tacocat list tacocat. norwegian food truck plan. 

1 basic (filling, beans, tomato, sauce, greens, onion, tomatillo, cilantro)

2 black bean/cuban. black beans in black bean soup sauce. spork and beans.

3 cactus. basic + nopales.

4 lentil. curried lentil taco, tomato, green stuff, taco sauce, lentil sprouts.

5 imp. possible. devil logo. it might be a taco. 

6 doggy style (in a bag for later). one now, one for later, one for the dog. arf. $8. 

7 tuna salad. tuna, mango, pear, kiwi, fruit, in a tortilla. 

8 unicorn club sandwich. basic taco on 3 slices bread. filling, beans, shredded carrot, tomato, greens, taco sauce, sword toothpick, olive. $10. product may not contain unicorn.

9 lindy - mush, beans, carrots, cucumber, sprouts, tomato, salsa, mrs ott's. big only, $10.

10. kim chi - korean bbq sauce/hoisin, beans, bean sprouts, kim chi. maybe daikon sprouts. side of sriratcha.

11. dragon - dragonfruit, mixed fruit. 

12 custom - you tell us. $10. big. 

13 no cilantro basic.

14. potato.

15. samosa taco. triangle folded, spiced potato-pea-mix, mint chutney.

16. mutton honey. 86. 

17. bean curd. 

18. goat. $11. greatest of all time. regular big taco, fancier plate. 

19. little donkey. (burrito)

20. christmas (red and green sauce).

21. scrapple. (vegan scrapple, basic)

22. plate lunch. $10. rice, barley, pasta salad, greens, fruit, avocado, optional tempura.

23. english breakfast. beans, toast, sauted tomato, mushrooms, potato.

24, 24, 25. bag of soup. soup de jour. soup of tomorrow. soup of yesterday. $5, big $10.

25. leftover plate. $5 small, $10 big. rice, beans, and whatever. 

86. we're out of it.

26. mushroom taco. ground mushroom filling.

27. cabbage taco.

28. fire taco. chef's challenge. no refunds.

1 - $3. 3- $8. big - $10. 3 big - $25. tax included. 

serve on paper plate with # number written on it, sticker

drinks: 

tea, earl grey, cold. $3. big $5.

miced coffee. $2. 

lemon-line shakeup. $5

mango shakeup $5

wassail $4. spiced apple. 

sangria. tentacle grape punch.

virgin margarita. 

ingredients on display:

avocados, dragonfruit, tuna, grapes, mangoes, apples, carrots, parsnips, beets, cucumbers, lemons, limes, ginger, cilantro, bay leafs, onions, lentil sprouts, mung bean sprouts, field greens, cabbage

people: order taker. cashier. food hander-outer. prep person. 

tuesday

walmart

auction

victory party

what else?

x collect $100 from brian

kc problem.

email paralegal.

900 Broken Sound Pkwy NW, Ste 400
Boca Raton, FL 33487 ​ 
 

CSL Plasma © 2022​ 

Candy Creek farm, 6679 S 600 E, Waldron, IN 46182

wednesday

plasma. so hydrate. 

find phone, call tommy.

work on briefs - sf, new hampshire. 

auction.

walmart.

food not bombs facebook. 

letter to paralegal.

saturday:

x 2. dishes.

x 1. activate chase card

3. clean up yard or stairs or car. call tommy.

4. work on new hampshire and san francisco cases. 

5. respond to poll worker email. couldn't find it

6 cash count $600. now $500, hid $100 in bank bag usual spot.

7. laundry

x 8. pay property tax, avoid 10% fee, paid $550 on chase card indy, $250 on 5th 3rd card texas. 

9.   dfinger@delawgroup.com

dfinger@delawgroup.com

10. made a comic, went through emails, wasted time on reddit.

did: 

cash count. $500. paid indy taxes and texas taxes. activated bank card, made credit card payment, checked credit score (750). killed 2 mice, 11. 

to do: clean car or yard, laundry, work on new hampshire. 

wednesday:

x 4 vote.

