No. 21-890 ======================================================= Supreme Court of the United States [needs gothic font] ____________ Gaspee Project And Illinois Opportunity Project, Petitioners, V. Diane C. Mederos, Stephen P. Erickson, Jennifer L. Johnson, Richard H. Pierce, Isadore S. Ramos, David H. Sholes, And William E. West, In Their Official Capacities As Members Of The Rhode Island State Board Of Elections, Respondents. __________ On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Amicus Curiae Brief of Robbin Stewart in Support of Petitioners *[Redacted] info as counsel of record [pagebreak] Table of Contents Table of Authorities Interests of the Amicus Curiae Summary of Argument Argument I. There is a deep split in lower courts. Question presented. Talley v California is being resisted by states and courts. At least 36 cases have sided with Talley, while at least 12 cases side against. The circuit courts have split 5-4. At least 12 states have ruled with Talley as well as their state constitutions, while at least 2 went the other way. II. Citizens United Part IV created confusion. States and lower courts, as here, are misreading Citizens United to have overruled Talley and McIntyre. This is error because the text at issue is dicta, is out of context, is limited to corporations, was a less restrictive means than a total ban, is at odds with prior precedent, and has been superseded by more recent cases including Becerra. III. The case is important because free elections require free speech. IV. This could be the Court's first opportunity to explore the new Bonta standard. V. The case could be decided under state law, avoiding the federal question. Conclusion. Table of Authorities A–1 A–Lectrician, Inc. v. Snipes, (9th Cir. 2015) ACLU of Georgia v. Miller, (977 F.Supp. 1228 (N.D.Ga 1997), ACLU of Nevada v Heller 378 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2004), ACLU v. Reno, 117 S.Ct. 2329 (1997), AID v Open Society, 570 U S 205 (2013) ALA v. Pataki, 969 F.Supp 160 (1997), Anonymous v Delaware,Civ. No. 17453 (Del. Ch. May. 10, 2000), Arkansas v Butler, 983 F. Supp. 1209 (W.D. Ark. 1997). Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990) Bailey v. Maine Commission on Governmental Ethics, 2012 WL 4588564 No. 1:11-CV-00179-NT, (D. Me. Sept. 30, 2012) Barnette , W.VA Board v., 319 US 624 (1943) Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960) Becerra, NIFLA v., 585 US _ (2018) Bonta, Americans for Prosperity Foundation v., 594 U S __. Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 564 U.S. 379, 388 (2011) Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation, 525 U.S.182 (1999), Canon v. Justice Court (1964) 61 Cal.2d 446, 457, 39 Cal.Rptr. 228, 393 P.2d 428, Ctr. for Individual Freedom, Inc. v. Tennant, 849 F. Supp. 2d 659 (S.D.W. Va. 2011) Citizens PAC Political Action Committee v. Davidson, 236 F. 3d 1174 (8th Cir. 2000) Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) City of Bogalusa v. May, 212 So.2d 408 (1968), Commonwealth v. Dennis, 329 N.E.2d 706 (Mass. 1975), Cooper v Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) Crawford v Marion County Election Board, 553 U.S. 181 (2008), Cyberspace v. Engler, 55 F.Supp.2d 737 (E.D. Mich 1999), Dennis v. Massachusetts, 329 N.E.2d 706 (Mass. 1975), Doe v. 2theMart, 140 F.Supp.2d 1088, Doe v. Mortham, 708 So.2d 929 (Fla.1998), Ex Parte Harrison, 110 S.W. 709, 212 Mo. 88 (M0 1908), Gable v Patton, 142 F.3d 940 (6th Cir. 1998). Gaspee Project And Illinois Opportunity Project, v. Mederos, Gobitis v. Minersville, 310 US 586 (1940) Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293 (1961) Griset v. Fair Political Practices Commission, 69 Cal. App. 4th 818, 82 Cal. Rptr.2d 25 (1999), reversed on other grounds, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) Hansen v Westerville, 43 F.3d 1472 (6th Cir. 1994) Idaho v. Barney, 448 P.2d 195 (1968), Illinois v. White, 506 NE2d 1284 (Ill. 1987), In re Opinion of the Justices, 324 A.2d 211 (Del. 1974), Janus v. AFSCME, 585 U.S. ___ (2018) KRLPAC v. Terry 108 F.3d 637 (6th Cir. 1997), Louisiana v. Fulton, 3.37 So.2d 866 (La. 1976), Louisiana. v. Moses, 655 So. 2d 779 (La. Ct. App. 1995), Majors v Abell, 317 F.3d 719 (7th Cir. 2003), 792 N.E.2d 22 (Ind. 2003), 361 F.3d 349, 361 F.3d 349, 358. (7th Cir. 2004), Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, 584 U.S. ___ (2018) McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003) McIntyre, Estate of, v. Ohio Elections Comm’n., 514 U.S. 334 (1995) Morefield v. Moore, 540 S.W.2d 873, 874-75 (Ky. 1976), N. Dakota v. N.D. Ed. Assoc., 262 N.W.2d 731, NAACP v Alabama ex rel. Patterson, National Organization for Marriage v McKee, 649 F.3d 34 (1st Cir. 2011), National Institute of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018) New York v. Duryea, 351 NYS2d 978 (1974), Norman v Reed. 502 U.S. 279 (1992) Ogden v. Marendt, 264 F.Supp. 2d 785 (S.D. Ind. 2003) (S.D. Ind 2004), Opinion of the Justices, 306 A.2d 18 (Maine 1973), People v Barney, 448 P.2d 195 (1968), 92 Idaho 581. People v. Bongiorni, 205 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 856 (Sup. Ct. 1962), People v. Drake (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d Supp. 32, 159 Cal.Rptr. 161, People v. Duryea, 351 N.Y.S.2d 978 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974). People v. White, 506 N.E.2d 1284, (I11. 1987), Printing Industries of the Gulf Coast v. Hill, 382 F.Supp. 8011 (S.D.Tx 1974), 42 L.Ed.26 33 dismissed as moot, Public Citizen v. FEC, (11th cir. 2001), 99-14823. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155 (2015), Reno v ACLU, 521 US 844 (1997) Riley v. Federation of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781 (1998), Roe v Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) Schuster v. Imperial County Mun. Ct., 167 Cal. Rptr. 447 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1042, Seymour v. Elections Enf. Comm’n (Con. 2000) Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) ShrinkMissouri v. Maupin, 892 F. Supp. 1246 (E.D. Mo. 1995), aff'd, 71 F.3d 1422 (8th Cir. 1995), Smithers v Fla. Elections, http://www.fec.state.fl.us/decisions/Smithers96-85.PDF, State v. Acey, 633 S.W.2d 306 (Tenn. 1982), State v. Burgess, 543 So. 2d 1332 (La. 1989), State v. Green Mountain Future, 2013 Vt. 87 (Vt. 2013) State v. North Dakota Educ. Ass'n, 262 N.W.2d 731, 736 (N.D. 1978), State v. Petersilie, 334 N.C. 169, 432 S.E.2d 832 (1993), Stewart v Taylor, 953 F. Supp. 1047 (S.D. Ind. 1997), Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957) Talley v California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960) Tattered Cover v Thornton, 44 P.3d 1044 (2002), Texas v. Doe, 61 S. W. 3d 99, (Tx. Cr.App. 5/14/2003), Tornillo v. Miami Herald, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) Valeo, Buckley v., 424 U.S. 1 (1976) Washington ex rel Public Disclosure v. 119 Vote No!, 957 P.2d 691 (1998), Watchtower v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002), West Virginians for Life, Inc. v. Smith, 919 F. Supp. 954 (S.D. W. Va. 1996), Wilkinson v Jones 876 F.Supp (W.D.Ky 1995), Wilson v Stocker, 819 F.2d 943 (10th Cir. 1987), Wooley v Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977), Worley v. Fla. Secretary of State, 717 F.3d 1238 (11th Cir. 2013), Yes to Life PAC v. Webster, 74 F.Supp.2d 37 (D.Me. 1999), 84 F. Supp. 2d 150 (D. Me. 2000). Zwickler v. Koota, 290 F. Supp. 244 (E. D. N. Y. 1968), vacated on other grounds (mootness) sub nom. Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103 (1969), Other Authorities: First Amendment Supreme Court Rule 37.6, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Doug_Guetzloe Martin Shaeffer, Meiklejohn, Alexander (1872 – 1964) [pagebreak] Interest of the Amicus Curiae Robbin Stewart, the amicus here, was the successful plaintiff in Stewart v Taylor, 953 F. Supp. 1047 (S.D. Ind. 1997), which found Indiana's disclaimer statute unconstitutional. Elections officials had confiscated his sign that read "Robbin Stewart for Township Board - Vote Tuesday". The court held "Stewart contends that this case is governed by McIntyre. Stewart is correct." The Indiana legislature then repassed the statute, with irrelevant changes. Stewart was lead counsel in Majors v Abell, 317 F.3d 719 (7th Cir. 2003), 792 N.E.2d 22 (Ind. 2003), 361 F.3d 349 (7th Cir. 2004.) in which Judge Posner upheld the new statute in light of indeterminacy caused by McConnell v FEC. Judge Easterbrook issued a dubitante opinion, 361 F.3d 349, 358, pointing out that four controlling Supreme Court precedents side with Majors. Majors has been cited at least 64 times. Stewart was cocounsel in Anonymous v Delaware, Civ. No. 17453 (Del. Ch. May. 10, 2000), in which the Court of Chancery dismissed the case on the grounds that the disclaimer statute was so obviously unconstitutional per McIntyre that there was no genuine controversy. However, post-Citizens United, Delaware is now enforcing a disclaimer statute, and the state's Attorney General has refused to issue an Attorney General Opinion in light of cases such as Janus and Becerra. Stewart has also filed comments with the FEC as to their disclaimer regulations. Stewart has participated in distributing campaign literature in a variety of campaigns since 1970, has held appointed public office in four states, has won primaries and lost general elections, and blogs about election law at http://ballots.blogspot.com, where he engages in express advocacy without disclaimers. He has spent over $1000 on signage. His speech is being chilled in Indiana, Rhode Island, Delaware, and elsewhere. He has filed amicus briefs in several disclaimer cases. One such brief helped get charges dropped against Martin Shaeffer, a Clarkburg WV city council-member who was arrested and jailed for helping publish a political newsletter. He was an amicus, along with the Privacy Project, in Crawford v Marion County Election Board, after he was prevented from voting because he has a sincere, possibly mistaken, belief that he has a right to vote without showing ID. https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legal-work/fa3a4f2682405f5e42_jbm6bhn9i.pdf. His work has focused on ballot access, campaign speech and finance, and privacy issues. [footnote 1] Amicus Curiae has obtained written consents to file from Movant and Respondent. Per Supreme Court Rule 37.6, Amicus Curiae states that no counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, and no persons other than Amicus Curiae and its counsel made any monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation and submission of this brief. Amicus Curiae is an individual and has no shareholders or partners. Summary of the Argument: 1. There is a deep circuit split which the court should resolve. 2. Dicta in Citizens United, part IV, has created confusion among lower courts and legislatures, which the court should clarify. 3. A major purpose of the First Amendment is to enable free elections. Public confidence in elections has been shaken in recent years, when incumbents can rig the elections by chilling the speech of their critics. The case is important, so that the First Circuit's acceptance of censorship of campaign speech can be overturned, and so that the states listed in Justice Scalia's footnote 2 in McIntyre are put on notice that these statutes remain void. 4. This case presents an opportunity to review an erroneous application of the Bonta standard, which may be something the court wants to explore. Conclusion: The court should grant cert, and rule broadly for plaintiffs, upholding Talley v. California as controlling law, not just narrowly striking down the unconstitutional top 5 donors disclaimer provision. 5. While neither party raises the issue, this case might be resolvable on state grounds. The Rhode Island constitution has a free speech provision. The court could, on its own motion, certify a question to the Rhode Island Supreme Court, as to whether there is any state right which could allow the federal question to be avoided. Most states which have raised the issue of a state constitutional right to anonymous speech have found one. Argument There is a deep circuit split which the Court should resolve. The question presented is: Rhode Island law requires most issue advocacy groups that mention a candidate or referendum in a communication before an election to register with the State and disclose most donors of at least $1,000. The law also requires that such communications include a disclaimer of the sponsoring group as well as an on-advertisement disclaimer of the group’s top five donors of at least $1,000 during the preceding year. Does Rhode Island’s on-advertisement donor disclaimer law impermissibly compel speech in violation of National Institute of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018)? This brief is in support of Gaspee Project, et al.’s petition for certiorari, https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/21/21-890/204745/20211210150814345_Gaspee%20Cert%20Petition%20v11%20FA.pdf, seeking review of an erroneous decision of the First Circuit which allows Rhode Island to require a disclaimer on certain political literature, including listing the top 5 donors, so that they can be singled out for harassment. The Gaspee Project wants to distribute a voting guide providing information to voters. In 1960 the court in Talley v California ruled that anonymous speech is constitutionally protected, and therefore an ordinance requiring a disclaimer was void. The opening paragraph of Gaspee Project's complaint cites to Talley and McIntyre, which should have been enough. Talley was one of the civil rights cases, along with NAACP v Alabama ex rel. Patterson, Bates v. Little Rock, Shelton v. Tucker, Gibson v. Florida Legis. Comm'n, Gremillion v. NAACP, Sweezy v. New Hampshire. These cases found a right to privacy and political association. Political association is a modern phrasing of the rights to assembly and petition, textually present in the First Amendment. Both the speech and press clauses are also implicated. Rhode Island seeks a return to the Jim Crow era, and prefers Gobitis over Barnette. Rhode Island here is making an attack on the right to privacy. There are current controversies as to the full extent of the privacy right discussed in Griswold and Roe v Wade, but all members of the court have agreed there is some First Amendment right to privacy and autonomy that prohibits compelled speech outside of narrow exceptions not at issue here. See Janus, Becerra, and concurrences in Masterpiece Bakeshop. Regardless of intent, the effect of disclaimer rules has been to severely burden speech, especially that of minorities, such as blacks (Talley), women (McIntyre), political minorities (ACLF), immigrants with relatives in the old country, and sundry other cases less easy to categorize. Although Talley is the law of the land, states and some lower courts refused to accept it, much as Alabama vigorously resisted NAACP for many years. The NAACP case reached the Supreme Court four times before Alabama finally backed down. California did not accept Talley, and continued to pass new unconstitutional disclaimer rules each time one was struck down, and still enforces them today. People v. Bongiorni, 205 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 856 (Sup. Ct. 1962), Canon v. Justice Court (1964) 61 Cal.2d 446, 457, 39 Cal.Rptr. 228, 393 P.2d 428, People v. Drake (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d Supp. 32, 159 Cal.Rptr. 161, Schuster v. Imperial County Mun. Ct., 167 Cal. Rptr. 447 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1042, Griset v. Fair Political Practices Commission, 69 Cal. App. 4th 818, 82 Cal. Rptr.2d 25 (1999), reversed on other grounds, NIFLA v Becerra, 585 U.S. ___ (2018). Louisiana has a similar history of as soon as one disclaimer statute is struck down, another is enacted, in an ongoing cycle. Louisiana v. Fulton, 3.37 So.2d 866 (La. 1976), State v. Burgess, 543 So. 2d 1332 (1989), Louisiana. v. Moses, 655 So. 2d 779 (La. Ct. App. 1995). In Kentucky, courts have upheld disclaimer rules four times, defying Talley. Morefield v. Moore, 540 S.W.2d 873, 874-75 (Ky. 1976), Wilkinson v Jones 876 F.Supp (W.D.Ky 1995), KRLPAC v. Terry (6th Cir. 1997), Gable v Patton, (6th Cir. 1998). In note 2 of his dissent in McIntyre, Justice Scalia cataloged how nearly every state has a disclaimer statute. What is needed is something like Cooper v Aaron that after 60 years really settles the matter, and lets election officials know that if they continue to violate the rule of Talley they can expect to pay damages. So a narrow ruling just about the 5 top donors is not enough. It is a waste of judicial resources to allow bad actors getting off scot-free for intentional violations of freedom of campaign speech, with substantial harm to the integrity of the election process, and an endless cycle of injunctions and declaratory judgments that fail to deter subsequent violations. A majority of cases have followed Talley, and later McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, but about 1/3 of the cases have refused to do so, and about 2/3rds of the states still enforce some unconstitutional disclaimer statute. This is unacceptable. Cases following Talley include: City of Bogalusa v. May, 212 So.2d 408 (1968), People v. Bongiorni, 205 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 856 (Sup. Ct. 1962), Doe v. Mortham, 708 So.2d 929 (Fla.1998), Griset v. Fair Political Practices Commission, 69 Cal. App. 4th 818, 82 Cal. Rptr.2d 25 (1999), reversed on other grounds, Printing Industries of the Gulf Coast v. Hill, 382 F.Supp. 8011 (S.D.Tx 1974), 42 L.Ed.26 33 dismissed as moot, Idaho v. Barney, 448 P.2d 195 (1968), Louisiana. v. Moses, 655 So. 2d 779 (La. Ct. App. 1995), Lousiana v. Fulton, 3.37 So.2d 866 (La. 1976), New York v. Duryea, 351 NYS2d 978 (1974), In re Opinion of the Justices, 324 A.2d 211 (Del. 1974), Opinion of the Justices, 306 A.2d 18 (Maine 1973) Ogden v. Marendt, 264 F.Supp. 2d 785 (S.D. Ind. 2003) (S.D. Ind 2004), ShrinkMissouri v. Maupin, 892 F. Supp. 1246 (E.D. Mo. 1995), aff'd, 71 F.3d 1422 (8th Cir. 1995), Schuster v. Imperial County Mun. Ct., 167 Cal. Rptr. 447 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1042. Smithers v Fla. Elections, http://www.fec.state.fl.us/decisions/Smithers96-85.PDF, Texas v. Doe, 61 S. W. 3d 99, (Tx. Cr.App. 5/14/2003), West Virginians for Life, Inc. v. Smith, 919 F. Supp. 954 (S.D. W. Va. 1996), Yes to Life PAC v. Webster, Zwickler v. Koota, 290 F. Supp. 244 (E. D. N. Y. 1968), vacated on other grounds (mootness) sub nom. Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103 (1969), Doe v. 2theMart,140 F.Supp.2d 1088, ACLU of Georgia v. Miller, (977 F.Supp. 1228 (N.D.Ga 1997), ACLU v. Reno, 117 S.Ct. 2329 (1997), ALA v. Pataki, 969 F.Supp 160 (1997), Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation, 525 U.S.182 (1999), Cyberspace v. Engler, 55 F.Supp.2d 737 (E.D. Mich 1999), Dennis v. Massachusetts, 329 N.E.2d 706 (Mass. 1975), Ex Parte Harrison, 110 S.W. 709 (Mo 1908) (on state grounds), Illinois v. White, 506 NE2d 1284 (Ill. 1987), McIntyre v. Ohio, 514 U.S. 334 (1995), N.Dakota v. N.D. Ed. Assoc., 262 N.W.2d 731, Washington ex rel Public Disclosure v. 119 Vote No!, 957 P.2d 691 (1998), Riley v. Federation of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781 (1998), Stewart v. Taylor, 953 F.Supp.1047 (S.D.Ind.1997), Texas v. Doe, (Tx. Cr.App. 5/14/2003), Watchtower v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002), West Virginians for Life, Inc. v. Smith, 919 F. Supp. 954 (S.D. W. Va. 1996), Wilson v Stocker, 819 F.2d 943, 950 (10th Cir. 1987), Wooley v Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977), Yes to Life PAC v. Webster, 74 F.Supp.2d 37 (D.Me. 1999), 84 F. Supp. 2d 150 (D. Me. 2000). Cases resisting Talley include: United States v. Scott, 195 F. Supp. 440, 443 (D.N. D. 1961), , State v. Acey, 633 S.W.2d 306 (Tenn. 1982), Morefield v. Moore, 540 S.W.2d 873, 874-75 (Ky. 1976), State v. Petersilie, 334 N.C. 169, 432 S.E.2d 832 (1993), Worley v. Fla. Secretary of State, 717 F.3d 1238 (11th Cir. 2013), Majors v Abell, 317 F.3d 719 (7th Cir. 2003), 792 N.E.2d 22 (Ind. 2003), 361 F.3d 349 (7th Cir. 2004), Wilkinson v Jones 876 F.Supp (W.D.Ky 1995), Seymour v @ Election Comm’n. (Con. 2000), State v. Green Mountain Future, 2013 Vt. 87 (Vt. 2013), NOM v McKee, 649 F.3d 34 (1st Cir. 2011), Terry, Gable v Patton, Arkansas v Butler, 983 F. Supp. 1209 (W.D. Ark. 1997). Public Citizen v. FEC (11th Cir.), Bailey v. Maine Commission on Governmental Ethics, 2012 WL 4588564 No. 1:11-CV-00179-NT, (D. Me. Sept. 30, 2012), (see Bailey v. Maine Commission on Governmental Ethics: Another Step Toward the End of Political Privacy, Engage Volume 14, Issue 2 July 2013). Circuits following Talley include 4th (West Virginians for Life, Inc. v. Smith, 919 F. Supp. 954 (S.D. W. Va. 1996)), 8th (Citizens PAC Political Action Committee v. Davidson, 236 F. 3d 1174 (8th Cir. 2000)), 9th (ACLU of Nevada v Heller 378 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2004), but see A–1 A–Lectrician, Inc. v. Snipes), and 10th (Wilson v Stocker, 819 F.2d 943 (10th Cir. 1987)). Circuits improperly ruling against Talley include the First, Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh, in the instant case, KYRTL v. Terry, Gable v Patton, Majors v Abell, and Public Citizen, Worley v Florida. Additionally, at least 12 states have found a right to anonymous speech in their state constitution, while two states decided the other way. The states include CA, CO, DE, ID, IL, LA, OH, MA, ME, MO, ND, and NY. Schuster v. Imperial County Municipal Court, 167 Cal. Rptr. 447 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980), Tattered Cover v Thornton, 44 P.3d 1044 (2002), In re Opinion of the Justices, 324 A.2d 211 (Del. 1974), People v Barney, State v. Burgess, 543 So.2d 1332 (La. 1989) People v. White, 506 N.E.2d 1284, (I11. 1987), Commonwealth v. Dennis, 329 N.E.2d 706 (Mass. 1975), Opinion of the Justices, 306 A.2d 18 (Me. 1973), Ex Parte. Harrison, 212 Mo. 88 (M0 1908), State v. North Dakota Educ. Ass'n, 262 N.W.2d 731, 736 (N.D. 1978), People v. Duryea, 351 N.Y.S.2d 978 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974). Ohio’s lockstep doctrine accepts McIntyre as controlling the state constitution as well. However, Ohio still enforces its disclaimer statute. States ruling the other way include NC, TN, Peterslie, State v Acey. This is a deep split. The court has made at least two previous attempts to resolve the split, in McIntyre, and Buckley v. ACLF. The question presented in McIntyre was whether there was an elections exception to Talley. The court found none. Ohio had used Valeo's permissive "exacting scrutiny" standard. While retaining the label "exacting scrutiny", McIntyre applied a strict form of scrutiny, requiring narrow tailing and an overriding state interest. Justice Scalia, dissenting, called this a "kiss of death" standard. While Margaret McIntyre has been described as a lone pamphleteer, she was actually a spokesperson for a larger group of about 60 people, as described in Hansen v Westerville, 43 F.3d 1472 (6th Cir 1994). Rhode Island here misreads McIntyre as only creating an exception for little ladies with home computers who spend under $1000, and misreads McConnell's electioneering communications discussion to allow disclaimers for issue speech when targeted and close to the election, thinking that this would satisfy the "In for a calf is not in for a cow" concurrence in McIntyre. As discussed below, Rhode Island misreads Citizens United as having implicitly repealed Talley, McIntyre, ACLF, Watchtower, etc. The statutes in Talley and McIntyre were broad, while Rhode Island’s is more narrow, but that is not why they were found unconstitutional. Americans have a right to speak about elections, unbound by compelled government speech. Buckley v ACLF carefully distinguished disclosure, which got permissive scrutiny under Valeo, and disclaimers, which get stricter scrutiny under McIntyre. Yet courts continued to rule adversely at times, and then the split got wider after McConnell and Citizens United rejected as-applied issue advocacy arguments brought by James Bopp. Mr. Bopp favors disclaimer statutes, as long as they are limited to express advocacy, so his arguments have been indirect. There is a deep split among lower courts, both state and federal, as to whether Talley and McIntyre remain good law and prohibit disclaimer rules. The Court should grant cert. to resolve this issue. Dicta in Citizens United, part IV, has created confusion among lower courts and legislatures, which the court should clarify. Citizens United was a case that held that strict scrutiny applies to political speech, overturned the anomalous Austin ruling, and greatly expanded constitutional protection of election speech. But states have seized on certain loose language about disclaimers, out of context, and some courts have followed, as the First Circuit did below, reasoning that Citizens implicitly overruled not just Austin, but Talley, Mcintyre, ACLF, Wooley, maybe even Barnette. This is error, for the following reasons. The language in Citizens about disclaimers is dicta, not holding. Citizens was a case about corporate speech, and does not authorize disclaimer rules for individuals, as the statutes of Rhode Island, Maine, and Vermont attempt to do. In Citizens, disclaimers were a less restrictive alternative to a complete ban. Rhode Island has no such ban, so the Citizens discussion does not apply. If Citizens had intended to overturn McIntyre et al., it would have explained why and how it was doing so, as it did in overruling Austin. If Citizens had overruled McIntyre, it would have itself been overruled by later cases such as Reed v. Town of Gilbert, AID v Open Society, Janus, and NIFLA v Becerra. Nonetheless, the dicta in Citizens has confused lower courts and legislatures, and the court should take this case to once again clearly establish that Talley and McIntyre remain good law, and states cannot compel the content of political ads. Perhaps in some future case, the Court may allow a disclaimer rule limited to speech by corporations. There are some sound policy reasons to do so, and Citizens hints at such a future case. But Citizens did not do so, and the Rhode Island statutes are not limited to corporate speech. In Citizens, echoing a similar failed strategy in McConnell v. FEC, plaintiffs argued that their speech was not express advocacy, and so the disclaimer and disclosure rules did not apply. The court disagreed, in Part IV, and found that the speech at issue was at least the functional equivalent of express advocacy, so its attempted loophole was closed. This was the holding. The court then went on in dicta to praise disclaimers and disclosure, lumping them together, as less restrictive means to advance the state interests. It is these statements that have been taken out of context. Plaintiffs had not argued that the disclaimer rule was facially void, only that they had found an exception. The current case does directly challenge the unconstitutional statute, and thus makes a good vehicle for the court to clarify its remarks in Citizens United. Perhaps in this case the Court will decide to overrule McIntyre, Talley, Barnette, Wooley, and Tornillo. If so it should do so explicitly, not sotto voce. A major purpose of the First Amendment is to enable free elections. Public confidence in elections has been shaken in recent years, when incumbents can rig elections by chilling the speech of their critics. The case is important, so that the First Circuit's acceptance of censorship of campaign speech can be overturned, and so that the states listed in Justice Scalia's footnote 2 in McIntyre are put on notice that these statutes remain void. The United States is an experiment in a libertarian constitutional democratic republic, in which the people are sovereign, instead of subjects of a monarch. The people govern themselves by choosing representatives via free and open elections. In order to do so, there must be free speech so that issues and candidates can be fully discussed. This is the Meiklejohn theory of the purpose of the First Amendment; that it makes democracy possible. It may be nice to have nude dancing and art and literature and liquor prices, but a core function of the First Amendment is to protect free and open elections. Here, the usual presumption of constitutionality is reversed, and censorship of political speech is suspect, presumptively invalid, subject to close, exacting, strict, kiss of death, scrutiny. What Rhode Island is doing here, perhaps with the best of intentions, criminalizes core political speech, and also imposes civil penalties without a mens rea element. Both of these severely chill speech, and detract from the integrity of the election process. Talley reversed a $10 fine. McIntyre reversed a $100 fine. The consequences in Rhode Island are more dire. And, as plaintiffs have argued, the 5 donor requirement goes well beyond the mere attribution requirements found invalid in Talley and McIntyre. When free speech is taken away, we are left with Potemkin elections, which retain the form but not the substance. The courts, and this Court, have an important role in safeguarding elections. It is not surprising that the Rhode Island legislature seeks to deter criticism, or here, accurate feedback, about the Rhode Island legislature. In such cases, no deference is due. “At the Gaspee Project, it is our duty to hold accountable lawmakers who ignore your best interests.” http://gaspeeproject.org/about. The right to petition allows citizens to express their ideas, hopes, and concerns to their government and their elected representatives, whereas the right to speak fosters the public exchange of ideas that is integral to deliberative democracy as well as to the whole realm of ideas and human affairs. Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 564 U.S. 379, 388 (2011). Actual jailings for disclaimer violations are rare, but not unknown. Harrison, Dennis, Schaeffer, and Geutzloe are among those who have been jailed. Ex Parte Harrison (Mo 1908), Commonwealth v Dennis (MA. 1975), http://shaeffercase.blogspot.com, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Doug_Guetzloe. Currently before congress is an election "reform" bill which would extend the FEC's unconstitutional disclaimer requirements to the internet, what Reno v ACLU called burning the global village to roast the pig. This court should take this case to better inform congress, the FEC, legislators, and lower courts, that there are constitutional limits to how election speech can be chilled. This would be the Court's first opportunity to explore the new Bonta standard. In this case, the First Circuit erroneously applied the new Bonta standard, instead of McIntyre's kiss of death standard. In doing so, it treated Bonta as as permissive as Valeo, essentially treating Bonta as an indeterminate "personal preferences of the judges" standard. If this case is allowed to stand, it will not be the only lower court to rule this way. This may be the first case to apply Bonta. The court could choose to take this case as a chance to further explore the Bonta standard. State Grounds 5. While neither party raises the issue, this case might be resolvable on state grounds. The Rhode Island constitution has a free speech provision. The court could, on its own motion, certify a question to the Rhode Island Supreme Court, as to whether there is any state right which could allow the federal question to be avoided. This would be a case of first impression, and the Rhode Island court would have no obligation to respond, but might choose to do so. Most states which have raised the issue of a state constitutional right to anonymous speech have found one. While the issue of whether there is a state constitutional right to anonymous speech remains unresolved, the state’s interests, whether legitimate, compelling, overriding, or narrowly tailored, are diminished. So there is an implicit state claim inside the federal claim. Conclusion: The court should grant cert., and rule broadly for plaintiffs, upholding Talley v. California, not just narrowly striking down the unconstitutional top 5 donors disclaimer provision. Alternatively, if there are six votes in support, it could summarily reverse, perhaps with an order for reconsideration in light of NIFLA v Becerra. Certification to the Rhode Island Supreme Court is another option. (word count). @ 3379 of 4386 Respectfully submitted, [Closing Signature Block with clearly identified counsel of record] FEBRUARY 4 2022

