Wednesday, August 31, 2022

 daily task list for friday


1.  oil change

x 2.  lonny problem. - is he still locked up? who was the accomplice? tristan. lonny does not show as locked up. lonny hall. appeal denied, 120 year sentence.

123 linden cornewell accomplice. Lind aen C ornewelllinden cornewel

at pendleton. could interview re lonnie.

x 3.  title and plates, 

insurance. ask brian what all is wrong besides the belt.


4.  pick up front yard. burn boxes? 

x 5. put away laundry.

 

7.  do i need to write to jeanie? 

8.  make better list -i'm forgetting something

x 9, call mark small or email. 

10. when is deadline for tort claims from election? make a list of baby steps for the case with small re the primary. 

11. clean car. 

did: $100 electric bill. $26 gas. at 3.69. paid $300 on credit card, $100 on line of credit, still owe $400. 


did: $43 5th 3rd. po box. fan $7. aldi $11. 

x started, not finished. 14. draft a power of attorney for KC re lot of brookside.

15.  work on new hampshire case and san francisco case, 

x 17. delphi ticket.

18. work on ethics complaint for hendrix county, new hampshire.

19. social security

20 BMV dispute.

21 toll by plate

22 american airlines

23 celerion

24. order a tesla model3.

x dumpster dived.

so that's:

2. oil change.

x 3. title and plates. 

4. social security

saturday: oil change

insurance office will be closed





Saturday, August 20, 2022

this is just some notes from shepardizing talley. 

Justice for All v. Faulkner

410 F.3d 760 (2005) | 


Maxon v. Ottawa Publishing Co.

929 N.E.2d 666 (2010) 



 it is well-settled law that once it is determined that state action impinges on high-order first amendment rights -- which these rules undoubtedly do -- then the burden of proof is on the state to show that the governmental interests asserted to support the impingement are "compelling." N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 78 S. Ct. 1163, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1488 (1958); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 265, 77 S. Ct. 1203, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1311 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (1957). 

NEW LEFT EDUC. PROJECT v. BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE

326 F. Supp. 158 (1970) | 



HYNES ET AL. v. MAYOR AND COUNCIL BOROUGH ORADELL ET AL.

brennan concurring cites talley

It can hardly be denied that an ordinance requiring

     the door-to-door campaigner to identify himself discourages free speech. Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960), invalidated a Los Angeles ordinance requiring handbills to carry the name and address of persons writing, printing, or distributing them. Since the requirement destroyed anonymity, "[t]here [could] be no doubt that such an identification requirement would tend to restrict freedom to distribute information and thereby freedom of expression," id., at 64, for: S

"Anonymous pamphlets, leaflets, brochures and even books have played an important role in the progress of mankind. Persecuted groups and sects from time to time throughout history have been able to criticize oppressive practices and laws either anonymously or not at all.... Even the Federalist Papers, written in favor of the adoption of our Constitution, were published under fictitious names. It is plain that anonymity has sometimes been assumed for the most constructive purposes." Id., at 64-65.I



Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Committee, 459 459 U.S. 87, 74 L. Ed. 2d 250, 103 S. Ct. 416 (1982), held that mere disclosure of membership in the Socialist Workers party was a substantial infringement of associational rights under the circumstances.

The Court reasoned "that significant encroachments on First Amendment rights of the sort that compelled disclosure imposes cannot be justified by a mere showing of some legitimate governmental interest." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 64.








Tuesday, August 16, 2022

  The restrictions thus function as the equivalent of a prior restraint, giving the FEC power analogous to the type of government practices that the First Amendment was drawn to prohibit. The ongoing chill on speech makes it necessary to invoke the earlier precedents that a statute that chills speech can and must be invalidated where its facial invalidity has been demonstrated. citizens united. 


 the First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech,

- citizens united.

political speech must prevail against laws that would suppress it by design or inadvertence. Laws burdening such speech are subject to strict scrutiny, which requires the Government to prove that the restriction “furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.”


 dispute not moot.

10 lies in clc amicus

1. because it is concerned about the harm that could result from the arguments advanced by plaintiffs-appellants San Franciscans Supporting Prop B, et al., which run counter to long-settled precedent

from statement of interest

2 dispute not moot. majors v abell.

3 - not a lie. gaspee project: the court relied on an amicus brief from clc, which may have alsoauthoried the state's brief. similar in alaska, smith v. helzer case.

4.  as well as every 5 other court to consider this argument

5. other court to consider this argument, has rejected the notion that strict scrutiny is warranted for electoral disclaimers requiring only factual information about an advertisement’s sponsors and funders.

mcintyre, aclf nifla town of gilbert.