2 scrap

x 3 plasma

x 1 lawyer zoom

x 5 mailbox

x make list of disclaimer projects - while at plasma.

gas $40. got $300 off my plasma card.

x need to go buy mousetraps. 6 mice so far this battle. $10.

took out trash.

minnesota

https://mn.gov/oah/assets/0325-38681-st-martin-bulmer-christenson-proulx-campaign-violation-report_tcm19-545545.pdf

massachusetts?

alaska

san francisco

https://www.ifs.org/cases/san-franciscans-supporting-prop-b-v-chiu/

i read a new controlling case just out from 9th circuit.

delphi

marion county

hendricks county

facebook washington

https://kingcounty.gov//~/media/courts/superior-court/docs/judges/State_of_WA_v_Meta_Order_Granting_Motion_for_Summary_Judgment.ashx

thursday i didn't get much done. bought and deployed mousetraps $13, took out trash. brian is here. back is only slightly better. time to go do standup. went well.

friday, new case, berks county PA disclaimer issue.

to do today: 

draft motion for leave to file amicus san fransciscans

subscribe to indiana lawyer

in the ninth circuit court of appeals

No.: 22-2785 @

SAN FRANCISCANS SUPPORTING PROP B, EDWIN M. LEE ASIAN PACIFIC DEMOCRATIC CLUB PAC SPONSORED BY NEIGHBORS FOR A BETTER SAN FRANCISCO ADVOCACY, and TODD DAVID, Plaintiffs, 

 v.

 DAVID CHIU, in his official capacity as San Francisco City Attorney, the SAN FRANCISCO ETHICS COMMISSION, CHESA BOUDIN, in his official capacity as San Francisco District Attorney, and the CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, Defendants. 

motion for leave to file amicus brief

 San Francisco is attempting, via ordinance, to censor the core political speech of plaintiffs, an example of cancel culture violating both constitutions. 

Earlier this week a panel of the 9th cicuit decided green v miss united states which is persuasive and may be controlling.

The enclosed brief discusses that case along with other state and federal case law.

I have some expertise in the matter of constitutionality of disclaimer rules which may aid the court in its decision, having been plaintiff in one case and counsel in two others.

The brief is in support of plaintiffs. Plaintiffs are well represented, but have not presented all of the arguments and authorities in support of their position. An amicus from CLC misstates the law, and might lead the court into error.

@ I have written to both parties requesting leave to file.

The ordinance violates the california constitution and case law.

The ordinance violates controlling supreme court precedents. list

talley mcintyre aclf watchtower riley tornillo wooley nifla are controlling. bonta and barnette are persuasive.  

previous 9th circuit precedent favors plaintiffs. in addition to green there is rosenberg, magic mike, and heller. the jimmy yamada corporate cases are distinguishable. citizens united, a corporate speech case, is distinguishable. recent cases misinterpreting c u are in error or are distinguishable.

there has been a split between the circuits since 1962, but the majority rule and better view is that disclaimer regulations like the one here are void. numerous lower court opinions are persuasive.

respectfully submitted, robbin stewart

certifications. 

@ look up an example.

=

summary of argument

green v miss.  is persusive and or controlling.

supreme court precedents from talley to nifla are controlling.

cu does not apply.

state case law, notably schuster, is controlling.

state constitutional decisions from 13 states are persuasive.

lower court opinions are persuasive.

there is no saving construction or lesser acceptable burden; the rule is void in its entirety.

 draft of letter to marion county clerk

To: Marion County Election Board

From: Robbin Stewart

Date: 10/22/22

Re: Disclaimer on Cindy for Indy sign.

Hi. I am outside the city county building, looking at the campaign signs. There is one that I can't tell whether or not it complies with IC 3 9 3 2.5 and your office's even more restrictive disclaimer policy.

It says

FED UP?

FIRE RYAN MEARS

Paid for by Cindi for Indy.

It does not say whether authorized by Ryan Mears, or anyone else.

Similarly there is another sign for a write-in candidate, which mentions the incumbent they are running against, and does not say not authorized by. 

As you know, I consider this statute void for the reasons set out in Robbin Stewart v Sarah Taylor (1997, Ogden v Marendt, and Mulholland v Marion County Election Board. It would be criminal, tortious, malfeasance, and unethical to try to enforce the void statute, but nonetheless it is your policy to do so. 

This week Mark Small decided he would not represent me in this matter after all, so I will probably not be filing anything in court until well after the election if at all.

So on the one hand I am generating more of a paper trail. On the other hand, as somewhat of an expert on this stuff, I can't tell whether or not these signs comply, so I'll let you folks decide. Please keep me posted. Thanks. (fixed some typos befpore emailing. sent.)

to do saturday oct 29.

x work.

bert show ticket where?

x put out mouse baits got 1 so far. 

x bmv

x early voting.