https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/office/create-a-table-of-authorities-ddd126ae-52bc-4299-9558-06dd0e4fe8c0

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Gaspee Project And Illinois Opportunity Project, v. Mederos, Talley v California Citizens United Part IV McIntyre Becerra Bonta Stewart v Taylor, 953 F. Supp. 1047 (S.D. Ind. 1997), Majors v Abell, 317 F.3d 719 (7th Cir. 2003), 792 N.E.2d 22 (Ind. 2003), 361 F.3d 349 (7th Cir. 2004.) 361 F.3d 349, 358. Anonymous v Delaware,Civ. No. 17453 (Del. Ch. May. 10, 2000), Janus Martin Shaeffer, Crawford v Marion County Election Board, Supreme Court Rule 37.6, NAACP v Alabama ex rel. Patterson, Bates v. Little Rock, Shelton v. Tucker, Gibson v. Florida Legis. Comm'n, Gremillion v. NAACP, Sweezy v. New Hampshire. Gobitis Barnette Griswold Roe v Wade Huminski v. Corsones, 396 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2004), Balancing Courtroom Safety and Free Expression: Huminski v. Corsones, Robert M. Howard,The Justice System Journal, Vol. 27, No. 1 (2006) National Institute of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018) Masterpiece Bakeshop. People v. Bongiorni, 205 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 856 (Sup. Ct. 1962), Canon v. Justice Court (1964) 61 Cal.2d 446, 457, 39 Cal.Rptr. 228, 393 P.2d 428, People v. Drake (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d Supp. 32, 159 Cal.Rptr. 161, Schuster v. Imperial County Mun. Ct., 167 Cal. Rptr. 447 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1042, Griset v. Fair Political Practices Commission, 69 Cal. App. 4th 818, 82 Cal. Rptr.2d 25 (1999), reversed on other grounds, Louisiana v. Fulton, 3.37 So.2d 866 (La. 1976), State v. Burgess, 543 So. 2d 1332 (1989), Louisiana. v. Moses, 655 So. 2d 779 (La. Ct. App. 1995). Morefield v. Moore, 540 S.W.2d 873, 874-75 (Ky. 1976), Wilkinson v Jones 876 F.Supp (W.D.Ky 1995), KRLPAC v. Terry (6th Cir. 1997), Gable v Patton, (6th Cir. 1998). Cooper v Aaron City of Bogalusa v. May, 212 So.2d 408 (1968), People v. Bongiorni, 205 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 856 (Sup. Ct. 1962), Doe v. Mortham, 708 So.2d 929 (Fla.1998), Griset v. Fair Political Practices Commission, 69 Cal. App. 4th 818, 82 Cal. Rptr.2d 25 (1999), reversed on other grounds, Printing Industries of the Gulf Coast v. Hill, 382 F.Supp. 8011 (S.D.Tx 1974), 42 L.Ed.26 33 dismissed as moot, Idaho v. Barney, 448 P.2d 195 (1968), Louisiana. v. Moses, 655 So. 2d 779 (La. Ct. App. 1995), Lousiana v. Fulton, 3.37 So.2d 866 (La. 1976), New York v. Duryea, 351 NYS2d 978 (1974), In re Opinion of the Justices, 324 A.2d 211 (Del. 1974), Opinion of the Justices, 306 A.2d 18 (Maine 1973) Ogden v. Marendt, 264 F.Supp. 2d 785 (S.D. Ind. 2003) (S.D. Ind 2004), ShrinkMissouri v. Maupin, 892 F. Supp. 1246 (E.D. Mo. 1995), aff'd, 71 F.3d 1422 (8th Cir. 1995), Schuster v. Imperial County Mun. Ct., 167 Cal. Rptr. 447 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1042. Smithers v Fla. Elections, http://www.fec.state.fl.us/decisions/Smithers96-85.PDF, Texas v. Doe, 61 S. W. 3d 99, (Tx. Cr.App. 5/14/2003), West Virginians for Life, Inc. v. Smith, 919 F. Supp. 954 (S.D. W. Va. 1996), Yes to Life PAC v. Webster, Zwickler v. Koota, 290 F. Supp. 244 (E. D. N. Y. 1968), vacated on other grounds (mootness) sub nom. Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103 (1969), Doe v. 2theMart,140 F.Supp.2d 1088, ACLU of Georgia v. Miller, (977 F.Supp. 1228 (N.D.Ga 1997), ACLU v. Reno, 117 S.Ct. 2329 (1997), ALA v. Pataki, 969 F.Supp 160 (1997), Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation, 525 U.S.182 (1999), Cyberspace v. Engler, 55 F.Supp.2d 737 (E.D. Mich 1999), Dennis v. Massachusetts, 329 N.E.2d 706 (Mass. 1975), Ex Parte Harrison, 110 S.W. 709 (Mo 1908) (on state grounds), Illinois v. White, 506 NE2d 1284 (Ill. 1987), McIntyre v. Ohio, 514 U.S. 334 (1995), N.Dakota v. N.D. Ed. Assoc., 262 N.W.2d 731, Washington ex rel Public Disclosure v. 119 Vote No!, 957 P.2d 691 (1998), Riley v. Federation of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781 (1998), Stewart v. Taylor, 953 F.Supp.1047 (S.D.Ind.1997), Texas v. Doe, (Tx. Cr.App. 5/14/2003), Watchtower v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002), West Virginians for Life, Inc. v. Smith, 919 F. Supp. 954 (S.D. W. Va. 1996), Wilson v Stocker, 819 F.2d 943, 950 (10th Cir. 1987), Wooley v Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977), Yes to Life PAC v. Webster, 74 F.Supp.2d 37 (D.Me. 1999), 84 F. Supp. 2d 150 (D. Me. 2000). State v. Acey, 633 S.W.2d 306 (Tenn. 1982), Morefield v. Moore, 540 S.W.2d 873, 874-75 (Ky. 1976), State v. Petersilie, 334 N.C. 169, 432 S.E.2d 832 (1993), Worley v. Fla. Secretary of State, 717 F.3d 1238 (11th Cir. 2013), Public Citizen 11th cir. Majors v Abell, 317 F.3d 719 (7th Cir. 2003), 792 N.E.2d 22 (Ind. 2003), 361 F.3d 349 (7th Cir. 2004), Wilkinson v Jones 876 F.Supp (W.D.Ky 1995), Seymour v Connecticutt State v. Green Mountain Future, 2013 Vt. 87 (Vt. 2013) NOM v McKee, 649 F.3d 34 (1st Cir. 2011), Terry, Gable v Patton, Arkansas v Butler, 983 F. Supp. 1209 (W.D. Ark. 1997). West Virginians for Life, Inc. v. Smith, 919 F. Supp. 954 (S.D. W. Va. 1996)), Citizens PAC Political Action Committee v. Davidson,236 F. 3d 1174 (8th Cir. 2000)), ACLU of Nevada v Heller 378 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2004), but see A–1 A–Lectrician, Inc. v. Snipes, Wilson v Stocker, 819 F.2d 943 (10th Cir. 1987). Schuster v. Imperial County Municipal Court, 167 Cal. Rptr. 447 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980), Tattered Cover v Thornton, 44 P.3d 1044 (2002), In re Opinion of the Justices, 324 A.2d 211 (Del. 1974), People v Barney, State v. Burgess, 543 So.2d 1332 (La. 1989) People v. White, 506 N.E.2d 1284, (I11. 1987), Commonwealth v. Dennis, 329 N.E.2d 706 (Mass. 1975), Opinion of the Justices, 306 A.2d 18 (Me. 1973), Ex Parte. Harrison, 212 Mo. 88 (M0 1908), State v. North Dakota Educ. Ass'n, 262 N.W.2d 731, 736 (N.D. 1978), People v. Duryea, 351 N.Y.S.2d 978 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974). Valeo Austin Norman v Reed. Hansen v Westerville, 43 F.3d 1472. Town of Vincent v Reed, AID v Open Society, McConnell v. FEC Tornillo Watchtower Meiklejohn First Amendment https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Doug_Guetzloe Reno v ACLU