6 Nor is there any merit to appellants’ claims that AFPF heightened the standard of exacting scrutiny

Mass. Fiscal All. v. Sullivan, No. 18-12119-RWZ, 2018 WL 5816344 at *3 (D. Mass. Nov. 6, 2018) (citing Nat’l Org. for Marriage v. McKee, 649 F.3d 34, 57 (1st Cir. 2011)). i will need to look into this.


[next day: have now read mass fiscal all. v. Sullivan ]








 No. 22-15824 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 

SAN FRANCISCANS SUPPORTING PROP B, EDWIN M. LEE ASIAN PACIFIC DEMOCRATIC CLUB PAC SPONSORED BY NEIGHBORS FOR A BETTER SAN FRANCISCO ADVOCACY, AND TODD DAVID, Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

v. 

DAVID CHIU, SAN FRANCISCO ETHICS COMMISSION, CHESA BOUDIN, AND CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, Defendants-Appellees. Appeal from the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California Honorable Charles R. Breyer Civil Action No. 3:22-cv-02785-CRB 

BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF Robbin Stewart IN opposition to DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES AND URGING Reversal.

table of cases

interest of amicus

summary of argument

argument

governed by state law

schuster, drake, bongiorni, talley.

governed by federal law

   janus, nifla, cruz, talley mcintyre aclf town of gilbert v reed watchtower barnette bonta. 

 citizens united does not apply because:

    dicta, corporations, superceded, also the 5-4 part of CU. 

clc brief wrong on law.

conclusion: it was abuse to discretion to deny the injunction where there is a strong likelihood on the merits because talley, schuster, mcintyre are controlling.

certifications


conclusion

table of cases


schuster, 

drake, 

bongiorni, 

talley.

janus, JANUS v. AMERICAN FEDERATION 

nifla,  NIFLA. v. BECERRA, 2018

cruz

mcintyre 

aclf 

town of gilbert v reed 

watchtower 

barnette 

bonta. 

citizens united 

clc brief 

schuster, 

Schuster v. Municipal Court, 109 Cal. App. 3d 887 (1980)


FN 2. Article I, section 2, of the California Constitution reads as follows: "Sec. 2. Every person may freely speak, write and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of this right. A law may not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press."

People v. Drake (1979) 97 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 32 [159 Cal. Rptr. 161],

People v. Bongiorni, Crim. A. No. 4154. June 22, 1962.

Grisset, 

Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977)Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624319 U. S. 633-634 (1943)
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U. S. 241 (1974),

masterpiece bakeshop 
aid v open society.


interest of amicus

amicus robbin stewart was plaintiff in stewart v taylor and counsel in majors v abell, a case cited by the lower court and in the clc brief. 

argument

A recent statement by the supreme court about election law comes in

fec v cruz for senate (2022).


The First Amendment “has its fullest and most urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office.” Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U. S. 265, 272 (1971).


This broad protection, we have explained, “reflects our profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.” 


 But there is no doubt that the law does burden First Amendment electoral speech, and any such law must at least be justified by a permissible interest. See McCutcheon v. Federal Election Comm’n, 572 U. S. 185, 210 (2014) (plurality opinion) (“When the Government restricts speech, the Government bears the burden of proving the constitutionality of its actions.”). 

Here, there is no permissible interest because san francisco is barred by Schuster (1980) , under the more expansive provisions of article I section two of the california constitution. 

The California constitution protects speech, elections, and privacy. The Schuster case is most on point. 

Schuster is part of a line of cases including Talley, Drake, Bongiorni, and Grisset. 

Since disclosure requirements undoubtedly tend to restrict the freedom to distribute and consequently deter free speech, the latter right encompasses the right to remain anonymous. (Talley v. California (1960) 362 U.S. 60, 64 [4 L. Ed. 2d 559, 563, 80 S. Ct. 536, 538];Huntley v. Public Util. Com., supra, 69 Cal.2d at p. 73.) Indeed, "[t]he proposition that, under certain circumstances, anonymity is essential to the exercise of constitutional rights is not a novel one. 'Inviolability of privacy in group association may in many circumstances be indispensable to preservation of freedom of association, particularly where a group espouses dissident beliefs.' (N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama (1958) 357 U.S. 449, 462 [2 L. Ed. 2d 1488, 1499-1500, 78 S. Ct. 1163];Britt v. Superior Court , supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 853.)" (Ghafari v. Municipal Court (1978) 87 Cal. App. 3d 255, 260 [150 Cal. Rptr. 813].) Further, "[a]nonymous pamphlets, leaflets, brochures and even books have played an important role in the progress of mankind. Persecuted groups and sects from time to time throughout history have been able to criticize oppressive practices and laws either anonymously or not at all." (Talley v. California , supra, 362 U.S. at p. 64 [4 L.Ed.2d at p. 562].)