-

longer term:

lawn mower

clean yard house car life

email paralegal?

get fnb ready: rolls, melons. 

bmv organ dispute

credit union email re line of credit

make better list of sign cases

email eric barnes

announce lawsuit on reddit

wwwwhat else?

go thru older lists

sf brief, alaska breif, email south bend lawyer, colorado disclasimer letter

 

 to do saturday oct 22nd.

x 1. indian buffet. went to wrong place.

x 1.5 draft email re signs to indy gov. sent.

x 2 early vote st lukes. electric car show, no early vote. 

3. scrap yard too late?

4. laundry.

x 5. clean car and yard.

6. make better list.

x 7. make a comic.

x 8. email photo of picture frames to tommy. took photo. 

did: trash. watered plants. fed fish. cleaned front yard slightly. burned brush. made ice. made list. started dishes. gathered laundry. emailed ex-lawyer. got a book on productivity. went to a park. got groceries. had coffee $5. yard sale $5. made comic. made list. emailed county election board re signs. 

to do: 

check firepit.

x laundry.

finish dishes. put away laundry. make sure food is out of car into fridge. x make comic. x bath.

email jeanie.

did laundry sunday. $12.

plan for sunday: put away some laundry, get fnb ready, 

work, what else? make bettter list:

american airlines.

phoenix celerion.

plasma center problem letters

did: posted about plaintiff needed

started a book about getting things done.

to do: post about plaintiff needed.

 to do: 

new hampshire amicus and disciplinary complaint.

needs to get there before 10/12 hearing. 

san francisco amicus

marion county complaint

alaska amicus

revise carroll complaint

hendricks complaint

 did/didn't wednesday 8/28.

did:

lawyer zoom. emailed mark latest revisions. took out trash. weeded garden. took car to mechanic. rode bike home. applied for indy food council.

To do: set alarm 6 am, jury duty tomorrow!!!!

didn't: bid on those auctions. 

tow van to mechanic. get insurance for van. find plate. 

what else?

to do: find draft of marion county complaint, hendricks complaint.

make better list. get 3 quotes for oil property in kansas. 

fix front door. clean front yard some. get scrap ready. tomorrow plasma after jury duty. make better list. make comic. withdraw about working the election. call tommy. get mom's password.

https://www.indy.gov/activity/councillor-jason-larrison

next up: bath, reddit, make comic, find complaints.

so list for monday:

plasma. scrap yard. van. clean yard. think about kc. bryant hospital letter. 

van: get insurance. bank, get money. install plate. scrub off sticker. try to air up tire. arrange for tow. make key.

casey: the redemption period is now open. go claim $14k, give kc 1K.

prepare attorney letter. and power of attorney form. find kc. get signature. 

did: bought 1 share tesla.

to do: sign stuff:

1. edit san franscisco brief, x look up filing rules. to do: contact counsel. draft motion for leave to file out of time. look into whether to file electronically. 

2, outline alaska brief, massachusetts and maine memos requesting AGOs, also nebraska.  

3.  edit the three complaints. make trial notebook of motions and memos. 

4. write to eric barnes, reddit, seeking plaintiff. 

example:

marion county

complaint

notice of tort claim

lawyer demand letter

motion for injunction

appeal of motion for injunction

motion for partial summary judgment on state claims.

petition for transfer

petition for cert

did: resent sokola letter to do write to the governor.

to do letter to david finger.

billing note 0.5 hours monday october 3 trial notebook organization.

missouri situation. aclu. maybe write a letter requesting an AGO?

draft letter as an example. 

to do letter to 92 counties? is there a list of the county election boards?

vandenburgh.

property taxes due: texas none indy 

November 10, 2022
$536.50

CLEs this week.

to do: go over old lists, make new/updated list.

did: dollar store items for work. squeegee, awesomesauce, brush, wire brushes. 

4.   

5.

...

===

saving draft here because lost internet connection, 11:00 9/22/22.

caption

motion for temporary injunction

intro

merits

other factors

conclusion

Injunctive relief requires irreparable harm and some likelihood of success on the merits. The court then weighs the likelihood of success, the balance of burden on the parties, the lack of alternative remedies, and the public interest. cite mulholland.

Here the merits are very strong. IC 3-9-3-2.5 is largely a reenactment of IC 3-9-3-2, which was struck down as unconstitutional by Stewart v Taylor, and is unconstitutional for the same reasons discussed in Stewart v Taylor.