yoshi. spaulding. $5500. 9 days. various sessions. find out when my end of study date was.

Gaspee project v mederoz notes for amivus

Reasons for cert Circuit split. After talley footnote two After mcintyre After aclf Citizens caused confusion. First case for bonta. Ct. case. Riley in kenticky v terry? Gable v patton Worely Public citizen 11th circuit Majors v abell State v acey Wilkinson? Green mountain futures N carolina peterslie merits. Talley mcintyre aclf watchtower Barnette Wooley tornillo riley Aid v open society janus nifla v beccera 1 sentence from each.

Bailey v. Maine Commission on Governmental Ethics, 2012 WL 4588564 No. 1:11-CV-00179-NT, (D. Me. Sept. 30, 2012): http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCOURTS-med-1_11-cv-00179/pdf/USCOURTS-med-1_11-cv-00179-3.pdf contact@ballsandstrikes.org "We have acknowledged that drivers who display a State’s selected license plate designs convey the messages communicated through those designs. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U. S. 705 , n. 15, 715 (1977) (observing that a vehicle “is readily associated with its operator” and that drivers displaying license plates “use their private property as a ‘mobile billboard’ for the State’s ideological message”). And we have recognized that the First Amendment stringently limits a State’s authority to compel a private party to express a view with which the private party disagrees. See id., at 715; Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U. S. 557, 573 (1995) ; West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 642 (1943) . But here, compelled private speech is not at issue." walker v texas.

interest of amicus. stewart v taylor. majors v abell, anonymous v delaware, fec comments. privacy project amicus in crawford v marion county.

summary of argument the case presents two issues, which the court below erred by treating as a single issue. 1. under the bonta standard, do plaintiffs present a triable issue on their disclosure claim? 2. are talley and mcintyre still good law, such that the disclaimer rule is facially invalid? this brief is focused on the second question. the court should take the case on the second issue, regardless of whether or not it takes the first issue. the case is important as the first case applying the new standard of review set out in AIP v Bonta. the case is important because it widens the circuit split that has existed since shortly after Talley v California, narrowed but did not end after McIntyre v. Ohio, widened again after Citizens United, and has not been resolved by cases such as Janus, NIFLA v Becarra, Masterpiece, or Bonta.

the case is important because voting rights are preservative of all other rights, and to be meaningful voting must be informed by a free flow of election speech, such as the voting guide at issue here. what is needed is a ruling like cooper v aaron, so that manuel talley's great grandchildren can finally enjoy the benifits of the ruling in his case. 60 plus years is too long to wait. the case is important because it can provide guidance to the FEC and congress, which are currently illegally refusing to follow Talley and McIntyre.

In Buckley v. ACLF, all 9 members of the court held that McIntyre is good law, and disclaimer regulations such as name badges for petitioners are unlawful, while upholding disclosure under the permissive Valeo standard. But in dicta in Citizens United, 8 members of the court lumped disclaimers in with disclosure, in discussing why an as applied challenge had failed for other reasons. In so doing, the court sowed confusion and discord, muddying the waters, so that public officials acting in bad faith can argue the rights established by Talley and McIntyre were not clearly established, and thus evade liability for their wrongdoing. At the moment, whether a citizen can be jailed for putting a "Vote for Smith" sign in their yard or on their home page depends on which state they live in and which circuit that state is in. National uniformity would be a better policy, and is required by the First Amendment.

friday plan

call st louis call baltimore

call mom and tommy

put away groceries clean car

write motion re bmv.

call missouri and kansas

work on brief

check email

make comic

maybe check mailbox.

i'm forgetting something. wednesday:

lawyer zoom

did 1/2 page of the brief, a start

washed car, washed dishes. washed self.

took out trash

put $1200 in bank, paid $200 on electric bill.

talked to tommy.

it felt productive but now it doesn't look like so much.

still to do:

sort mail

brief

mice killed today 1, month 5. thursday: stopped by church, no dinners due to covid. cleaned car slightly. good set tonight. picked out two boxes of food but sheriifs van so i will go back later. got a parking ticket. slept late and did not get much of anything done.

