monday did:
paid electric $200.
cashed $80 of my plasma money,
paid $60 on water bill
got $240 in cash for trip.
aired up tire.
to do
x pack
call mom
email jean and marg.
mail check to mom 8,000.
money:
5 k gross rents
8.3 k return of basis on rual house
5k oil - 500 tax.
2k wages
2k gift
10.6 studies
1k plasma
400 bank bonuses.
imputed expenses
10,000 miles 5600
60 days 3000
hotels 100
computers 300
legal fees 200+100+400= 700. +10.
internet 50% of 600= 300.
subtotal
10,010.
net 590. x 0.15= 90 fica.
rents
-internet 200
water 1000
electric 2400
tax 2000
subtotal 5600.
net taxable income 7500.
to do:
memo to tommy re kokomo foreclosure
- quitclaims from both heirs tisha and niece
- back taxes
-how much have they been paying? how much monthly payment?
how far behind?
how much owed to them by other heir?
did they sign anything re mortgage?
bank maybe cannot foreclose on them.
rights of tenants in possession.
jerrine smith's equitable rights.
memo to tommy re kokomo auto accident.
memo re tommy disability claim.
- childhood drowning incident, hypoxia, mental defect.
- my personal knowledge of lack of job skills.
can't drive, gets losts, panics. rarely leaves room. watches same videos over and over like a 5 year old. mostly cartoons, a few old sitcoms, disney movies.
skilled with smartphone and youtube.
does not read books newspapers magazines cereal boxes.
uses netflix and grindr.
last worked as male stripper 10 years ago, wasn't very good at it because couldn't drive.
not employable at dollar general, dishwasher at pizza place.
thursday jan 2d.
went to screening
$12 coffee $7 shopping
got job at korea house. start 4 30 tomorrow.
car won't start.
charging phone. will take bus to hotel, i hope, or taxi.
this is not a public blog, just a place hwere i can leave myself notes. nothing to see here folks, move along.
Tuesday, December 31, 2019
Sunday, December 29, 2019
open tabs
https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/19/19-767/125342/20191212143100866_NAGR%20Petition.pdf magnan
file:///home/chronos/u-a552fdee1b1e55a45ca8699fb2905239176f1380/MyFiles/Downloads/gov.uscourts.mdd.430450.1.0.pdf washpo complaint
https://www.ziprecruiter.com/c/Aegis-Worldwide/Job/IT-Desktop-Support/-in-Indianapolis,IN?jid=DQ249da1cbf57059037ee1ad867e88513d&job_id=867aa9e7b59936a80a823631d700b495&contact_id=66076bd9&auth_token=_v3p_8464411f109742aced81b6a3b73c0c2b62417c4a02e64bf40ef680982b45f890&expires=1577147552&jid=DQe2dd837c033fcb2dc63ab4ff27b27523
http://teamaegis.com/careerportal/#/jobs
https://www.ziprecruiter.com/c/Alpha-Rae-Personnel,-Inc./Job/Vital-Records-Clerical-Assistant-3-(67031)/-in-Indianapolis,IN?jid=Qe7bfd667-122fec2b&mid=103&job_id=07734c09f4373a3aeaeabf7f37c26990&contact_id=66076bd9&auth_token=_v3p_be721f24c3d85942ef1eb69474be2ba7ae0fcfed740ceb8dd137292581d05fbc&expires=1576449723&jid=DQd7d3da12945df113e5c482f233c190d1
https://www.thestate.com/news/local/crime/article237745849.html
https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/19/19-767/125342/20191212143100866_NAGR%20Petition.pdf magnan
file:///home/chronos/u-a552fdee1b1e55a45ca8699fb2905239176f1380/MyFiles/Downloads/gov.uscourts.mdd.430450.1.0.pdf washpo complaint
https://www.ziprecruiter.com/c/Aegis-Worldwide/Job/IT-Desktop-Support/-in-Indianapolis,IN?jid=DQ249da1cbf57059037ee1ad867e88513d&job_id=867aa9e7b59936a80a823631d700b495&contact_id=66076bd9&auth_token=_v3p_8464411f109742aced81b6a3b73c0c2b62417c4a02e64bf40ef680982b45f890&expires=1577147552&jid=DQe2dd837c033fcb2dc63ab4ff27b27523
http://teamaegis.com/careerportal/#/jobs
https://www.ziprecruiter.com/c/Alpha-Rae-Personnel,-Inc./Job/Vital-Records-Clerical-Assistant-3-(67031)/-in-Indianapolis,IN?jid=Qe7bfd667-122fec2b&mid=103&job_id=07734c09f4373a3aeaeabf7f37c26990&contact_id=66076bd9&auth_token=_v3p_be721f24c3d85942ef1eb69474be2ba7ae0fcfed740ceb8dd137292581d05fbc&expires=1576449723&jid=DQd7d3da12945df113e5c482f233c190d1
https://www.thestate.com/news/local/crime/article237745849.html
SC’s Social Security requirement stops people from voting, federal lawsuit alleges
disclaimer stuff
https://www.orlandosentinel.com/news/lake/os-ne-mascotte-mayor-candidates-spar-20191028-xrhbgtybvfdclb5lcx7qu7x76e-story.html
https://lii-returnassets.com/
https://www.theindianalawyer.com/articles/49371-convicted-ex-acs-chief-burkhart-loses-bid-to-stay-lawsuits burkhart
https://www.google.com/search?q=Virginia+Democrat+Virginia+Smith+fined+%241750+for+vote+for+smith+signs.&rlz=1CAHKDC_enUS870&oq=Virginia+Democrat+Virginia+Smith+fined+%241750+for+vote+for+smith+signs.&aqs=chrome..69i57.2075j0j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8
https://apnews.com/7a36586687d14fbd91144b099465442c washpo
https://dockets.justia.com/docket/maryland/mddce/1:2018cv02527/430450 washpo docket
https://www.commoncause.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Proposed-Memo-of-Amici-in-Support-of-Defs-Opposition-to-Pls-Motion-for-Preliminary-Injunction-1.pdf
https://www.ifs.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/IFS-Amicus-Brief-Washington-Post-v-McManus_6.7.19.pdf
