) (“[T]he only court that can overturn a Supreme Court precedent is the Supreme Court itself.” (citations omitted)); Nat’l Coal. for Men v. Selective Serv. Sys., 969 F.3d 546, 547 (5th Cir. 2020) (“[O]nly the Supreme Court may revise its precedent.”).

Inferior courts must follow directly applicable Supreme Court precedent that has not been overruled or modified. See, e.g., Freedom From Religion Found. v. Mack, 4 F.4th 306, 315 (5th Cir. 2021) (“We are bound to follow the Supreme Court precedent that most squarely controls our case.”). 

us v vargas 5th cir. 2023.

 $13,000

3,963.96 Square Feet

3555 Linden St, Indianapolis, IN 46227

1641 E Southern Ave 12,000 southern and state. 

 

wednesday plans:

noon zoom. missed. 

1:30 work meeting. kid, shorts. slightly late. kid wasn't there today.

x plasma. $100;

scrap yard. 

sort car! did some. but got more stuff.

clean front steps, kitchen, stairs.

church or standup. no one at church.

what am i forgetting?

bike, lawn mower.

oil change, car repair, lights, stewart electric.

did: looked at 2 properties.  more boxes of food. checked 6 places. 

thursday, crackers. 

pay 1-90 toll.

write letter to kokmo church

email tommy.

museum. 

make comic. 

bags, fred's tree serivice, look for phone.

Fred & Son's

314 East Cragmont Dr

Indianapolis, IN 46227

(317) 708-4255

tuesday: club. worked. grease trap, 7 cops, groceries. made ice. 

 monday plans

x laundry

x bank

sort van

x dishes

stairs

clean bathroom -only slightly. bath.

look for phone.

x comic

better list.

oppenheimer was sold out. all i found was a box of food, some scrap metal, a keurig, a wastebasket, another box of food. 3 pizzas, two matching puppy stuffed animals. 

i could go back for the big screen tv and the wood. 

 the indiana supreme court's opinion turned down a facial challenge to the statute, saying if there's even one case where the statute is ok that is enough to defeat a facial challenge, but left it very clear they welcome as-applied challenges. so that could be the next step; a series of as-applied challenges that would chip away at the statute.

that's how mccain-feingold was dealt with. a facial challenge, mcconnell v fec, lost, by opponents kept chipping away at it with as-applied challenges, of which the strongest so far has been citizens united. 

on the other hand, in crawford v marion county, a facial challenge to the voter ID statute lost, and there haven't been as-applied challenges. 

the lawyers here are the aclu's ken faulk and gavin rose. they are very good lawyers - i've met them-  and not likely to just go away. 

if you know of a person who has particular circumstances with a pregnancy that would result in them being a good test case, please have them contact the aclu. here https://action.aclu.org/give/support-aclu-indiana is a link to donate to aclu.

 what are my side hustles?

1. day job

2. oil well

3. social security

4. vacant lots

5. renting rooms

6. law

7, recycling company

8. bank bonuses

9. class actions

10. (cleaning restaurants)

11. estate

12. plasma

13. medical studies

14. (referrals to medical studies)

15. portfolio/tesla.

what are my side hustles?

1. day job                              17k 2022

2. oil well                                5K 2022

3. social security                    7k 2023

4. vacant lots                         (10k)

5. renting rooms                    2 cars

6. law                                    ---

7, recycling company          200 scrapyard. 3K avoided food expense

8. bank bonuses                    $1000 a year.

9. class actions                     $155. 2023

10. (cleaning restaurants) 

11. estate                              someday. $1000 this year.

12. plasma                           4k

13. medical studies             1k 2023

14. (referrals to medical studies) ---

15. portfolio/tesla.              1K+

 Dear Senator Freeman,

 I am writing today to both of your hats, as senator and as a lawyer.

Senator first: Thank you for requesting the AGO from AG Rokita. While I haven't found the text anywhere, the upshot was to confirm that Mayor Hogsett's gun ordinance is unlawful. As a Marion County republican and gun rights supporter, I appreciate this.

I am not your constituent. I live in house district 100, which I ran for back in 2010. Recently I wrote to my state rep, Mr. Johnson, and never heard back. I was writing to request that he request an AGO on the constitutionality of IC 3-9-3-2.5, the disclaimer statute that requires you to put "paid for by __" on your political signs.

