur County Election Board met to consider a disclaimer complaint by a Tony Blodgett, against the wife of a sheriff's candidate, who had distributed a mailing.
The complaint and mailing are set out in Table II. 

9. At a later meeting, Blodgett withdrew his complaint, and the board closed the file. 

10. The state election division distributes a Political Literature brochure setting out a disclaimer policy, which we think the county adheres to as their own policy. Table III. 

11. By counsel, Plaintiff wrote to the Board's attorney advising her of the unconstitutionality of the statute. Counsel did not respond substantively, but did, via the clerk, provide a copy of the Blodgett complaint.

12. That the board convened a meeting to consider the complaint, and did not cease and desist after the letter from counsel, in addition to the text of the statute, presents a live controversy.  Plaintiff's speech is being chilled. 

13. However, because, at the request of Blodgett, the complaint was dismissed with no fine assessed and no referral for criminal charges, it is not clear that the board has taken affirmative steps to enforce its apparent policy, so no personal capacity claims are made here against the members of the board or their staff, and no Monell claim has been alleged. In the event that discovery reveals that affirmative steps are being taken to enforce the void unconstitutional policy, we may seek to amend the complaint to add damage claims, since the right to make political signs is clearly established, and the county is a municipality which can have 1983 liability under Monell. 

Claims:
State claims:
Count I

14. The sign censorship policy violates  Article I section 9 of the Indiana constitution. "No law shall be passed, restraining the free interchange of thought and opinion...."

Count II.
15. The sign censorship policy violates Article I section 9 of the Indiana constitution.  No law shall be passed ... restricting the right to speak, write, or print, freely, on any subject whatever; but for the abuse of that right, every person shall be responsible. Price v State (1993). While there is no Indiana case exactly on point, 13 states have found a right to anonymous speech under their state constitutions. Most of these cases involved similar disclaimers as are at issue here.

Count III

16. The sign censorship policy violates Article II section I, elections shall be free and equal.

Count IV

17. The sign censorship policy violates Article I section I, 

 WE DECLARE, That all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their CREATOR with certain unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness; that all power is inherent in the PEOPLE; and that all free governments are, and of right ought to be, founded on their authority, and instituted for their peace, safety, and well being. For the advancement of these ends, the PEOPLE have, at all times, an indefeasible right to alter and reform their government.

Count V

18. The sign censorship policy violates Article I section 3, Section 3. No law shall, in any case whatever ... interfere with the rights of conscience. 

Count VI

19. The sign censorship policy violates due course of law under Article I section 12.

Count VII

20. The sign censorship policy violates Article 1 section 31, Section 31. No law shall restrain any of the inhabitants of the State from assembling together in a peaceable manner, to consult for their common good; nor from instructing their representatives; nor from applying to the General Assembly for redress of grievances. Political signs such as Vote for Smith are an example of peaceable assembly, consulting for the common good, and applying for redress.  

Federal Claims:

Count VIII

21. The sign censorship policy violates the First Amendment right of freedom of the press. 

Count IX

22. The sign censorship policy violates the First Amendment right of freedom of speech.

NIFLA v Becerra, Janus v Municipal Workers, Talley v California, McIntyre v Ohio Elections Commission, Buckley v American Constitutional Law Foundation, Watchtower v Stratton, Riley v Federation of the Blind, Tornillo v Miami Herald, Wooley v Maynard, Barnette v Board.  

Count X

23. The sign censorship policy violates the First Amendment right of assembly and petition, also referred to as political association. NAACP v Alabama, Bates v Little Rock. 

Count XI. 

24.  The sign censorship policy violates the First Amendment right of privacy. 

Count XII

25. The sign censorship policy violates the 14th amendment, including the due process clause, equal protection clause, and privileges or immunities clause. 

Relief sought:

Plaintiff seeks a preliminary and permanent injunction, declaratory judgment, court costs, reasonable legal fees at counsel's standard rate of $235/hr., and such other relief as is in the interests of justice. 

3:00 am - 5:04 am 1/2/2023, 2 hours drafting complaint. 7:20 resume, begin marshall county complaint

to do: proposed consent decree. look for an example.

https://legal.thomsonreuters.com/en/c/practical-law/section-1983-toolkit <useful resource for templates.

free week available.

http://lukenbill-law.com/adam-k-lukenbill/

 general@lukenbill-law.com
Lukenbill & Lukenbill, llp
501 East Jefferson Street
Plymouth, IN 46563

Deb VanDeMark, 14750 Tulip Road, Culver,



Sean Surrisi
City Attorney
 Phone574-936-2948
Fax574-936-4371
Email cityattorney@plymouthin.com Physical Address 124 N Michigan St
Plymouth, IN 46563
Primary Department: City Attorney

to do: trt cles.

