What was your training and supervision, with regard to the rights of the occupants,
June 7th. Ooh, the response brief from san francisco should be in.
==
Withdrew my last $300 at chase. Need to go over credit card statement
Got ins. 600/yr. Business ins. Need to go back and get homeowners.
Friday. Tonight, make some bags go away.
Melissa? Medlinda? Ralph?
Needs a fine dealt with.
So to do, go on mycase.com. Get her info, print it off, do a template letter for reduction of fines.
To the Honorable ___,
____ County Court
___ County Courthouse:
Cc: [ ]
I am writing with reference to case # , name, dob. I write as a friend of the court and not in a representative capacity. I am Robbin Stewart, IN 17147-53.
Recently I had an interview with ___ to discuss an office manager position/
Business partnership position.
This job may involve operating a company vehicle at times, so we require our subcontractors to be licensed and insured.
I learned that ___ has outstanding [charges, fines, fees.] which have been interfering with her abilty to find a job and housing. It is my impression that she has served her time, has paid over $3000, but has been unable to raise the last $700.
Timbs v Indiana counsels that fines should not be excessive. This has changed Indiana law after v’s sentencing, and could be taken into account. Similarly, under the Indiana constitution article 1 section 16, the purpose of the criminal justice sytstem is to be reformatory, not punitive. Given her indigency and current inability to pay, the remaining fees represent an undue hardship.
I am writing to respectfully request that the remaining fees be dismissed and her case closed.
Sincerely, me.
Letter head?
=5:47 friday night.
Took the cans, got $38.
Cleaned my room for a few hours. Put away some books, took out trash. Ok i’m out of here.
Got car insurance
Need business and home insurance
New text may 25th.
=
To do list
Stewart & associates.
H n h/ gupta.
San francisco
Starke
Carroll
Hendrix
Stewart & associates.
H n h/ gupta.
San francisco
The current status of this case is that we are waiting on the supreme court to rule or not on an interlocutory appeal.
Perhaps for long term strategic reasons, plaintiff focuses almost entirely on Bonta. And the defense focuses mostly on an imaginary version of citizens united that never existed, but certainly no longer does in light of subsequent cases such as reed v town of gilbert, nifla, masterpiece, Cruz, 303, and so forth.
Meanwhile, I am submitting this amicus brief to discuss first San Francisco law, then California law, then US law.
San Francisco’s best known case might be Yick Wo v. Hopkins. In that case, an overtly neutral regulation of wooden laundries was found to actually be racist and to offend due process. Here, times have changed, a little. San Francisco’s void disclaimer rules are racist and sexist. Doxxing is one of the worst sins of the new online era.
Talley v California, 1960, did not involve San Francisco, but another municipality. The holding of Talley was that local governments in California cannot require disclaimers on political speech. This specific holding, never overruled, governs this case. All that discussion of tiers of scrutiny under bonta and citizens is misplaced, when this case has already decided the specific question of law before us - can a california municipality impose a disclaimer rule?
While Talley governs this case, it is helpful to know that McIntyre (1995) clarified that there is no “elections exception” to Talley. McIntyre and Talley remain good law today.
In Talley, Manuel Talley was a black man married to a white woman in 1960, years before Loving. If he had been doxxed at his home address, this would have endangered his children. The Supreme Court reversed his ten dollar fine. Talley, NAACP v Alabama, and Bates v Little Rock are a trio of civil rights cases that establish the modern right to privacy and political association. The position San Francisco takes here is that of Jim Crow.
I am not suggesting that any of the defendants here hold individually racist views; rather they are supporting institutional racism in a way neither constitution allows.
The Talley case is the landmark in this area of law. Any court case about disclaimers that fails to mention Talley is suspect. Talley informed the next San Francisco case, Farzad Ghafari v People, 1978:
The rights of freedom of speech, peaceful assembly and free association fn. 2 are unquestionably protected activities which "lie at the foundation of a government based upon the consent of an informed citizenry ..." (Bates v. Little Rock (1960) Britt v. Superior Court (1978) [1] Appellants contend that the statute is overbroad on its face because it flatly prohibits anonymity under circumstances where these protected activities may be involved and because the restriction is not required by a compelling state interest nor is it implemented in the least restrictive manner possible. We agree.
