FOR REVIEW AND REVISION ONLY

***

STATE OF INDIANA   )              IN THE MARION COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT
                   ) SS:          TRAFFIC / MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE DIVISION
COUNTY OF MARION   )              MARION COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT 33

CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS,             )
                                  )
      Plaintiff,                  )
                                  )
v.                                )   CASE NO. 49D33-2411-OV-041405
                                  )
ROBBIN STEWART,                   )
                                  )
      Defendant.                  )

***

### [PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING CONTINUANCE, CASE MANAGEMENT PLAN, AND TRANSFER 
### TO THE PLENARY CIVIL DIVISION PURSUANT TO TRIAL RULE 13(M)

The Defendant, Robbin Stewart, having filed his Motion to Dismiss, Motion for 
Continuance, Motion for Case Management Plan, and Motion for Jury Trial, and 
the Court being duly advised in the premises, hereby finds that **GOOD CAUSE** 
has been shown under Indiana Trial Rules 1, 6(B), and 13(M) to stay these 
specialized ordinance proceedings. 

The Court further finds that Defendant has asserted compulsory counterclaims and 
third-party claims for common law defamation and lost professional business 
profits arising out of active federal litigation in *Robbin Stewart v. Taylor* 
(Case No. 1:96-cv-03108), triggering an inviolate right to a jury trial under 
Article 1, Section 20 of the Indiana Constitution. Because this specialized 
Division lacks the administrative infrastructure to impanel or host civil 
juries, a transfer of the record is contractually and constitutionally required.

**IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED** by this Court that:

1. The evidentiary hearing currently scheduled in this matter is hereby 
**CONTINUED** to allow a reasonable time for the completion of discovery.

2. The Plaintiff City of Indianapolis shall complete and tender full, verified 
responses to Defendant's First Request for Production of Documents under Trial 
Rule 34 within thirty (30) days of this Order.

3. This action, including all underlying ordinance citations, compulsory 
counterclaims, and third-party claims, is hereby **TRANSFERRED** out of the 
Traffic and Municipal Ordinance Division and re-docketed into the **Plenary Civil 
Division of the Marion County Superior Court** pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 
13(M).

4. The Clerk of Marion County is directed to assign this matter to a Plenary 
Civil Division judge, and the parties shall establish a formal Case Management 
Plan within thirty (30) days of re-docketing to govern all remaining written 
discovery, depositions, and pre-trial filings.

**SO ORDERED** this _____ day of ________________, 2026.


                                       _________________________________________
                                       Judge, Marion County Superior Court 33

Use code with caution.

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Please copy and save this Proposed Order block alongside your omnibus motion file. In Indiana practice, judges expect you to submit a standalone page like this so they can simply sign, date, and hand it to the clerk to initiate the transfer.

Now that the entire package is built, make sure you keep a copy of your First Request for Production of Documents ready to serve on Assistant Prosecutor Hulsey at the exact same time you file this motion.

If you'd like, we can draft a template for the formal Third-Party Complaint against the neighbor next to establish the defamation counts that trigger this jury transfer. Let me know how you want to proceed.

 text

DO NOT FILE - DISCUSSION DRAFT
FOR REVIEW AND REVISION ONLY

***

BEFORE THE INDIANA SUPREME COURT DISCIPLINARY COMMISSION

In the Matter of:
Hannah Lynette Hulsey, Attorney No. 38102-49
Respondent.

COMPLAINT AND REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION

I. OPENING STATEMENT

This grievance is formally submitted to the Indiana Supreme Court Disciplinary
Commission to request an investigation into the professional conduct of
Respondent Hannah Lynette Hulsey (Bar No. 38102-49), currently serving as an
Assistant City Prosecutor for the City of Indianapolis Office of Corporation
Counsel.

This complaint alleges that Respondent Hulsey has engaged in professional
misconduct that violates the integrity of the legal profession and the special
responsibilities of a public prosecutor. Specifically, the Complainant alleges
that Respondent Hulsey entered into an agreement with a private citizen—the
Complainant’s neighbor—allowing herself to be used as a pawn to abuse her
prosecutorial authority, weaponize the legal system, and legitimize a fabricated
"dog bite" incident.

This fabricated incident was manufactured as retaliation following the
Complainant’s refusal to yield to an unlawful gun threat and extortion scheme
orchestrated by the same neighbor, who demanded and continues to demand a payment
of \$100. 

The neighbor has continued to issue threats against the Complainant and the
Complainant's dog, explicitly using the existence of this ongoing legal case as
unlawful leverage to force compliance. By participating in this conspiracy,
assisting in the validation of fraudulent evidence, and pursuing a case that is
unsupported by clear and convincing evidence, Respondent Hulsey has violated
Indiana Rules of Professional Conduct 3.8 (Special Responsibilities of a
Prosecutor), 4.1 (Truthfulness in Statements to Others), and 8.4(b), (c), and
(d) (Misconduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, and the administration of
justice).