The reason that the statute is 2.5 is that the previous statute, IC 3-9-3--2, was found unconstitutional in Stewart v Taylor,  953 F. Supp. 1047 (S.D. Ind. 1997), https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/FSupp/953/1047/1746959/, after one of my signs was confiscated at a polling place. 

The new statute is equally unconstitutional for the same reasons.

I suspect that AG Rokita might agree, especially in light of 303 Creative, 6/30/23, in which the Supreme Court once again held that compelled speech violates the First Amendment. 

That would accomplish my objective without the time and expense of a lawsuit. Is this something you would be willing to do for me?

The request could be as simple as "Dear Attorney General Rokita, does IC 3-9-3-2.5 violate the federal or state constitutions, in light of 303 Creative and Price v Indiana?" You know the format better than I do since you have just been through it. 

Thanks in advance for your time.

Now I'll switch hats. Let me give you a quick elevator pitch for a lawsuit, and if it interests you I'd be happy to meet and discuss further. 

I have a multi-issue dispute with the Marion County Elections Board.

First there's the sign issue. They are threatening to enforce the disclaimer law against me again. Since I have beaten them on this once, I think there is some potential for non-trivial damages. I settled my case for $7,000. The Mulholland case, similar issues, was settled for $70,000. 

Next, it looks like they didn't count my provisional vote in the fall election, which might or might not be actionable, and there's a public records dispute because since January they have been unwilling to tell me whether or not my vote was counted. 

Next, in the Spring primary, the precinct official at the voting center at St Mark's church did not allow me to vote a provisional ballot, and threatened me with arrest when I attempted to document this on video. The Board had denied me press credentials because my reporting is online rather than in traditional media.

So as you can see there are several potential torts there.

OK, I guess that's about it. Thanks again. 

Sincerely, Robbin Stewart.  

 thursday daily task list

unload van

scrap run

buy bags.

x stop by work

plasma? x po box? 

call tommy

x memos.

clean stairs.

x borax/sugar

wash dishes.

shower.

x flea bomb?

x comic.

find phone.

 test. we are in syracuse new york on our way to berlin 

 

1:00 pm 6/20/2023 until: 2:00. 1 hour. Made a good start on writing down what I've had in my head over the weekend.

rough notes about hammond v indiana

after our meeting Nick sent me three documents in reference to City of Hammond v Indiana, Lake County Board of Elections, et al. 

These are the state's memo in support of summary judgment, a detailed and substantive response,

the board's motion for sumarry judgment, a short empty argument saying they win on the merits, therefore the court lacks jurisdiction. in my country we call this the "does not follow."

i need to go check what the third document is; it is similar to the second. complains that the board has not done anything wrong, therefore not a proper party. 

most of this writing will be in response to the state's filing, hereinafter "memo".

let's say that i can come up with a refutation of the state's argument, what do we do with it? a) send it over to hammond's hight priced lawyers. b) file it as an amicus from roberts and maybe me. 

The structure of the state's memo is as follows:

Introduction..................................................................................................1

Summary Judgment Standard.........................................................................2

Argument.....................................................................................................2

I. Plaintiffs’ Claims Must Fail as This Court Does Not Have

Jurisdiction to Hear Them .......................................................2

II. Plaintiffs Voting Rights Act Claim ...........................................4

III. Plaintiffs Art. 4 § 23 Indiana Constitution Claim ......................8

IV. Plaintiffs Art. 1 § 23 Indiana Constitution Claims....................10

A. Indiana Code Section 33-33-45-28 Does Not Violate Art. 1, §

23 by denying attorneys the right to choose judges.............12

B. The Judicial Nomination and Retention Scheme Does Not

Violate Art. 1, § 23...............................................................13

Conclusion..................................................................................................14

---

I will follow that structure in responding.

The standard of review is mostly correct.

The court does have jurisdiction. 42 USC 1983 and the Voting Rights Act confer jurisdiction. There is live controversy between the parties. Section 2 is designed to remedy these kind of disputes. The court has dependent and ancillary jurisdiction over the state claims.

The state's concerns about a federal court deciding close questions of state constitutional law have some merit. 

"Further, Plaintiffs’ remaining claims are first andforemost a question of Indiana constitutional law, and it would be inappropriate for this Court to decide these issues in federal court."

The best response would be to certify the state claims to the Indiana Supreme Court.

The court has the authority to take this step on its own initiative without a motion from the parties. BAPAC v Baldwin, Majors v Abell.