The proposition that, under certain circumstances, anonymity is essential to the exercise of constitutional rights is not a novel one. "Inviolability of privacy in group association may in many circumstances be indispensable to preservation of freedom of association, particularly where a group espouses dissident beliefs." (N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama (1958) Britt v. Superior Court) "Persecuted groups and sects from time to time throughout history have been able to criticize oppressive practices and laws either anonymously or not at all." (Talley v. California (1960) [87 Cal. App. 3d 261].
The People argue that section 650a in no way restricts the legitimate exercise of First Amendment freedoms. The assertion is patently in error. The fact that the state, through this statute, takes no direct action to restrict the exercise of constitutional rights is not dispositive, for in the area of First Amendment liberties, "abridgement of such rights, even though unintended, may inevitably follow from varied forms of governmental action." (N.A.A.P. v. Alabama, supra,
[ i think this same quote shows up in the 2023 opinion]
Second, if arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply them ...
Section 650a denies equal protection of the laws.
[5] Appellants claim that the distinction in section 650a between anonymous entertainment or amusement and anonymous public issue communication is a violation of the equal protection clause. (U.S. Const., 14th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 7.) Because section 650a affects fundamental First Amendment rights, it is not clothed with the usual presumption of constitutionality which most legislation enjoys in the face of an equal protection argument. Rather, "the state must first establish that it has a compelling interest which justifies the law and then demonstrate that the distinctions drawn by the law are necessary to further that purpose." (People v. Olivas (1976) 17 Cal. 3d 236, 251 [131 Cal. Rptr. 55, 551 P.2d 375].) The state has not met this burden. As discussed above, the state cannot show that section 650a is necessary to a compelling state interest--
Content control is the essence of forbidden censorship under the equal protection clauses.
Speech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government.
FN 5. In light of our holding, it is unnecessary for us to reach the other issues raised by petitioners, namely, that section 650a violates the right of privacy (Cal. Const., art. I, § 1; see White v. Davis (1975) 13 Cal. 3d 757 [120 Cal. Rptr. 94, 533 P.2d 222]),
FN 6. The ironies of history. The state vigorously defends a statute which, if 205 years ago the Royal Colony of Massachusetts had had an analogue thereof, Samuel Adams and Paul Revere, with their band of colonials disguised as Indians, might never have reached Boston Harbor, the greatest Tea Party in our history would never have occurred, and there, unlike here, there was an intent to do a wrongful act.
Next I will look at California law.
Following Talley, most of the case law is based on the First Amendment, until Schuster.
Canon City liked the general idea of a disclaimer statute, but found that this particular one was defective. Bongiorni strikes down another California statute based on Talley. People v. Bongiorni, 205 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 856 (Sup. Ct. 1962.) Drake, 1979. 97 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 36.
Schuster ruled that disclaimer statutes violate both constitutions. Schuster v. Imperial County Mun. Ct., 167 Cal. Rptr. 447 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1042. That holding remains binding today. San Francisco’s disclaimer rules, under Schuster, violate the state constitution. Therefore they are not “legitimate” state interests under the Bonta test, and are not overriding state interests under the McIntyre test. Plaintiffs have not made claims under the state constitution, but the two are interconnected in this way.
The next California case after Schuster was Griset. The Griset case is procedurally complicated.
In what I will call Griset I, Griset v. Fair Political Practices Commission, , the court distinguished Schuster but did not overrule it. The opinion upheld a disclaimer statute. In Griset II, 69 Cal. App. 4th 818, 82 Cal. Rptr.2d 25 (1999), years later, the court pointed to McIntyre and said the California disclaimer rules were unconstitutional. In Griset III, the court vacated Griset II on mootness grounds. After Griset III, Griset II was no longer binding, and the California Fair Political Practices Commission resumed requiring disclaimers, although Griset II remains persuasive precedent for the idea that for them to do so is unconstitutional, which suggests they are acting unethically.