The statute violates both constitutions, by either the plain text, the case law, history and tradition.

2.5 has some changes from 2, but none that are relevant here. 2.5 has an exception for skywriting, but skywriting is not the issue here.

Similarly, 2.5 exempts referanda, and is limited to express advocacy, but the text at issue in Stewart v Taylor was not about referenda, and was express advocacy. Taylor, a federal case, is not binding here, but the case on which it relies, McIntyre v Ohio, is. Taylor was not a case about overbreadth or vagueness, but found that the speech at issue was core political speech protected by the First Amendment. Because it resolved the case on federal grounds, it declined to reach the state constitutional issues.

The question presented in McIntyre is whether there is any "elections exception" to the rule in Talley v California that disclaimer requirements are unconstitutional. The ruling was that these is no such exception, a form of strict scrutiny applies, and the Ohio statute, which required identification disclaimers on candidate literature, was void and unenforcable.

Disclaimer cases following Talley include McIntyre, Buckley v. ACLF, Watchtower v Stratton, and NIFLA v Becerra.

The cases are a subset of the general principle that the right to speak includes the right not to speak, the right to remain silent.

Barnette, Tornillo, Riley v Federation of the Blind, Wooley v Maynard, Janus, are other cases making this same point. Each is binding on this court; any one of these cases by itself is sufficient to find a strong likelihood of success.

The First Amendment, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, forbids abridgment of the

8 JANUS v. STATE, COUNTY, AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES Opinion of the Court

 freedom of speech. We have held time and again that freedom of speech “includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all.” Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U. S. 705, 714 (1977); see Riley v. National Federation of Blind of N. C., Inc., 487 U. S. 781, 796–797 (1988); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U. S. 539, 559 (1985); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U. S. 241, 256–257 (1974); accord, Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U. S. 1, 9 (1986) (plurality opinion).

“If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics". Janus, citing Barnette.

Perhaps because such compulsion so plainly violates the Constitution, most of our free speech cases have involved restrictions on what can be said, rather than laws compelling speech. But measures compelling speech are at least as threatening. Janus.

NIFLA v Becerra:

The First Amendment, applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits laws that abridge the freedom of speech. When enforcing this prohibition, our precedents distinguish between content-based and content-neutral regulations of speech. Content-based regulations “target speech based on its communicative content.” Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U. S. ___, ___ (2015) (slip op., at 6). As a general matter, such laws “are presumptively unconstitutional and may be justified only if the government proves that they are narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests.” Ibid. This stringent standard reflects the fundamental principle that governments have “‘no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.’” Ibid. (quoting Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92, 95 (1972)). The licensed notice is a content-based regulation of speech. By compelling individuals to speak a particular message, such notices “alte[r] the content of [their] speech.” Riley v. National Federation of Blind of N. C., Inc., 487 U. S. 781, 795 (1988); accord, Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U. S. 622, 642 (1994); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U. S. 241, 256 (1974). NIFLA.

Further, when the government polices the content of professional speech, it can fail to “‘preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail.’” “[T]he best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market,” Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting), and the people lose when the government is the one deciding which ideas should prevail.

Indiana courts have followed McIntyre on several occasions. These include Ogden v Marendt, 264 F. Supp. 2d 785 (S.D. Ind. 2003), Mulholland, AKKKK v Goshen. Ogden relied on McIntyre to find Indiana's slating sign rules unconstitutional censorship of political signs. Mulholland's case was settled for $70,000 after Marion County violated the declaratory judgment of Ogden. In Akkkk v Goshen, an anti-mask ordinance was found to violate right to anonymous speech.

A district court will grant a preliminary injunction if there is a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits of the claim, no adequate remedy at law, and failure to grant the injunction would cause irreparable harm to the party seeking it. Jones v. InfoCure Corp.,310 F.3d 529, 534 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing Ty, Inc. v. Jones Group, Inc.,237 F.3d 891, 895 (7th Cir. 2001)). If the

Ogden v. Marendt, (S.D.Ind. 2003), 264 F. Supp. 2d 785, 788 (S.D. Ind. 2003)

“If the moving party has made a sufficient showing of those elements, the court then balances the relative harms to the parties depending on whether the injunction is granted or denied, and taking into account the public interest in the matter.” Ogden v. Marendt, (S.D.Ind. 2003), 264 F. Supp. 2d 785, 788 (S.D. Ind. 2003)

Likewise in the present case, the anti-slating law burdens core political speech. The endorsement or expression of support for candidates for office whose views one shares goes to the heart of First Amendment protections. See Buckley v. Valeo,424 U.S. 1, 14, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976) ("there is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of th[e First] Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs. . . . of course includ(ing) discussions of candidates [.]") (citing Mills v. Alabama,384 U.S. 214, 218, 86 S.Ct. 1434, 16 L.Ed.2d 484 (1966)). "The First Amendment has its fullest and most urgent application to speech uttered during a campaign for political office."