BROWNSBURG AREA PATRONS AFFECT. CHANGE (BAPAC) v. Baldwin, 943 F. Supp. 975 (S.D. Ind. 1996). wrong cite, that's the lower court opinion. 137 F.3d 503 (7th Cir. 1998).

https://casetext.com/case/brownsburg-area-patrons-aff-ch-v-baldwin

Because this case presents an important issue regarding the interpretation of a state statute, we certify this case to the Supreme Court of Indiana.

These possibly competing principles of statutory interpretation lead us to conclude that the most prudent course of action is to certify this case to the Supreme Court of Indiana pursuant to this circuit's Rule 52. See Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Alabama v. Nielson, 116 F.3d 1406, 1413 (11th Cir. 1997) (stating that the case for certification is even stronger where "the answer . . . depends upon reconciliation of the competing trajectories of a number of canons of statutory construction"). Here, a federal court would be required to determine whether the statutory language is ambiguous, but at the same time, construe the statute to be constitutional if possible. 

Circuit Rule 52 states:

When the rules of the highest court of a state provide for certification to that court by a federal court of questions arising under the laws of that state which will control the outcome of a case pending in the federal court, this court, sua sponte, or on a motion of a party, may certify such a question to the state court in accordance with the rules of that court, and may stay the case in this court to await the state court's decision of the question certified. The certification will be made after the briefs are filed in this court. A motion for certification shall be included in the moving party's brief.

The Supreme Court of Indiana permits certification to its court under Indiana Rule of Appellate Procedure 15(O) which states:

When it shall appear to the Supreme Court of the United States, to any circuit court of appeals of the United States, to the court of appeals of the District of Columbia, or to any United States District Court sitting in Indiana that there are involved in any proceeding before it questions or propositions of the laws of [Indiana], which are determinative of the said cause, and there are no clear controlling precedents in the decisions of the Supreme Court of [Indiana], such federal court may certify such questions or propositions of the laws of [Indiana] to the Supreme Court of [Indiana] for instructions concerning such questions or propositions of state law which certificate the Supreme Court of [Indiana], by written opinion, may answer.

However, the United States Supreme Court recently reminded us that "`[s]peculation by a federal court about the meaning of a state statute in the absence of prior state court adjudication is particularly gratuitous when . . . the state courts stand willing to address questions of state law on certification from a federal court.'" Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 117 S. Ct. 1055, 1074 (1997) (quoting Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 510, 105 S. Ct. 2794, 2805, 86 L. Ed. 2d 394 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring)). Thus, in the interests of comity, certification is entirely appropriate in this case.

Moreover, an interpretation of the statute by Indiana's highest court will be outcome determinative.

Such an important determination is better left to the state's highest court. See Stephan v. Rocky Mountain Chocolate Factory, Inc., 129 F.3d 414, 418 (7th Cir. 1997) ("Although neither party here has requested certification, we are free to certify questions on our own motion."). Consequently, due to the breadth of impact of the issue at bar and the important concerns of federalism apparent when a federal court is asked to interpret a state statute, we respectfully certify  the following question to the Supreme Court of Indiana....

 

[American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 327 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd without opinion, 475 U.S. 1001, 106 S.Ct. 1172, 89 L.Ed.2d 291 (1986)  note to self: hudnut did go to scotus after all, just no opinion.]

We therefore certify to the Indiana Supreme Court, pursuant to 7th Cir. R. 52 and Ind. Code § 33-2-4-1, the following question, upon the answer to which the further proceedings in this appeal will depend:

Majors v. Abell, 317 F.3d 719 (7th Cir. 2003)

https://casetext.com/case/majors-v-abell-2

The U.S. Supreme Court, in its first pronouncements as to certification in Lehman Bros. v. Schein (1974), advised that, while "[w]e do not suggest that where there is doubt as to local law and where the certification procedure is available, resort to it is obligatory," certification "does, of course, in the long run save time, energy, and resources and helps build a cooperative judicial federalism." https://www.reuters.com/legal/legalindustry/certification-questions-law-state-supreme-courts-2021-06-22/.

The state's challenge to jurisdiction is because it has gotten confused about the difference between federal claims and state claims.

"However, the mere presence of a federal issue in

a state cause of action does not automatically confer federal question jurisdiction." Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 813 (1986).

Here, there is a federal claim, under a federal statute. The court absolutely does have jurisdiction over this federal claim. That juridiction extends to the declaratory and injunctive relief sought. Because there is federal jurisdiction over the federal claim, the court also has supplemental and ancillary jurisdiction over the separate state claims. A party is not required to file its federal claims in federal court and state claims in state court; rule 1 urges cases to be simple when possible.  Indeed, if plaintiffs had filed in state court as well, defendants would be arguing for abstention.