***

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

Complainant requests an investigation based upon the following chronological
sequence of events, which can be corroborated by the evidence attached to this
grievance:

1. The Extortion Scheme and Weapon Threat (Date: [Insert Date]): On or about
[Insert Date], Complainant’s neighbor approached Complainant and threatened
Complainant with a firearm. This threat was made as a component of an ongoing
extortion scheme, wherein the neighbor demanded a cash payment of \$100.
Complainant refused to comply with the neighbor's demands.

2. The Manufactured Retaliation Incident (Date: [Insert Date - The Next Day]):
On the immediate following day, [Insert Date], as retaliation for Complainant's
refusal to comply with the \$100 extortion scheme, the neighbor manufactured,
staged, and fabricated an alleged "dog bite" incident involving Complainant. No
such bite or injury occurred as described by the neighbor.

3. The Ongoing Threats and Case Leverage: Following the fabrication of the case,
the neighbor has continued to issue ongoing threats directed at the Complainant
and the Complainant's dog. While the neighbor has not visibly displayed the
firearm again since the initial confrontation, the neighbor is actively and
continually using the pending legal action as direct leverage to perpetuate the
\$100 extortion scheme.

4. The Involvement and Conspiracy of Respondent Hulsey (Date/Timeframe: [Insert
Date/Range]): Following the manufactured incident, Respondent Hannah Lynette
Hulsey entered into an agreement with the neighbor, letting herself be used as a
pawn in his dispute. Rather than acting as a neutral minister of justice,
Respondent Hulsey leveraged her official position as an Assistant City Prosecutor
to validate the neighbor’s narrative and provide him with the legal leverage
used to continue his harassment.

5. Specific Overt Acts in Furtherance of the Conspiracy: [Insert specific facts
showing her involvement outside of normal courtroom behavior. Examples include:
Participating in unauthorized pre-charge investigations, coordinating private
communications with the neighbor to align stories, manipulating or instructing
the fabrication of reports, or ignoring documented evidence of the prior day's
gun threat and \$100 extortion attempt to push forward a case that is
unsupported by clear and convincing evidence.]

6. Continued Misconduct: Despite having access to, or the ability to verify,
the true retaliatory nature of the neighbor's claims and the ongoing threats,
Respondent Hulsey has continued to allow her office to be used as a tool to
target the Complainant, converting a private grievance into an official
state-backed action completely unsupported by clear and convincing evidence.

***

III. COUNT TWO: USE OF IMPROPER STANDARD OF PROOF TO EVADE DUE COURSE OF LAW

As an independent basis for investigation, Complainant alleges that Respondent
Hulsey has committed an administration of justice and prosecutorial duty issue
by attempting to apply an unconstitutional, lower standard of proof in this
matter.

1. Quasi-Criminal Nature of the Case: The pending enforcement action brought by
Respondent Hulsey carries consequences, including the potential seizure,
destruction, or labeling of Complainant's dog, alongside substantial fines. Under
Indiana law, actions of this nature are quasi-criminal.

2. Constitutional Mandate Under Section 12: Article 1, Section 12 of the Indiana
Constitution guarantees that "All courts shall be open; and every person, for an
injury done to him in his person, reputation, or property, shall have remedy by
due course of law." Due course of law requires a standard of proof that matches
the severity of the rights at stake. Because property rights in a companion
animal are protected, and the action is quasi-criminal, due course of law
demands the standard of "clear and convincing evidence" rather than a mere
preponderance.

3. Respondent's Ethical Breach: Respondent Hulsey is currently maintaining and
arguing that the standard of proof is a mere preponderance of the evidence. As a
licensed lawyer and a public prosecutor, Respondent Hulsey should know that
prosecuting a quasi-criminal matter under a deficient standard of proof strips
the citizen of constitutional protections. Her insistence on using a lower tier
of evidence to advance a claim unsupported by clear and convincing evidence
constitutes an abuse of her power.

4. Violation of Rules of Professional Conduct: By attempting to use the wrong
standard of proof to secure a judgment against Complainant, Respondent Hulsey
has violated:
  a. Rule 3.8 (Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor): A prosecutor's primary
  duty is to seek justice, which requires upholding constitutional due process,
  not exploiting lower standards to secure a victory on a manufactured claim
  unsupported by clear and convincing evidence.
  b. Rule 8.4(d) (Misconduct): This intentional degradation of the required
  constitutional standard constitutes conduct that is prejudicial to the
  administration of justice.