2:30 wednesday 12/29. 3:20. taking a break to go to the bank. COVER INFORMATION > Docket number 21-890 >The party names as they appear on the docket > State whether the case is “On Petition” (at the Petition stage) or “on Writ” (at the Merits stage) > The Lower Court as it appears on the docket > The Name of Your Amicus (or Amici) [See below] > The Party Supported [See below] > The address block or blocks selecting only ONE counsel of record @ 21-890 Gaspee Project et al. v Mederos et al. On Petition from First Circuit Court of Appeals Amicus Curiae Brief of Robbin Stewart in Support of Petitioners *Mark Small info as counsel of record Table of Contents Table of Authorities Interests of the Amicus Curiae (with required footnote) Argument 1 Argument 2 Argument 3 Argument 4 Conclusion Closing Signature Block with clearly identified counsel of record Table of Contents Table of cases I. There is a deep split in lower courts. II. Citizens United Part IV created confusion. III. The case is important because free elections require free speech. IV. This would be the Court's first opportunity to explore the new Bonta standard. Conclusion Table of Authorities (still needs table of authorities) Interests of the Amicus Curiae Robbin Stewart, the amicus here, was the successful plaintiff in Stewart v Taylor, 953 F. Supp. 1047 (S.D. Ind. 1997), which found Indiana's disclaimer statute unconstitutional. Elections offcials had confiscated his sign that read "Robbin Stewart for Township Board - Vote Tuesday". The district court held "Stewart contends that this case is governed by McIntyre. Stewart is correct." The Indiana legislature then repassed the statute, with irrelevant changes. Stewart was lead counsel in Majors v Abell,317 F.3d 719 (7th Cir. 2003), 792 N.E.2d 22 (Ind. 2003),361 F.3d 349,(7th Cir. 2004.) in which Judge Posner upheld the statute in light of indeterminacy caused by McConnell v FEC. Judge Easterbrook issued a dubitante opinion, 361 F.3d 349, 358, pointing out that four controlling Supreme Court precedents sided with Majors. The Supreme Court clerk properly denied a petition for certiorari because it had been filed a day late. Majors has been cited at least 64 times. Stewart was cocounsel in Anonymous v Delaware,Civ. No. 17453 (Del. Ch. May. 10, 2000),in which the Court of Chancery dismissed the case on the grounds that the disclaimer statute was so obviously unconstitutional per McIntyre that there was no genuine controversy. However, post-Citizens United, Delaware is now enforcing a disclaimer statute, and the state's Attorney General has refused to issue an Attorney General Opinion in light of cases such as Janus and Becerra. He has filed comments with the FEC as to their disclaimer regulations. Stewart has participated in distributing campaign literature in a variety of campaigns since 1970, has held appointed public office in four states, has won primaries and lost general elections, and blogs about election law at http://ballots.blogspot.com, where he engages in express advocacy without disclaimers. He has spent over $1000 on signage. His speech is being chilled in Indiana, Rhode Island, Delaware, and elsewhere. He intends to continue to be politically active. He has filed amicus briefs in several disclaimer cases. One such brief helped get charges dropped against Martin Shaeffer, a Clarkburg WV city councilmember who was arrested and jailed for helping publish a political newsletter. He was an amicus, along with the Privacy Project, in Crawford v Marion County Election Board, after he was prevented from voting because he has a sincere, possibly mistaken, belief that he has a right to vote without showing ID. His work has focused on ballot access, campaign speech and finance, and privacy issues. [footnote 1] Amicus Curiae has obtained written consents to file from Movant and Respondent. Per Supreme Court Rule 37.6, Amicus Curiae states that no counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, and no persons other than Amicus Curiae and its counsel made any monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation and submission of this brief. Amicus Curiae is an individual and has no shareholders or partners. Argument 1 There is a deep circuit split which the court should resolve. Argument 2 Dicta in Citizens United, part IV, has created confusion among lower courts and legislatures, which the court should clarify. Argument 3. A major purpose of the First Amendment is to enable free elections. Public confidence in elections has been shaken in recent years, when incumbents can rig the elections by chilling the speech of their critics. The case is important, so that the First Circuit's acceptance of censorship of campaign speech can be overturned, and so that the states listed in Justice Scalia's footnote 2 in McIntyre are put on notice that these statutes remain void. Argument 4: This case presents an opporunity to review an erroneous appication of the Bonta standard, which may be something the court wants to explore. Conclusion: The court should grant cert, and rule broadly for plaintiffs, upholding Talley v. California, not just narrowly striking down the unconstitutional top 5 donors disclaimer provision. Table of Cases Argument 1 There is a deep circuit split which the Court should resolve. In 1960 the court in Talley v California ruled that anonymous speech is constitutionally protected, and therefor an ordinance requiring a disclaimer was void. The opening paragraph of Gaspee Project's complaint cites to Talley and McIntyre, which should have been enough. Talley was one of the civil rights cases, along with NAACP v Alabama ex rel. Patterson, Bates v Little Rock, Shelton v. Tucker, Gibson v. Florida Legis. Comm'n, Gremillion v. NAACP, Sweezy v. New Hampshire. These cases found a right to privacy and political association. Political association is a modern phrasing of the rights to assembly and petition, textually present in the First Amendment. Both the speech and press clauses are also implicated. Rhode Island here seeks a return to the Jim Crow era, and prefers Gobitis over Barnette. Rhode Island here is making an attack on the right to privacy. There are current controversies as to the full extent of the privacy right discussed in Griswold and Roe v Wade, but I think all members of the court agree there is some First Amendment right to privacy and autonomy that prohibits compelled speech outside of narrow exceptions not at issue here. See Janus, Becerra, and concurrences in Masterpiece.

Regardless of intent, the effect of disclaimer rules has been to severely burden the speech of minorities, such as blacks (Talley), women (McIntyre), political minorities (ACLF), immigrants with relatives in the old country, and sundry other cases less easy to categorize. For example, in Anonymous v. Delaware, the until-now anonymous plaintiff did not want to risk interfering with another pending case, later settled for around a million dollars. Huminski v. Corsones, 396 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2004), Balancing Courtroom Safety and Free Expression: Huminski v. Corsones, Robert M. Howard,The Justice System Journal, Vol. 27, No. 1 (2006).