Exacting scrutiny is a contronym. Under McIntyre v Ohio Elections Com'n., exacting scrutiny means the fuctional equivalent of sctrict scrutiny, requiring close fit to an overiding state interest. 

Under Buckley v Valeo, it had meant the opposite, a permissive approach.

Dissenting in McIntyre, Justice Scalia called exacting scrutiny a kiss of death standard. 

Citizens United does not apply to this case. Citizens United's praise for disclaimers was dicta in a case about corporations. It is important to look at both parts of CU, one 5-4, the other 8-1. 

Previously, corporate speech had been banned under Austin, now overturned. The court found that disclosure and disclaimer would be a less restrictive means.

San Francisco is not dealing with banned corporate speech. Citizens United does not apply. [needs quotes from cu] 

Subsequently to Citizens United the court provided opinions in town of gilbert, janus, nifla and bonta, which supercede whatever CU did or didn't hold about disclaimers. 

Town of Gilbert clarifies that the standard for political signs is strict scrutiny. 

Under both the first amendment, and california law, san fransisco's disclaimer rules are unconstitutional. 

ACLU v Heller was correct when it ruled that McIntyre is controlling. 

Plaintiffs do not seek to completely invalidate the rules, only to seek an exception as to naming the top 3 sponsors on the ad. They are entitled to that relief. An injunction should issue.

 There is a strong likelihood of success on the merits.The public interest requires that injunctive relief issue. The burden on the plaintiffs far exceeds the burden on defendants. Harm is irrepable. Each prong is met. 


Monday, August 15, 2022

6.   because speech itself is of primary importance to the integrity of the election process, any speech arguably within the reach of rules created for regulating political speech is chilled.

citizens united.

=

40k +30K + 60k = 130k + 600k. 



Friday, August 12, 2022

 caption

san francisco 

v.

somebody,


Statement of amicus:


interest of amicus:

The brief by clc cites to Majors v Abell, in which I was counsel. 

I was plaintiff in Stewart v Taylor, cite,  1997? 

I have written amicus briefs before on this topic to various courts. 

It is possible that I will later move to intervene in this case, but for now an amicus is the quickest way to alert the court to my positions. 


summary of argument


Plaintiff's claim must be granted. The controling authority is Schuster,1980, a state constitutional ruling, 

The California constitution protects three areas: elections, speech, and privacy.

Talley v Califronia is the first landmark in 1960.

The cases that followed included  Drake, Bongiorni,  Grisset, Canyon City, 

The controlling federal cases include Talley, McIntrye, ACLF, Watchtower, NIFLA, Janus, AID v Open Society Institute, Town of Gilbert v Reed, Barnette, Wooley, Tornillo, Riley., FEC v Cruz for Senate. 

12 other state courts have found rights to anonymous speech as well.

Argument:

Schuster, 1980,  is controlling.  Based on the state constitution, schuster found a violation of the right to freedom of speech under the state constitution.

A copy of Schuster is appended. 

San Francisco's ordinance violates  the rights granted under Schuster., and is void. 

The california constitution protects free elections, free speech, and privacy.

Schuster is the best precedent as to the state constitutional claim. 

The controlling federal cases include Talley, McIntrye, ACLF, Watchtower, NIFLA, Janus, AID v Open Society Institute, Town of Gilbert v Reed, Barnette, Wooley, Tornillo, Riley., FEC v Cruz for Senate. 

12 other state courts have found rights to anonymous speech as well.




Here, the ordinance violates the speech, elections, and privacy clauses of the calornia constitution, and therefore, whether under  exacting or strict scrutiny, the ordinance  fails,

when balanced against the interests of the plaintiffs

each of the  prongs for the injunction are met:

the public interest is in striking down san francisco's rule. 

irreparable harm would occur. elrod v burns. 

there is a strong likehood of success on the merits once rdeached.

there is a justiciable controversy, ripe and not moot. 

both state and federal controllong precedents compel a ruling for plaintiff in this case.






 reasons citizens united does not control here.

1    CU, part IV, was dicta.

2    CU has been modified by later rulings such as janus, nifla, bonta, AID, Town of Gilbert v Reed. CU is not some superprecedent that must be followed even after repeal or modification. 