[case on privacy clause.]
Cases under other state constitutions:
Schuster’s holding that disclaimer rules violate the state constitution is not an outlier. 15 states, at least, have considered this issue. 13 of them have found a right to anonymous free speech under their state constitutions.
To do: quote some of the best
Table 2 list:
AZ: Quill and Penn 2023
CA: Schuster v. Imperial County Mun. Ct., 167 Cal. Rptr. 447 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1042,
CO: Tattered Cover
DE: In re Opinion of the Justices, 324 A.2d 211 (Del. 1974),
FL: Doe v. Mortham, 708 So.2d 929 (Fla.1998), broward, smithers
IL: Illinois v White, 506 NE2d 1284 (Ill. 1987),
LA: Louisiana. v. Moses, 655 So. 2d 779 (La. Ct. App. 1995), Louisiana v. Fulton, 337 So.2d 866 (La. 1976), Louisiana v. Burgess, 543 So.2d 1332 (1989), Jackson.
MA: Commonwealth v Dennis, 368 Mass. 92, 329 N.E.2d 706 (1974),
ME: Opinion of the Justices, 306 A.2d 18 (Maine 1973),
MO: Ex Parte Harrison, 110 S.W. 709 (Mo 1908),
ND: Ed assoc case
NY: New York v. Duryea, 351 NYS2d 978 (1974),
OH: McIntyre (1994, 1995.)
OR ripple
TN v Acey
NC v Peterslie
[Washington ex rel. Public Disclosure v. 119 Vote No!, 957 P.2d 691 1998)]
9th cir cases:
Rosen v. Port of Portland, 641 F.2d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir.1981), Grossman v. City of Portland, 33 F.3d 1200, 1207-08 (9th Cir. 1994). ACLU v Heller, 378 F3d 979 (9th Cir. 2004), Magic Mike v. City of Seattle, (9th Cir. 6/24/2009) ,
Other circuits:
Wilson v stocker, Citizens for Responsible Gov't State PAC v. Davidson, 236 F.3d 1174, (10th Cir. 2000)
Vermont Right to Life v. Sorrell, 221 F.3d 376, 392 (2d Cir. 2000),
Virginia Society for Human Life Inc. v. Caldwell, 152 F3d 268 (4th Cir. 1998),
{Washington ex rel. Public Disclosure v. 119 Vote No!, 957 P.2d 691 1998), [Watchtower v Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002)}
Supreme Court cases:
Barnette, 1943, was a First Amendment religion clause case, so was not dirextly controlling, but has been adopted by recent precedent such as 303 and janus.
Following Talley. Tornillo, Wooley, Riley, McIntyre, ACLF, Watchtower, Town of Gilbert, Janus v Municipal Workers #35, NIFLA v Becerra, and 303 LLC v Colorado, are the controling cases.
Three cases that are not controlling are Valeo, McConnell, and Citizens Unted. While these are landmark express advocacy cases, the instant case is not an express advocacy case.
The word ‘disclaimer’ does not appear in Valeo. We use the term “Valeo” to distinguish it from the Victoria Buckley v American Constitutional Law Foundation case, which doees control here. McConnell, in note 88, specfcally states that McIntyte remains good law.
(revise) The Citizens United case is discussed in more detail below, but a few highlights:
It was initially drafted as an express advocacy case by James Bopp, but when CU switched lawyers to Paul Clement, the express advocacy argument was downplayed, a sidepoint to a side point.
The discussion of disclaimers in Part IV is wholly dicta, and is not the holding of the case. Bopp, who approves of disclaimer regulations, does not challenge them directly, but only seeks express advocacy exemptions, sometimes called loopholes.
The term “disclaimer” was not mentoned at oral argument.
