friday I list 2/27
1 file motion to quash
2 file case to expunge
3 email helen
4 file response for ex of time federal court
5 umpster ive two bags
6 cut grass on brookside lot
7 picke up trash
8 made list
9 emaile opposing counsel
10 $5 coffee newspaper.
- need ins!
check brakes
load car with scrap.
clinic in am?

wenesay 7/25
did
1 calle mom
2 move boxes in basement a  attic
3 sol generator
4 umster ive foo
5 put out trash
  6 file aearancce maile an emaile


to o


motion to squash
mow lawn
ue to ost r

“‘Bury the niggers,’ ” Brandenburg v.Ohio, 395 U. S. 444, 446, n. 1 (1969) (per curiam).

test

Giron v. Corrections Corporation of America, 14 F. Supp. 2d 1245 (D.N.M. 1998). In that case a woman was raped by a guard at a private prison. The court held that the guard was “performing a traditional state function” by working at the prison, so his actions were “under color of state law.”

summary of argument



h an h shoul be enie any injunctive relief in this case because they come wih unclean hans.
they shoul be barre from ositive injuncions in every case,
or a least the court shoul regar any such requess as sttrongly isfavore an subject to a rebutabke oresumtion.

unclean hhans;

1 abuse of ro se littigants, 3 reorte cases

Brian J. Paul, Daniel E. Pulliam, Anne K. Ricchiuto, Faegre Baker Daniels LLP, Indianapolis, IN, Amy B. Jones, Silvia B. Miller, Health and Hospital Corporation of Marion County, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellant. Dennis Foreman, Indianapolis, IN, Appellee pro se.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

HEALTH AND HOSPITAL CORPORATION OF MARION COUNTY, Appellant–Plaintiff, v. Dennis FOREMAN, Appellee–Defendant.

No. 49A02–1504–OV–229.

    Decided: February 10, 2016

10] Because the provisions of Ind.Code § 16–22–8–31(e) and Ind.Code § 34–35–3–3 required Foreman to file an affidavit concerning why he wanted a change of judge, and Foreman did not do so, the trial court erred when it granted Foreman's request for change of judge. We accordingly reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

 

election Issues

Common Cause of Indiana v. Lawson (U.S. Dist. Ct. – So. Dist. of Ind.; Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals) (Filed 10/17)

            This case alleges that a recent Indiana statute violates the federal National Voter Registration Act of 1993 by allowing voters to be purged from voter registration rolls prematurely. The district court entered a preliminary injunction in favor of the plaintiff and the matter is being appealed by the State.

            ATTORNEY(S):  Jan P. Mensz, Gavin M. Rose, ACLU and other national attorneys,

 

2 kille a baby, sough tot evae liabiliy hry mumbojumbo.

BELLER WELCH v. HEALTH AND HOSPITAL CORP OF MARION ..

3 i hear hey kille a og 

four  miller
5 alafox
six rior 5six cases 
7 tresass
77 lienan clean - racism an sexism.
cleanan jerk
9 hysical iinvasion of home
ten ba warrant - lawyer's office.
11 violation of uty of civility.
12 bronner case contemt an violation of attorney client rivilege

13 awn young case - kille an hurt ol eole. robbe. rying to gett the money back.
 majors v abel - uty to court -canor to tribunal. whatshisnamehan h resient with big law firm
matthew guttwein. was suose to write the motion to submit tranfer the certifie case to the inia sureme court, but never ni so.
the result was thesureme court ever hear the case on those issues.
it later hear the case on other issuees.
131 - the guy with the van has stories. woman with tomatoes.
 15 they o nt sen emails to ro se, only ostcars.
151 h an h commaneers the courtroom.
17 they threaten rather thhan roblemsolve.
then they try to eny they threatene.
amit emails.
179 
they urn litering into civil rights violattiuons. blame  theh victim. meention vicims rights amenment. contrary to ublic olicy.
miller. ask her ner oah about her obligations unerr tthe iniaja aoth, e g never tturn own a clkient.
1 ossible - miller state that x ha been foun in contemt, an the only issue before the court was whetther to sentence for 3 ays. juge foun, no, no n contemt yet. so i she lie o te court/ or just make an argument/

22
2o1 eastern also  fourty n tacoma

Miscellaneous

Gillenwater v. City of Jeffersonville (U.S. Dist. Ct. – So. Dist.) (2/18)
            The plaintiff owns property in Jeffersonville and a house on the property was in disrepair.  While the plaintiff was in negotiations with a non-profit organization interested in purchasing and renovating the house, the City of Jeffersonville decided that it should be destroyed as an unsafe building.  However, the only notice that they provided of their intent to do so was provided to the vacant house, and not to the plaintiff’s separate residential address.  As a result, the plaintiff did not appear at a scheduled hearing and, in his absence, an order issued for the house to be demolished and it has since been demolished.  The case alleges that this is a violation of procedural due process.
think about section 12 too

23
 Indiana Protection and Advocacy Services Commission v. Commissioner, Indiana Department of Correction (U.S. Dist. Ct.—So. Dist. of Indiana)
shoul contact them.