https://www.google.com/search?q=TED+YOAKUM+-+michigan+city&rlz=1CAHKDC_enUS870&oq=TED+YOAKUM+-+michigan+city&aqs=chrome..69i57j33.7641j0j8&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8 related to disclaimer story
http://www.co.putnam.in.us/clerk/
https://lii-returnassets.com/
https://www.theindianalawyer.com/articles/49371-convicted-ex-acs-chief-burkhart-loses-bid-to-stay-lawsuits burkhart
https://www.google.com/search?q=Virginia+Democrat+Virginia+Smith+fined+%241750+for+vote+for+smith+signs.&rlz=1CAHKDC_enUS870&oq=Virginia+Democrat+Virginia+Smith+fined+%241750+for+vote+for+smith+signs.&aqs=chrome..69i57.2075j0j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8
https://apnews.com/7a36586687d14fbd91144b099465442c washpo
https://dockets.justia.com/docket/maryland/mddce/1:2018cv02527/430450 washpo docket
https://www.commoncause.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Proposed-Memo-of-Amici-in-Support-of-Defs-Opposition-to-Pls-Motion-for-Preliminary-Injunction-1.pdf
https://www.ifs.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/IFS-Amicus-Brief-Washington-Post-v-McManus_6.7.19.pdf
https://www.google.com/search?q=TED+YOAKUM+-+michigan+city&rlz=1CAHKDC_enUS870&oq=TED+YOAKUM+-+michigan+city&aqs=chrome..69i57j33.7641j0j8&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8 related to disclaimer story
http://www.co.putnam.in.us/clerk/
Thursday, December 26, 2019
friday
1 x bank paid $650, have 8k in bank. 12.5 in cedit union -8k mom.
2 x city hall for taxes $1900.
mail check to mom
email jeanie/marg
3 x recycling where?
electric bill/
4 x po box.
6 x email proof of service to mike.
5 x return cable box paid 65 +23.
send tommy memo re kokomo house.
7 laundry $15
did: movie and a drink w tommy. $30 + ticket.
1 x bank paid $650, have 8k in bank. 12.5 in cedit union -8k mom.
2 x city hall for taxes $1900.
mail check to mom
email jeanie/marg
3 x recycling where?
electric bill/
4 x po box.
6 x email proof of service to mike.
5 x return cable box paid 65 +23.
send tommy memo re kokomo house.
7 laundry $15
did: movie and a drink w tommy. $30 + ticket.
more notes for ifs v becerra
- Schuster v. Municipal CourtRelying on Talley, the Appellate Department of the San Diego Superior Court held former section 12049,…
- State v. PetersilieWe recognize that other jurisdictions have found statutes proscribing anonymous publications to be…
- 205 Cal.App.2d Supp. 856 23 Cal.Rptr. 565 The PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Harry BONGIORNI, Defendant and Respondent. No. CR-4154. Superior Court of California, Appellate Division, San Diego County June 22, 1962.
Schuster v. Municipal Court
109 Cal.App.3d 887 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980)
in schuster, the california supreme court found that a disclaimer provision violated the state constitutiona as well as the first amendment.
Wednesday, December 25, 2019
to do list 12/25/19
tort claim re voter id.
list for mark small
outline brief in support of institute for free speech v becerra
pay utilities forward for january.
pay chase cards and pnc $50
letter for tommy
make better list
rochester
clean room. get bug stuff.
1st and 2nd draft took about 6 hours 12/25 w a dinner break. mostly written at neidhammer coffee.
very rough notes toward an
outline of a brief in support of institute for free speech v becerra
In The Supreme Court of the United States
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Whether a state official’s demand for all significant donors to a nonprofit organization, as a precondition to engaging in constitutionally-protected speech, constitutes a First Amendment injury.
2. Whether official demands for membership or donor information outside the electoral context should be reviewed under strict or exacting scrutiny.
Interest of Amicus
Robbin Stewart is a former partner in Tavel and Stewart Public Interest Law Firm, which monitored states' compliance with Talley and McIntyre. I was the plaintiff in Stewart v Taylor,which found Indiana's disclaimer statute unconstitutional, and was counsel in Majors v Abell, which erroneously upheld Indiana's re-enacted unconstitutional disclaimer statute. I was an amicus in Crawford v. Marion County, as part of the Cyber Privacy Project brief. I blog about election law at http://ballots.blogspot.com.
Summary of Argument
This case presents an opportunity to address a split in the circuits over disclosure of political association, and to cure some of the indeterminacy of the Valeo exacting scrutiny test.
Here, plaintiffs were severely burdened, so strict scrutiny should be applied, but the court could reach the same result under an exacting scrutiny test.
The court below failed to understand that NAACP, Bates, and Talley are landmark cases setting out a broad first amendment right to privacy, and are not limited to their exact facts.
Citizens United muddled this area of law, and clarity is needed. This case is a good vehicle.
Argument
NAACP v Alabama ex rel Patterson, Bates v Little Rock and Talley v California set out a right to privacy under the first amendment which is implicated in this case.