3    CU only applied to corporations, and this is not a case about corporations. 

4    CU, read the way opposing amicus suggests, would be in tension with prior constitutional rulings, including Talley, McIntyre, Barnette, ACLF, Tornillo, Riley, Wooley, 

5    CU, read the way opposing amicus suggests, would be in tension with 13 state constitutional rulings, including CA, CO, MA, ME, N.D., DE, MO, ID. LA. 

6. 

CU itself holds that the standard is strict scrutiny. 

 The restrictions thus function as the equivalent of a prior restraint, giving the FEC power analogous to the type of government practices that the First Amendment was drawn to prohibit. The ongoing chill on speech makes it necessary to invoke the earlier precedents that a statute that chills speech can and must be invalidated where its facial invalidity has been demonstrated. citizens united. 


 the First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech,

- citizens united.

political speech must prevail against laws that would suppress it by design or inadvertence. Laws burdening such speech are subject to strict scrutiny, which requires the Government to prove that the restriction “furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.”

omit: citizens united'ssylubus:

Premised on mistrust of governmental power, the First Amendment stands against attempts to disfavor certain subjects or viewpoints or to distinguish among different speakers, which may be a means to control content. The Government may also commit a constitutional wrong when by law it identifies certain preferred speakers. There is no basis for the proposition that, in the political speech context, the Government may impose restrictions on certain disfavored speakers. Both history and logic lead to this conclusion. 


The First Amendment does not permit laws that force speakers to retain a campaign finance attorney, conduct demographic marketing research, or seek declaratory rulings before discussing the most salient political issues of our day. Prolix laws chill speech for the same reason that vague laws chill speech

see: Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U. S. 844, 867 (1997). = citizens united.

While some means of communication may be less effective than others at influencing the public in different contexts, any effort by the Judiciary to decide which means of communications are to be preferred for the particular type of message and speaker would raise questions as to the courts’ own lawful authority.

  In re Ind. Newspapers, Inc., No. 49A02-1103-PL-23, ___ N.E.2d ___ (Ind. Ct. App., Feb. 21, 2012).(Indiana constitution and First Amendment.) 44. Dendrite 45. Doe v Cahill (Del.) 46. Digital Music News LLC v. Superior Court (Cal. Ct. App. May 14, 2014) (California constitutional right to privacy). 47. It is well-settled that “an author's decision to remain anonymous, like other decisions concerning omissions or additions to the content of a publication, is an aspect of the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment.” In re Anonymous Online Speakers, 661 F.3d 1168, 1173 (9th Cir. 2011) 48. Hartman v O'Connor 1:20cv163 (S.D. Ohio Sep. 29, 2021)(judicial speech withstood strict scrutiny) 49. Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. v. Kelley, 291 F.Supp.2d 1052, 1069 (D.Minn. 2003), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 427 F.3d 1106 (8th Cir. 2005). 50. Riley v. Jankowski, 713 N.W.2d 379 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006)

SUNDAY, MAY 16, 2021

Doe v.2theMart,140 F.Supp.2d 1088, 4 ACLU v. Ashcroft, _ U.S. _ (2004), 2,4 

ACLU of Georgia v. Miller, (977 F.Supp. 1228 (N.D.Ga 1997), 4 
ACLU v. Reno, 117 S.Ct. 2329 (1997) 4 
ALA v. Pataki, 969 F.Supp 160 (1997) 4 
American Constitutional Law Foundation [ACLF], Buckley v., 525 U.S.182 (1999), 2,3,5,6 
Anonymous v. Delaware, 2000 Del. Ch. Lexis 84 (2000), 
Cyberspace v. Engler, 55 F.Supp.2d 737 (E.D. Mich 1999) 

Dennis v. Massachusetts, 329 N.E.2d 706 (Mass. 1975), 
Ex Parte Harrison, 110 S.W. 709 (Mo 1908) Free Speech Coalition v. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. 234 (2002) 
Griset v CalFPPC (1999), reversed on other grounds, 
Gulf Coast Printers v. Hill, 382 F.Supp. 8011 (S.D.Tx 1974), dismissed as moot. 
Idaho v. Barney, 448 P.2d 195 (1968),
 Illinois v. White, 506 NE2d 1284 (Ill. 1987) 
Louisiana. v. Moses, 655 So. 2d 779 (La. Ct. App. 1995), 
Majors v. Abell, 317 F.3d 719 (7th Cir. 2003), 792 NE2d 18 (Ind. 2003), 361 F.2d 349 (2004), 
McIntyre v. Ohio, 514 U.S. 334 (1995) 
N.Dakota v. N.D. Ed. Assoc., 262 N.W.2d 731 

New York v. Duryea, 351 NYS2d 978 (1974) 