Ogden v. Marendt, (S.D.Ind. 2003), 264 F. Supp. 2d 785, 790 (S.D. Ind. 2003)

In 2014, the election board again tried to impose the unconstitutional slating statute, but was rebuffed by the 7th Circuit in Mulholland v Marion County Election Board.

Even granting that the Indiana anti-slating statute does not plumb such hyperbolic depths of unconstitutional offense, the Election Board's attempt to enforce a law that a federal court has already told the Board in a final judgment is unconstitutional represents the sort of “other unusual circumstance that would call for equitable relief.” Mulholland.

Because the district court erred in dismissing the case under Younger, we REVERSE that decision and REMAND for further proceedings, with the additional instruction that the district court consider promptly whether to issue a preliminary injunction against the Board, keeping in mind the primary election scheduled for May 6, 2014. Id. 

The case then settled for around $70,000.

A prior statute, materially the same as it affects this case, was declared unconstitutional in Stewart v Taylor.

Turning to the substantive issue in the case, we must determine whether section 3-9-3-2 violates Stewart's First Amendment right to freedom of speech. In McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, 514 U.S. 334, 115 S. Ct. 1511, 131 L. Ed. 2d 426 (1995), the Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutional an Ohio statute that required all printed political campaign literature in the state to contain the name and address of the person or head of the organization responsible *1054 for the publication of the literature. The Court held that the Ohio statute violated the First Amendment because it burdened core political speech in a manner that was not narrowly tailored to serve an overriding state interest. Id. at ___ - ___, 115 S. Ct. at 1519-24. Stewart contends that this case is controlled by McIntyre. Stewart is correct.

The Supreme Court made clear in McIntyre that campaign literature in support of a candidate for elective office is "core political speech" that is entitled to the fullest protection of the First Amendment.

When statutes and regulations burden core political speech, courts must apply "exacting scrutiny" when passing on the constitutionality of those laws and uphold them only when they are narrowly tailored to serve an overriding state interest. Id. at ___, 115 S. Ct. at 1519. See also Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 198, 112 S. Ct. 1846, 1851, 119 L. Ed. 2d 5 (1992). The Ohio statute challenged in McIntyre, Ohio Rev.Code § 3599.09(A) (1988), like section 3-9-3-2, required that all campaign signs disclose the name of the person or the name of an official of the organization responsible for issuing or making the sign.[6] The Court found the state's putative interest in preventing fraudulent and libelous statements and in providing the electorate with relevant information did not justify the Ohio statute's ban on anonymous campaign literature, because the statute's strictures applied to all campaign literature, not just the misleading, fraudulent, or libelous. Id. at ___ - ___, 115 S. Ct. at 1519-22. As with the Ohio statute, section 3-9-3-2 also makes no distinction among the various types of campaign literature that would narrowly tailor the statute's requirements to the furtherance of a legitimate state goal or interest. Section 3-9-3-2 applies to all

campaign literature not specifically exempted on the basis of impracticality in subsection (c) of the provision.[7] The statute *1055 burdens dissemination of campaign literature that is informative as well as misleading, innocuous as well as libelous, truthful as well as fraudulent. Therefore, we find that section 3-9-3-2 is not narrowly tailored to meet a compelling state interest.

In AKKKK v Goshen, the Northern District of Indiana struck down a municipal ordinance which prohibited a white seperatist group from wearing masks at their gatherings.

The First Amendment embraces the right to communicate and associate anonymously. See Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation, Inc., ___ U.S. ___, 119 S.Ct. 636, 142 L.Ed.2d 599 (1999); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 115 S.Ct. 1511, 131 L.Ed.2d 426 (1995); ... Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 80 S.Ct. 536, 4 L.Ed.2d 559 (1960); National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488 (1958).

These cases control this case as well.

It would be legal error and abuse of discretion to deny an injunction in this case.