By refusing to recognize an applicable right of privacy under this trio of cases, the cicrcuit court undermines not only Buckley v. Valeo, but Roe v Wade. Those members of the court who care about the right to privacy under the constitution should not let this case go by. Not all of the current court supports Roe v Wade, which goes beyond speech into action. but even Roe's detractors have supported protection for political expession, as in Town of Vincent v Reed, Becerra, Janus, AID, and Masterpiece Bakeshop. Fundamental core First Amendment values are at risk here.
The 9th circuit below erred when it found no harm to First Amendment interests when the state tried to compel production of confidential donor lists as a precondition of doing business in California. Disclosure chills and kills.
There are two possible legal arguments plaintiff-appellants could have made but did not, which this court can consider as factors in its Valeo balancing.
First, the compelled disclosure may be preempted by IRS statutes and regulations authorized under the 16th amendment. If confidential IRS donor information is going to be involuntarily disclosed to states, where it is at risk of leaking and becoming public, charitible organizations will be incentivized to underreport to the IRS, subverting public policy interests in compliance. The 16th Amendment probably authorizes the IRS, but not the state of California, to compel this information.
This court has a policy of avoiding constitutional questions when it can decide on a lesser ground, but also prefers not to address issues not raised by the parties. It can at least take these considerations into account in its Valeo balancing.
Second, Plaintiff could have claimed exemption from disclosure under the California constitution's explicit textual right to privacy.
Adopted by voters in 1972, the amendment was motivated by the way in which the growth of computer data bases was eroding reasonable expectations of privacy and creating a surveillance society. Here, the Institute for Free Speech, closely associated with Brad Smith and the views he once expressed as an FEC commissioner, is opposed by the "reform" faction which argues for ever greater regulation or prohibition of campaign speech. It would help the reform faction and hurt the institute if they could learn who the institute's donors are, and subject them to scrutiny or even harrasment.
The damage would not be just in California, but nationally. The Institute has chosen, for years now, to forgo doing business at all in California, as the lesser burden on its rights of association speech and press. This seems to be genuine and not just a manufactured test case. California is not just one of 50 states. It is an economy the size of Japan, and a locus both of wealth and philanthropy. The Institute is severely burdened by being effectively banned there.
Under Norman v Reed, see J. Thomas concurring in Buckley v ACLF, a severe burden to speech rights triggers strict scrutiny.
The Norman v Reed severe burden test is a subset of the Anderson v Celebrezze balancing test as used in Crawford. The court first looks to the extent of the burden, the strengths of the state interests, and the fitness between them, in deciding what standard of scrutiny to apply. Here, the regulation is a kiss of death for the Institute in California, while the state's legitimate interests are minimal and trivial. Becarra, conceivably, could have a corrupt and illegitimate interest in wanting to squelch the speech of the institute, because it attacks his power, but this, if true, gets no weight in the balancing.
When a federal court engages in a first amendment balancing of a plaintiff's interests versus legitimate or compelling state interests, it may not weigh every interest the legislature or executive chooses to assert. It can only weigh those interests to the extent that they are legitimate or compelling. The court has used the term exacting scrutiny in different ways at different times, sometimes using compelling, sometimes legitimate. McIntyre, Valeo.
Amicus contends that in evaluting, in a federal question, whether a state interest is legitimate, it should look to the state constitution, even where plaintiffs have made no distinct state constitutional claim. Here, the disclosure regulations are in conflict with the textual California constitution's right of privacy, so the state's professed interest in having that information should be given no weight. This would be a substantial change in how the court does its analysis. If the court finds this line of argument worth considering, that would be enough of a reason to grant cert.
If the court agrees that the severe burden of the state regulation requires strict scrutiny, it could grant, summarily reverse, and remand. While the 9th circuit is no longer the most reversed circuit, it has at times required exacting scrutiny by this court.
But this case makes a good vehicle to examine and clarify the meaning of "exacting scrutiny" as used in campaign finance cases.
Ever since the test was announced in Valeo (1976), it has served in practice as a "personal preferences of the judge" test. It is vague and nebulous. In effect it has become a lax scrutiny test, not as permissive as rational basis, but offering little guidance as to how to decide close cases. Campaign finance regulations have been upheld maybe 3/4ths of the time under the test.
This indeterminacy became even worse following Citizens United (2010), part IV. [part D?] In Citizens United, plaintiff, when at first represented by James Bopp, had argued its speech was not express advocacy, so was exempt from the disclosure and disclaimer regulations. The court found the speech was express advocacy or equivalent after all, so that line of argument failed, and that should have been the end of it. But instead the court (possibly Justice Scalia?) engaged in dicta praising disclosure and disclaimer regulations, in direct conflict to Talley and numerous prior cases about compelled speech. It did not clarify that its remarks were about the case before it, where disclosure replaced a prior total ban and was a less restrictive alternative, and did not distinguish between disclosure and disclaimer.
States have seized on this passage to argue for qualified immunity of egregious campaign censorship, since the law is no longer clearly established, or have decided cases wrongly. Nom v McKee, Green Mountain Futures. This case presents an opportunity to once again clearly establish that political speech is strongly protected by the first amendment, and scrutiny must be exacting in fact and not just an empty label.
In 1956 Alabama's Attoney General Patterson demanded the NAACP's organization records including its membership lists.
The Supreme Court intervened several times over the next 7 years, with the main ruling coming in 1958.
Bates v Little Rock was a similar case about NAACP membership lists, while Talley v California was about whether a CORE chapter activist had to put his name on a flyer urging an econpomic boycott. Together these three cases are the foundation for the modern First Amendment right to privacy.
The court found that political association is protected as an aspect of the First Amendment rights of assembly and petition, and that the NAACP had a right of privacy by which it could refuse to disclose its membership list. Alabama did not go along quietly; its courts and executive branch actively resisted for years.
California is not motivated by racial animus, but has a similar overestimation of its power and authority over private political association.