"Of the claims brought by Plaintiffs, only one claim invokes an alleged violation of federal law—the Voting Rights Act claim.... As discussed below, Plaintiffs’ federal Voting Rights Act claim fails, and thus, so does this Court’s jurisdiction to hear Plaintiffs’ case under federal question jurisdiction."

This argument wrongfully conflated the merits with jurisdiction.

Plaintiffs may win or lose on the merits. Either way, the court has jurisdiction under the voting rights act to reach and decide this question. 

It would not serve the state well for its argument to prevail. If it were correct, plaintiffs could win on the merits, but could never lose on the merits. Under the state's theory, if plaintiffs stated a case that would lose on the merits, the court is deprived of jurisdiction, in which case it cannot reach any decision on the merits, but would simply have to dismiss for want of juridiction, so the question would remain unanswered.

===

2:30 wednesday june 21, 2023. to 2:55.

The lake county board of elections, filing 90, makes a similar argument in its brief in support of summary judgment.

1. legal argument

A. Legal standard:

I mostly agree with their setting out of the non-controversial standard for summary judgment. Liberty Lobby, Pepitone, Celotex, the usual stuff. Similarly, Lujan is on point for standing.

B: Plaintiffs lack standing:

This section is wrong. The board is, or pretends to be, confused about the difference between official capacity and individual capacity claims.

The board conducts retention elections and does not hold general elections for Lake County judge. This is the case and controversy that gives rise to Article III standing and justiciability. This is the live dispute between the parties. Holding judicial elections, similar to those of the other 89 counties, is what the plaintiffs are asking the court to order the board to do. The redressibility prong for standing is met.

The board is following the statute, which is proper, until superseded by a court order based either on the federal statute, federal constitution, or state constitution. It would be highly improper for the board to refuse to follow a final order of the court.

There is no allegation in this action that the board has done "anything wrong." If there were, there would be individual capacity claims against the members of the board, and we would be arguing issues such as qualified immunity. Instead, plaintiffs are properly seeking prospective injunctive and declaratory relief, under federal and state law, to which they are entitled as a matter of law. The board defendants' motion for summary judgment on jurisdictional grounds should be denied.

" The Election Board does not have the power to

confer or deny the Plaintiffs, or others similarly situated, the right to vote for Judges in Lake

County. Nor does the Election Board have the power to authorize the remedies sought by the

Plaintiffs described in their Second Amended Complaint."

We agree. The court, however, does have the power to confer this right and authorize the remedies. That's why plaintiffs are in court; there is a legal dispute between the parties which the court can, should, and must resolve. Such disputes are known as cases and controversies, and satisfy Article III standing under Lujan.

The Board's response is limited to this failed attack on the court's jurisdiction, and does not address the merits. The Board's motion should be denied.

===

2:55:

Document 93 is an amended brief similar to document 90. I am not yet clear what the difference is, but will give it a quick skim. I am still unclear on what changed, so I'll stick with my analysis above. Now back to the state's brief.

===

II - Voting right act claim:

 “Despite the ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment, the right of African-Americans to vote was heavily suppressed for nearly a century.”  State political processes would include “poll taxes, literacy tests, property qualifications, ‘white primar[ies],’ and ‘grandfather clause[s].’” "Brnovich, 141 S. Ct. at 2330.

We agree. The modern version of the poll tax is Voter ID. See Frank v LULAC, in which the Wisconsin Supreme Court found that a voter ID programs like Indiana's was an unconstitutional poll tax, and J. Souter's dissent in Crawford. In an earlier case about the problematic Lake County judicial elections, plaintiffs analogized the Indiana bar exam as being like a literacy test. 

In Price v. Indiana, the leading case on the right to free speech under section 9, the Indiana Supreme Court described Indiana's history as a tension between aristocratic factions of landed gentry, and populism. [cite.] Having judges chosen by a judicial selection commission including lawyers and politicians instead of by an election of the people reflects that this tension is still very much alive. 

Indiana parties have only very recently gotten rid of the slating conventions, which functioned similarly to Texas's jaybird primaries, a way for the elites to make sure that they got to choose the candidates, so the election was in form only, not substance. 