5. decatur county complaint, no damages.

indiana style caption

 in the @blank court of marshall county indiana

John Doe, 

plaintiff

v                                        cause number  _____ judge ____

Marshall  County Election Board, Sean Surissi, Jane Doe #1 and #2,

defendants

COMPLAINT

 1 Introduction. This is a suit to enjoin and declare unconstitutional Indiana's disclaimer statute, IC 3-9-3-2.5, and the county's policy of enforcing a disclaimer policy, and for damages.

2. Jurisdiction: This is a court of general jurisdiction. This court has subject matter jurisdiction via the Indiana Declaratory Judgment Act and concurrent subject matter jurisdiction per  42 USC 1983 et seq.:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress,

3. Venue is in Marshall County, Indiana, where defendants have their offices.  

4. Parties:

Plaintiff John Doe is a voter who lives in Marion County Indiana. He makes and distributes political signs throughout Indiana, and intends to distribute signs in Marshall county. A motion to proceed under a fictitious name is filed herewith. The signs contain express advocacy, often for Libertarian party candidates. In the past his signs have been seized by election officials for lack of a disclaimer.

5. Defendants comprise the Marshall County Election Board, and are  Adam Luckenbill, Ralph "Rick" Huff and County Clerk Deb Vandemark. They are named in their official and personal capacities.  They maintain offices at 211 W. Madison St, Plymouth, IN 46563. 

Sean Surrisi is a former member of the board. He is named in his personal capacity. He maintains an office at blank. Jane Doe #1 and #2 are staff of the election department who have conspired to actively enforce the campaign censorship policy. They are named in their personal capacity. Their true names are not known at this time. Whether defendants have personal liability will depend on whether they have acted in some affirmative way to promote and enforce the policy. They are not liable personally simply by holding the office, nor by adjudicating cases, since that is a quasi-judicial activity. Because the unconstitutionality of the statute is clearly established, by cases including NIFLA v Becerra and Reed v Town of Vincent, they do not enjoy qualified immunity.

Surrisi also serves as the city attorney. It is a violation of attorney ethics for a lawyer to participate in a conspiracy to violate civil rights by censoring campaign literature in violation of the Indiana constitution and First Amendment. This court may choose to refer that issue to the Indiana Disciplinary Commission if it finds good cause to do so. This court does not have direct disciplinary jurisdiction over Surrisi. Similarly Huff and Luckenbill are also an attorneys and may be in violation of attorney ethics for the same reasons. 

6. The Indiana Attorney General, currently Todd Rokita, is not a party, but has a right to notice and the right to intervene within 30 days, because the suit challenges the constitutionality of a statute. 

7. Facts:
Shortly after the previous statute was declared unconstitutional per McIntyre v Ohio, by Stewart v Taylor, Indiana passed IC 3-9-3-2.5, in 1997, re-enacting the unconstitutional statute with  minor immaterial changes. The statute makes it a crime to make 100 signs such as "Vote for Smith". Instead, it compels a disclaimer, such as "Vote for Smith, Paid for by Doe, 123 Main Street." The statute is set forth in Table I.

8. During the 2022 fall election cycle, the Marshall County Election Board met at least once to consider  disclaimer complaints. One case was resolved with a $250 fine, while another case may remain pending. 

9.  These meetings were the subject of news articles. https://max983.net/2022/10/marshall-county-election-board-holds-hearing-on-complaint/.

10. The state election division distributes a Political Literature brochure setting out a disclaimer policy, which we think the county adheres to as their own policy. Table III. https://www.in.gov/sos/elections/files/2022-Disclaimer-Brochure.pdf.

11. By counsel, Plaintiff wrote to the Board's attorney advising her of the unconstitutionality of the statute. Counsel did not respond substantively, but did, via the clerk, provide a copy of the Blodgett complaint.

12. That the board convened a meeting to consider a complaint, and did not cease and desist after the letter from counsel, in addition to the text of the statute, presents a live controversy.  Plaintiff's speech is being chilled. 