1 hr. resume editing 12:01 am 9/21/22 - 3 am. 2 more hours 2.0 9/22 in kokomo.

The state constitution provides several additional bases to enjoin the void statute. Article 1, Section 9, is a free speech provision. Unlike the federal constitution, which protects only the "freedom of" speech, the text is categorical and unambigious. However, in the leading case, Price v State, 1993, the Indiana Supreme Court chose to provide strict scrutiny only to political speech, rather than all speech. Here the speech, a series of signs of the format "Vote for Smith", are unquestionably political, so strict scrutiny applies. A second wind for the indiana bill of rights, IN L Rev.

No Indiana Constitutional law case has reached the issue of anonymous speech. In a prior case about 3-9-3-2.5, Majors v. Abell, the court declined to reach the state constitutional issues, and only settled a matter of statutory interpretation. In footnote 11, the court did provide a limiting construction to the statute, finding that it did not apply to signs unless there were 100 or more of them.

The Carroll County Board has a more restrictive policy. A single sign would be enough to trigger enforcement, according to the "Political Literature" brochure. cite url.. See LaDue v Gileo, United States v. Grace. Thus the Board's unconstitutional censorship policy goes even further than the void statute, as that statute has been limited by the state supreme court.

A number of states have found anonymous speech to be protected by the state constitution, as well as federally, usually in controversies about disclaimers.. These include CA, CO, DE, ID, IL, LA, MA, ME, MO, ND, NY. These cases are not controlling, but are persuasive. Schuster, Tattered Cover, Opinion of the Justices (DE), State v Barney, People v White, State v Moses, State v Fulton, Dennis v Massachusetts, Opinion of the Justices (ME), Ex rel _ (1906), ND Ed Association, People v Duryea.

Other courts, both state and federal, have based decisions solely on federal grounds. [cite.]

Not all states are on board. KY, TN, NC, and CT have upheld disclaimer rules. Gable v Patton, State v Acey, Peterslie. These are older cases predating Town of Vincent v Reed, which found that strict scrutiny applies to political sign cases, Janus, which upheld anonymous speech, and NIFLA, which found a disclaimer statute unconstitutional. Many of these cases used the lax and permissive Buckley v Valeo standard, before that was abfogated by Bonta.

Several recent cases have erroneously allowed disclaimer rules, based on dicta in Citizens United taken out of context. That case, unlike this case, was limited to corporate speech, and suggested disclosure and disclaimers as a less restrictive remedy than a complete ban. Indiana has no such ban on politcal signs generally. Citizens United expanded rather than restricted speech, and made no claim to have overruled McIntyre, Barnette, Talley, or ACLF. What these cases have in common is that they were unduly influenced by amicus briefs from the Campaign Legal Center, which misstated Citizens United. Even if that case had held what the Center claims it did, it has been mooted by subsequent case law including Town of Vincent, Janus, and NIFLA. Similarly, McConnell v FEC declained to hold BCRA facially invalid except in part, and denied a specific as-applied challenge to a disclaimer provision, but explicitly stated that McIntyre remains good law.

In Majors v. Abell, the 7th Circuit denied relief on the basis that McConnell had created uncertainty about disclosure law. Subsequent cases, such as WRTL I and II, Davis v FEC, Free Enterprise Fund, Western Tradition, Citizens United, and Cruz v FEC, have removed this uncertainty. Majors did not apply heightened scrutiny, and does not survive Town of Vincent, or NIFLA. When Mulholland reached the 7th Circuit, the only mention of Majors was as it related to standing. Mulholland at the 7th circuit was on a procedural point, not the merits, but it indicated Majors was no longer considered controlling on the merits.

The controlling cases include Price as to state law, and Talley, McIntyre, ACLF, Barnette, Wooley, Riley, Janus, and NIFLA, as to the First Amendment claim.

Talley found a $10 fine excessive for engaging in protected speech, while McIntyre found a $100 fine excessive for similar speech. The 3-9-3-2.5 statutory penalty, including both fines and jail time, is an excessive fine per Timbs v. Indiana. [add count to the complaint.]

Manuel Talley had distributed a flyer without naming himself as the author. Margaret McIntyre and several associates had distributed a flyer at meetings opposing a tax increase.

Section 9 is not the only basis for a finding under the state constitution. Article II section 1 states that elections shall be free and equal. Elections are not free when the state chills election speech with criminal penalties.