Here, though, they no longer even go through the motions of holding an election. The elites, headed by the governor, directly choose the judges. That these judges are eventually subject to retention elections, which, as incumbents, they almost always win, does nothing to change the fact that these judges are chosen by the elite for the elite, instead of by the people for the people. Even if every judge lost every retention election, the elites would merely appoint a new set of elites; a popular choice of the people would still have no way to get nominated or chosen.

The voting rights act requires at least the semblance of a free and open election.

One thing has changed since 1965. The political system is no longer characterized by open hostility toward African-Americans. Here, the African-Americans of Lake, [ ] and Marion Counties are not being disenfranchised because they are Blacks. They are being disenfranchised because of a reasonable fear that if allowed to vote, they would choose Democrats. 

It is not clear whether Indiana's free and equal elections clause protects against discrimination against Democrats. What is clear is that both section 2 of the Voting Right s Act and Article II of the Indiana Constitution do protect against the racial result here; that most White voters get to elect their judges, while most Black voters do not.  This court has jurisdiction and authority to remedy this disparity by ordering the Board and the state to hold free and equal elections in Lake County, similar to those held in the 98 White super-majority counties.

=3:30, stopping here for now, 1.0 hours.

 38 +

16 x 270 = ~4k.

2

44k. +oil, house, trust. 730 + 44 = 774. 

https://accounts.chase.com/investing/share/234339075

this is my link that i get $50 for if someone opens a chase brokerage account. i have found my chase account very easy to use, compared to my other account at schwab. on the other hand, chase doesn't give me margin, which schwab does.  

there are perks for the person who signs up, but i'm not sure what they are. 

i have to go track down my link for the $100 bonus of opening a chase checking account, or maybe it's the credit card. i have that also easy to use, and get 1 1/2% back. a person could use the first bonus to help fund the brokerage account, which takes $200. currently getting 5% on gas this quarter. 

plan for thursday:

work on memos:

hammond, counties, memo to nick re sign case. 

plasma 1/2

scrap run

saturday did: nothing. might go pay electric bill.

to do turn on capital one card by sending id photos. did not work. 

make better list. 

memo. 

install mousetraps. fruit fly traps. find flytrap. work on back yard. 

monday: plasma, scrap yard, memo.

letter re penalties re mom's taxes. 

x pac@opac.in.gov letter sent.

this is a draft only. to do, send to kook. 

To Bumpers.

I wrote to you 11 months ago asking you to prepare my mom's taxes after she died, Marion Stewart.

I emailed the address on your website. I never got an answer. Those have recently been filed, but with thousands of dollars in penalties and interest.

What I am writing about today is to ask you to file a request that the penalties be waived.

My mother died in may of 2022. I was her caretaker in 2020, and brought you her various records, and her taxes were timely filed that year. During 2021 her health declined further, and she had difficulty remembering things and organizing her finances, and it appears she did not get her taxes in that year. She was living in Hawaii under my sister's care when she died, and was not mentally alert in the final months. Under these sorts of situations, it is not unusual for the IRS to waive penalties. 

Since you are a tax professional, it makes more sense for you to submit the request than for me; I am aware the process exists, but have not done one.

I do not know whether the IRS will waive the penalties, but we should at least ask. 

The kansas penalty is only a few dollars so we can skip that.

I'm fine with however it turns out, and thank you for your help in getting the taxes filed. Having it done is more important than squeezing out the last dime. Nonetheless it is a large enough amount I would like the waiver request filed.

Another minor point: My mother was legally blind during her final years. I know approximately nothing about taxes, but I was under the impression that there was an extra personal exemption for the blind, that I did not see reflected in her tax filings for the past 3 years. I could easily be wrong, but please review this point.  

Sincerely, Robbin Stewart.

cc: Jeanie Stewart

robbin stewart <gtbear@gmail.com>	Sat, Jul 2, 2022, 3:42 PM
to cpa, me, jeanie

To: Doug Kook

Hi. My mother has passed away, as of May 15 2022. We did not get around to doing her 2021 taxes.

We would like your firm to handle this, as you usually have, and also prepare a death return. My sister, Jeanie Stewart, is the executor. Her son Zach, at the 28 Marsh Woods Lane address, probably has any documents you need. 

She might or might not have already let you know all this.