This case challenges the continued confinement of seriously mentally ill prisoners by the Department of Correction in segregated or extremely isolated prison environments.  The case is brought on behalf of Indiana Protection and Advocacy Services which is charged by federal law for advocating on behalf of the mentally ill.  We have added prisoners and class has been certified and we are moving forward.  The case was tried in July of 2011 and the trial court recently ruled in plaintiffs’ favor, finding that the treatment of these seriously mentally ill prisoners violates the 8th amendment.  A final settlement has been negotiated and has been allowed to go into effect.  The case remains open for monitoring.

[4] We first note Foreman proceeded at trial and proceeds in this appeal pro se. A litigant who proceeds pro se is held to the same established rules of procedure that trained counsel is bound to follow. Smith v. Donahue, 907 N.E.2d 553, 555 (Ind.Ct.App.2009), trans. denied, cert. dismissed. One risk a litigant takes when he proceeds pro se is that he will not know how to accomplish all the things an attorney would know how to accomplish. Id. When a party elects to represent himself, there is no reason for us to indulge in any benevolent presumption on his behalf or to waive any rule for the orderly and proper conduct of his appeal. Foley v. Mannor, 844 N.E.2d 494, 502 (Ind.Ct.App.2006).

[10] Because the provisions of Ind.Code § 16–22–8–31(e) and Ind.Code § 34–35–3–3 required Foreman to file an affidavit concerning why he wanted a change of judge, and Foreman did not do so, the trial court erred when it granted Foreman's request for change of judge. We accordingly reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

this case is an examle of how h an h uses the court system to abuse ro se litigants, this is unclean hans.

Also, unclean hands is a form of “affirmative defense”. This means that the defendant alleges that the plaintiff has done something which disqualifies them from obtaining relief. Therefore, the defendant has the burden of both raising the defense in court and proving it.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court

entered judgment in favor of HHC on its complaint

,

ordered Slate to pay

the

$100 citation to HHC, issued a “clean & lien for [the

] property,” and issued a

permanent injunction “that [the defendant] shall not violate Chapter 10 of the

Code.”

Id.

[3]

On August 7, 2015, Slate filed an answer and a
 

In particular, Slate maintains that

[he] had no time to even talk to a lawyer before the hearing, let

alone prepare [his] meritorious defense. [He] did not voluntarily

go to court

on December 23rd but went because the summons

ordered [him] to go there or face bad consequences. [He] did not

even have time to finish reading all the legal papers [he] had

found behind [his] door and just barely found the Courthouse in

time for the hear

ing. Without legal advice, [he] had to go to

court having no idea what terms like due process, jurisdiction,

service of process or appeal meant and what would happen at the

hearing. [He] was physically at the hearing but not mentally

legally there. [He]

filed no Answer or Appearance Form or even

knew what they were.

Court of Appeals of Indiana

|

Memorandum

Decision

49A02

-

1603

-

OV

-

681

|

N

o

v

e

m

b

e

r

3

0

,

2

0

1

6

Page

8

of

10

bears the burden of proving the lack of personal jurisdiction by a preponderance

of the evidence, unless that lack is apparent on the face of the complaint.

Id.

[7]

A defendant can waiv

e the lack of personal jurisdiction and submit himself to

the jurisdiction of the court if he responds or appears and does not contest the

lack of jurisdiction.

Id.

Here,

Slate appeared at the December 23, 2014,

hearing on HHC’s complaint and participate

d in the hearing.

At no time did

Slate challenge the trial court’s personal jurisdiction over him. It was not until

more than one year later when, in his motion to set aside judgment, Slate

alleged that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over him and the

judgme

nt was void under Trial Rule 60(B)(6).

[8]

We hold that, because Slate appeared at the December 23, 2014, hearing and

did not contest the trial court’s jurisdiction over his person at that time, Slate

waived his claim of lack of personal jurisdiction

and sub

mitted himself to the

jurisdiction of the court

. Accordingly, the trial court did not

err

when it denied

Slate’

s motion to set aside the judgment as void for lack of personal jurisdiction.

Issue Two: Due Process

[9]

Slate also contends that, while a Sheriff’

s deputy left a copy of the complaint

and summons at his residence, Slate did not find those documents until the day

before the December 23, 2014, hearing. Slate maintains that he was

“prejudiced and harmed by not receiving the summons and complaint throu

gh

the mail” and that the “lack of adequate notice time was [a] due process

violation.” Appellant’

s Br. at 18

-

19.