***

IV. COUNT THREE: ETHICAL LIABILITY FOR DEFAMATORY CITATION AND BREACH OF THE DUTY
OF CIVILITY

Complainant further alleges that Respondent Hulsey has violated her explicit
ethical duties by validating and maintaining a false, defamatory municipal ticket,
constituting a breach of her professional duty of civility.

1. Distinction Between Civil Immunity and Ethical Responsibility: Complainant
acknowledges that, under substantive civil law, a public prosecutor may enjoy
absolute immunity from personal liability in a civil defamation lawsuit. However,
civil immunity does not shield a practitioner from ethical oversight by this
Commission. A prosecutor remains fully responsible under the Indiana Rules of
Professional Conduct for the truthfulness and civility of the claims they publish
and maintain under color of law.

2. False Ticket as Defamation Per Se and Per Quod: The municipal citation maintained
by Respondent Hulsey falsely publishes that Complainant's dog committed an
unprovoked bite. This false allegation damages Complainant's standing and
attacks the status of the companion animal. The ticket acts as defamation per se
by imputing hazardous misconduct, creating an immediate insurability bar that
prevents Complainant from securing liability coverage. It further constitutes
defamation per quod, as the real-world operational effects of this false
publication threaten the companion animal with permanent loss of life based
entirely on allegations unsupported by clear and convincing evidence.

3. Violation of the Professional Duty of Civility: Under the Indiana Oath of
Attorneys and the preamble to the Rules of Professional Conduct, lawyers owe a
strict duty of civility, fairness, and professionalism to opposing parties. By
allowing herself to be used as a pawn to advance an unverified, retaliatory
narrative, Respondent Hulsey has violated this duty. Transforming a known
fraudulent private grievance into an official municipal charge—solely to give an
extortionist leverage over a family pet on a record completely unsupported by
clear and convincing evidence—represents a degradation of professional civility,
rendering the prosecution a tool of harassment rather than a search for justice. This
breach directly violates Rule 4.4(a) (Respect for Rights of Third Persons) by using
means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a
citizen, as well as Rule 8.4(d) (Conduct Prejudicial to the Administration of
Justice).

***

V. INDEX OF SUPPORTING EVIDENCE

The following copies of documentary evidence are attached hereto in support of
this complaint. (Note: Only copies are attached; Complainant retains all original
records).

EXHIBIT A: Evidence of the initial extortion demand and firearm threat by the
neighbor on [Insert Date], including [specify type: e.g., text messages, video 
recordings, audio logs, or witness statements].

Use code with caution.

EXHIBIT B: Documentation of the ong

 

First Amendment scrutiny regardless of how the government characterizes the requirement. Alaska's disclaimer requirement cannot survive that scrutiny.

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Argument Section (Draft)

I. THE ALASKA COURT APPLIED THE WRONG STANDARD.

The "paid for by" requirement compels speech on the face of a communication. It is a disclaimer. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995), controls.

McIntyre applied exacting scrutiny to a compelled identification requirement on political literature and struck it down. In McIntyre, exacting scrutiny is strict scrutiny — the same standard this Court applied in NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960), and Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977). Alaska's disclaimer requirement fails that standard for the same reasons Ohio's did.

II. THE BUCKLEY TEST IS A MYTH.

The deferential "substantially related to a sufficiently important interest" standard the Alaska court applied derives from equal protection intermediate scrutiny, not from Buckley v. Valeo. Its attribution to Buckley is without support in that decision's text. Buckley applied exacting scrutiny in the same demanding sense as NAACP and Bates.

III. CITIZENS UNITED DICTA DOES NOT CONTROL.

No party in Citizens United challenged the disclaimer or disclosure provisions. The Court's characterization of exacting scrutiny as a lesser standard was unnecessary to any holding. Dicta cannot displace McIntyre.

IV. THE NINTH CIRCUIT GOT IT RIGHT.

ACLU of Nevada v. Heller, 378 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2004), applied McIntyre correctly to a disclaimer requirement and struck it down. That decision is directly controlling in Alaska. The Alaska Supreme Court ignored it.

V. CHILES AND FIRST CHOICE CONFIRM THE CORRECT FRAMEWORK.

Chiles v. Salazar, 607 U.S. ___ (2026), reaffirms that relabeling compelled speech does not reduce scrutiny. First Choice Women's Resource Centers v. Davenport, 608 U.S. ___ (2026), reaffirms that compelled identification of speakers and associates burdens First Amendment rights from the moment of demand. Alaska's disclaimer requirement survives neither.