Cordially, Robbin Stewart.

friday did:

i didn't get much done today. i put $500 in the bank. i shoo'd a crackhead robber out of my house. i did a load of laundry. that was about it.  i bought trash bags and mousetraps and bleached the trash containers and trimmed some shrubs. going to go pay electric bill.

to get rid of mice: onions, garlic, lavender, mint, cintronella, chysanthemum, catnip. 

x trash

sort stairs.

omar.

clean car. the usual.

did: regular dumpster, a couple others. found cooler.

po box. $638. bank was closed. bought a good lawnmower $100. forgot to ask how it starts. needs gas. 

got banned at crackers. had drink at metro. $6. Haircut $14. 

friday:

scrap run. pay electric bill.  x buy lawnmower.

plan for wednesday:

x 4 pm rathskeller

x 5:30 pm indybar marion county bar association meeting, then drinks. was hour late. skipped drinks. 

x 7:30 church, or standup. 

x take out trash.

email for thursday slot. 

did:

emailed margaret and tommy. 

lawyer zoom.

1.0 hours on memo, sent draft of memo to nick. washed floor in hall.  

Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (decided June 21, 1915): invalidating grandfather clauses exempting white people from written exam which everyone else (i.e., black people) had to pass in order to be allowed to vote (one imagines the written exams disappeared pretty quickly after this decision)

plan for monday:

sort stairs

unload van

write memo re summary judgment.

 plan for friday: x po box. x talbot street art fair? it's not till tomorrow. call tommy about his mother.  

x walmart or target for electric kettle.

billed another hour on judge case 2-3 pm friday. stopped to make po box run. shoulkd unload van. did not do a scrap run.

capital one card activate email

 lie list notes

https://casetext.com/case/bradley-v-work

Future litigation may prove that the "totality of the circumstances" under the revised system shows a violation of the mandates of the Voting Rights Act. At that point, the parties could propose alternate means to rectify the violation from the menu of remedies typical of Voting Rights Act cases, properly tailored to this situation. Cf. Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v. Texas Attorney Gen., 501 U.S. 419, 423, 426 (1991); Barnett v. City of Chicago, 141 F.3d 699, 705-06 (7th Cir. 1998); Haster v. Illinois State Bd. of Election Comm'rs, 28 F.3d 1430, 1435-36 (7th Cir. 1993). The record in this case does not show any violation of the Act, however, so we need not consider the appropriateness of specific remedies.

lie list re: MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS’

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

general framework:

1. does the court have jurisdiction?

2. VRA  claim

3. art IV 23 claim

4. art I 23 claim.

conclusions.

1. the court has juridiction. there is a case or controversy, on a federal claim.

2. vra applies. gingles test does not. 

3. strong.

4. weak.

conclusion: P wins.

lie list. 1:23 am 6/16 friday, been at it for an hour. 

p.1.

1.   However, Plaintiffs’ claims fail as a matter of law. 

2. The statutory scheme does

not violate the Voting Rights act. 

3. Further, Plaintiffs’ remaining claims are first and

foremost a question of Indiana constitutional law, and it would be inappropriate for

this Court to decide these issues in federal court. 

4. Second, if this Court does decide to

hear these issues, the method of nomination and retention elections has been heard

by other courts before and has been held valid under law. 

5. Finally, Plaintiffs are

incorrect as to their claims under the Indiana Constitution because the statutory

scheme is constitutional special legislation [not sure.]

 6. and no special privilege or burden has

been created by the nomination and retention method.

7. Because Plaintiffs present no genuine dispute as to any material fact and State

Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law, this Court must grant

summary judgment in favor of the State Defendants.

p.2. 

summary judgment standard: agree, mostly agree.

problematic:

Nor may the nonmovant defeat summary judgment by challenging the credibility of a supporting affidavit. Walter v. Fiorenzo, 840 F.2d 427, 434 (7th Cir. 1988).

Does that mean a party can just perjure their way out of a lawsuit? seems unreasonable, nonmoving party should be able to attack a false affidavit. haven't read the case to see what it actually says.

p.3.

"A case arises under federal law when an essential element of the plaintiff’s cause of action depends for its resolution upon validity, construction, or effect of federal law. 28 U.S.C. 1331." true. now we get into the lie area.

8. "However, the mere presence of a federal issue in a state cause of action does not automatically confer federal question jurisdiction."

red herring not applicable here. this is a federal cause of action, not a state one.

9. "As discussed below, Plaintiffs’ federal Voting Rights Act claim fails, and thus, so does this Court’s jurisdiction to hear Plaintiffs’ case under federal question jurisdiction."