The state constitution, Article I section I, holds that Hoosiers have an inalienable right to liberty, codifying the Declaration of Indipendence. A sign that says "Vote for Smith" is an expression of that liberty. Section 1 goes on to say that Hoosiers have the right to alter or abolish the government. Free and equal elections are, usually, the process by which we do so. Section 11, like the 4th Amendment, protects a person's papers and effects from being commandeered by the government, except when there is probable cause. Section 16 requires just compensation when County commandeers private property, which the signs are. Section 31 protects petition and assembly. Signs saying Vote for Smith are a form of petition, and free and equal elections are a form of assembly; the signs are an exercise of the right of assembly. There is little case law on section 31. NAACP v Alabama ex rel Patterson (1958) and Bates v Little Rock (1960) are persuasive but not controlling. Section 12 protects due course of law. Due course of law incorporates some degree of freedom of speech, and requires, at a minimum, a mens rea requirement, which the statute lacks. See Smith v California, which found that bookstore censorship without a mens rea element violates due process and the First Amendment. Due course of law is not identical to due process, but they are related concepts, based in the history and tradition of american and english law at least as far back as the magna charta. The right of a printer to publish anonymous materials critical of the government was at issue in John Peter Zenger's case in 1735, and the founders had that case in mind when they adopted the First and Seventh amendments.

If there were no first amendment and no section 9, plaintiffs would still have a likelihood of success on the merits.

[quote from price about text, case law, history and tradition. bruen also.]

Plaintiffs have a strong likelihood of success on the merits.

Each of the other factors also favors injunction.

The burden on plaintiff is that they risk arrest and fine, or in the alternative submit to having their speech chilled or censored.

This is a severe burden. Concurring in Buckley v. ACLF, Justice Thomas found the identification badge rule a severe burden, triggering strict scrutiny under Norman v Reed.

In contrast, Defendants only need to refrain from illegally violating civil rights, a trivial limit. Perhaps they could answer emails in a more timely and responsive manner. Perhaps they could educate themselves more on what their responsibilities are under the Bill of Rights of both constitutions. But all they need to do for plaintiff is to promise to leave them alone, and stop threatening them. The balance of the burdens favors plaintiff, and an injunction would help protect the integrity of the election process.

There is no public interest in the enforcement of an unconstitutional statute. ACLU of Georgia v Miller. "No long string of citations is necessary to find that the public interest weighs in favor of having access to a free flow of constitutionally protected speech." Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 851, ACLU v Zell Miller. This simply “acknowledge[s] the obvious: enforcement of an unconstitutional law is always contrary to the public interest.” Gordon v. Holder, 721 F.3d at 653 (citations omitted)

Violation of First Amendment freedoms is irreparable harm. Elrod v Burns.

Plaintiffs have standing, ripeness, and a justiciable controversy. There is irreparable harm with no adequate remedy at law. They have an extremely strong case on the merits. The public interest requires that the Board's policy be enjoined as soon as possible. The balance of the burdens heavily favors plaintiffs. Each prong of the test for injunctive relief is satisfied, and each factor weighs in favor of granting the injunction. This request for injunctive relief is preliminary, and is not intended as a full resolution of the merits at this time. Time is of the essence, with the campaign season already well under way, although passage of the election will not moot any of the issues in this case.

The court should issue a TRO and schedule a full hearing, and then grant a temporary injunction, later to be made permanent. respectfully submitted [certifications].

2nd confidential offer of settlement:

we offer two options to settle this case:

First, be willing to sign a consent decree agreeing not to enforce IC 3-9-3-2.5, pay $1 in damages, and pay court costs and legal fees actually incurred but not to exceed $10,000.

or, Second, pay $10,000 within 30 days of filing in exchange for dismissal with prejudice.

If this offer is denied, we expect the odds are good of a win on the merits, by which time legal fees will be well in excess of $10,000. We will be asking for a trial by jury on the issue of damages, which you will oppose, and we will go through months or years of appeals on issues of damages, while legal fees continue to mount. In the unlikely event that we lose, this case will be a good candidate for a cert petition; we hope to get this issue before the supreme court, whether in your case or some other, because there is a currently a split between the circuits.

I look forward to hearing from you promptly. If there has been no response within ten days, the offer is withdrawn. We anticipate that our next offer will be for $20,000.

2:34 am 9/21, 2.5 hours 9/21, 1.0 hours 9/20.