Although Talley is the law of the land, states and some lower courts refused to accept it, much as Alabama vigorously resisted NAACP for many years. The NAACP case reached the Supreme Court four times before Alabama finally backed down. California did not accept Talley,and continued to pass unconstitutional disclaimer rules, and still enforces them today. People v. Bongiorni, 205 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 856 (Sup. Ct. 1962),Canon v. Justice Court (1964) 61 Cal.2d 446, 457, 39 Cal.Rptr. 228, 393 P.2d 428, People v. Drake (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d Supp. 32, 159 Cal.Rptr. 161, Schuster v. Imperial County Mun. Ct., 167 Cal. Rptr. 447 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1042, Griset v. Fair Political Practices Commission, 69 Cal. App. 4th 818, 82 Cal. Rptr.2d 25 (1999), reversed on other grounds. @ add NIFLA v Becerra. Louisiana has a similar history of as soon as one disclaimer statute is struck down, another is enacted, in an ongoing cycle. Lousiana v. Fulton, 3.37 So.2d 866 (La. 1976), State v. Burgess, 543 So. 2d 1332 (1989),Louisiana. v. Moses, 655 So. 2d 779 (La. Ct. App. 1995), In Kentucky, courts have upheld disclaimer rules four times, defying Talley. (@ cite terry, gable v patton, wilkinson) In note 2 of his dissent in McIntyre, Justice Scalia cataloged how nearly every state has a disclaimer statute. What is needed is something like Cooper v Aaron that after 60 years really settles the matter, and lets election officials know that if they continue to violate the rule of Talley they can expect to pay damages. So a narrow ruling just about the 5 top donors is not enough. It is a waste of judicial resources to allow bad actors getting off scot-free for intentional violations of freedom of campaign speech, with substantial harm to the integrity of the election process,and an endless cycle of injunctions and declaratory judgments that fail to deter subsequent violations. The split began in 1961, and continues in 2022. A majority of cases have followed Talley, and later McIntyre v. Ohil Elections Commission, but about 1/3 of the cases have refused to do so, and about 2/3rds of the states still enforce some disclaimer statute. Cases following Talley include: City of Bogalusa v. May, 212 So.2d 408 (1968), People v. Bongiorni, 205 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 856 (Sup. Ct. 1962), Doe v. Mortham, 708 So.2d 929 (Fla.1998), Griset v. Fair Political Practices Commission, 69 Cal. App. 4th 818, 82 Cal. Rptr.2d 25 (1999), reversed on other grounds, Printing Industries of the Gulf Coast v. Hill, 382 F.Supp. 8011 (S.D.Tx 1974), 42 L.Ed.26 33 dismissed as moot, Idaho v. Barney, 448 P.2d 195 (1968), Louisiana. v. Moses, 655 So. 2d 779 (La. Ct. App. 1995), Lousiana v. Fulton, 3.37 So.2d 866 (La. 1976), New York v. Duryea, 351 NYS2d 978 (1974), In re Opinion of the Justices, 324 A.2d 211 (Del. 1974), Opinion of the Justices, 306 A.2d 18 (Maine 1973) Ogden v. Marendt, 264 F.Supp. 2d 785 (S.D. Ind. 2003) (S.D. Ind 2004), ShrinkMissouri v. Maupin, 892 F. Supp. 1246 (E.D. Mo. 1995), aff'd, 71 F.3d 1422 (8th Cir. 1995), Schuster v. Imperial County Mun. Ct., 167 Cal. Rptr. 447 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1042. Smithers v Fla. Elections, http://www.fec.state.fl.us/decisions/Smithers96-85.PDF, Texas v. Doe, 61 S. W. 3d 99, (Tx. Cr.App. 5/14/2003), Vermont Right to Life v. Sorrell, 221 F.3d 376, 392 (2d Cir. 2000) [?], West Virginians for Life, Inc. v. Smith, 919 F. Supp. 954 (S.D. W. Va. 1996), Yes to Life PAC v. Webster, Zwickler v. Koota, 290 F. Supp. 244 (E. D. N. Y. 1968), vacated on other grounds (mootness) sub nom. Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103 (1969), Doe v.2theMart,140 F.Supp.2d 1088, ACLU of Georgia v. Miller, (977 F.Supp. 1228 (N.D.Ga 1997),ACLU v. Reno, 117 S.Ct. 2329 (1997), ALA v. Pataki, 969 F.Supp 160 (1997), Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation, 525 U.S.182 (1999), Cyberspace v. Engler, 55 F.Supp.2d 737 (E.D. Mich 1999), Dennis v. Massachusetts, 329 N.E.2d 706 (Mass. 1975), Ex Parte Harrison, 110 S.W. 709 (Mo 1908)(on state grounds), Griset v CalFPPC (1999), reversed on other grounds, Illinois v. White, 506 NE2d 1284 (Ill. 1987), Louisiana. v. Moses, 655 So. 2d 779 (La. Ct. App. 1995), McIntyre v. Ohio, 514 U.S. 334 (1995), N.Dakota v. N.D. Ed. Assoc., 262 N.W.2d 731, New York v. Duryea, 351 NYS2d 978 (1974), Washington ex rel Public Disclosure v. 119 Vote No!, 957 P.2d 691 (1998) Ogden v. Marendt, (S.D. Ind 2004),Riley v. Federation of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781 (1998),Stewart v. Taylor, 953 F.Supp.1047 (S.D.Ind.1997), Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960), Texas v. Doe, (Tx. Cr.App. 5/14/2003), Watchtower v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002), West Virginians for Life, Inc. v. Smith, 919 F. Supp. 954 (S.D. W. Va. 1996), Wilson v Stocker, 819 F.2d 943, 950 (10th Cir. 1987), Wooley v Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977), Yes to Life PAC v. Gardner. Cases resisting Talley include: needs work state v acey, peterslie, worley, majors v abell, wilkinson, connecticut case, green mountain futures, NOM v McKee, Terry, Gable v Patton, Arkansas v Butler, Circuits resisting Talley include: First (Nom v McKee), Sixth (Gable v Patton), Seventh (Majors v Abell), Eleventh (Worley v Florida). Circuits following Talley include 4th (WVfL v Smith), 8th, (236 F. 3d 1174 (8th Cir. 2000) - Citizens PAC Political Action Committee v. Davidson), 9th (ACLU of Nevada v Heller), 10th (Wilson v Stocker). Additionally, at least 12 states have found a right to anonymous speech in their state constitution, while at least three states decided the other way. The states include CA, CO, DE, ID, IL,LA, OH, MA,ME,MO, ND, NY. Schuster, Tattered Cover, Opinion of the Justices (DE), People v Barney, State v Burgess, People v White, Dennis v Mass., Opinion of the Justices (ME), Ex Rel. Harrison, ND Ed Assoc., People v Duryea. States ruling the other way include NC, TN, Ky. Peterslie, State v Acey, Wilkinson. This is a deep split. The court has made at least two previous attempts to resolve the split, in McIntyre, and ACLF. The question presented in McIntyre was whether there was an elections exception to Talley. Ohio had used Valeo's permissive "exacting scrutiny" standard. While retaining the label "exacting scrutiny" McIntyre applied a strict form of scrutiny, requiring narrow tailing and an overiding state interest. Justice Scalia, dissenting, called this a "kiss of death" standard. Rhode Island here misreads McIntyre as only creating an exception for little ladies with home computers who spend under $1000, and misreads McConnell's electionering communications discussion to allow disclaimers for issue speech when targeted and close to the election, thinking that this would satisfy the "In for a calf is not in for a cow" concurence in McIntyre. As discussed below, Rhode Island misread Citizens United as having implicitly repealed Talley, McIntyre, ACLF, Watchtower, etc. Buckley v ACLF carefully distinguished disclosure, which gets permissive scrutiny under Valeo, and disclaimers, which get stricter scrutiny under McIntyre. Yet courts continued to rule adversely at times, and then the split got wider after McConnell and Citizens United rejected as-applied issue advocacy arguments brought by James Bopp. There is a deep split among lower courts, both state and federal, as to whether Talley and McIntyre remain good law and prohibit disclaimer rules. The Court should grant cert to resolve this issue. Dicta in Citizens United, part IV, has created confusion among lower courts and legislatures, which the court should clarify. Citizens United was a case that held that strict scrutiny applies to political speech, overturned the anamalous Austin ruling,and greatly expanded constitutional protection of election speech. But states have seized on certain loose language about disclaimers, out of context,and some courts followed, as the First Circuit did below, as holding that Citizens implicitly overuled not just Austin, but Talley, Mcintyre, ACLF, Wooley, maybe even Barnette. This is error, for the folowing reasons. The language in Citizens about disclaimers is dicta, not holding. Citizens was a case about corporate speech, and does not authorize disclaimer rules for individuals, as the statutes of Rhode Island, Maine, and Vermont attempt to do. In Citizens, disclaimers were a less restrictive alternative to a complete ban. Rhode island has no such ban, so the Citizens discussion does not apply. If Citizens had intended to overturn McIntyre et al.,it would have explained why and how it was doing so, as it did in overruling Austin. If Citizens had overruled McInytre, it would have itself been overuled by later cases such as Town of Vincent v Reed, AID v Open Society, NIFLA v Becerra, and Janus. Nonetheless, the dicta in Citizens has confused lower courts and legislatures, and the court should take this case to once again clearly establish that Talley and McIntyre remain good law, and states cannot compel the content of political ads. Perhaps in some future case, the Court may allow a disclaimer rule limited to speech by corporations. There are some sound policy reasons to do so, and Citizens hints at such a future case. But Citizens did not do so, and the Rhode Island statutes are not limited to corporate speech. In Citizens, echoing a similar issue in McConnell, plaintiffs argued that their speech was not express advocacy, and so the disclaimer and disclosure rules did not apply. The court disagreed, in Part IV, and found that the speech at issue was at least the functional equivalent of express advocacy, so its attempted loophole was closed. This was the holding. The court then went on in dicta to praise disclaimers and disclosure, lumping them together, as less restrictive means to advance the state interests. It is these statements that have been taken out of context. Plaintiffs had not argued that the disclaimer rule was facially void, only that they had found an exception. The current case does directly challenge the unconstitutional statute, and thus makes a good vehicle for the court to clarify its remarks in Citizens United. Perhaps in this case the Court will decide to overule McIntyre, Talley, Barnette, Wooley, and Tornillo. If so it should do so explicitly, not sotto voce. A major purpose of the First Amendment is to enable free elections. Public confidence in elections has been shaken in recent years, when incumbents can rig the elections by chilling the speech of their critics. The case is important, so that the First Circuit's acceptance of censorship of campaign speech can be overturned, and so that the states listed in Justice Scalia's footnote 2 in McIntyre are put on notice that these statutes remain void. The United States is an experiment in a libertarian constitutional democratic republic, in which the people are sovereign, instead of having a monarch. The people govern themselves by choosing representatives via free and open elections. In order to do so, there must be free speech so that issues and candidates can be fully discussed. This is the Meiklejohn theory of the purpose of the First Amendment; that it makes democracy possible. It may be nice to have nude dancing and art and literature and liquor prices, but the core function of the First Amendment is to protect free and open elections. Here, the usual presumption of constitutionality is reversed, and censorship of political speech is suspect, presumptively invalid, subject to close, exacting, strict, kiss of death, scrutiny. What Rhode Island is doing here, perhaps with the best of intentions, criminalizes core political speech, and also imposes civil penalties without a mens rea element. Both of these severely chill speech, and detract from the integrity of the election process. Talley reversed a $10 fine. McIntyre reversed a $100 fine. The consequences in Rhode Ilsand are more dire. And, as plaintiffs have argued, the 5 donor requirement goes well beyong the mere attribution requirements found invalid in Talley and McIntyre. When free speech is taken away,we are left with Potemkin elections, which retain the form but not the substance. The courts,and this court, have an important role in safegarding elections. Actual jailings for disclaimer violations are rare, but not unknown. Harrison, Dennis, Schaeffer,and Doug Geutzloe are among thiose who have been jailed. Ex rel Harrison (Mo 1908), Dennis v Mass (MA. 1972), shaeffercase.blogspot.com, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Doug_Guetzloe. Currently congress has a partisan split on an election "reform" bill which would extend the FEC's unconstitutional disclaimer requirements to the internet, what Reno v ACLU called burning the global village to roast the pig. This court should take this case to better inform congress, the FEC, legislators, and lower courts, that there are constitutional limits to how election speech can be chilled. In this case, the First Circuit erroneously applied the new Bonta standard, instead of McIntyre's kiss of death standard. In doing so, it treated Bonta as as permissive as Valeo, essentially treating Bonta as an indeterminate "personal preferences of the judges" standard. If this case is allowed to stand, it will not be the only lower court to rule this way. As far as I know this may be the first case to apply Bonta. The court could choose to take this case as a chance to further explore the Bonta standard. Conclusion: The court should grant cert., and rule broadly for plaintiffs, upholding Talley v. California, not just narrowly striking down the unconstitutional top 5 donors disclaimer provision. (word count) [Closing Signature Block with clearly identified counsel of record] = The cover of an amicus brief must comply with all of the requirements applicable to the cover of other booklet-format briefs. Rules 33.1(e), 33.1(g) and 34.1. At the petition stage, an amicus brief should have a cream cover; at the merits stage, an amicus brief in support of the petitioner or in support of neither party should have a light green cover, and an amicus brief in support of the respondent should have a dark green cover. Rule 33.1(g). In consolidated cases, the Court’s docket may provide more = Forty copies of an amicus brief must be submitted in booklet form. Rule 33.1(f).

to do tonight call mom call tommy work on brief work on bmv motion "Paddy and his gay friend walk into a bar and a lesbian waitress walks up them"

sunday: 5 boxes to food not bombs. came back with a full car. went to a trivia night. was winning at first but lost bad, but it was nice. forgot to go to zonies to meet that new dancer. saturday: went to see tommy. brought food, we did laundry, had sex, i went home. friday did/didn't 1. deposited $4000. balance $1600. took 3 trips to bank. 2. called bmv, found out my hearing was the 15th. have 7 days to undo dismissal. need to write that up. 3. got back into chromebook /google account. had to change password and give up my phone number. i guess i didnt do much else today. should go unload car. == thursday bank. paid off ^620, chase, deposited $2000 sent tommy $50. standup went well. bought moosetraps. ==weds. forgot to call re hearing. po box. paid off 5th 3rd. trash, dishes, scotty, started unloading car. to do friday: unload car get more moousetraps. defrost fridge? go see tommy. lube. to do eventually resume to team america tires brief

saturday i slept in, then explored the neighborhood, first on foot then by car. walked around the park. saw a deer. found a secret tunnel under rt 40 to get back to the hotel quicker. $30 at a korean megagrocery. found a couple art books, a few groceries, some cigar boxes, a keg of merlot that i can't drink. maybe i'll take it to food not bombs.

https://www.thekokomopost.com/articles/kokomo-is-so-boring-indiana-entertainment-things-to-do

Date: _11/14/21_____________________ FBI Attn: FOIPA Request 200 Constitution Drive Winchester, VA 22602 Dear FOIA Officer: ______________________ This is a request under the Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy Act. Date range of request: _____1960-present_________________ Description of request: ________________________________________________________________ any info in file. ___________________________________________________________________________________ Please search the FBI’s indices to the Central Records System for the information responsive to this request related to: __any info in file________________________________________________________________ _ I am willing to pay up to $__20__ for the processing of this request. Please inform me if the estimated fees will exceed this limit before processing my request. I am seeking information for personal use and not for commercial use. Thank you for your consideration, Name: Robbin Stewart ______________________________________________________________ Street Address: PO Box 29164________________________________________________________ City/State/ZIP Code: _____Cumberland IN 46229_______________________________________________ Email (optional):_gtbear at gmail.com______________________________________________________ did: submitted fbi file request via online form. did not expedite. will take indefinite. did: email marion county auditor re tax sale. to do: call mom. call tommy. make comic. skim brief draft. get off reddit.

did, wednesday. checked into study. $60 hotel. paid chase credit cards. could not pay 5th 3rd or pnc cards. pnc: go to bank. 5th 3rd: call. to do: call marion county for info on tax sale. or email. email mark small re press credentials issue. make better list call mom, call tommy. pay tax bill. work on amicus

49A1539 1096235 FOLEY, CASEY 2102 BROOKSIDE AV, INDIANAPOLIS POWELLS SUB E T FLET 1ST BROOKSIDE L5 BLK1 EX42.6FT NW END $1,005.84 $14,300.00 $15,305.84 662

monday

tax sale

scrap yard

call mark small

make better list.

https://www.thespruce.com/white-frangipani-plumeria-care-and-growing-guide-5197390

friday: stuff to work on: photocopy driving record, mail to passport office. To: Passport office My name is robbin george stewart. Prior to 1979, my name was richard lee stewart. Apparently my passport, the one your office refuses to tell me the number of, issued in 1980, and lost by 1988, had my prior name on it. I enclose some documentation showing that my name is currently robbin stewart, including my indiana driving record, missouri driving record, social security records, continuing legal education records, and so forth. I would call your attention to Robbin Stewart v Sarah Taylor, 953 F. Supp. 1047 (1997). I was admitted to the Indiana bar in 1993 as Robbin Stewart. Additionally my legal signature is an X. It has been since the accident 12/30/2015. I would call your attention to the Americans with Disabilities Act. I am mostly healed since the accident, and have regained full use of my right arm, but continue to use the x as my signature, which of course I have the legal right to do. I hope that this resolves your concerns and that you will issue the passport I have applied for. I would like to vote in Indiana in the future, particularly for senators Young and Brawn, and they regard a passport as acceptable ID. Sincerely Robbin Stewart. /s/X. email mark small. work on: amicus disciplinary complaint hendricks rokita letter letter to legislators bmv issue. draft: to lawyer: can you provide any insight on how the bmv came up with its policy to require multiple opt-in for organ donation? for example, is it a regulation, made with a public comment period? is it from some memo from a specific bmv official, if so when and can i get a copy? next, is there any path forward to my getting a real ID? I mean within Indiana; delaware has no intention of changing my birth certificate, nor should they; that was my name at birth, it just isn't my current name. next, can you provide any insight on why or how the ball was dropped in my case for those several years? did the alj and counsel leave the bmv voluntarily? are there other cases like mine resting in limbo? was it ethical for the alj to quit without resolving open cases? was there some sort of succession plan to handle his open cases like mine? in general i want to let you know that i am open to working with you cooperatively in resolving my concerns. your initial posture seems adversarial; you seem focused on winning, and indeed you can probably "win" at this stage of things, but i can continue to escalate the dispute in various ways, and it makes more sense for us to try to find a solution we are both comfortable with. the hearing process is more about generating a paper trail, so that i can follow up later in court or with the legislature. i will have more to say later, just wanted to get in touch now that i have your email.