NAACP, Bates and Talley state a broad principle that there is a first amendment right to privacy which protects assembly and petition, also referred to as the right to political association.
They are also important precedents for their more narrow holdings.
NAACP and Bates stand for the principle that an organization can seek an as-applied exemption to disclosure regimes if they can show a reasonable likelihood of political or economic retaliation.
Socialist Workers v Brown. The Institute has not made such a showing, because it does not cite these cases for their narrow holding, but for their broad holding.
In Talley v California, the court found that the right of privacy set out in NAACP reached far enough that Manuel Talley could not be required to put "paid for by Manuel Talley" on his flier urging a boycott of racist businesses. Disclaimers and disclosures are separate categories, as was explored in Buckley v ACLF. Plaintiff here is not invoking the narrow rule of Talley that they do not have to put "paid for by _" on their publications. They invoke Talley for the principle that the First Amendment contains a right of privacy which, in most cases, protects political association against compelled speech. Valeo sets out a narrow exception to this rule for groups with a major purpose of express advocacy for election speech, but the Institute is not within this exception.
The cout below erred in finding Talley Bates and NAACP inapposite.
Much as Alabama tried to resist the holding in NAACP, California has never accepted the holding in Talley. Even today, 60 years later, California insists on disclaimers on political literature. Time after time its regulations have been struck down by courts; time after time they have been re-enacted. Canon City, People v Drake, People v Bongiorni, and Grisset v FPPC are among these cases.
This case does not squarely confront California's contemptuous refusal to abide by the holding in Talley, that its disclaimer rules are void, unenforceable, and unconstitutional. But its insistance that the Institute disclose confidential IRS communications is part of California's ongoing resistance to Talley. This court should not take such resistance to its holdings lightly. In Cooper v Aaron, the court put its foot down about resistance to Brown v Board. In McIntyre, the court tried to settle a circuit split about whether Talley should be followed. McIntyre did not resolve the split, which continued, and has widened after Citizens United left the topic confused and indeterminate. Cases like Janus and Becerra have provided some clarification that Barnette, Talley, and McIntyre remain good law but neither Mr. Becerra nor the 9th circuit have gotten the message. The court should grant certiorari in this case.
Respectfully submitted,
Robbin Stewart
PO Box 29164
Indianapolis IN 46229
tort claim re voter id.
list for mark small
outline brief in support of institute for free speech v becerra
pay utilities forward for january.
pay chase cards and pnc $50
letter for tommy
make better list
rochester
clean room. get bug stuff.
1st and 2nd draft took about 6 hours 12/25 w a dinner break. mostly written at neidhammer coffee.
very rough notes toward an
outline of a brief in support of institute for free speech v becerra
In The Supreme Court of the United States
INSTITUTE FOR FREE SPEECH, Petitioner,
v.
XAVIER BECERRA, Attorney General of California, Respondent.
Amicus Curiae Brief of Robbin Stewart
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Whether a state official’s demand for all significant donors to a nonprofit organization, as a precondition to engaging in constitutionally-protected speech, constitutes a First Amendment injury.
2. Whether official demands for membership or donor information outside the electoral context should be reviewed under strict or exacting scrutiny.
Interest of Amicus
Robbin Stewart is a former partner in Tavel and Stewart Public Interest Law Firm, which monitored states' compliance with Talley and McIntyre. I was the plaintiff in Stewart v Taylor,which found Indiana's disclaimer statute unconstitutional, and was counsel in Majors v Abell, which erroneously upheld Indiana's re-enacted unconstitutional disclaimer statute. I was an amicus in Crawford v. Marion County, as part of the Cyber Privacy Project brief. I blog about election law at http://ballots.blogspot.com.
Summary of Argument
This case presents an opportunity to address a split in the circuits over disclosure of political association, and to cure some of the indeterminacy of the Valeo exacting scrutiny test.
Here, plaintiffs were severely burdened, so strict scrutiny should be applied, but the court could reach the same result under an exacting scrutiny test.
The court below failed to understand that NAACP, Bates, and Talley are landmark cases setting out a broad first amendment right to privacy, and are not limited to their exact facts.
Citizens United muddled this area of law, and clarity is needed. This case is a good vehicle.
Argument
NAACP v Alabama ex rel Patterson, Bates v Little Rock and Talley v California set out a right to privacy under the first amendment which is implicated in this case.
By refusing to recognize an applicable right of privacy under this trio of cases, the cicrcuit court undermines not only Buckley v. Valeo, but Roe v Wade. Those members of the court who care about the right to privacy under the constitution should not let this case go by. Not all of the current court supports Roe v Wade, which goes beyond speech into action. but even Roe's detractors have supported protection for political expession, as in Town of Vincent v Reed, Becerra, Janus, AID, and Masterpiece Bakeshop. Fundamental core First Amendment values are at risk here.
The 9th circuit below erred when it found no harm to First Amendment interests when the state tried to compel production of confidential donor lists as a precondition of doing business in California. Disclosure chills and kills.
There are two possible legal arguments plaintiff-appellants could have made but did not, which this court can consider as factors in its Valeo balancing.
First, the compelled disclosure may be preempted by IRS statutes and regulations authorized under the 16th amendment. If confidential IRS donor information is going to be involuntarily disclosed to states, where it is at risk of leaking and becoming public, charitible organizations will be incentivized to underreport to the IRS, subverting public policy interests in compliance. The 16th Amendment probably authorizes the IRS, but not the state of California, to compel this information.
This court has a policy of avoiding constitutional questions when it can decide on a lesser ground, but also prefers not to address issues not raised by the parties. It can at least take these considerations into account in its Valeo balancing.