An organizaton that calls itself the Campaign Legal Center has been misrepresenting the decision, leading to what I will call the Mederos fallacy. Their version of CU fits their agenda, whch we could call “reform” or “pro-censorship”. They have millions of dollars, 88 staff members, are highly skilled at zealous advocacy, have a long term vision, and are distorting the development of the law in this area. Mederos, hizer v alaska?, this case’s panel decision in March, later re-adopted, are examples of their corrosive influence.
Their argument is not based on the case as a whole, which expands First Amendment protection of election speech and reaffirms strict scrutiny as the standard of review.
Instead, it takes one brief passage out of context, and then attempts a bait and switch, first misreading what the passage actually says, and then falsely claiming that this passage is the holding of the case, rather than being dicta inside of dicta.
Sometimes in the English language a word can have more than one meaning, depending on context. Is your refrigerator running? I do have Prince Albert in a can.
Sometimes in the English language a word can be a contronym, meaning both one thing and its opposite. “Exacting” is a such a contronym. Its meaning is contextual. “Exacting sctruniny” means one thing in a land use case about group homes, another thing in a case about censorship of political speech, and a third, opposite, thing, in a case about financial reporting of the small percent of campaign expenses whch constitute express advocacy.
In one sentence the word “exacting” is used in one way, then in the next sentence it is used on the opposite way. Both sentences are by themselves true. But when stacked as they were, it invites a misinterpration. It is less of an error than a trap for the unwary. While the opnion is listeed as by Justice Kennedy, I have often wondered if J. Scalia had anything to do with this clever passage.
As Plaintiiffs have said, these are terms of art.
Proposition One is that the court has used the term exacting scrutiny in both disclosure and disclaimer cases. (That is to say, in both cases about apples and oranges, or in both cases about elephants and giraffes. I will try to avoid the terms “disclosure” anmd “disclaimer”.) This is true.
Proposition Two is that in disclosure cases “exacting scrutiny” is used to describe a permissive legal regime, first under Buckley, now under Bonta, where the word was used as a euphemism to mean a lack of exacting scrutiny, merely “substantial relation to legitimate government interest.”
This is also true, if somewhat irrelevant to the issue at hand, the unconstitutional censorship of political speech, requring the strictest most exacting scrutiny.
Let’s look up the term exacting n a dictionary.
What I call the Mederos fallacy is taking propositions One and Two and reaching the false conclusion that disclaimers (unconstitutional censorship of politicaqal speech) are only subject to the “merely substantial relation to legitimate government interest” test.
When a court falls victim to this bit of legerdemain/sleight of hand, it has taken the bait and switch, and allowed a discussion aboutt disclaimers (the unconstitutional censorship of core political speech) to be sidetracked by different rules about disclosure (financial reporting of express advocacy.)
That is what the passage suggests but does not state, and certainly does not hold. It’s a trap. I personally suspect CLC knows this and is arguing in bad faith. Perhaps they draw a different line than I do between the poles of zealousness and a duty of candor to the tribunal.
When you see a court’s opnion failing to cite cases about disclaimers, and instead citing cases about financial reporting of express advocacy, they may have fallen for the Mederos fallacy.
Instead of controlling cases such as Buckley v ACLF and Reed v Town of Gilbert or Norman v Reed, the Mederos fallacy case will cite to Buckley v Valeo and Doe v. Reed.
The March panel obviously fell prey to the Mederos fallacy. Why the October panel then republished the eroneous opinion after it had been fully repudiated by 303 v Elenis, is beyond my ken.
In 303 LLC, the court began with Barnette and reaffirned each compelled speech ruling, mentioning Tornillo, Riley, Wooley, NAACP, and so forth.
Plaintiff’s claim that San Francisco’s compelled speech disclaimer rules are unconstitutioanl and void is supported by the 303 reaffirmation of the basic free speech princple that government may not compel speech, and therefore has shown the requiste level of likelihood of success such that it would be an abuse of discretion and error of law to fail to issue a temporary injunction as the case proceeds.