TALLAHASSEE — A federal judge on Friday allowed a series of challenges to a new state elections law to move forward, setting the stage for a showdown over Republican legislators' efforts to make it more difficult for Floridians to vote by mail and for organizations to conduct voter-registration drives. The Florida Conference of the NAACP, Disability Rights Florida, the League of Women Voters of Florida, UnidosUS and a number of other organizations allege that the changes approved by the Legislature this spring could curtail voting by Black, Latino and disabled residents. The law (SB 90) was one of the most controversial issues of the 2021 legislative session and came after a relatively smooth 2020 election in Florida. But GOP legislators maintained the changes were necessary to ensure election security and prevent fraud in future elections. Escambia County redistricting:First draft puts Perdido Key in District 1 Redistricting:Preserving Pensacola's 2 majority Black districts presents challenge to redistricting The lawsuits focus on several parts of the law that deal with voting by mail, as well as a requirement that third-party voter registration groups provide a disclaimer to people signing up to vote. The law set new restrictions on the availability and use of drop boxes, where people can drop off vote-by-mail ballots. Under the law, supervisors of elections must have the boxes staffed at all times and can only use the boxes during early voting hours and at early voting sites. Supervisors who violate the requirement face $25,000 fines. The lawsuits contend that the restrictions will have a negative impact on people who work during the day and voters with disabilities, who might be forced to bring ballots into early voting sites if supervisors don't provide drop boxes outside. In four separate rulings Friday, Chief U.S. District Judge Mark Walker said Secretary of State Laurel Lee, Attorney General Ashley Moody and supervisors of elections should remain as defendants in the cases, though he dismissed the officials from some parts of the challenges. https://www.pacermonitor.com/public/case/40272767/Florida_Rising_Together_et_al_v_LEE_et_al has the documents, but paysite. https://www.democracydocket.com/cases/florida-voter-suppression-bill-fl-rising/ does not have the new documents.

https://www.annualcreditreport.com/index.action to do: fill out passport forms.

make better list.

x check icon for study info

x insurance co to update

x scrap yard

x laundry

x crackers.

x friday sam morill.

bring in washer/dryer

sort fridges.

x bacon and eggs?

plasma email.

to do monday

x laundry

in progress x bank deposit check get cash.

car: brakes, headlight, something else?

sort papers

call mark small

plasma?

x check for studies.

make better list

make a comic- broken?

email for spots

x test tv

scrap yard

x work on amicus. - find example of an amicus for template.

Spider Labs Ltd. v. Doe No. MC-20-00039-PHX-SPL (D. Ariz. Oct. 22, 2020) passport appointment - photocopy letter, documents etc.

pay bank cards.

buy a notebook for gas log.

mileage sandusky trip 184844 - 185467 = 156+ 467= 623. $60 gas @ 3.03 30.83+ so 623 x 50 cents = 310. pay= $100.

did wednesday.

got a microwave. need to test it.

made a list.

bank, withdrew $100.

tuesday

unloaded car

paid electric bill $200.

saw 16 cops cars between 12 and 2 am, if i count the firetruck and ambulance. the game.

to do: write down mileage. call tommy. call mom.

buy gas, or did i?

write downt he items from my list.

Gaspee project v mederoz notes for amivus Reasons for cert Circuit split. After talley footnote two After mcintyre After aclf Citizens caused confusion. First case for bonta. Ct. case. Riley in kenticky v terry? Gable v patton Worely Public citizen 11th circuit Majors v abell State v acey Wilkinson? Green mountain futures N carolina peterslie merits. Talley mcintyre aclf watchtower Barnette Wooley tornillo riley Aid v open society janus nifla v beccera 1 sentence from each. Bailey v. Maine Commission on Governmental Ethics, 2012 WL 4588564 No. 1:11-CV-00179-NT, (D. Me. Sept. 30, 2012): http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCOURTS-med-1_11-cv-00179/pdf/USCOURTS-med-1_11-cv-00179-3.pdf contact@ballsandstrikes.org "We have acknowledged that drivers who display a State’s selected license plate designs convey the messages communicated through those designs. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U. S. 705 , n. 15, 715 (1977) (observing that a vehicle “is readily associated with its operator” and that drivers displaying license plates “use their private property as a ‘mobile billboard’ for the State’s ideological message”). And we have recognized that the First Amendment stringently limits a State’s authority to compel a private party to express a view with which the private party disagrees. See id., at 715; Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U. S. 557, 573 (1995) ; West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 642 (1943) . But here, compelled private speech is not at issue." walker v texas.

note to self mow grass at the church.

Biolife L.L.C. 8163 25th Court East Sarasota, Florida 34243 Phone: (941) 360-1300 Toll Free: 800-722-7559 Fax: (941) 360-1310 email: customer.care@biolife.com Office hours: 8:00 am to 5:00 pm EST Monday through Friday

notes on gaspee project v mederos.

to do: motion to intervene.

to do: draft of amicus in support of cert.

to do: email volokh

to do: make better list

to do: write to justice r dissenting re support for amicus.

to do: submission to balls and strikes.

to do: submission to eugene's free speech journal. other stuff

to do: draft of amicus in support of cert.

keep working on disciplinary complaint

100 interogatories for hendricks

records request for hendricks.

plasma

check for studies

clean house

talk to jake

to do: draft of amicus in support of cert.

interest of amicus. stewart v taylor. majors v abell, anonymous v delaware, fec comments. privacy project amicus in crawford v marion county. summary of argument the case presents two issues, which the court below erred by treating as a single issue. 1. under the bonta standard, do plaintiffs present a triable issue on their disclosure claim? 2. are talley and mcintyre still good law, such that the disclaimer rule is facially invalid? this brief is focused on the second question. the court should take the case on the second issue, regardless of whether or not it takes the first issue. the case is important as the first case applying the new standard of review set out in AIP v Bonta. the case is important because it widens the circuit split that has existed since shortly after Talley v California, narrowed but did not end after McIntyre v. Ohio, widened again after Citizens United, and has not been resolved by cases such as Janus, NIFLA v Becarra, Masterpiece, or Bonta. the case is important because voting rights are preservative of all other rights, and to be meaningful voting must be informed by a free flow of election speech, such as the voting guide at issue here. what is needed is a ruling like cooper v aaron, so that manuel talley's great grandchildren can finally enjoy the benifits of the ruling in his case. 60 plus years is too long to wait. the case is important because it can provide guidance to the FEC and congress, which are currently illegally refusing to follow Talley and McIntyre. In Buckley v. ACLF, all 9 members of the court held that McIntyre is good law, and disclaimer regulations such as name badges for petitioners are unlawful, while upholding disclosure under the permissive Valeo standard. But in dicta in Citizens United, 8 members of the court lumped disclaimers in with disclosure, in discussing why an as applied challenge had failed for other reasons. In so doing, the court sowed confusion and discord, muddying the waters, so that public officials acting in bad faith can argue the rights established by Talley and McIntyre were not clearly established, and thus evade liability for their wrongdoing. At the moment, whether a citizen can be jailed for putting a "Vote for Smith" sign in their yard or on their home page depends on which state they live in and which circuit that state is in. National uniformity would be a better policy, and is required by the First Amendment.

https://www.campaigntrailyardsigns.com/rhode-island-yard-sign-regulations/ https://www.bobvila.com/slideshow/the-pickiest-political-yard-sign-rules-in-america-577673

F Sa Su M 01:20AM - 11:50AM Possible Start Date: 24th Sep 2021 (or earlier!) $18.00/hr 36 - 40 hrs/wk 8316 Allison Ave, INDIANAPOLIS, IN 46268 United States 1151 S. Graham Rd. Greenwood IN 46143 Things to bring

notes on possible disciplinary complaint [4] Lawyers holding public office assume legal responsibilities going beyond those of other citizens. A lawyer's abuse of public office can suggest an inability to fulfill the professional role of lawyers. What this complaint is about is that x serves on the hendricks county election board, and is engaged in illegal unconstitutional censorship. as an attorney, he should have heard of the first amendment. @too snarky. 8 pm thursday. On the one hand, the rules require me to report a violation of the rules. On the other hand, this complaint should be taken with a grain of salt, as it is part pf a larger dispute that will probably involve litigation. I have been a member of the Indiana bar since 1993, and have never filed a disciplinary complaint against anyone, even if there were a couple of times I probably should have done so; it is not something I take lightly. Public officials enjoy a quasi- absolute immunity when they act in a quasi-judicial capacity, as x did in ruling on my complaint against sheriff candidate terry judy. Public officials enjoy qualified immunity when they impose unconstitutional policies where the law is not clearly established. Here, the law is clearly established, yet I am aware courts often treat qualified immunity as absolute immunity. Public Officials too often treat holding office as a license to engage in unlawful behavior. So a disciplinary complaint may be the only available option. x is to be commended for serving on the county election board. this is the sort of pro bono service that is encouraged. however, such service still has a duty of competence. Citizens are deemed to know the law. And the plain text of the first amendment is clear that the government cannot interfere with freedom of the press. The Supreme Court established that disclaimer rules are unconstitutional in 1960. They have restated this in 1995, 1999, 2005, and 2019. Further, in my complaint letter that initiated the election board meeting at issue, I cited some of the relevant cases. So this was not some accident or oversight, but deliberate and willful refusal to follow controlling cases.