Second, Plaintiff could have claimed exemption from disclosure under the California constitution's explicit textual right to privacy.
Adopted by voters in 1972, the amendment was motivated by the way in which the growth of computer data bases was eroding reasonable expectations of privacy and creating a surveillance society. Here, the Institute for Free Speech, closely associated with Brad Smith and the views he once expressed as an FEC commissioner, is opposed by the "reform" faction which argues for ever greater regulation or prohibition of campaign speech. It would help the reform faction and hurt the institute if they could learn who the institute's donors are, and subject them to scrutiny or even harrasment.
The damage would not be just in California, but nationally. The Institute has chosen, for years now, to forgo doing business at all in California, as the lesser burden on its rights of association speech and press. This seems to be genuine and not just a manufactured test case. California is not just one of 50 states. It is an economy the size of Japan, and a locus both of wealth and philanthropy. The Institute is severely burdened by being effectively banned there.
Under Norman v Reed, see J. Thomas concurring in Buckley v ACLF, a severe burden to speech rights triggers strict scrutiny.
The Norman v Reed severe burden test is a subset of the Anderson v Celebrezze balancing test as used in Crawford. The court first looks to the extent of the burden, the strengths of the state interests, and the fitness between them, in deciding what standard of scrutiny to apply. Here, the regulation is a kiss of death for the Institute in California, while the state's legitimate interests are minimal and trivial. Becarra, conceivably, could have a corrupt and illegitimate interest in wanting to squelch the speech of the institute, because it attacks his power, but this, if true, gets no weight in the balancing.
When a federal court engages in a first amendment balancing of a plaintiff's interests versus legitimate or compelling state interests, it may not weigh every interest the legislature or executive chooses to assert. It can only weigh those interests to the extent that they are legitimate or compelling. The court has used the term exacting scrutiny in different ways at different times, sometimes using compelling, sometimes legitimate. McIntyre, Valeo.
Amicus contends that in evaluting, in a federal question, whether a state interest is legitimate, it should look to the state constitution, even where plaintiffs have made no distinct state constitutional claim. Here, the disclosure regulations are in conflict with the textual California constitution's right of privacy, so the state's professed interest in having that information should be given no weight. This would be a substantial change in how the court does its analysis. If the court finds this line of argument worth considering, that would be enough of a reason to grant cert.
If the court agrees that the severe burden of the state regulation requires strict scrutiny, it could grant, summarily reverse, and remand. While the 9th circuit is no longer the most reversed circuit, it has at times required exacting scrutiny by this court.
But this case makes a good vehicle to examine and clarify the meaning of "exacting scrutiny" as used in campaign finance cases.
Ever since the test was announced in Valeo (1976), it has served in practice as a "personal preferences of the judge" test. It is vague and nebulous. In effect it has become a lax scrutiny test, not as permissive as rational basis, but offering little guidance as to how to decide close cases. Campaign finance regulations have been upheld maybe 3/4ths of the time under the test.
This indeterminacy became even worse following Citizens United (2010), part IV. [part D?] In Citizens United, plaintiff, when at first represented by James Bopp, had argued its speech was not express advocacy, so was exempt from the disclosure and disclaimer regulations. The court found the speech was express advocacy or equivalent after all, so that line of argument failed, and that should have been the end of it. But instead the court (possibly Justice Scalia?) engaged in dicta praising disclosure and disclaimer regulations, in direct conflict to Talley and numerous prior cases about compelled speech. It did not clarify that its remarks were about the case before it, where disclosure replaced a prior total ban and was a less restrictive alternative, and did not distinguish between disclosure and disclaimer.
States have seized on this passage to argue for qualified immunity of egregious campaign censorship, since the law is no longer clearly established, or have decided cases wrongly. Nom v McKee, Green Mountain Futures. This case presents an opportunity to once again clearly establish that political speech is strongly protected by the first amendment, and scrutiny must be exacting in fact and not just an empty label.
In 1956 Alabama's Attoney General Patterson demanded the NAACP's organization records including its membership lists.
The Supreme Court intervened several times over the next 7 years, with the main ruling coming in 1958.
Bates v Little Rock was a similar case about NAACP membership lists, while Talley v California was about whether a CORE chapter activist had to put his name on a flyer urging an econpomic boycott. Together these three cases are the foundation for the modern First Amendment right to privacy.
The court found that political association is protected as an aspect of the First Amendment rights of assembly and petition, and that the NAACP had a right of privacy by which it could refuse to disclose its membership list. Alabama did not go along quietly; its courts and executive branch actively resisted for years.
California is not motivated by racial animus, but has a similar overestimation of its power and authority over private political association.
NAACP, Bates and Talley state a broad principle that there is a first amendment right to privacy which protects assembly and petition, also referred to as the right to political association.
They are also important precedents for their more narrow holdings.
NAACP and Bates stand for the principle that an organization can seek an as-applied exemption to disclosure regimes if they can show a reasonable likelihood of political or economic retaliation.
Socialist Workers v Brown. The Institute has not made such a showing, because it does not cite these cases for their narrow holding, but for their broad holding.
In Talley v California, the court found that the right of privacy set out in NAACP reached far enough that Manuel Talley could not be required to put "paid for by Manuel Talley" on his flier urging a boycott of racist businesses. Disclaimers and disclosures are separate categories, as was explored in Buckley v ACLF. Plaintiff here is not invoking the narrow rule of Talley that they do not have to put "paid for by _" on their publications. They invoke Talley for the principle that the First Amendment contains a right of privacy which, in most cases, protects political association against compelled speech. Valeo sets out a narrow exception to this rule for groups with a major purpose of express advocacy for election speech, but the Institute is not within this exception.
The cout below erred in finding Talley Bates and NAACP inapposite.