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cruz v fec notes: A recent supreme court election case shows that the court has not given up on its protecttions for political speech. In FEC v. Cruz for Senate, the Court said:

The First Amendment “has its fullest and most urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office.”

This broad protection, we have explained, “reflects our profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”

[T]here is no doubt that the law does burden First Amendment electoral speech, and any such law must at least be justified by a permissible interest. (“When the Government restricts speech, the Government bears the burden of proving the constitutionality of its actions.”).

“The First Amendment requires us to err on the side of protecting political speech rather than suppressing it.”

All the above is pretty meager, given that we are considering restrictions on “the most fundamental First Amendment activities”—the right of candidates for political office to make their case to the American people.

Moreover, deference to [Congress] would be especially inappropriate where, as here, the legislative act may have been an effort to “insulate[] legislators from effective electoral challenge.”

12:08 9/23/22. notes from janus, while waiting for internet to come back up.

Fundamental free speech rights are at stake. Janus.

Free speech serves many ends. It is essential to our

democratic form of government, , and it furthers the

search for truth.

[got distracted, do not bill for this time.] resumed for 1 hr, 2:30-3:30 am.

“This Court has not hesitated to overrule decisions offensive to the First Amendment (a fixed star in our constitutional constellation, if there is one).” Federal Election Comm’n v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U. S. 449, 500 (2007) (Scalia, J.,

concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Citizens United, supra, at 362–365 (overruling Austin, 494 U. S. 652); Barnette, 319 U. S., at 642 (overruling Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U. S. 586 (1940)).

“Stare decisis is the preferred course because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.” We will not overturn a past decision unless there are strong grounds for doing so.

This court is obligated, by the Supremecy clause, dual sovereignty, and stare decisis, to follow the binding precedents of the supreme court, as to the First Amendment, which here include Talley McIntyre ACLF Janus and Nifla, and to follow the binding precedents of the Indiana Supeme Court, as to the Indiana Constitution, here including Price v State.

Not controling, but persuasive, are some 40 cases from lower courts or other states, which have protected anonymous speech and/or invalidated disclaimer requirements, or struck down rules which would compel speech.

Table III, list of cases.

It is entirely possible that whatever judge this case is assigned to would have a personal preference in favor of disclaimers. There are certainly public policy arguments that weigh in favor of some kind of a public right to know. One could point to the dicta in Citizens United part IV, or hints in the Indiana Supreme Court's ruling in Majors v Abell, which did not address the constitutional issue, but seemed comfortable with the statute. Or one could look at numerous amici

briefs by the campaign legal center, in cases such as Gaspee Project.     However, the court has a legal moral and ethical duty and obligation to follow the precedents of the supreme court, which have found that compelled speech usually violates the constitution (with exceptions not at issue here), that the disclaimer rules in Talley McIntyre and NIFLA are that sort of unconstitutional compelled speech, and therefore void.     Under Price, the statute's censorship of core political speech is subject to strict scrutiny under section 9, which it cannot withstand. Other sections of the Indiana Bill of rights counsel the same conclusion.     We do not need to formally decide the merits today. It is enough to recognize that there is a strong likelihood of success on the merits, which, when combined with the other factors, requires that an injunction issue while the case remains pending, so that the 2022 election can be one of substance, not merely of form.

There is irreparable harm, which can be redressed by the court's preliminary injunction. The balance of burdens strongly favors plaintiff. There is no public interest in allowing unconstitutional censorship to harm the integrity of the election process. Here, an injunction must issue.

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notes on price v state

we also believe § 9 has substantive content: that popular comment on public concerns should not be restrained. This conclusion is supported by both the text and historical context of our free expression guarantee.

The frontier democrats who dominated the first Constitutional Convention *962 countered the risk that reactionary elements might fashion a non-majoritarian government by adopting measures to guarantee popular participation and protect scrutiny of public affairs.[10]

Public discourse could hardly be called an abuse which impairs the sovereign when, in fact, a hale state government requires that discourse be unfettered and *963 forthcoming.[13] We thus confirm that § 9 enshrines pure[14] political speech as a core value. 

To the extent that Ind. Code Ann. § 35-45-1-3(2) permits the State to impose a material burden upon the free exercise of political speech, it cannot stand. 

Whenever the state dictates the means by which political opinion may be voiced, however, it teeters on the edge of its authority. The machinery of democracy produces a sonorous cacophony, not a drone.

dissent: It is true that speech not constituting disorderly conduct may not be criminalized merely because it includes political protest.