13. However, because, at the request of Blodgett, the complaint was dismissed with no fine assessed and no referral for criminal charges, it is not clear that the board has taken affirmative steps to enforce its apparent policy, so no personal capacity claims are made here against the members of the board or their staff, and no Monell claim has been alleged. In the event that discovery reveals that affirmative steps are being taken to enforce the void unconstitutional policy, we may seek to amend the complaint to add damage claims, since the right to make political signs is clearly established, and the county is a municipality which can have 1983 liability under Monell. 
The county election board has adopted a policy of fining and or investigating political signs containing core political speech in violation of the First Amendment. The county, a municipality, is thereby liable under 42 USC 1983 under Monell.

Claims:
State claims:
Count I

14. The sign censorship policy violates  Article I section 9 of the Indiana constitution. "No law shall be passed, restraining the free interchange of thought and opinion...." IC 3-9-3-2.5 restrains the free interchange of thought and opinion.

Count II.
15. The sign censorship policy violates Article I section 9 of the Indiana constitution.  No law shall be passed ... restricting the right to speak, write, or print, freely, on any subject whatever; but for the abuse of that right, every person shall be responsible. Price v State (1993). While there is no Indiana case exactly on point, 13 states have found a right to anonymous speech under their state constitutions. Most of these cases involved similar disclaimers as are at issue here. IC 3-9-3-2.5 restricts the right to speak and write or print. A sign such as "Vote for Smith" is not an abuse of that right.

Count III

16. The sign censorship policy violates Article II section I, elections shall be free and equal. Elections are not free when a person such as Doe can be jailed or fined for a sign that says "Vote for Smith." Elections are not equal when the board engages in content-based discrimination of which core political signs will be allowed. 

Count IV

17. The sign censorship policy violates Article I section I, 

 WE DECLARE, That all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their CREATOR with certain unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness; that all power is inherent in the PEOPLE; and that all free governments are, and of right ought to be, founded on their authority, and instituted for their peace, safety, and well being. For the advancement of these ends, the PEOPLE have, at all times, an indefeasible right to alter and reform their government. 

Doe here is one of the people. Their right to alter and reform the government is interfered with if they are threatened with arrest or fine for making and distributing campaign signs. 

Count V

18. The sign censorship policy violates Article I section 3, Section 3. No law shall, in any case whatever ... interfere with the rights of conscience. A campaign sign is an example of the exercise of the right of conscience. Section 3 is not limited to religious issues, but includes political speech, as here. 

Count VI

19. The sign censorship policy violates due course of law under Article I section 12.

Count VII

20. The sign censorship policy violates Article 1 section 31, Section 31. No law shall restrain any of the inhabitants of the State from assembling together in a peaceable manner, to consult for their common good; nor from instructing their representatives; nor from applying to the General Assembly for redress of grievances. Political signs such as Vote for Smith are an example of peaceable assembly, consulting for the common good, and applying for redress.  IC 3-9-3-2.5 restrains these rights.

Federal Claims:

Count VIII

21. The sign censorship policy violates the First Amendment right of freedom of the press. 

Count IX

22. The sign censorship policy violates the First Amendment right of freedom of speech.

NIFLA v Becerra, Janus v Municipal Workers, Talley v California, McIntyre v Ohio Elections Commission, Buckley v American Constitutional Law Foundation, Watchtower v Stratton, Riley v Federation of the Blind, Tornillo v Miami Herald, Wooley v Maynard, Barnette v Board are among the controlling cases of the Unites States Supreme Court which prohibit the government from compelling speech. 

Count X

23. The sign censorship policy violates the First Amendment right of assembly and petition, also referred to as political association. NAACP v Alabama, Bates v Little Rock. 

Count XI. 

24.  The sign censorship policy violates the First Amendment right of privacy. 

Count XII

25. The sign censorship policy violates the 14th amendment, including the due process clause, equal protection clause, and privileges or immunities clause. 

Relief sought:

Plaintiff seeks a preliminary and permanent injunction, declaratory judgment, court costs, reasonable legal fees at counsel's standard rate of $235/hr., and such other relief as is in the interests of justice. 

- finished first draft at 9:12 pm 1/2/23. 7:20-9:13 = 1.9 hours. 








 jan 2. 2:00 am to 3:10. 1.0 hours.

caught up on two possible cases, marshall county, $250 fine for disclaimer, sue for damages,

decatur county sue of injunction and declaratory judgment.

to do: public records request to marshall county re disclaimer cases past 3 years.

check emails to see if i overlooked anything.