Much as Alabama tried to resist the holding in NAACP, California has never accepted the holding in Talley. Even today, 60 years later, California insists on disclaimers on political literature. Time after time its regulations have been struck down by courts; time after time they have been re-enacted. Canon City, People v Drake, People v Bongiorni, and Grisset v FPPC are among these cases.
This case does not squarely confront California's contemptuous refusal to abide by the holding in Talley, that its disclaimer rules are void, unenforceable, and unconstitutional. But its insistance that the Institute disclose confidential IRS communications is part of California's ongoing resistance to Talley. This court should not take such resistance to its holdings lightly. In Cooper v Aaron, the court put its foot down about resistance to Brown v Board. In McIntyre, the court tried to settle a circuit split about whether Talley should be followed. McIntyre did not resolve the split, which continued, and has widened after Citizens United left the topic confused and indeterminate. Cases like Janus and Becerra have provided some clarification that Barnette, Talley, and McIntyre remain good law but neither Mr. Becerra nor the 9th circuit have gotten the message. The court should grant certiorari in this case.
Respectfully submitted,
Robbin Stewart
PO Box 29164
Indianapolis IN 46229
Sunday, December 22, 2019
did list
sunday: day off so far. called re service of process.
saturday dishes trash fridge sent 3 emails (mike re car crash, 2 v rochester)
friday
drove from nebraska.
$30 passenger.
bought tire $30.
bank, po box. paid $298 on electric bill, $100 on both chase credit cards
plasma $45. oil check 60. dolla store $15.
thursday coffee $10 service of process $20
screening went fine.
wednesday court cost filing fee $400
hotel $40. gas $150?
sunday to do: sort mail.
make lawsuit list for mark small
monday to do:
results call.
plasma,
call mark small re appointment.
call e rochester. maybe file counterclaim $2000.
sunday: day off so far. called re service of process.
saturday dishes trash fridge sent 3 emails (mike re car crash, 2 v rochester)
friday
drove from nebraska.
$30 passenger.
bought tire $30.
bank, po box. paid $298 on electric bill, $100 on both chase credit cards
plasma $45. oil check 60. dolla store $15.
thursday coffee $10 service of process $20
screening went fine.
wednesday court cost filing fee $400
hotel $40. gas $150?
sunday to do: sort mail.
make lawsuit list for mark small
monday to do:
results call.
plasma,
call mark small re appointment.
call e rochester. maybe file counterclaim $2000.
Saturday, December 21, 2019
Lisa Hoggins (Jean), 59 - Lincoln, NE Background Report at ...
https://www.mylife.com › People Search › NE › Lincoln › Lisa Hoggins
Lisa Hoggins is 59 years old today because Lisa's birthday is on 06/04/1960. Before moving to Lisa's current city of Lincoln, NE, Lisa lived in York NE and Grand ...
Lisa Hoggins Lincoln, 402-470-0846, White Pages
https://www.bizyellowpages.com › people › lincoln-lisa-hoggins-4024700...
Lisa Hoggins, address 2021 Nw 44th St Lincoln NE 68528 USA. +1.4024700846 phone number is registered to Lisa Hoggins in Lincoln.
Aliases: Lisa J Bosle, Lisa J Hogging, L Bosle, Lisa Hoggin
Female, Age 59
Relatives: Victor Hoggins
Locations: Lincoln, NE • Glendale, AZ • Grand Island, NE • York, NE • Phoenix, AZ
Lisa HogginsAge 59 (402) 362-2010
Tuesday, December 17, 2019
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR NEBRASKA,
LINCOLN DIVISION
ROBBIN STEWART,
Plaintiff,
v.
Cause number: _________________
LISA J. HOGGINS,
Defendant
Complaint and
Demand For Jury Trial
Comes now plaintiff Robbin Stewart, for himself, and for his
complaint and demand for jury trial states as follows.
1. Introduction and nature of the case: This is a suit for
damages from an automobile accident.
2. Parties:
Plaintiff is Robbin Stewart. I reside at 4015 E Washington
Street in Indianapolis Indiana. My mailing address is P O Box 29164,
Indianapolis IN 46229. My email address is gtbear at gmail.com.
3. Defendant is Lisa J. Hoggins, a resident of Lincoln Nebraska.
Her address, or last known address, is 2021 NW 44th Street Lincoln NE 68528.
4. Jurisdiction and venue: Venue is proper in Lincoln, where
Defendant lives and the incident took place. Jurisdiction is based on diversity
of the parties, 28 USC 1332. There is no federal question. The amount in
controversy is $200,000.
5. Claims:
On the onramp to Rt 77 east from O Street in Lincoln Nebraska on
the afternoon of December 30th 2015, Defendant, in her car, struck plaintiff's
car from behind, as described in Nebraska Investigator's Motor Vehicle Accident
Report # 2015054990 75840.
6. She had a duty of reasonable care. The collision was caused by the recklessness,
carelessness and negligence of the Defendant, for that among other acts and
omissions the Defendant:
operated the motor vehicle at a high, dangerous and excessive rate of speed under the circumstances then and there existing;
failed to reduce speed to avoid a collision;
failed to observe due care and precaution and to maintain proper and adequate control of the motor vehicle;
failed to keep a proper lookout for other vehicles lawfully upon the highway;
failed to exercise reasonable care in the operation of the motor vehicle under the circumstances then and there existing; and in other respects not now known to the Plaintiff but which may become known before or at the time of trial.
operated the motor vehicle at a high, dangerous and excessive rate of speed under the circumstances then and there existing;
failed to reduce speed to avoid a collision;
failed to observe due care and precaution and to maintain proper and adequate control of the motor vehicle;
failed to keep a proper lookout for other vehicles lawfully upon the highway;
failed to exercise reasonable care in the operation of the motor vehicle under the circumstances then and there existing; and in other respects not now known to the Plaintiff but which may become known before or at the time of trial.