Washington ex rel Public Disclosure v. 119 Vote No!, 957 P.2d 691 (1998)
 Ogden v. Marendt, (S.D. Ind 2004),
[ Peterslie v. N.Carolina, (N.Car. 1993)]
 Griset v. Cal. Fair Practices, 884 P.2d 116 (1994),(1999),(2001) 
Riley v. Federation of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781 (1998) 
ShrinkMo v. Maupin, 892 F. Supp. 1246 (E.D. Mo. 1995), aff'd, 71 F.3d 1422 (8th Cir. 1995), 
Smith v California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959), 
Stewart v. Taylor, 953 F.Supp.1047 (S.D.Ind.1997), 
Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960), 
Texas v. Doe, (Tx. Cr.App. 5/14/2003)
 Vermont Right to Life v. Sorrell, 221 F.3d 376, 392 (2d Cir. 2000),
 Watchtower v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002) 
West Virginians for Life, Inc. v. Smith, 919 F. Supp. 954 (S.D. W. Va. 1996),
 Wilson v Stocker, 819 F.2d 943, 950 (10th Cir. 1987), Wooley v Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) 
Yes to Life PAC v. Gardner,

SATURDAY, OCTOBER 20, 2018

a few notes in 2018

https://casetext.com/case/people-v-mishkin

22People v. Mishkin, 17 A.D.2d 243 | 1962.

THURSDAY, AUGUST 8, 2013

today i tracked down and read the lower court opinions in zwickler v koota. they are not online - i had to find a law library. i had read the two supreme court opinions in the case, but there is more detail in the lower court opinions. should have looked these up years ago. i would summarize, but i'm on a bus and it is hard to type.

a lawyer took me to lunch, and we discussed the nuts and bolts of doing a case om michigan's disclaimer statute. we decided that, while i'm not relicenced yet, i can bill this time as a paralegal, at a fraction of my usual rates.

THURSDAY, AUGUST 1, 2013

I had forgotten that Zwickler v Koota went to the supreme court twice. the second time, it was dismissed as moot. I saw an article today about Koota's grandson, which is the lawyer now on trial for winning a $12-billion judgment again chevron in equador.


http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/31/business/steven-donziger-lawyer-who-beat-chevron-in-ecuador-faces-trial-of-his-own.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0




Zwickler v. Koota - 389 U.S. 241 (1967)


U.S. SUPREME COURT

Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967)

Zwickler v. Koota
No. 29
Argued October 12, 1967
Decided December 5, 1967
389 U.S. 241
Syllabus
Reversal on state law grounds of appellant's conviction of violating a New York statute by distributing anonymous political handbills was affirmed by the State's highest court. Thereafter appellant, invoking federal jurisdiction under the Civil Rights Act and the Declaratory Judgment Act, sought in the District Court declaratory relief and an injunction against future criminal prosecutions for violating the statute, claiming that, on its face, the statute contravened the First Amendment by its "overbreadth." A three-judge court applied the doctrine of abstention and dismissed the complaint, leaving the appellant to assert his constitutional challenge in the state courts either in the defense of any criminal prosecution for future violations of the statute or by way of a declaratory judgment action. The court held that abstention from ruling on the declaratory judgment issue was warranted because appellant had made no special showing of the need for an injunction against criminal prosecution.
Held:
1. The District Court erred in refusing to pass on appellant's claim for a declaratory judgment as there was no "special circumstance" warranting its application of the abstention doctrine to that claim. Pp. 389 U. S. 245-252.
(a) A federal court has the duty of giving due respect to a suitor's choice of a federal forum for the hearing and decision of his federal constitutional claims and escape from that duty is not permissible merely because state courts are equally responsible for the enforcement and protection of federal constitutional rights. P. 389 U. S. 248.
(b) A statutory construction by the state courts would not avoid or modify the constitutional question as the statute involved here is being challenged not for its lack of clarity, but for its "overbreadth." Pp. 389 U. S. 249-250.
(c) The principle that abstention cannot be used simply to give the state courts the first opportunity to vindicate a federal claim is particularly significant when, as here, the statute is being attacked as repugnant to the First Amendment, for the delay
from requiring recourse to the state courts might chill the very constitutional right which a plaintiff seeks to protect. P. 389 U. S. 252.
2. The District Court had the duty of adjudicating the request for a declaratory judgment regardless of its conclusion as to the propriety of the issuance of an injunction, for, asDombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U. S. 479, made clear, the questions of abstention and of injunctive relief are not the same. Pp. 389 U. S. 252-255.
261 F.Supp. 985, reversed and remanded.


Official Supreme Court caselaw is only fo

MONDAY, JULY 29, 2013

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