The 303 decision directly controls here. It may also be useful in the Alaska case, Smith v Helzer. The issue in Helzer is whether the state may compel the speech of someone named Smith. The holding of 303 was that the state may not compel the speech of a Smith. But see J. Sotomayor’s dissent, arguing that smiths are a public accomodation.
(I have not even gotten to reasons 6-10 yet re CU)
Summary:
I write only about the disclaimer claim, not the disclosure claim.
The ordinance is void because it violates the free speech provisions of the state constitution under the controlling case of Schuster, and is highly likely to violate the privacy clause as well. 13 of 15 states agree. While this does not mean there is a 13/15ths likelihood of success, there is some likelihood of success, just on either state claim, before we get to the controlling federal authority and the weight of the 50 cases in support. It would be abuse of discretion to cause irreparable harm by failing to issue a tro.
The ordinance is void because it conflicts with ten controlling supreme court decisions about compelled speech. Cases about campaign financial reporting of express advocacy are of little relephants, because they are about giraffes/ a different topic and a different standard of review, even if they share the same label. There are 10 reasons CU does not control.
Under the McIntyre line of cases, the usual assumptions of constitutionality are reversed, and the government bears the burden of defending its rules. The court applies close strict exacting scrutiny under the “kiss of death: :well nigh insuperable
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new text june 8 2024 3 51 am.
medicated. still up.
it's been an interesting week.
1, i bought a trailer, $1000, 2 mr. de andrade came back. 3 we had a chat about me selling him
the jersey coffee company. 0.5 a cup, since 1854.
menu:
coffee 0.5
better coffee 2
w/ g'oatmilk. + 0.5
keep the cup +1.
refills 1.
H2O 1. Dihydrous monoxide 2.
NaivE mineral water 2/spring water/summer water
Fiji water 5
Hawaii water 3.
How about a nice Hawa'ain punch? 5, 10
POG 3 cup 5 pint
Lemon shookup big cup 5, barrel 10
Mango shookup 5
Lemon Italian Ice 5 cup, 8 pint
corn 5
burger 9
something fried 6
veggie tempura 5
fungus tempura 8
potato tempura 4
sliced cucumbers and/or tomatos small plate 5, platter 10
dolmas 7
soup of tomorrow cup 5, pint 7
(list of many soups, just open can) 5, 7.
knishes - out
soft serve - machine is broken. g'oatmilk soft serve? coffee flavored. tiramisu.
beagles 4 a round rye roll
maui plate lunch 10
snacks 1, 2, or 3.
ok enough of that, now back to ghafari. 4:28 am.
this is exciting. two reasons ghafari might govern. law of the case/ issue preclusion/claim preclusion, even works for yick wo v Hopkins! res judicata.
second reason: ghafari is controlling precedent for the proposition that San Francisco is violating equal protection under section 7, as well as the 14th A. also, it used strict scrutiny.
so if the regulation is void under the state equal protection clause, it cannot pass scrutiny under cases such as NIFLA.
The district court and the circuit court may be in error, having misunderstood the key cases such as Talley and McIntyre, and led astray by the false statements of law in the clc brief.
More likely, however, CLC has carefully forum shopped, and hoped to draw a panel in open revolt against the Supreme Court's consensus that, whether or not discriminating against Negros or Chinamen or women or religious minorties is a wise policy choice, it is unconstitutional. Talley, Bates, NAACP v Ala, Button, etc. Gobitis, Barnette. Watchtower v Stratton, Wooley v Maynard.
See the Buckeye institute brief for scholarly references.
When I was a lad and began my study of law in 1978, the lions of the court at the time, Justices Brennan and Marshall, were liberal democrats who supported free speech, while the conservative faction was more stodgy.
These days it is often the liberal wing of the court that opposes free speech (as well as other fundamental liberties including 2nd A.)
here though this plot against the constitution cannot prevail.
new text Saturday June 6
spent $1200 at home Depot. paid my crew about 400. bought tools $100.
went to pride. got insurance yesterday. today we missed the ins guy.
bj back. some new guy zz working.
to do: charge laptop,
draft complaint ... not Delphi... Knox! Starke county.