7. She was negligent or reckless in causing the accident. She
did not act with intent; this is not a battery case. By causing the accident
she breached her duty of care.
8. She caused the accident by driving her car at about 50
miles per hour into the rear of my car.
9. She was given a citation by Lincoln police for causing the
accident, LB479145.
10. My car, a 1992 Volvo 240 station wagon, was destroyed in the
accident. The parties have settled for the value of the car, at about $1900,
which has been paid, and is not at issue in this lawsuit.
11. Her car, a 2016 Chevolet, was damaged in an amount estimated
at $8000.
12. I was injured by the accident. While I walked away from the
crash, after being assisted by witnesses, I began experiencing back pain about
20 minutes later. My back pain was severe at first, and got gradually better
over the next several years, to the point where I no longer feel the pain unless
I try to lift things or engage in physical activity.
13. I was temporarily disabled by the accident. I spent most of
the next two years lying in bed hurting. I was mostly unable to work at any job
for wages during this time, and experienced lost income.
14. I was partially permanently disabled by the accident. My
previous best paying jobs have been as a warehouse worker. I was a teamster. I
am no longer able to work jobs that involve lifting.
15. I was planning to apply as a warehouse worker at Amazon in
Plainfield Indiana. I can no longer do that job, or similar jobs.
16. Another set of jobs I have held before the accident is being
a dishwasher. I have worked in 5 restaurants and two bakeries. In 2019, after
several years of recuperation, medical treatment from Dr. David White of the
Jane Pauley Center in Indianapolis, and while taking 2 prescription naproxen
sodium tablets a day, I attempted to re-enter the workforce by taking a job as
a dishwasher at Petit Chou, a bistro run by Patachou Inc. in Indianapolis. I
stuck it out for two months but had to resign because the back pain was too
much for me.
17. Even moderately physical jobs are more than I can handle.
Since the accident I have worked at waged jobs for a total of 4 months and have
been unemployed or self-employed the rest of the time.
I have had some income from taking part in medical experiments
for pharmacuetical companies, but I am too old for most such studies and cannot
currently make a living doing that. I donate plasma twice a week. I have been
unable to find other employment.
18. I am 59. My lifetime earnings capacity has been negatively
affected by the accident. I estimate that I make $10,000 less each year as a
result of the accident. I did not intend to work for wages past age 70.
19. My purpose for being in Lincoln Nebraska that day is that I
had just applied for a study which would have paid $4000. As a result of the
accident, I was not able to participate in the study and had net lost income of
$3000.
20. I have had medical expenses resulting from the
accident, including $900 for Bryant West emergency room, $450 for physical
therapy at athletico in St Charles Mo, $300 from two visits to Concentra
medical clinic in St Charles Missouri, approximately $2000 for treatment from
the Jane Pauley center in Indianapolis, where I was treated for back pain and
depression. My depression is a pre-existing condition, but became acute in late
2018 as a result of chronic pain from the accident.
21. My damages include pain and suffering, lost income,
temporary and partial permanent disability, and medical expenses.
Prayer for relief:
Wherefor I demand a trial by jury, damages as determined by a
jury, or $200,000.oo, and such other relief as is in the interest of justice.
Respectfully submitted,
_________________
Robbin Stewart.
I aver and affirm that the above statements are true to be best of my knowledge and belief.
Robbin Stewart
_______________
Respectfully submitted,
_________________
Robbin Stewart.
I aver and affirm that the above statements are true to be best of my knowledge and belief.
Robbin Stewart
_______________
first draft 12/17/2019. proofread before filing. add name of defendant.
Robert V. Denney Federal Building
100 Centennial Mall North
Room 593
Lincoln, NE 68508
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR NEBRASKA, LINCOLN DIVISION
ROBBIN STEWART,
Plaintiff,
v. Cause number: _________________
LISA J. HOGGINS,
Defendant
Complaint and Demand For Jury Trial
Comes now plaintiff Robbin Stewart, for himself, and for his complaint and demand for jury trial states as follows.
1. Introduction and nature of the case: This is a suit for damages from an automobile accident.
2. Parties:
Plaintiff is Robbin Stewart. I reside at 4015 E Washington Street in Indianapolis Indiana. My mailing address is P O Box 29164, Indianapolis IN 46229. My email address is gtbear at gmail.com.
3. Defendant is Lisa J. Hoggins, a resident of Lincoln Nebraska. Her address, or last known address, is 2021 NW 44th Street Lincoln NE 68528.
4. Jurisdiction and venue: Venue is proper in Lincoln, where Defendant lives and the incident took place. Jurisdiction is based on diversity of the parties. 28 USC 1332. There is no federal question. The amount in controversy is $200,000.
5. Claims:
On the onramp to Rt 77 east from O Street in Lincoln Nebraska on the afternoon of December 30th 2015, Defendant, in her car, struck plaintiff's car from behind, as described in Nebraska Investigator's Motor Vehicle Accident Report # 2015054990 75840.
6. She had a duty of reasonable care. The collision was caused by the recklessness, carelessness and negligence of the Defendant, for that among other acts and omissions the Defendant:
operated the motor vehicle at a high, dangerous and excessive rate of speed under the circumstances then and there existing;
failed to reduce speed to avoid a collision;
failed to observe due care and precaution and to maintain proper and adequate control of the motor vehicle;
failed to keep a proper lookout for other vehicles lawfully upon the highway;
failed to exercise reasonable care in the operation of the motor vehicle under the circumstances then and there existing; and in other respects not now known to the Plaintiff but which may become known before or at the time of trial.
operated the motor vehicle at a high, dangerous and excessive rate of speed under the circumstances then and there existing;
failed to reduce speed to avoid a collision;
failed to observe due care and precaution and to maintain proper and adequate control of the motor vehicle;
failed to keep a proper lookout for other vehicles lawfully upon the highway;
failed to exercise reasonable care in the operation of the motor vehicle under the circumstances then and there existing; and in other respects not now known to the Plaintiff but which may become known before or at the time of trial.