This confuses jurisdiction with the merits. If the court lacks jurisdiction, it cannot announce any decision on the merits. That would not give the state the answer they want; if that were the rule, they could only lose cases but never win them. Logically it would be possible for the state to prevail in a case in which the court did have jurisdiction. This argument is meritless.

9., repeated: Therefore, it would be inappropriate for this Court to claim jurisdiction under the federal question doctrine of 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

8., repeated: “[F]ederal jurisdiction over a state law claim will lie if a federal issue is:....

True: The

alleged violations of law claimed by Plaintiffs concern questions of Indiana constitutional law and should be decided by an Indiana court,

[ not a federal court.] - trueish.

The proper procedure here is certifcation. Majors v Abell 2003, BAPAC v Baldwin. 

p.4. 

10. Nevertheless, to the extent the Court decides to proceed, summary judgment in favor of State Defendants is still proper because neither the Voting Rights Act nor the Indiana Constitution has been violated.

agree: State political processes would include “poll taxes, literacy tests, property qualifications, ‘white primar[ies],’ and ‘grandfather clause[s].’” Id. (citations omitted).

These days we refer to Voter ID, bar exams, residence requirements, slating conventions, and gerrymandering.

agree: Section 2  prohibits voting prerequisites, practices, and procedures that discriminate on the basis of race or color.

The use of the missouri plan for the 4 mixed race counties, but free and equal elections for the white counties, is such a procedure.

agree: A Section 2 violation occurs if a plaintiff shows by the totality of circumstances that a state or political subdivision’s political process leading to nomination or election are not equally open to a protected class, where members have “less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.”

11. Section 2 does not apply to instances where officials are appointed, not elected.

while generally true, here it is false, because of the disparate treatment of counties. 

Bradley v Woke: mckinny, upheld by 7th.

Bradley was largely the result of inept litigation, more than it was a decision on the merits. Plaintiffs in Bradly actually prevailed, in that the legislature responded to the suit by amending the process. the original claims became moot due to changed circumstances, and the new circumstances were too new to generate a body of evidence. 

i have a quote somewhere above from bradly.

 lie list notes

https://casetext.com/case/bradley-v-work

Future litigation may prove that the "totality of the circumstances" under the revised system shows a violation of the mandates of the Voting Rights Act. At that point, the parties could propose alternate means to rectify the violation from the menu of remedies typical of Voting Rights Act cases, properly tailored to this situation. Cf. Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v. Texas Attorney Gen., 501 U.S. 419, 423, 426 (1991); Barnett v. City of Chicago, 141 F.3d 699, 705-06 (7th Cir. 1998); Haster v. Illinois State Bd. of Election Comm'rs, 28 F.3d 1430, 1435-36 (7th Cir. 1993). The record in this case does not show any violation of the Act, however, so we need not consider the appropriateness of specific remedies.

2 am. might stop here for now and pick it up in the morning.

2 pm next day, friday june 16th.

p.6. 

11. "Bradley litigated and settled the issues presented in this case."

That is false. Bradley contained no state constitutional issues. Bradley did not argue for free and open elections (now i'm not sure what bradley argued.) Bradley barely got its case to the 7th circuit at all, waived some of the claims it had made below, had much of its evidence disallowed, .. am i confusing it with the mckinney case? Anyway, this case presents very different arguments and evidence than the Bradley case, which is not controlling here.

12. Therefore, the issues present in the instant case are no different from those in Bradley, as Plaintiffs in both cases make nearly identical claims concerning the Voting Rights Act implications of Lake County’s judicial selection statute.

false. bradley was about the makeup of the judicial commission, not about whether mixed race counties may be denied the same  free and open elections that the all-white counties get. 

Quinn may be on point and I haven't read it yet. section 2 claim about chicago school board members appointed while elected in the white parts of the state. i'm not sure i trust how the meo characterizes the case. so read it later. 

13. The same holds true here—there is no disparate impact nor vote dilution created by the appointment statutes because, although minority groups do not vote for the position, neither does anyone else and thus, the system does not violate §2 because no group of Lake County voters elects trial judges before they are eligible for retention.

False. in 98 white counties, voters get to vote for their judges. that's the whole point of this case, that black voters should be allowed to vote for judges the same way the white voters do.

switzerland county for example is 96 % white, 1% black, and has free and open elections for judge.

"Further, as stated by the Seventh Circuit in Bradley, §2 of the Voting Rights Act does not apply to appointments of officials. Therefore,...." repeats error #13. 