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To Do

• Read full Chiles opinion (Kagan concurrence, Jackson dissent)
• Read full First Choice opinion
• Identify SCOTUS-admitted counsel to sign brief (contact Institute for Free Speech after cert petition filed July 13)
• Pin down Boren/Buckley cross-contamination — find first case where "substantially related" appears in First Amendment disclaimer context
• Find specific Alaska out-of-state speaker additional disclaimer requirement (separate Alaska case, details forgotten)
• Consider Crawford amicus as style model
• File supplemental authority notice to Alaska Supreme Court
• Walk into Reagan National Advertising office re: billboard

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Notes on IC 3-9-3-2.5 (Indiana — Separate but Related)

Indiana's current disclaimer statute has never been ruled on under Indiana Constitution Article 1, Section 9 — Stewart has been asking courts to rule on it for years without success. A SCOTUS clarification that McIntyre exacting scrutiny = strict scrutiny would force Indiana courts to finally confront the Section 9 question. Stewart v. Taylor struck the predecessor (IC 3-9-3-2). Majors v. Abell lost on 3-9-3-2.5 via Posner/McConnell. Chiles and First Choice now provide the framework to try again.

 so mr briown comes over todasy and he mentions about how michelle wanted to get my poa nd have me civally committed and then live in my house. we'll do a podcast about it.

 ITIGATION BLUEPRINT: CLASS-ACTION CASE SUMMARY

Forum: U.S. District Court, Eastern District of California
Parties: John Doe et al. v. Members of the Fair Political Practices Commission (FPPC)
Counsel Target: Alan Gura (Institute for Free Speech, D.C. / CA Bar Active)

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1. The Core Injury & Class Structure (The Binary Trap)

The FPPC's unconstitutional sign-layout rules force political candidates to surrender up to 35% of their physical visual canvas under explicit threat of misdemeanor prosecution, asset seizure, and jail time. The class action splits this injury into a binary structure across a 2-year federal / 1-year state lookback window:

• Subclass A (The Canvas-Extinguished Class): Candidates who complied with the mandate, resulting in concrete actual damages measured as "Extinguished Advertising Inventory" (loss of visual market value) plus printing remediation costs.
• Subclass B (The Stewart/Deterred Class): Candidates who refused to comply and were completely deterred from distributing or printing their signage due to the express threat of criminal enforcement (Stewart v. Taylor).

2. The Dual-Track Damages Engine

• Federal Track (42 U.S.C. § 1983): Claims for actual compensatory market-value damages and uncapped individual-capacity punitive damages. Nominal damages are locked in under Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski, ensuring absolute Article III standing and a permanent path to a $5 million lump-sum fee/cost award under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (Hutto v. Finney exception).
• State Track (Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1 - The Bane Act): Bypasses standard state-law sovereign immunity hurdles by utilizing a statutory private right of action. Both Subclasses are entitled to a mandatory minimum statutory floor of $4,000 per individual violation without being required to prove actual economic loss. If willful operational suppression or coercive distress is proven, the jury can trigger a treble multiplier, escalating recovery to $12,000 per violation, per person.

3. The Evisceration of Defensive Immunities

• Federal Qualified Immunity: Completely defeated via the "Griset II Notice Hammer." Griset v. FPPC (Griset II) provided explicit, binding notice within the Ninth Circuit that statutory layout/disclosure rules violate the core anonymous and unencumbered political speech rights established in McIntyre and Talley. Continued enforcement constitutes bad-faith, reckless disregard of clearly established law.
• State Statutory Immunity (Gov. Code §§ 820.2 & 821.6): Completely neutralized. Under the native constitutional interest vacancy doctrine (Schuster; Ghafari), a state actor has zero legal authority or discretion to enforce an unconstitutional mandate; their actions are strictly ultra vires. Furthermore, Leon v. County of Riverside (2023) confines § 821.6 prosecutorial immunity strictly to formal malicious prosecution, stripped of authority over pre-litigation administrative civil rights coercion. Under Cornell, reckless disregard of a constitutional boundary automatically establishes the specific intent required to unlock Bane Act liability.

4. The Settlement & Litigation Wedges

• The Yick Wo Discovery Protocol: Subpoenaing internal FPPC case management logs, digital communication channels (Slack/text/email), and audit logs to prove a systematic, politically asymmetric pattern and practice of selective enforcement.
• The Certification Feint: A tactical motion under California Rules of Court, Rule 8.548 requesting that the Ninth Circuit certify a question to the California Supreme Court regarding direct actual damages for Tri-Constitutional violations (Speech, Privacy, Equal Protection) targeting internet speakers. While Degrassi and Gates present a nominal-damages wall on pure state constitutional claims, the threat of the Supreme Court using the Privacy Clause (Art. I, § 1) to create a borderless digital tort creates an asymmetric risk that forces the state to blink.
• The Maher Pipeline: The ultimate hammer. Individual staff face personal punitive bankruptcy from the § 1983 and Bane Act claims. To rescue their judgment-proof staff, the California Attorney General must step to the table, waive 11th Amendment immunity, and execute a prospective federal consent decree alongside the global fee-shifting payout.

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