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































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n rmore, the purpose of the Rules can be subverted when they are invoked by opposing parties as procedural weapons. The fact that a rule is a just basis for a lawyer's self-assessment, or for sanctioning a lawyer under the administration of a disciplinary authority, does not imply that an antagonist in a collateral proceeding or transaction has standing to seek enforcement of the Rule. Nevertheless, since the Rules do establish standards of conduct by lawyers, a lawyer's violation of a Rule may be evidence of breach of the applicable standard of conduct. (a) A lawyer who knows that another lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, shall inform the appropriate professional authority. Rule 8.4. Misconduct It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: (b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects; (c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation; (d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice; (f) knowingly assist a judge or judicial officer in conduct that is a violation of applicable rules of judicial conduct or other law; or (g) engage in conduct, in a professional capacity, manifesting, by words or conduct, bias or prejudice based upon race, gender, religion, national origin, disability, sexual orientation, age, socioeconomic status, or similar factors. Legitimate advocacy respecting the foregoing factors does not violate this subsection. A trial judge's finding that preemptory challenges were exercised on a discriminatory basis does not alone establish a violation of this Rule. Rule 8.2. Judicial and Legal Officials (a) A lawyer shall not make a statement that the lawyer knows to be false or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge, adjudicatory officer or public legal officer, or of a candidate for election or appointment to judicial or legal office. [1] A lawyer, as a member of the legal profession, is a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system and a public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of justice. Whether or not engaging in the practice of law, lawyers should conduct themselves honorably. [4] In all professional functions a lawyer should be competent, prompt and diligent. [5] A lawyer's conduct should conform to the requirements of the law, both in professional service to clients and in the lawyer's business and personal affairs. A lawyer should use the law's procedures only for legitimate purposes and not to harass or intimidate others. A lawyer should demonstrate respect for the legal system and for those who serve it, including judges, other lawyers and public officials. While it is a lawyer's duty, when necessary, to challenge the rectitude of official action, it is also a lawyer's duty to uphold legal process.

wednesday

took out trash

driver's record $4. dispute w bmv. needs memo.

made notes on brief

tire $50

photocopied/printed passport stuff.

what else?

going to helium tonight.should leave soon. unpack car.

did: van sold for $800 + a washer and dryer.

did: emails to tommy and bj re mail, and mark small re possible case.

trash is probably a day late due to holiday. mouse #33. need to put out mousetraps. Worley v. Fla. Sec’y of State, 717 F.3d 1238 (11th Cir. 2013) https://www.courtlistener.com/audio/71649/yes-on-prop-b-v-city-and-county-of-sf/ Nat’l Org. for Marriage v. Daluz, 654 F.3d 115 (1st Cir. 2011) ..............................................................................15 Nat’l Org. for Marriage v. McKee, 649 F.3d 34 (1st Cir. 2011) (“NOM I”)...................................................... passim Nat’l Org. for Marriage v. McKee, 669 F.3d 34 (1st Cir. 2012) (“NOM II”).. Bailey v. Maine Commission on Governmental Ethics, 2012 WL 4588564 No. 1:11-CV-00179-NT, (D. Me. Sept. 30, 2012): http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCOURTS-med-1_11-cv-00179/pdf/USCOURTS-med-1_11-cv-00179-3.pdf Kentucky Right to Life, Inc. v. Terry, 108 F.3d 637 Washington Post v. McManus 4th cir. Oregon Attorney General Opinion No. 8266 (March 10, 1999). Van Hollen v. Federal Election Commission, Any opinions expressed in this paper should not be attributed to any of Eric Wang’s clients, or those of his firm.

AFFIDAVIT REGARDING A CHANGE OF NAME 3. Applicant's Former Name 4. Applicant's Date of Birth Middle 6. Number of Years You Have Known the Applicant 7. Your Relationship to the Applicant By Former Name 8. Explain the difference in the applicant's former name and the name currently used. State whether the current name is used exclusively and for all purposes or if it is used as an "also known as" name. (Attach a separate sheet of paper if more space is needed.) OATH: I declare under penalty of perjury that the information given above by me is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief; that the applicant named above has been known by both his or her present and former names as stated; and that the applicant is known by his or her present name to friends and relatives, and in the community in which he or she is residing. (Jr.,Sr.,III) (mm-dd-yyyy) (City and State) Last Suffix First (Jr.,Sr.,III) Middle PURPOSE An Affidavit Regarding a Change of Name may be submitted with an application for a U.S. passport when the name which is used by the applicant is (1) substantially different from that shown on the evidence of citizenship or (2) has been adopted without formal court proceedings and was not acquired by a marriage. The affiant (preferably a blood relative) must have personal knowledge of the applicant's use of both names. To support a change of name that has been adopted without formal court proceedings or by a marriage, the applicant must present original or certified copies of three or more public documents evidencing that the applicant has used the acquired name publicly and exclusively for five years or longer. Affidavits Regarding a Change of Name from at least two persons, attesting that they have known the applicant by both names and that the applicant has used the new name exclusively for at least five years, may be provided in place of one of the public documents if the applicant cannot obtain a third public document. The affidavit must be accompanied by a photocopy of the front and back of the affiant's identification. Final determination of the name(s) to be shown in the U.S. passport will be made by Passport Services based on all submitted evidence. Completed affidavits will be retained and requests for copies of this affidavit should be made at the time of execution. An affidavit is not needed if an applicant presents a court order or marriage certificate documenting the change of his or her name. This affidavit must be signed in front of a notary, unless it is submitted to an authorized Passport Agent or Acceptance Agent. U.S. Department of State OMB APPROVAL NO. 1405-0133 EXPIRES: 10-31-2020 ESTIMATED BURDEN: 40 MINUTES Address of Affiant Identifying Document Presented: Subscribed and Sworn to before me this day of at Name of Passport Agent, Acceptance Agent, or Notary Public Location DS-60 07-2017 Page 1 of 2 NOTARY SEAL (Number and Street, City, State, and Zip Code ) (Affirmed) (Passport Agency or City & State)

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

to do check for buddy study next week pay pnc 280 pay 5th 3rd 85. work on brief and motions go thru old to do lists for open items passport fbi file Submitting a Freedom of Information Act Request (FOIA) Image titled Obtain Your FBI File Step 1 1 Draft a FOIA request. When requesting your personal FBI records through the Freedom of Information Act, you must draft a detailed letter specifically requesting the information that you desire and any information that can help the FBI identify the records. This letter should include the following: Date Address: Record/Information Dissemination Section
Attn: FOIPA Request
170 Marcel Drive
Winchester, VA 22602-4843 Identifying the request as under the Freedom of Information Act. Date range of the request. You can make the request from your date of birth to the present. Description of the request. Request copies of all information, including but not limited to files, correspondence, reports, surveillance or any other records concerning you. Provide information to assist in the search. You should give your name, date of birth, social security number, place of birth and the first and last names of your parents, any aliases that you use, and former addresses. http://www.rageuniversity.com/PRISONESCAPE/PRISON%20MENTAL%20HEALTH/psychologypower.pdf Game over! Strategies for redirecting inmate deception by bill elliott and vicki verdeyen

In construing constitutional amendments, our chief purpose is to give effect to the intent of the framers. State ex. rel. Webb v. Cianci, 591 A.2d 1193, 1201 (R.I. 1991); Bailey v. Baronian, 120 R.I. 389, 391, 394 A.2d 1338, 1339 (1978) (citing In re House of Representatives, 45 R.I. 289, 120 A. 868 (1923)). In doing so, we rely on the well-established rule of constitutional construction that when words in a constitution are free from ambiguity, they are to be given their plain, ordinary, and usually accepted meaning. Mikaelian v. Drug Abuse Unit, 501 A.2d 721, 723 (R.I. 1985); Bailey, 120 R.I. at 391, 394 A.2d at 1339; Davis v. Hawksley, 119 R.I. 453, 455, 379 A.2d 922, 923 (1977). Moreover, "every clause must be given its due force, meaning and effect and that no word or section must be assumed to have been unnecessarily used or needlessly added." Kennedy v. Cumberland Engineering Co., 471 A.2d 195, 198 (R.I. 1984) (citing Wright v. United States, 302 U.S. 583, 588, 58 S. Ct. 395, 397, 82 L. Ed. 439, 442 (1938)). "[W]e must presume the language was carefully weighed and that its terms imply a definite meaning." Bailey, 120 R.I. at 391, 394 A.2d at 1339 (citing Opinion to the Governor, 62 R.I. 316, 6 A.2d 147 (1939); Blais v. Franklin, 31 R.I. 95, 77 A. 172 (1910)). In Re Advisory Opinion to Governor 612 A.2d 1 (1992)

https://participantskc.altasciences.com/volunteers/current-studies/healthy-volunteers-2 $5k at vince. call tomorrow. frontage. upcoming, no dates yet, 3500. booked a screening at vince. $5k. screen 8/13 friday 10 am.. study is sep 7th-18th. followup 9/24. i phone call in october. =

sunday: $30 gas. $10 zonies. 1000 miles kc trip. no hotel. 2 days out of town. so $600 deductions.

did i ever file my taxes?

what else? monday:

x plasma. go get blood test. did tuesday.

clean car.

clean front yard. = = =

delaware cocounsel. work on delaware complaint.

nebraska

x bmv outcome of hearing - make inquiry.

senator young re passport number.

passport office request for americans with disabilities act reasonable accomodation.

x sort box of coffee. photos.

clean kitchen floor.

clean fridges.

call mom

x call tommy

state fair.

x brief.

wednesday:

zoom.

email mark.

state fair

sort mail

email pnc

put away laundry

order bug bucket and puffer.

did i do my taxes? do i have a rough draft in my files?

read through old comics to make notes about money.

and to do list items.

i didn't get much done yet wednesday, but i checked on that $400 car - needs an engine so i didnt buy it. i cleaned the house for half an hour. emptied the buckets under the sink, took out the trash, sprayed for ants, found a box of socks and one of my teddy bears, put out mousetraps, did some gardening. it's hot enough i could put on the air conditioner. going to take a break for now. later i hope to sort mail. send at least one email, wash the kitchen floor, start cleaning the fridge. maybe the oven, bj always leaves the oven trashed. i could put away the rest of the laundry. check to power steering fluid. look for that oil envelope. look for my tax estimate from january. find out if i ever filed it - probvably not. read letters from the irs. take the stew off the stove. clean the stove. put away groceries. clean the van. if i list too much at once, i get overwhelmed. didnt do much else all day, went to church. wiped off the stove. got groceries.

wd 40 at dollar store bucket of cimexa $110. gas. power steering stuff

notes on studies. it's been long enough, so i could screen. frontage: no dates yet. 9 days, 3500. get phone turned on and call. spaulding study was full when i called so thursday plans: did not get enough sleep x laundry. x print and mail rokita letters sort mail work on brief tried to change a lightbulb, but it was the fixture.

some of what i found today sheets, blankets vitamins $600 check from trump, which i mailed back to the same address. 2 backpacks 3 burberry boxers, not my size 5 short shorts clothes sriratcha oats 200 pounds scrap metal picture frame mousetraps drink mix jeans 100 ft extension cord towel handkerchiefs 3 caps to do: next letter re passport. reasonable accomodation of my disability per disabilities act. go through this pile of mail. turn phone on. call tommy and mom. go to state fair. look for the dead mouse in my room.