And, citing

World

-

Wide Volkswa

 Slate cannot show that the trial court’s judgment against him

is void

because of a due process violation.

Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), this

Memorandum Decision shall not be

regarded as precedent or cited before any

court except for the purpose of establishing

the defense of res judicata, collateral

estoppel, or the law of the case.

APPELLANT PRO SE:

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

DALE RABER, PRO SE

ERIC J. ESSLEY

Indianapolis, Indiana 

Dale Raber (“Raber”) appeals, pro se

, the Marion Superior Court’s judgments

against him in two separate actions, both

stemming from environmental health code

violations filed by the Health and Hospital Corporation of

Marion County (“the

Corporation”) pursuant to Indi

ana Code section 16-22-8-31(b).

1

Concluding that Raber

has failed to comply with various rules of

appellate procedure, we dismiss his appeal. 

 Raber now appeals th

e trial court’s rulings in both civil actions.

Discussion and Decision

An appellant who proceeds pro se is “held to the same established rules of

procedure that a trained legal counsel is bound to follow and, therefore, must be prepared

to accept the consequences of his or her action.”

Thacker v. Wentzel

, 797 N.E.2d 342,

345 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (quoting

Ramsey v. Review Bd. Of

Ind. Dep’t of Workforce

Dev.

, 789 N.E.2d 486, 487 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003)). As

such, a pro se litigan

t is expected to

adhere to the prescribed form

of the appellate brief set out in Appellate Rule 46. Among

other things, that means the Statement of Fact

s is to be a narrative statement of the facts

in the underlying action and is

not to be argumentative. 

 Additionally, the appellate brief

must contain a Statement of the Case section.

The rule describes the contents of that

section as follows: “This statement shall br

iefly describe the nature of the case, the

course of the proceedings relevant to the issues presented for revi

ew, and the disposition

of these issues by the trial court or Admi

nistrative Agency.” Ind. Appellate Rule

46(A)(5) (2006). The Statement of the Case sets

forth the procedural history of the case.

See

Moore v. Liggins

, 685 N.E.2d 57, 65-66 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997).

Raber has failed to include these sections

under separate headings in his appellate

brief.

Among others, Raber “believes he is

being herrassed [sic] by the inspector,

Mr. Vanvoorst [sic].” Br. of Appellant at

2. Further, Raber requests that the

Corporation’s attorney “Amy Jones [sic] continuous misbehavior and Court Missconduct

[sic] should be looked into[.]” B

r. of Appellant at 5. 

Failure to follow the appellate

rules can, in egregious situations, lead to dismissal

of the appeal.

Kirchoff v. Selby

, 703 N.E.2d 644, 656 (Ind. 1998). We regretfully

conclude that Raber’s failure to comply with

the appellate rules precludes review of his

appeal.

Dismissed.

Failure to follow the appellate

rules can, in egregious situations, lead to dismissal

of the appeal.

Kirchoff v. Selby

, 703 N.E.2d 644, 656 (Ind. 1998). We regretfully

conclude that Raber’s failure to comply with

the appellate rules precludes review of his

appeal.

Dismissed. 

		Indiana Southern District Court
Judge:	Tanya Walton Pratt
Referred:	Matthew P Brookman
Case #:	1:18-cv-01664
Nature of Suit	442 Civil Rights - Employment
Cause	42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

RYKER v. HEALTH AND HOSPITAL CORPORATION OF MARION COUNTY

https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-7th-circuit/1618704.html

7th circuit case. they kill a baby an escae liabiliy.

 

No claim under the Indiana Constitution can be maintained under the circumstances identified by Stewart, because the persuasive authority is that there is no private cause of action for damages under the Indiana Constitution. See Estate of O’Bryan v. Town of Sellersburg, 2004 WL 1234215 at *21 (S.D.Ind. May 20, 2004); Malone v. Becher, 2003 WL 22080737 at *18 (S.D.Ind. Aug. 29, 2003) (Indiana Supreme Court has not recognized an implied right of action for damages under Article 1, sections 15 and 16); Boczar v. Kingen, 2000 WL 1137713 at *24-25 (S.D.Ind. March 9, 2000); Ratliff v. Cohn, 693 N.E.2d 530, 542 (Ind. 1998) (“particularized, individual applications are not reviewable under Article 1, Section 18 because Section 18 applies to the penal code as a whole and does not protect fact-specific challenges.”) (emphasis in original); Bailey v. Washington Theater Co., 34 N.E.2d 17, 19-20 (Ind. 1941).
 https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCOURTS-insd-1_06-cv-00923/pdf/USCOURTS-insd-1_06-cv-00923-0.pdf




https://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/indiana/insdce/1:2008cv00431/18110/43/

a cca marion county case. certification enie 2
https://www.in.gov/judiciary/opinions/pdf/06210601trb.pdf
cantrell