7. She was negligent or reckless in causing the accident. She did not act with intent; this is not a battery case. By causing the accident she breached her duty of care.
8. She caused the accident by driving her car at about 50 miles per hour into the rear of my car.
9. She was given a citation by Lincoln police for causing the accident, LB479145.
10. My car, a 1992 Volvo 240 station wagon, was destroyed in the accident. The parties have settled for the value of the car, at about $1900, which has been paid, and is not at issue in this lawsuit.
11. Her car, a 2016 Chevolet, was damaged in the amount estimated at $8000.
12. I was injured by the accident. While I walked away from the crash, after being assisted by witnesses, I began experiencing back pain about 20 minutes later. My back pain was severe at first, and got gradually better over the next several years, to the point where I no longer feel the pain unless I try to lift things or engage in physical activity.
13. I was temporarily disabled by the accident. I spent most of the next two years lying in bed hurting. I was mostly unable to work at any job for wages during this time, and experienced lost income.
14. I was partially permanently disabled by the accident. My previous best paying jobs have been as a warehouse worker. I was a teamster. I am no longer able to work jobs that involve lifting.
15. I was planning to apply as a warehouse worker at Amazon in Plainfield Indiana. I can no longer do that job, or similar jobs.
16. Another set of jobs I have held before the accident is being a dishwasher. I have worked in 5 restaurants and two bakeries. In 2019, after several years of recuperation, medical treatment from Dr. David White of the Jane Pauly Center in Indianapolis, and while taking 2 prescription naproxen sodium tablets a day, I attempted to re-enter the workforce by taking a job as a dishwasher at Petit Chou, a bistro run by Patachou Inc. in Indianapolis. I stuck it out for two months but had to resign because the back pain was too much for me.
17. Even moderately physical jobs are more than I can handle. Since the accident I have worked at waged jobs for a total of 4 months and have been unemployed the rest of the time.
I have had some income from taking part in medical experiments for pharmacuetical companies, but I am too old for most such studies and cannot currently make a living doing that. I donate plasma twice a week. I have been unable to find other employment.
18. I am 59. My lifetime earnings capacity has been negatively affected by the accident. I estimate that I make $10,000 less each year as a result of the accident. I did not intend to work for wages past age 70.
19. My purpose for being in Lincoln Nebraska that day is that I had just applied for a study which would have paid $4000. As a result of the accident, I was not able to paticipate in the study.
20. I have had medical expenses resulting from the accident, including $900 for Bryant West emergency room, $450 for physical therapy at athletico, $300 from two visits to Concentra medical clinic in St Charles Missouri, approximately $2000 for treatment from the Jane Pauly center in Indianapolis, where I was treated for back pain and depression. My depression is a pre-existing condition, but became acute in late 2018 as a result of chronic pain from the accident.
21. My damages include pain and suffering, lost income, temporary and partial permanent disability, and medical expenses.
Prayer for relief:
Wherefor I demand a trial by jury, damages as determined by a jury, or $200,000.oo, and such other relief as is in the interest of justice.
Respectfully submitted,
_________________
Robbin Stewart.
I aver and affirm that the above statements are true to be best of my knowledge and belief.
Robbin Stewart
_______________
Respectfully submitted,
_________________
Robbin Stewart.
I aver and affirm that the above statements are true to be best of my knowledge and belief.
Robbin Stewart
_______________
Monday, December 16, 2019
In the center township marion county small claims court
County of Marion
Partners in Housing Development Corp
plaintiff
v. Judge Roper
Rochester Foster Cause # 49K01-1911-SC-006166
defendant
MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGEMENT
Comes now Defendant Rochester Foster, pro se, and for his motion to set aside default judgment states as follows.
1. Foster first learned of this lawsuit on or about December 13th when served with an order dated DEcember 10th.
2. Foster was not served with the complaint and did not have notice of a hearing held December 10th which is why he was not present.
3. Due process and due couse of law require notice and a hearing.
4. The order seeks to evict Foster from his home at 55 S Linwood Ave Unit B 6. with only a few days notice which would be an undue hardship.
5. Foster lives there in a rent-subsidized unit owned by Plaintiffs.
He is elderly, disabled, is recovering from a stroke, has diabetis, periperal neuopathy, has a limited ability to walk with a cane.
He has nowhere to go.
6. His rent is paid and current. Under the terms of the lease, he is entitled to not less than 30 days notice, which has not been given.
7. Robbin Stewart, 17147-53, assisted pro bono in preparation of this filing.
Wherefor,
Foster moves the court set aside its order for possession of December 10th, and set this matter for a hearing.
Respectfully Submitted
Rochester Foster
/s/Rochester Foster
A copy of this filing has been mailed or hand-delivered today December 16th to
Partners in Housing
725 N Pennsylvania St
Indianapolis IN 46204.
/s/Rochester Foster
In the center township marion county small claims court
County of Marion
Partners in Housing Development Corp
plaintiff
v. Judge Roper
Rochester Foster Cause # 49K01-1911-SC-006166
defendant
Proposed Order
The default judgment of 12/10/2019 is set aside.
A hearing is scheduled for _______________.
So ordered ___________
Judge Roper
Distribution:
Foster
Partners in Housing
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