 "Therefore, as the 7th Circuit upheld thechallenged statute and the Plaintiffs’ claims do not follow established precedent, there is no genuine dispute of material fact present here and this Court should enter summary judgment in favor of the State Defendants.

repeats error 12, then jumps to a false conclusion.

p. 8., the state constitutional claims.

true:  Here, the challenged law is undoubtedly special legislation, as it only affects Lake County.

note: generally, statutes are presumed constitutional. this presumption disappears, however, in the election context. there is an inherent conflict of interest. when the republicans are in power, they will tend to rewrite the election laws to favor republicans; when the democrats are in power, they will tend to rewrite the laws to favor democrats. therefore, courts have a duty to provide close exacting scrutiny. i do not know if there is case law that says this in relation to Article IV. I don't even have a good quote file of cases that say it generally, although i've read that sort of passage before.

“A special law is permissible ‘when an affected class’s unique characteristics justify the differential treatment the law provides to that class.’”

Here, the unique characteristic is that too many of Lake county's voters are black, and thus at risk of electing democratic judges.

That's why the legislature has chosen a different system for Lake, @, Allen and Marion Counties, where the minority voters, than in the other 89 counties which have white supermajorities.

suggested structure for this memo.

part 1. list 20 lies. part II list 20 truths. part III explain the lies.

part IV: conclusion. once the lies are redacted, the truths left are not sufficient to support summary judgment.  

(“Bonnet Aff.”) - there's an evidentiary record in this case that i have not seen. that's probably gerry bonnet, assistant secretary of state. 

possible true: it was noted that a majority were unsatisfied with the judges elected via partisan elections, citing unequal caseloads among Lake County Judges, inconsistent application of Indiana’s trial rules, and an excessive number of cases being sent by Lake County judges to venues in outside counties.

To the extent that these represent real concerns, they could be remedied with narrowly tailored means which are not racist.

14. Due to the results of the survey and interviews, Lake County presents a unique scenario that is not amenable to the general unform operation of judicial elections;

15 therefore, the hybrid system in Lake County is a constitutionally allowed special law.

14. 

11. 

2.   

3.   

4.   

5.   

6.   

7.   

8.   

9.   

10.   

 to do tonight:

unload van.

sort stairs.

begin lie list.

draft hendricks county complaint. 

Both sides seeking summary judgment under Voting Rights Act, Indiana Constitution in suit challenging appointment of Lake Co. judges

https://www.theindianalawyer.com/articles/both-sides-seeking-summary-judgment-under-voting-rights-act-indiana-constitution-in-suit-challenging-appointment-of-lake-co-judges

 (paywall)

Competing motions for summary judgment are seeking to resolve the litigation against Lake County’s merit-based judicial selection process, with each side urging the Indiana Northern District Court to rule in their favor on claims under the federal Voting Rights Act and the Indiana Constitution.

The motions were filed this week by both the plaintiffs and defendants in City of Hammond, et al. v. Lake County Board of Elections, et al., 2:21-cv00160. The case — initially filed in May 2021 and later amended — alleges the process of appointing superior court judges in Lake County, rather than electing them, is racially discriminatory.

Plaintiffs include the city of Hammond, Hammond Mayor Thomas McDermott and voter Eduardo Fontanez. Indiana State Sen. Lonnie Randolph, a Democrat from East Chicago, has also joined the complaint in his personal capacity.

https://www.nwitimes.com/amended-complaint-in-hammond-v-lake-county-judicial-nominating-commission/pdf_a94aca56-ed1a-5a5c-8019-cb19dc752193.html

notes on defendants motion for summary judgment:

1. state constitutional issues should be in state court:

this issue presents important concerns of federalism and comity.

we agree. the appropriate remedy is to ceritify the statte constitutional questions to the indiana supreme court.

baypac v baldwin, majors v abell. especially the article IV section 23 claim. 

wrong about the federal claim being a state claim. it's a federal claim.

State political processes would include “poll

taxes, literacy tests, property qualifications, ‘white primar[ies],’ and ‘grandfather

clause[s].’” Id. (citations omitted).

Today these are known as voter ID, bar exams, residence requirements, slating conventions, and gerrymandering. 

[could cite souter, stephens, ginsburg,posner, wisconsin supreme court, on voter ID being a poll tax.]

“Despite the ratification of

the Fifteenth Amendment, the right of African-Americans to vote was heavily

suppressed for nearly a century.” we agree. the current method choosing judges in indiana continues this voter suppression. it is not new. the form varies, but the substance remains.